



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

### Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

### About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>

1,280,946





[









C. A. W. H. A. C. B. R. S. S.

*Second Edition*

*Lond. n. Henry Colburn 1841*



**The only authorized Edition.**

---

**HISTORY**  
**OF THE**  
**CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE**  
**OF**  
**FRANCE UNDER NAPOLEON.**

**FORMING A SEQUEL TO**  
**“THE HISTORY OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION.”**

**BY**  
**M. A. <sup>Adolphe</sup> THIERS,**  
**LATE PRIME MINISTER OF FRANCE,**  
**MEMBER OF THE FRENCH ACADEMY, AND OF THE INSTITUTE,**  
**&c. &c. &c.**

**TRANSLATED BY**  
**D. FORBES CAMPBELL, Esq.**  
**WITH THE SANCTION AND APPROVAL OF THE AUTHOR.**

  
**VOL. III.**

**LONDON:**  
**HENRY COLBURN, GREAT MARLBOROUGH-STREET,**

**SOLD ALSO BY**  
**CHAPMAN AND HALL, STRAND.**

**1845.**

DC  
201  
.T443

40

Vol 13 Chap 12  
1-22-42

# CONTENTS

OF

## THE THIRD VOLUME.

---

### BOOK X.

#### EVACUATION OF EGYPT.

PAGE.

The Attention of Europe fixed upon the Negotiation opened at London—Speculations of the probable Influence of the Death of Paul I. on this Negotiation—State of the Russian Court—Character of Alexander—His young Friends form a Secret Government with him, which directs all the Affairs of the Empire—Alexander consents to lower considerably the Pretensions set up by M. de Kaïtscheff at Paris, in the name of Paul I.—He gives Duroc a gracious Reception—Reiterated Protestations of his Wishes to remain on good Terms with France—Commencement of the Negotiation set on foot at London—Preliminary conditions proposed on both Sides—Acquisitions of the two Countries by Sea and Land—England consents to the Restitution of a Part of her Maritime Conquests, but makes the Question of the Evacuation of Egypt a *sine quâ non*—The two Governments tacitly agree to temporise, in order to watch the Issue of the Military Operations going on—The First Consul being apprised that the Negotiation depends upon these Events, urges Spain to march against Portugal, and makes renewed Efforts to succour Egypt—Operations of the Naval Forces—Divers Expeditions projected—Voyage of Ganteaume after leaving Brest—This Admiral succeeds in passing the Straits of Gibraltar—Being on the Point of proceeding onwards to Alexandria, he takes alarm at imaginary Dangers, and puts back into Toulon—State of Egypt subsequently to the Death of Kléber—Submission of the Country, and prosperous Condition of the Colony with respect to its Resources—Incapacity and Insubordination amongst the Officers in Command—Deplorable Differences amongst the Generals—Ill-judged Measures of Menou, who wishes to do every thing at once—Notwithstanding the repeated Warnings he receives of the Approach of an English Expedition, he takes no Precautions—Landing of the English in the Roads of Aboukir, on the 8th of March—General Friant, whose Forces are reduced to 1500 men, makes unavailing Attempts to repel them—A Reinforcement of two Battalions of the Division at Alexandria would have saved Egypt—Tardy Concentration of the Forces ordered by Menou—Arrival of Lanusse's Division, and second Battle fought with an insufficient number of Troops on the 13th of March

—Menou at length arrives with the Main Body of the Army—Sad Consequences of the Dissensions amongst the Generals—Plan of a decisive Battle—Battle of Canopus, fought on the 21st of March, and remains undecided—The English are left Masters of the Plain of Alexandria—Long Procrastination, during which Menou might have retrieved the Fortunes of the French, by manœuvring against the Bodies detached from the Enemy—He does nothing—The English make an Attempt against Rosetta, and succeed in taking possession of one Mouth of the Nile—They advance into the Interior—The last Opportunity for saving Egypt at Ramanieh, lost by the Incapacity of General Menou—The English seize upon Ramanieh, and cut off the Division of Cairo, from that of Alexandria—The French Army thus divided, has no other Alternative but to capitulate—Surrender of Cairo by General Belliard—Menou shut up in Alexandria, dreams of the Glory of a Defence similar to that of Genoa—Egypt finally lost to France... 3

## BOOK XI.

### GENERAL PEACE.

Last unsuccessful Attempt of Ganteaume to put to Sea—He touches at Derne, but dares not land 2000 Men whom he had on board, and puts back to Toulon—Capture of the Swiftsure on the Passage—Admiral Linois, sent from Toulon to Cadiz, is obliged to cast anchor in the Bay of Algéziras—Brilliant Engagement off Algéziras—A combined French and Spanish Squadron sails from Cadiz to assist Linois' Division—Return of the combined Fleet to Cadiz—Action between the Rear-Division and Admiral Saumarez—Dreadful Mistake of two Spanish Ships, which, in the Night, taking each other for Enemies, fight with Desperation, and are both blown up—Exploit of Captain Troude—Short Campaign of the Prince of the Peace against Portugal—The Court of Lisbon hastens to send a Negotiator to Badajoz, and to submit to the joint Requisitions of France and Spain—Course of European Affairs since the Treaty of Lunéville—Increasing Influence of France—Visit to Paris of the Infants of Spain, destined for the Throne of Etruria—Renewal of the Negotiation in London, between M. Otto and Lord Hawkesbury—The English present the Question in a new Shape—They demand Ceylon in the East Indies, Martinique or Trinidad in the West Indies, Malta in the Mediterranean—The First Consul answers these Pretensions by threatening to seize upon Portugal, and, in case of need, to invade England—Warm Altercation between the *Moniteur* and the English Newspapers—The British Cabinet gives up Malta—Renews all its Pretensions, and demands the Spanish Island of Trinidad—The First Consul, to save the Possessions of an allied Court, offers the French Island of Tobago—It is rejected by the British Cabinet—Silly Conduct of the Prince of the Peace, which furnishes an unexpected Solution to the Difficulty. This Prince treats with the Court of Lisbon, without concerting with France, and thus deprives the French Legation of the Argument drawn from the Dangers of Portugal—Irritation of the First Consul, and Threats of War against Spain—M. de Talleyrand proposes to the First Consul to finish the Negotiation at the Expense of the Spaniards, by giving up the Island of Trinidad to the English—M. Otto is authorised to make this Concession, but only in the last Extremity—During the Negotiation, Nelson makes the greatest Efforts to destroy our Flotilla at Boulogne—Splendid Actions off Boulogne, fought by Admiral Latouche-Treville with Nelson—Defeat of the English—Joy in France, Alarm in England, in consequence of these two Engagements—Reciprocal Tendency to a Reconciliation—The last Difficulties are overcome, and Peace is concluded, in the Form of Preliminaries by the Sacrifice of the Island of Trinidad—Unbounded Joy in England and

France—Colonel Lauriston, sent to London with the Ratification of the First Consul, is drawn about in Triumph for several Hours—Meeting of a Congress in the City of Amiens to conclude a definitive Peace—Series of Treaties successively signed—Peace with Portugal, the Ottoman Porte, Bavaria, Russia, &c.—Fête in Celebration of the Peace signed for the 18th Brumaire—Lord Cornwallis, Plenipotentiary to the Congress of Amiens, is present at that Fête—His Reception by the People of Paris—Banquet in the City of London—Extraordinary Demonstrations of Sympathy reciprocated at this Moment by the two Nations .....

69

## BOOK XII.

### THE CONCORDAT.

The Catholic Church during the French Revolution—Civil Constitution of the Clergy decreed by the Constituent Assembly—Assimilation of the Administration of Religion to that of the Realm—One Diocese established for each Department—Election of Bishops by their Flocks, and dispensing with the Canonical Law—An Oath of Fidelity to this Constitution required from the Clergy—Refusal of the Oath, and Schism—Different Classes of Priests, their Character and Influence—Inconvenience of this State of Things—The Means which it furnished to the Enemies of the Revolution to trouble the Repose of Families—Different Systems proposed to remedy the Evil System of Inaction—System of a French Church of which the First Consul was to be the Head—System of strong Encouragement to Protestantism—Opinions of the First Consul on the various Systems proposed—He forms the Plan of re-establishing the Catholic Religion, rendering its Discipline in Harmony with the new Institutions of France. He wishes for the Deposition of the ancient titular Bishops, a Limitation comprising sixty Sees in place of 158, the Founding a new Clergy composed of respectable Priests of all classes, the State to have the Management of the Forms of Worship, salaries for the Priests in lieu of Endowments in Lands, and for the Sanction by the Church of the Sale of National Property—Friendly Relations between Pope Pius VII. and the First Consul—Monsignor Spina charged with the Negotiations at Paris, retards the Negotiation for the temporal Interest of the Holy See—Secret Desire to have the Legations back—Monsignor Spina feels the Necessity of Despatch—He confers with Abbé Bernier, charged to treat on the part of France—Difficulties of the Plan proposed to the Court of Rome—The First Consul sends his Project to Rome, and demands an Explanation from the Pope—Three Cardinals consulted—The Pope, after this Consultation, wishes the Catholic Religion to be declared the Religion of the State, that he should not be required to depose the ancient titular Bishops, nor sanction, otherwise than by his Silence, the Sale of the Property of the Church, &c.—Debates with M. de Cacault, Minister from France to Rome—The First Consul, fatigued by these Delays, commands M. de Cacault to quit Rome in Five days, unless the Concordat be adopted within that Time—Terrors of the Pope and Cardinal Gonsalvi—M. de Cacault suggests to the Pontifical Cabinet the Idea of sending Cardinal Gonsalvi to Paris—His Departure for France, and his Fears—His Arrival at Paris—His gracious Reception by the First Consul—Conferences with Abbé Bernier—Understanding on the Principle of a State Religion—The Catholic Religion declared to be the Religion of the Majority of Frenchmen—All the other Conditions of the First Consul relative to the Deposition of the ancient Titulars, the new Circumscriptions of the Sees, the Sale of the Property of the Church, are accepted, saving some Change of Terms in the Compilation—Definitive Agreement on all Points—Efforts made at the last Moment by the Adversaries of the Re-establishment of Worship to hinder the First Consul from signing the Concordat—



He persists—Signature given July 15, 1801—Return of Cardinal Gonsalvi to Rome—Satisfaction of the Pope—Solemnity of the Ratifications—Choice of Cardinal Caprara as Legate à *latere*—The First Consul would have wished to celebrate on the 18th Brumaire Peace with the Church, at the same Time as Peace with all the European Powers—Necessity of applying to the ancient Titulars, to obtain their Resignations, causes Delay—A Demand for their Resignation addressed by the Pope to all the old Bishops, constitutional or not—Wise Submission of the constitutional Bishops—Noble Resignation of the Members of the old Clergy—Admirable Replies—The only Resistance is from the Emigrant Bishops in London—Every thing is ready for the Re-establishment of Religion in France, but a sharp Opposition in the Tribune causes new Delay—Necessity of overcoming this Opposition before going further ..... 117

## BOOK XIII.

### THE TRIBUNATE.

Internal Administration—Suppression of Highway Robbery and Repair of the Roads—Revival of Commerce—Exports and Imports of the Year 1801—Material Results of the French Revolution, in Respect to Agriculture, Manufactures, and Population—Influence of the Prefects and Sub-prefects on the Administration—Order and Celerity in the Despatch of Business—Councillors of State on Circuit—Discussion of the Civil Code in the Council of State—Brilliant Winter of 1801-1802—Extraordinary Resort of Foreigners to Paris—Court of the First Consul—Organisation of his Civil and Military Establishment—The Consular Guard—Prefects of the Palace and Ladies of Honour—Sisters of the First Consul—Hortense de Beauharnais marries Louis Bonaparte—Messrs. Fox and De Calonne in Paris—Prosperity and Luxury of all Classes—Approach of the Session of the Year X.—Warm Opposition raised against some of the best Plans of the First Consul—Causes of this Opposition, shown not only by Members of the Deliberative Assemblies, but by some Distinguished Officers of the Army—Conduct of General Lannes, Augereau, and Moreau—Opening of the Session—Dupuis, Author of the Work on the Origin of all Religions, is elected President of the Legislative Body—Ballot for the Places vacant in the Senate—Nomination of the Abbé Grégoire, contrary to the Propositions of the First Consul—Violent Explosion in the Tribune, on account of the word *Subject* introduced into the Treaty with Russia—Opposition to the Civil Code—Discussion in the Council of State respecting the Course to be adopted under these Circumstances—It is resolved to await the Discussion of the First Sections of the Civil Code—The Tribune rejects those First Sections—Result of the Ballot for the Places vacant in the Senate—The First Consul proposes old Generals not selected from among his Creatures—The Tribune and the Legislative Body reject them, and agree to propose M. Daunou, known for his Opposition to the Government—Warm Speech made by the First Consul to a Meeting of Senators—Threats of an Arbitrary Measure—The Opponents, being intimidated, submit, and contrive a Subterfuge to annul the Effect of the First Ballots—Cambacérès dissuades the First Consul from any illegal Measure, and advises him to get rid of the Opposition Members by means of Article XXXVIII. of the Constitution, which prescribes that the First Fifth of the Legislative Body and the Tribune shall go out in the Year X.—The First Consul adopts this Idea—Suspension of all the Legislative Labours—Advantage is taken of it to assemble at Lyons an Italian Diet, by the Title of Consulta—Before leaving Paris, the First

Consul despatches a Fleet with Troops for St. Domingo—Plan for the reconquest of that Colony—Negotiations of Amiens—Object of the Consulta convoked at Lyons—Various Constitutions proposed for Italy—Plans of the First Consul relative to this Subject—Creation of the Italian Republic—General Bonaparte proclaimed President of that Republic—Enthusiasm of the Italians and French assembled at Lyons—Grand Review of the Army of Egypt—Return of the First Consul to Paris .....	171
--	-----

## BOOK XIV.

### CONSULATE FOR LIFE.

Arrival of the First Consul in Paris—Scrutiny of the Senate, which excludes sixty Members of the Legislative Body, and twenty Members of the Tribune—The excluded Members succeeded by Men devoted to the Government—End of the Congress of Amiens—Some Difficulties arise at the last Moment of the Negotiation, in consequence of Jealousies excited in England—The First Consul surmounts these Difficulties by his Moderation and his Firmness—The Definitive Peace signed 25th of March, 1802—Although the first Enthusiasm for Peace has subsided in France and in England, they welcome, with renewed Joy, the Hope of a sincere and durable Reconciliation—Extraordinary Session of the Year X., destined to convert into Law, the Concordat, the Treaty of Amiens, and different Projects of high Importance—The Law for regulating Religious Matters added to the Concordat, under the Title of *Organic Articles*—Presentation of this Law and of the Concordat to the new Legislative Body and the Tribune—Coldness with which these two Projects are received, even after the Exclusion of the Oppositionists—They are adopted—The First Consul fixes on Easter Sunday for the Publication of the Concordat, and for the first Ceremony of the Re-established Religion—Organisation of the New Clergy—Part assigned to the Constitutionals in the Nomination of Bishops—Cardinal Caprara refuses, in the Name of the Holy See, to institute the Constitutionals—Firmness of the First Consul, and Submission of Cardinal Caprara—Official Reception of the Cardinal as Legate *à latere*—Consecration of the four principal Bishops at Notre Dame on Palm Sunday—Curiosity and Emotion of the Public—The very Eve of Easter Day, and of the solemn *Te Deum* which was to be chanted at Notre Dame, Cardinal Caprara wishes to impose on the Constitutionals a humiliating Recantation of their past Conduct—New Resistance on the part of the First Consul—Cardinal Caprara does not yield until the Night before Easter Day—Repugnance of the Generals to repair to Notre Dame—The First Consul obliges them to it—Solemn *Te Deum* and Official Restoration of Religion—Adherence of the Public, and Joy of the First Consul on seeing the Success of his Efforts—Publication of the *Génie du Christianisme*—Project of a General Amnesty with regard to the Emigrants—This Measure, having been discussed in the Council or State, becomes the Object of a *Senatus Consultum*—Views of the First Consul on the Organisation of Society in France—His Opinions on Social Distinctions, and on the Education of Youth—Two Projects of Law of High Importance, on the Institution of the Legion of Honour, and on Public Instruction—Discussion of these two Projects in a full Council of State—Character of the Discussions of that Great Body—Language of the First Consul—Presentation of the two Projects to the Legislative Body and to the Tribune—Adoption, by a great Majority, of the Project of Law relative to Public Instruction—A large Minority pronounces against the Project relative to the Legion of Honour—The Treaty of Amiens presented last, as the Crowning Work of the

First Consul—Reception given to this Treaty—It affords occasion for saying that a National Recompense ought to be conferred on the Author of all the Benefits enjoyed by France—The Partisans and Brothers of Bonaparte contemplate the Re-establishment of Monarchy—The Idea appears premature—The Idea of Conferring the Consulate for Life prevails generally—The Consul Cambacérès offers his Intervention with the Senate—Dissimulation of the First Consul, who will not avow what he is desirous of—Embarrassment of Consul Cambacérès—His Efforts to induce the Senate to confer the Consulate on General Bonaparte for the Rest of his Life—The Secret Enemies of the General profit by his Silence to persuade the Senate that a Prolongation of the Consulate for Ten Years should suffice—Vote of the Senate on this Construction—Displeasure of the First Consul—He thinks of refusing—His Colleague Cambacérès hinders him from doing so, and proposes, as an Expedient, to appeal to the National Sovereignty, and to put the Question to France, to know if General Bonaparte shall be Consul for Life—The Council of State charged to draw up the Question—Opening of Registries to secure Votes in the Mayoralty Offices, the Tribunals, and the Offices of Notaries Public—Eagerness of all the Citizens to tender their Affirmative Votes—Change wrought in the Constitution of M. Sieyès—The First Consul receives the Consulate for Life, with the Power of appointing a Successor—The Senate is invested with the Constituent Power—The Lists of Notability abolished, and replaced by Electoral Colleges for Life—The Tribunate reduced to be only a Section of the Council of State—The New Constitution becomes completely Monarchical—Civil List of the First Consul—He is proclaimed solemnly by the Senate—General Satisfaction at having founded, at last, a strong and durable Power—The First Consul takes the Name of Napoleon Bonaparte—His Moral Power is at its Culminating Point—*Resumé* of this Period of Three Years..... 241

## BOOK X.

---

### EVACUATION OF EGYPT.

The Attention of Europe fixed upon the Negotiation opened at London—Speculations on the probable Influence of the death of Paul I. on this Negotiation—State of the Russian Court—Character of Alexander—His young Friends form a Secret Government with him, which directs all the Affairs of the Empire—Alexander consents to lower considerably the Pretensions set up by M. de Kalitscheff at Paris, in the name of Paul I.—He gives Duroc a gracious Reception—Reiterated Protestations of his Wishes to remain on good Terms with France—Commencement of the Negotiation set on foot at London—Preliminary Conditions proposed on both Sides—Acquisitions of the Two Countries by Sea and Land—England consents to the Restitution of a Part of her Maritime Conquests, but makes the Question of the Evacuation of Egypt, a *sine quâ non*—The two Governments tacitly agree to temporise, in order to watch the Issue of the Military Operations going on—The First Consul being apprised that the Negotiation depends upon these Events, urges Spain to march against Portugal, and makes renewed Efforts to succour Egypt—Operations of the Naval Forces—Divers Expeditions projected—Voyage of Gauthaume after leaving Brest—This Admiral succeeds in passing the Straits of Gibraltar—Being on the Point of proceeding onwards to Alexandria, he takes alarm at imaginary Dangers, and puts back into Toulon—State of Egypt subsequently to the Death of Kléber—Submission of the Country, and prosperous Condition of the Colony with respect to its Resources—Incapacity and Insubordination among the Officers in command—Deplorable Differences amongst the Generals—Ill-judged Measures of Menou, who wishes to do every thing at once.—Notwithstanding the repeated Warnings he receives of the Approach of an English Expedition, he takes no Precautions—Landing of the English in the Roads of Aboukir, on the 8th of March—General Friant, whose Forces are reduced to 1500 men, makes unavailing Attempts to repel them—A Reinforcement of Two Battalions to the Division at Alexandria would have saved Egypt—Tardy Concentration of the Forces ordered by Menou—Arrival of Lanusse's Division, and second Battle fought with an insufficient number of Troops on the 13th of March—Menou at length arrives with the Main Body of the Army—Sad Consequences of the Dissensions amongst the Generals—Plan of a decisive Battle—Battle of Canopus, fought on the 21st of March, and remains undecided—The English are left Masters of the Plain of Alexandria—Long Procrastination, during which Menou might have retrieved the fortunes of the French, by manœuvring against the Bodies detached from the Enemy—He does nothing—The English make an Attempt against Rosetta, and succeed in taking possession of one Mouth of the Nile—They advance into the Interior—The last Opportunity for saving Egypt at Ramanieh, lost by the Incapacity of General Menou—The English seize upon Ramanieh, and cut off the Division of Cairo, from that of Alexandria—The French Army thus divided, has no other Alternative but to capitulate—Surrender of Cairo by General Belliard—Menou shut up in Alexandria, dreams of the Glory of a Defence similar to that of Genoa—Egypt finally lost to France.





**HISTORY**  
**OF**  
**THE CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE**  
**OF**  
**FRANCE**  
**UNDER**  
**NAPOLÉON.**

---

**BOOK X.**

**EVACUATION OF EGYPT.**

THE aim which the First Consul had in view in assuming power, was now on the eve of attainment; for tranquillity reigned throughout France, and peace having been signed at Lunéville with Austria, Germany, and the Italian powers, virtually re-established with Russia, and in train of negotiation at London with England;—these events filled the minds of the people with profound satisfaction. Once formally signed with these two latter cabinets, peace would become general, and in twenty-two months young Bonaparte would have accomplished his noble task, and have rendered his country the most happy, and the most powerful of all the nations in the universe. But it was necessary to complete this mighty work; above all, it was essential to conclude peace with England; for, so long as that power had not laid down its arms, we were excluded from the seas, and, what was more serious still, the continental war might be revived under the corrupting influence of British subsidies. The general exhaustion left England, it is true, but a slender chance of being able to re-arm the continent against us. Even but recently she had witnessed the greater part of Europe combined with us against her maritime supremacy,

and, had not the death of Paul supervened, she might have expiated fatally her acts of violence against the neutral powers. But this sudden death was an unexpected and grave occurrence, which could not fail to produce a considerable change in the present aspect of affairs.

What influence, then, would the catastrophe at St. Petersburg exercise over the affairs of Europe? This was still a doubtful question, and the First Consul was impatient to solve it. He had sent Duroc to St. Petersburg, in order to obtain, as early as possible, the most correct information.

A short time before the death of Paul, our relations with Russia had still presented considerable difficulties, in consequence of the excessive pride of that emperor, and the no less excessive pride of his ambassador at Paris, M. de Kalitscheff. The deceased czar, as we have said elsewhere, wished to dictate, authoritatively, the conditions of peace to be entered into by France with Bavaria, Wurtemberg, Piedmont, and the Two Sicilies—states, of which he had made himself the protector, either by his own spontaneous will, or compulsorily, in pursuance of treaties, which had been contrived by the second coalition. He was desirous even of regulating our relations with the Porte, and insisted that the First Consul ought to evacuate Egypt, inasmuch as that province belonged to the sultan, and that there was no good grounds whatever, he said, for depriving him of it.

The emperor, inflamed as he was against England, was, nevertheless, a dangerous ally; misunderstandings might at any moment be revived, even with him. Moreover, that which only appeared as a symptom of insanity on the part of the emperor Paul, was a remarkable instance of the progress of Russian ambition, during three-quarters of a century. In fact, it was but eighty years before that Peter the Great, attracting, for the first time, the attention of all Europe, limited the sphere of his policy to the north of that continent, by contending against Charles XII., in order to carry the election of a king for Poland. Forty years afterwards, Russia, extending already her ambition towards Germany, entered into a contest against Frederick, in conjunction with Austria and France, in order to prevent the consolidation of the Prussian power. Some years afterwards, in 1772, she partitioned Poland. In 1778, she advanced a step farther, and participated, equally with France, in the regulation of German affairs, interposing her mediation between Prussia and Austria, who were ready to come to blows about the succession of Bavaria, and had the signal honour of guaranteeing the German constitution at Teschen. In short, before the cycle of the century was complete, in 1799, she marched 100,000 Russians into Italy, not to settle a question of territory, but a moral question—to preserve, she said, the balance of power in Europe, and social order which was menaced by the French Revolution.

The history of the world furnishes no example of such aggran-

disement of influence by any one power, in so short a time. Paul, in aspiring to be himself the arbiter of every thing, as the price of his alliance with the First Consul, was, therefore, but the unconscious instrument of a policy which was the result of profound consideration in the Russian cabinet. His representative at Paris required, in a tone of cold and persevering disdainfulness, that which his master demanded, in that frame of excessive excitement, with which he was accustomed to enforce his wishes. He affected ridiculously, to constitute himself the protector of the minor powers, who were now at the mercy of France, after having given her deep offence. The court of Naples had even sought to place herself under this protection, but this had not been attended with success, as M. de Gallo had been sent away from Paris, and his court had been compelled to submit, at Florence, to the conditions imposed by the First Consul. M. de Saint Marsan, who was empowered to represent the house of Savoy, in treating with the French Republic, wished to follow the example of M. de Gallo, and had been also dismissed.

M. de Kalitscheff had eagerly supported the pretensions of the cabinets of Naples, and of Turin, whose states his court had guaranteed, and he took it for granted, when signing a treaty with France, that he was not merely to confine himself to stipulate for the re-establishment of friendly relations between the two empires, which had no subject-matter in dispute, neither at sea, nor on the continent; but further to regulate the affairs of Germany and Italy, in almost all their details, and even those of the East, for he still persisted in demanding the restitution of Egypt to the Porte.

In spite of a wish to keep on friendly terms with the emperor Paul, we replied to his ambassador with firmness. We had agreed to add to the public treaty, which was to re-establish, unconditionally, peace and amity between the two states, a secret convention, in which an undertaking was entered into, to concert with Russia the adjustment of the Germanic indemnities, and to favour especially the courts of Baden, Wurtemberg, and Bavaria, with which Russia was connected, either by ties of relationship or alliance; to reserve an indemnification for the house of Savoy, if not reinstated in its dominions; but without specifying the place, the time, nor the extent; as the First Consul had already conceived the design of reserving Piedmont for France. That was all that could be conceded. As for Naples, the treaty of Florence was declared irrevocable, and, as regarded the restitution of Egypt, we had come to a decision not to listen to one word upon the subject.

M. de Kalitscheff insisting, with a tone and manner sufficiently unbecoming, upon these points, it ended in not making any further reply to his applications, and leaving him at Paris, in rather an embarrassing position, with the engagements he had

come under to the minor powers. Such was the posture of affairs when the news of the tragical death of Paul I. arrived. M. de Kalitscheff, without waiting for further orders from his new sovereign, and anxious to extricate himself from the false position in which he had placed himself, addressed, on the 26th of April, a peremptory note to M. de Talleyrand, in which he demanded an immediate answer to all the points of the negotiation, complaining that things conceded, said he, at Berlin, between general Beurnonville and M. de Krudener, were disputed at Paris. He seemed even to insinuate that, if the minor states were not better treated by France, the glory of the First Consul would be tarnished, and that his administration would be confounded with the revolutionary governments which had preceded it.

M. de Talleyrand replied to him immediately, that his despatch was very unbecoming, that it was deficient in the respect due from one independent power to another; that it could not be submitted to the First Consul, whose dignity would be justly offended by it; that M. de Kalitscheff might therefore consider it, as not having been written; and that the reply solicited, in the name of his cabinet, would not be made until the application should be renewed in other terms, and in another despatch.

This severe rebuke had great effect on M. de Kalitscheff. He seemed to be alarmed at the consequences of his proceeding. Already, even, the minor protégés who sheltered themselves behind him, were growing afraid of his protection, and felt regret at having intrusted their interests to his keeping. M. de Kalitscheff, having no alternative but to remain without an answer, or to remodel his claims in a better shape, wrote a second note, in which he reiterated his demand for an explanation, but confined himself to the simple enumeration of each point, unaccompanied by any comments, by any complaint, and even without the usual compliments. The despatch was cold, but unobjectionable. He was then told by M. de Talleyrand, that, couched in their present shape, the questions should be submitted to the First Consul, and should receive duly a reply. It was added by M. de Talleyrand, that the latter despatch only would be preserved in the archives of the foreign office, and that the preceding one should be destroyed.

Some few days after, M. de Talleyrand replied to M. de Kalitscheff, in very polite but explicit terms. He recapitulated all the points of the decision of the French cabinet, and added this natural reflection—that if France had consented, touching many of the most important affairs of Europe, to act in amicable concert with Russia, and had appeared disposed to act in deference to her wishes, it was in consideration of the close alliance formed with Paul, against the policy of England; but that, since the accession of the czar Alexander, it was essential, previous to making the same concessions, to know whether the new emperor would

enter into the same views, and to be absolutely assured, that he would prove as resolute and determined an ally as the deceased emperor.

From that day M. de Kalitscheff remained quiet, and waited for instructions from his new master.

The prince, who had just ascended the throne of the czars, was of a singular character; singular, as most of the princes who have reigned over Russia for the last century. Alexander was just twenty-five years of age; he was tall in stature, and although not possessing quite regular features, had a noble and sweet countenance; he was endowed with an acute understanding; and his generosity of heart, was united with the most perfect gracefulness of manners. Nevertheless, some of the traces of hereditary infirmity might be discerned in him. His lively, volatile, and susceptible mind was easily and successively impressed with the most incompatible ideas. Yet this remarkable prince was not always merely hurried away by the impulse of the moment; there was a depth of understanding in his enlarged quick perception of things, which escaped the discrimination of the closest observers. He was honourable, yet at the same time a dissembler, capable of artifice; and already some of these good qualities and defects, had begun to develop themselves, in the tragical events which had preceded his advent to power. Let us, however, take care to guard ourselves against calumniating this illustrious prince; he had been completely under a delusion with respect to the designs of count Pahlen. He had imagined, with the inexperience of youth, that the abdication of his father was the sole object meditated, and would have been the only result of the conspiracy which had been confided to him; he had thought, in lending himself thereto, to save the empire, his mother, his brothers, and himself from unknown violence. Now, enlightened by the event, he abhorred the error of which he had been guilty, and those who had made him their instrument in its consummation. This young emperor, in short, noble in aspect, gracious in manners, witty enthusiastic, mercurial, artificial, hard to fathom, was endowed with an irresistible personal charm, and destined to exercise the most seductive influence over his cotemporaries. He was now called upon to exert this seductive influence, upon the extraordinary man, so difficult to deceive, who at that time swayed the destinies of France, and with whom at a future period, he was destined to be involved in such serious and terrible differences.

The education which this young prince had received, was a very strange one. A pupil of colonel Laharpe, who had inspired him with the sentiments and ideas of Swiss republicanism, Alexander had yielded with his accustomed facility, to the influence of his preceptor, and visibly felt the effect of these principles, when he ascended the throne. Whilst he was yet an imperial prince, continually subjected to a severe yoke, at one time that of Catherine, and afterwards that of Paul, he had formed acquaintance



with some young men of his own age, such as M. Paul Strogonoff, M. de Nowosiltzoff, and above all with prince Adam Czartorisky. This last, the scion of one of the most distinguished families of Poland, and deeply attached to his country, was at St. Petersburg, as a sort of hostage; he served in the regiment of guards, and lived at court, with the young grand dukes. Alexander, attracted towards him by a community of sentiments and ideas, communicated to him all the reveries of his youth. They both deplored in secret the misfortunes of Poland, which was extremely natural in a descendant of the Czartoriskys, but somewhat surprising in the grandson of Catherine; and Alexander vowed solemnly to his friend, that when he should be seated on the throne, he would restore to unhappy Poland her laws and her liberties.

Paul having perceived this intimacy, took some umbrage at it, and banished prince Czartorisky, by appointing him Russian minister to a king without any dominions, that is to say his Sardinian majesty. No sooner was Alexander proclaimed emperor than he despatched a courier to his friend, then residing at Rome, and recalled him to St. Petersburg. He also collected round his person, Messrs. Paul Strogonoff, and de Nowosiltzoff; and thus formed a sort of secret government, composed of young men without experience, animated by generous sentiments, which all of them have not preserved; their minds being filled with wild illusions, and little qualified, it must be admitted, to direct the affairs of a great country, in the critical and perplexing conjunctures of the time. They were eager to get rid of the old Russians, who had held the reins of government up to that period, and with whom they entertained no sentiments whatever in common. One personage alone, their senior in years, with greater steadiness of character, prince Kotschoubey, mingled in this society of young men, and corrected by a more ripened judgment their youthful vivacity. He had travelled over Europe, and had acquired much valuable knowledge; in conversation, he availed himself of every opportunity of impressing upon his sovereign a due sense of the improvements, which he thought might advantageously be introduced into the internal government of the empire. They all concurred in condemning the policy, which consisted, at first in declaring war against France on account of the revolution, and afterwards in carrying it on against England, about a dogma of the law of nations. They neither wished to wage a war of principles against France, nor a maritime war against England. The great empire of the north, according to their notions, ought to hold the balance between these two powers, which threatened to make the whole world their prey, and thus to become the arbiter of Europe, the stay of the weaker states against the more powerful. But, generally speaking, their attention was directed less to foreign policy, than to the interior regeneration of the empire; they went so far as to contemplate the organic change of new institutions, modelled partly upon what they had seen abroad in civi-

lised countries; they were actuated, in short, by all the generosity, the inexperience, and the presumption of youth.

The ostensible ministers of Alexander were all old Russians, prejudiced against France, prepossessed in favour of England, and, moreover, extremely disagreeable to their sovereign. Count Pahlen alone, thanks to the firmness of his judgment, did not share in the prejudices of his colleagues, and was desirous of keeping aloof from any external influence, and of remaining neutral between France and England. In this respect, his ideas were in accordance with those of the new emperor, and of his friends. But count Pahlen committed the error of treating Alexander as a youthful prince, whom he had placed on the throne, whom he had directed, and whom he wanted still to keep under his direction. The sensitive vanity of his young master, was consequently frequently wounded. Count Pahlen also behaved with great harshness to the dowager empress, who exhibited an ostentatious grief, and a deadly hatred against the murderers of her husband. In a religious establishment endowed by her bounty, the dowager empress had placed an image of the virgin, with Paul represented at her feet, invoking the vengeance of heaven upon the heads of his assassins. Count Pahlen ordered the image to be removed in spite of the cries of the empress, and the dissatisfaction of the son. An authority exercised so harshly could not be permanent.

In the early part of the reign, Count Panin continued to preside over the department of foreign affairs; count Pahlen remained the most influential minister, taking part in all the different branches of the government. Alexander having first concerted measures with his friends, transacted business afterwards with his ostensible ministers. Under these various influences, sometimes thwarting each other, it was decided to treat with England, and to commence by raising the embargo laid upon the English vessels, which, in the opinion of Alexander, was a most unjustifiable measure. They decided, that it was desirable to conclude with lord St. Helens such a maritime convention as would at least protect the interests of Russia, if it did not save the rights of the neutrals. Alexander classing among the unreasonable notions of his father, the pretension of being the grand master of the order of Jerusalem, declared that he would be only its protector, until the different nations, of which the order was composed, could be convened and elect a new grand master. This resolution at once removed many difficulties with the English on one hand, who, set a great value upon Malta; and with the French on the other, who were not disposed to carry the war to extremity, in order to restore this island to the order; and also with the courts of Rome and Spain, neither of which had ever consented to recognise a schismatic prince, as the grand master of St. John of Jerusalem.

In order to put an end to another subject of contention, that

with France, it was resolved that the evacuation of Egypt should be no longer insisted upon; Russia was, in fact, more interested in seeing it in the hands of the French, than in those of the English. With regard to Naples and Piedmont, Russia, it was alleged, was bound to them by solemn treaties, and Alexander, on his first appearance in the character of a sovereign, was anxious to create an exalted idea, of his integrity of purpose. It was settled that she would no longer claim for the court of Naples, the revocation of the treaty of Florence, but simply the guarantee of its present dominions, and the evacuation, at the peace, of the gulf of Tarentum. As to Piedmont, she resolved to demand for the house of Savoy, either Piedmont itself, or in default thereof, a corresponding indemnity. Moreover, Alexander pretended to a share, in concert with France, in the regulation of the indemnities promised to the German princes, for their territorial losses on the left bank of the Rhine. Nothing in all this presented any difficulty, as the First Consul had already concurred in these arrangements. M. de Kalitscheff was recalled, and M. de Markoff appointed to succeed him; a man of undoubted ability, but with respect to knowledge of official forms, not a whit superior to his predecessor.

Duroc, who had been dispatched to congratulate the new emperor, found on his arrival at St. Petersburg, all these points determined upon, and received, both from the ministers and the monarch, the most gracious reception. His elegant deportment, his intelligence and tact, succeeded in Russia, as in Prussia, and he contrived to inspire both esteem and confidence. After the usual formal audiences, he obtained several private conferences, in which Alexander seemed to take pleasure in unveiling his real sentiments, to the representative of the First Consul. One day especially, in one of the public gardens of St. Petersburg, the prince perceived Duroc, advanced towards him, and accosting him with a familiarity replete with elegance, dismissing the officers in attendance, led him to a retired spot, and seemed to open himself to him, with the most unrestrained freedom. "I am," he said to him, "at heart, a friend of France, and have admired for a long time, your new ruler; I duly appreciate all that he has done, for the repose of his country, and for the maintenance of social order in Europe. It is not from me, that he need apprehend a new war between the two empires. But on his part, let him reciprocate these sentiments, and avoid furnishing pretexts to others, who are jealous of his power. You see I have made concessions: I say no more about Egypt; I prefer that it should belong to France, rather than to England, and if unfortunately the English seize upon it, I will unite with you, to wrest it from their hands. I have given up Malta, in order to remove the obstacles which stood in the way of the peace of Europe. I am bound to the kings of Piedmont and Naples by treaties; I am conscious that their conduct to France

has been indefensible; but how were they to act, hemmed in as they were, and domineered over by England? I should deeply regret to see the First Consul seize upon Piedmont, as the recent acts of his policy would lead one to believe he intended. Naples complains of being deprived of part of her territory. All this is unworthy of the ambition of the First Consul, and tarnishes his glory. He is not taxed like the governments which preceded him, with menacing social order, but he is accused of wishing to overrun all countries. This is injurious to him, and exposes me personally, to the clamour of the minor princes, by whom I am continually importuned. Let him remove these difficulties between us, and we shall live for the future, upon a perfectly good understanding."

Alexander, giving way to his feelings, further added: "Do not repeat any thing I now say to my ministers; be discreet; employ only trustworthy couriers. But tell general Bonaparte to send me men on whom I can rely. The most direct relations will be found best suited to establish good feeling between the two governments." Alexander further said a few words respecting England. He affirmed that he would not give up to her the dominion of the seas, the common property of all nations; that if he had removed the embargo on her vessels, it was only from a sense of justice. Existing treaties allowed, in cases of rupture, one entire year to enable the English merchants to liquidate their affairs; it was, therefore, obviously an injustice to seize upon their property. "I will be guilty of no such act," exclaimed Alexander, with emotion; "I have no other motive than a sense of justice. But I have no intention of becoming a satellite of England. It depends entirely upon the First Consul, whether I shall continue to be his ally, his friend."

The young emperor, during this conversation, showed himself unpretending, confiding, desirous above all to set aside his ministers, and make it evident that he had personal views, and a policy of his own.

Duroc quitted St. Petersburg, loaded with favours and proofs of regard from the emperor.

It was obvious, from these communications that Russia could no longer be of any great assistance against England, but that for the future, there would be much less difficulty in the settlement of general affairs. The First Consul, confident now of being able to come to an understanding with this cabinet, did not hurry himself to conclude the negotiation, inasmuch as time seemed every day to smooth the difficulties which still subsisted between it and France. England indeed, at that moment, evinced but little interest respecting the houses of Naples and Piedmont, and if, as there was reason to believe, she no longer made their interests one of the conditions of the peace, it must be much more easy to act as we might deem proper, towards these two houses,

when England herself had so far abandoned them, as to give them up to the First Consul.

The negotiation with England, became then the paramount, and almost the exclusive object at this moment. To manage it properly, it was not only necessary to treat skilfully at London, but also to push on briskly the war with Portugal, and dispute vigorously with the British forces the possession of Egypt: as the issue of events in those two parts of the world, must exercise a great influence over the future treaty. The First Consul, wishing to throw another weight into the scale, caused preparations to be made with great parade at Boulogne, and at Calais, in order that it might be believed, that this extreme measure of an invasion of England, which the Directory had long meditated, was neither relinquished, nor beyond his aim and resources. Numerous corps were put in motion towards that part of France, and a great number of substantially-built gun-boats were collected on the coasts of Normandy, Picardy, and Flanders, heavily armed, and rendered fit for the transport of troops across the channel at Calais.

In pursuance of their previous arrangements, lord Hawkesbury and M. Otto had been engaged during the middle of April, 1801 (germinal, year IX.), in diplomatic conferences. According to custom, the first pretensions were excessive. England proposed a very simple arrangement as a basis, namely, the *uti possidetis*, that is to say, that each of the powers should keep the acquisitions which the events of the war had placed in its hands. England, in fact, profiting by the protracted struggle between Europe and France, had enriched herself, whilst her allies had become exhausted, and she had possessed herself of the colonies of all other nations. She had seized upon the entire continent of India, as well as upon the most important commercial stations in the four quarters of the globe. From the Dutch she had taken Ceylon, that extensive and valuable island, which, placed at the extremity of the Indian peninsula, forms to it a most desirable addition. She had acquired the other possessions of the Dutch, in the Indian seas, with the exception, it is true, of the splendid island of Java. She had wrested from them, between the two oceans, the Cape of Good Hope, one of the best situated naval stations in the world. Her most persevering efforts had never been able to obtain the Mauritius, the possession of which we had never ceased to maintain at any time. In South America, she had deprived the unfortunate Dutch, the most ill-treated power during the whole war, of the territory of Guiana, extending from the Amazon to the Oronoko, comprising Surinam, Berbice, Demerara, and Essequibo, magnificent countries, the agricultural and commercial resources of which had not at that time, and have not yet been fully developed, but which dependencies, are destined one day to arrive at a vast prosperity,



which moreover presented the temptation of forming an advanced post, towards the great Spanish colonies of the American continent. England coveted those colonies; at least she entertained the design, of aiding them to obtain their independence, to revenge herself for what had occurred in North America, and she flattered herself, moreover, with reason, that once having become independent, they would soon fall a prey to her commerce. For this same reason she set a great value upon the conquest of one of the West India islands, made from the Spaniards, the fine island of Trinidad, contiguous to South America, being a sort of foothold, advantageously situated either for contraband trade, or for the purposes of aggression against the Spanish possessions. She had also made an acquisition of great value in the West Indies, which was Martinique, taken from the French. The mode by which she had accomplished this, had not been very legitimate, as the colonists of Martinique, apprehensive of an insurrection of the slaves, had placed themselves temporarily in the hands of the English, who had converted a voluntary surrender into an actual property. England clung to Martinique on account of the large harbour in that island. She had also taken, in the West Indies, St. Lucia and Tobago, moderate-sized islands compared with the preceding, and near the fishing stations, St. Pierre and Miquelon. Lastly, in Europe she had taken from the Spaniards the most valuable of the Balearic islands, and from the French, who had captured it from the knights of St. John of Jerusalem, Malta, the queen of the Mediterranean.

After these conquests, it may be said that there was not much left for her to dispute with the maritime nations, the continental possessions of the Spaniards in the two Americas excepted. It is true that the English threatened, if the expedition against Portugal were further prosecuted, to indemnify themselves by the seizure of Brazil.

To counterbalance these vast maritime acquisitions, France had seized upon the finest portions of the European continent, assuredly much more important than all England's distant territories, but we had restored them all, with the exception of that portion comprised between the great lines of the Alps, the Rhine, and the Pyrenees. She had conquered besides, a colony, which to her was alone equivalent, for all the colonial greatness acquired by England,—this was Egypt. No other possession was of equal value to that. If it was meditated to shake anew the British possessions in India, Egypt was the most certain route by which to reach them. If it was only contemplated, which was the wiser policy, to bring back to the ports of France a portion of the trade of the east, Egypt, again, was the natural channel for this commerce. In time of peace, as in war, it was the most valuable colony in the world. If at the moment the ruler of the French government, had only considered the interests of France, and not those of her allies, he might have accepted the

terms proposed by England ; for Martinique itself, the only positive loss worthy of attention which France had suffered during the war, was of little consequence compared with Egypt, a real empire placed between the seas of the east and the west, commanding, and at the same time shortening, the communication between these two seas. But the First Consul considered himself in honour bound to restore to the allies of France the greater part of their possessions. It did not depend upon him to save Holland from all the sacrifices which she was condemned to suffer from the defection of her navy, which had followed, as we know, the stadtholder to England ; but he felt himself called upon to require the restitution of the Cape and Guiana : he was desirous that Spain, who had acquired nothing during the war, should also lose nothing, and that Trinidad and the Balearic islands should be restored to her ; finally, it was decided not to cede Malta at any price, as that would at once weaken our conquest of Egypt, and render its possession precarious in our hands.

His intention then was to leave England in undisturbed possession of Hindostan, including the small factories of Chander-nagor and Pondicherry, which were not of any consequence to us : to add even Ceylon, the property of the Dutch, but to require the restitution of the Cape, Guiana, Trinidad, Martinique, the Balearic islands, and Malta ; but to retain Egypt, considering this conquest as an equivalent to France, for the acquisition of the Indian continent by England. We shall see in what way he proceeded to accomplish these objects, during a negotiation which lasted five entire months.

To the proposition made of adopting the *uti possidetis*, as the basis of a future treaty of peace, the French negotiator was instructed to reply, by the most explicit arguments. " You wish to lay down, as a principle," he said to lord Hawkesbury, " that each of the two nations should keep whatever she has conquered ; but, in that case, France should, in Germany, keep Baden, Wurtemberg, Bavaria, and three-fourths of Austria ; she should, in Italy, keep the whole of Italy, that is to say, the ports of Genoa, Leghorn, Naples, and Venice ; she should keep Switzerland, which she intends to evacuate as soon as she has re-established there a proper order of things ; she should keep Holland, occupied by her armies, and where she would be enabled to equip the most powerful squadrons. She could take Hanover, and give it as a compensation to certain powers on the continent, and, by this means, attach these powers to her for ever. She could, in short, prosecute the campaign commenced against Portugal, indemnify Spain with the spoils of that state, and secure new ports for herself. How important would be these naval stations, stretching from the Texel to Lisbon and Cadiz, from Cadiz to Genoa, from Genoa to Otranto, and from Otranto to Venice. If abstract principles were to be

laid down as the basis of the negotiation, peace would be impossible. France has restored the greater part of their dependencies to the several governments, which she has conquered; to Austria she has restored a part of Italy; to the king of the Two Sicilies the kingdom of Naples; to the pope the whole Roman territories; she has given Tuscany, which she could easily have retained, to the house of Spain; she has reinstated Genoa in her independence; she confines herself to making Lombardy a friendly republic; and is preparing to evacuate Switzerland, Holland, and even Hanover. England must, therefore, on her side, give up part of her conquests. Those which France claims do not directly affect her, but ought to to her allies. France holds it to be her duty to recover them, for the purpose of restoring them to their rightful owners. Moreover, if India and Ceylon are conceded to England, of what consequence are those possessions, the restitution of which is now demanded? If she will make no concession she ought to say so, and should declare that the negotiation is but a lure. The world will know through whose fault peace has become impossible; then France will make a last effort, and this effort, difficult, perilous, no doubt, may be fatal for England; for the First Consul does not despair of being able to cross the channel at Calais, at the head of 100,000 men."

Lord Hawkesbury and Mr. Addington both negotiated with an earnest desire to arrive at an advantageous peace for their respective countries, which was very natural; and they also desired to bring it about immediately. They felt the force of the arguments of the French cabinet, and were struck with the determination contained in these words. Accordingly, they quickly moderated their pretensions, and paved the way to a reconciliation. They first replied to the argument of the First Consul, founded upon the conquests restored by France; that if France had relinquished a part of her conquests, it was because she was unable to retain them; while no navy in the world could deprive England of the colonies which she had conquered; that if France did restore a part of the territories occupied by her armies, she kept Nice, Savoy, the banks of the Rhine, and, above all, the mouths of the Scheldt and Antwerp, which aggrandised her considerably, not only on land, but at sea; that it was necessary to re-establish the equilibrium of Europe; that it was expedient to re-establish it, if not altogether on the continent, at least on the ocean; that if France wished to preserve Egypt, India was no longer a sufficient compensation for England; and that the British cabinet would, in that case, retain a great part of her recent acquisitions. "Nevertheless," added lord Hawkesbury, "we have only thrown out a first proposition for consideration, and we are ready to abate any thing in it which may appear too rigorous. We will restore some of our



conquests ; only specify those, the restitution of which you have most at heart."

The First Consul made an animated reply to these arguments of the English minister. It was not exactly correct to say, according to him, that England could keep all her maritime conquests, whilst, on the contrary, France could not preserve her continental conquests. The continental war having been brought to a close, either by the absolute exhaustion of a part of the allies of England, or by the disgust of the others at her alliance ; France, aided by the resources of Holland, Spain, and Italy, might have done whatsoever she pleased on the continent, and she was in a position to perform, on the seas, much more than the British cabinet gave her credit for. Doubtless, France could not have retained the centre of Germany, and three-fourths of Austria, without producing a convulsion in Europe ; but she could have concluded a more moderate peace than that of Lunéville ; Austria being exhausted, she might, after the battle of Hohenlinden, have kept the whole of Italy, even Switzerland, without it being in the power of any state to oppose it. As to the balance of power on the continent, it had been disturbed on the day when Prussia, Russia, and Austria partitioned amongst themselves, without any equivalent being given to any other power, the vast and beautiful kingdom of Poland ; the banks of the Rhine, the slopes of the Alps, being hardly an equivalent to France for what these rivals had acquired on the continent. At sea, Egypt was scarcely a compensation for the conquest of the Indies. It was even questionable whether, with this colony, France could preserve her ancient maritime proportions with regard to England.

These arguments had reason on their side, and were fortunately supported by the strong arm of power ; for both are indispensable when negotiations are pending. The basis of a negotiation was soon agreed upon. It was settled that England, on remaining possessor of India, should restore a part of the conquests made from France, Spain, and Holland. The specific acquisitions which she was to surrender, or preserve, next became the subject of consideration.

Without formally granting the possession of Egypt to France, —a point, which the English negotiator desired to leave enveloped in doubt, he nevertheless proposed two hypotheses ; one, on the supposition that France should preserve Egypt, and the other, that France should abandon it, whether compelled thereto by force of arms, or by an act of voluntary relinquishment. On the first supposition, that of the retention of Egypt by France, England, retaining India and Ceylon, as well as Chandernagor and Pondicherry, would require, in addition, the Cape of Good Hope, a part of the Guianas, that is to say, Berbice, Demerara, Essequibo, Trinidad, and Martinique, in the West Indies, and

finally, and above all, the island of Malta. She would give up the smaller Dutch possessions in the Indies, Surinam, the insignificant islands of Saint Lucia and Tobago, St. Pierre, and Miquelon, together with Minorca. On the second hypothesis, that France should not remain in possession of Egypt, England still required India and Ceylon; but she consented to surrender the small factories of Pondicherry, Chandernagor, the Cape of Good Hope, and Martinique, or Trinidad, leaving the option of either of these two islands to France, but retaining the other. Finally, she claimed Malta, but not in a peremptory manner.

The extent of these restitutions did not satisfy the First Consul. The negotiators, however, approximated to an accommodation and at last, after a month's discussion, arrived at the following propositions, which were at the bottom, the real views of both governments.

England insisted, at all events, upon India and the island of Ceylon. Should the French evacuate Egypt, she would yield to them the small factories of Chandernagor and Pondicherry; she would restore the Cape to the Dutch, on condition that it should be declared a free port, and she would restore Berbice, Demerara, Essequibo, and Surinam, all settlements situated on the continent of South America; she would surrender one of the two large West India islands, Martinique, or Trinidad, besides St. Lucia, Tobago, St. Pierre, and Miquelon, together with the islands of Minorca and Malta. Thus, as the final result of the war, provided we did not keep Egypt, she obtained the continent of India, Ceylon, besides one of these two large West India islands, Trinidad, or Martinique; and, if we retained Egypt, she got, in addition, Chandernagor and Pondicherry, the Cape, Martinique, with Trinidad, and, finally, Malta; that is to say, that in the latter case, she deemed it expedient, as a measure of prudence, to deprive us of the two foot-holds of Chandernagor and Pondicherry, situated on the peninsula of India; and to secure as an equivalent, Trinidad, which threatened Spanish America, Martinique, which is the finest harbour in the West India islands, and, finally, Malta, which is the first port in the Mediterranean.

Although the Cape, Malta, with either Martinique or Trinidad, demanded over and above, in the case of our keeping Egypt, were far from being as valuable as that important possession, and although it would have been expedient to yield at once, had this condition been unavoidable, the First Consul hoped to preserve Egypt, and yet pay less dearly for this concession. He hoped that, if the English army sent to the Nile should fail in their expedition, that if the Spaniards urged on the war against Portugal, he would be enabled not only to keep Egypt, but to compel the restitution of the Cape to the Dutch, of Trinidad to the Spaniards, and of Malta to the order of St. John of Jerusalem, and thus oblige England to rest satisfied with India and Ceylon, a

portion of Guiana, and one or two of the smaller West India islands.

Every thing, then, depended upon the events of the war, and the English hoping, on their side, that it would turn to their advantage, were not averse to wait the issue, which could not remain long undecided; as it depended upon knowing, whether the Spaniards would dare to march against Portugal, and whether the English troops on board admiral Keith's fleet, in the Mediterranean, could effect a landing in Egypt. To ascertain these points, an interval of a month or two only was necessary. Thus, on both sides, at the same time that they took every precaution not to break off the negotiation, which both were sincerely anxious to terminate in a peace, they adopted the expedient of gaining time, and the multiplicity and complication of the subjects which had to be discussed, furnished the obvious means to effect this without having recourse to much diplomatic *finesse*.

"Every thing depends upon two things," wrote M. Otto. "Will the English army be beaten in Egypt? Will Spain boldly march against Portugal?—Make haste, obtain these two results, or one of them, and you will conclude the most advantageous peace in the world. But I must tell you," added he, "that while the English cabinet fears the soldiers of our army in Egypt, it makes very light of the resolution of the court of Spain."

The First Consul, therefore, made incessant efforts to arouse the spirit of the old court of Spain, in order to procure her co-operation in his two great designs; which consisted, on the one hand, in seizing upon Portugal, and, on the other, in directing towards Egypt the combined naval forces of the two nations. Unfortunately, the resources of this ancient monarchy were utterly exhausted. A plain, honest king, but blinded and absorbed by the most vulgar cares, pursuits wholly unworthy of a throne; a queen sunk in the most shameless debaucheries; and a vain, fickle, incapable favourite, dissipated, in recklessness and excess, the last resources of the monarchy of Charles V. Lucien Bonaparte, sent as ambassador to Madrid to make amends for the loss of the department of the interior in the ministry, ambitious of emulating the diplomatic success of his brother Joseph, bestirred himself in Spain, with a view to promote with lustre his brother's policy, and it is true that he had acquired some influence, thanks to his name; thanks, also, to the successful boldness with which he had neglected the ostensible ministers, to put himself in direct communication with the real head of the government, that is to say, with the prince of Peace. By leaving this prince no choice between the resentment or favour of the First Consul, he had excited in him more than ordinary zeal for the interests of the alliance, and had made him enter completely into the scheme for the invasion of Portugal. Lucien had said to the court of Spain: "Your object is peace,

you desire to secure it, if not upon advantageous terms, at least upon terms not actually prejudicial to your interests,— you are desirous to obtain it without the loss of any of your colonies; assist us, then, in seizing upon the pledges, which we will make use of, to wrench from England the greater part of her maritime conquests.” Such reasons were convincing, and incapable of being controverted; but they were not the most decisive with the prince of Peace. Lucien had conceived others much more efficacious. “ You are every thing here,” he said to the favourite, “ my brother is well aware of it, he will ascribe to you alone, the ill success of the measures of the alliance. Will you have the Bonapartes for friends or enemies ?” These arguments already employed to induce Spain to decide upon the war against Portugal, were now repeated every day, to expedite the preparations. After all, whatever the arguments were, which operated upon the prince of Peace in engaging in this war, he did not betray the interests of his country. He could not, on the contrary, serve them better, for the war against Portugal was the only mode of forcing England to restore the Spanish colonies.

The preparations were hurried on as fast as possible, and the last resources of the monarchy were applied to their completion. Who would credit, that this great and noble nation, whose glory has filled the whole world, and whose patriotism was shortly after to be developed with lustre, and unhappily directed against us, who would believe that she experienced the utmost difficulty in raising 25,000 men ? That, with magnificent harbours, a large number of ships, the vestiges of the splendid reign of Charles III., that she found difficulty in paying the wages of some workmen in her arsenals, in order to put her vessels afloat ? Nay more, that it was quite out of her power to victual her fleet ? Who would believe that the fifteen Spanish ships shut up for two years in Brest, formed the whole of her navy, at least of her navy fit for service ? The want of the precious metals, consequent upon the interruption of her trade with Mexico, had reduced her to a paper currency, and this circulating medium was deteriorated to the last point of discredit. An application had just been made to the clergy, who did not possess, at the moment, the funds which were required, but who, enjoying more credit than the crown, and making use of this credit, thus enabled her to complete the preparations set on foot.

Twenty-five thousand men, tolerably equipped, at length advanced towards Badajos ; but this force was quite insufficient. The prince of Peace had intimated, that without a division of French troops, they could not venture to enter Portugal. The First Consul had hastened the assemblage of this division at Bordeaux ; it had soon crossed the Pyrenees, and made rapid marches towards Ciudad Rodrigo. The prince of Peace was desirous of entering with the Spanish troops by way of Alentejo,

while the French division should penetrate through the provinces of *Tras-os-Montes* and *Beira*. General *St. Cyr*, who was to command the French, had proceeded to *Madrid*, to concert operations with the prince of *Peace*, and although he was little qualified to humour the susceptibility of others, being exceedingly sensitive himself, he contrived to induce the prince to accept some good advice, and to concert with him a suitable plan of operations.

Portugal, seeing herself so closely pressed, had dispatched *M. d'Aranjo* to *Madrid*, but he had been stopped at the Spanish frontiers. *M. d'Aranjo* had then repaired to France, where he was subjected to the same treatment. Portugal declared herself ready to submit to every condition imposed, provided she was not compelled to close her ports to English merchant-vessels. These offers were rejected. It was determined that she should be required to exclude completely, both English merchant-vessels, and ships of war, that three of her provinces should be held as security until the peace, and that she should be made to pay the expenses of the expedition.

The troops of the two nations began their march, and the prince of *Peace* left *Madrid*, with his head filled with the most extravagant dreams of glory. The court and even *Lucien* were to accompany him. The First Consul had enjoined the most exact discipline to be observed by the French troops; he had ordered them to attend mass on Sundays, that the officers should pay their respects to the bishops when passing the chief places of their dioceses, in short, to conform in every thing to the Spanish customs. He was anxious that the sight of the French, instead of alienating the Spaniards, should render them better affected towards France.

Every thing in that quarter proceeded to the entire satisfaction of the First Consul, and in furtherance of the paramount interests involved in the negotiation pending at *London*. But still a great deal remained to be done, with reference to the employment of the naval forces. We have seen in what manner the three navies of *Holland*, *France*, and *Spain*, were to co-operate for one common object. Five Dutch ships, five French, and five Spanish, in all fifteen, filled with troops, were to threaten *Brazil*, or attempt the recapture of *Trinidad*. The whole of the remainder of the naval forces was destined for *Egypt*. *Ganteaume*, having got out of *Brest*, with seven ships, and carrying considerable supplies, was on his way towards *Alexandria*. The other Spanish and French vessels remained at *Brest*, to keep alive the fear of a sudden expedition against *Ireland*; whilst a second expedition, leaving *Rochefort*, and falling in with five Spanish ships fitted out at *Ferrol*, and six others equipped at *Cadiz*, were to follow *Ganteaume* to *Egypt*. But we had not been able to disclose our designs to *Spain*, for fear of her indiscretion. She was requested, without further explanation,



to order round to Cadiz the naval division fitted out at Ferrol. The court of Spain expostulated warmly against that destination, alleging the danger of running through the English cruisers, which were very numerous at the entrance of the straits and in the neighbourhood of Gibraltar. The ships at Ferrol were, besides, scarcely ready to put to sea, their equipment had been so much retarded. Lucien, without revealing the project meditated, of succouring Egypt, enlarged upon the importance of being masters of the Mediterranean, upon the feasibility of attempting something useful to both countries in that sea; and perhaps, making an effort to retake Minorca. At length, he contrived to procure the necessary orders, and the Spanish division at Ferrol was to be conducted to Cadiz by the French fleet from Rochefort. Nor was this all; Spain, as it must be remembered, had promised to furnish us with six ships as a free gift. There was a misunderstanding about the period when this condition should be performed, but as Tuscany was about to be given up, even before Louisiana was restored to France, it was but just that these vessels should be placed at our disposal forthwith. The Spanish ministry at length decided to select six lying in the arsenal at Cadiz, and to give them up to us immediately; but they would not deliver them ready armed and victualled. We could not, however, send from France, guns and biscuit. These were paltry disputes, in the face of the common enemy, against whom it was essential to fight by all manner of means, if we wanted to compel them to lower their pretensions. These difficulties were at length settled according to the wishes of the First Consul. We have already seen that the French admiral Dumanoir, had set out post for Cadiz, in order to expedite the equipment of the Spanish vessels, now under the French flag, and to assume the command of them. This admiral had visited the ports of Spain, and found them all in confusion; every thing betraying the destitution of ill-regulated and improvident opulence. Though still in possession of the remains of a magnificent stock of stores, materials for ship-building, numerous fine, but dismantled vessels, with splendid dockyards; there was not at Cadiz, for want of wages, either a sailor or an artisan to get these vessels ready for sea. Every thing was given up to waste and plunder.\* The French minister had sent to admiral Dumanoir credits upon the richest houses in Cadiz, and by dint of ready money, this officer had succeeded in overcoming the main difficulties. After having selected the vessels which had least suffered from time and Spanish neglect, he contrived to arm them by taking the guns and stores from the remainder. He procured French sailors, some emigrants, in consequence of the Revolution,

---

\* The reports of this admiral, which are preserved in the archives, not of the Admiralty, but of the Foreign Office, furnish the most curious picture of the state to which a great country can fall, when its affairs are in improper hands.

others escaped from the English prisons; he enrolled a certain number, sent from the ports of France in light vessels; he solicited and obtained permission to enter also some Spaniards, and, by the offer of increased wages, secured the services of some Danes and Swedes. He was supplied from France with the requisite number of flag and other officers, who travelled post across the peninsula, while a detachment of French infantry was marched from Catalonia to complete his complement of men. This division, with that at Ferrol, and that at Rochefort, forming together a force of about eighteen ships, was to proceed to Egypt, after having touched at Otranto, to take on board, at that place, 10,000 men for disembarkation. The designs, which we have before detailed, were now in a state of active progress.

In order to urge Spain to the feeble efforts which had been thus extorted from her with so much difficulty, the First Consul had performed all his promises towards her with implicit fidelity, and had even exceeded them. The house of Parma having received, in lieu of its duchy, the fine country of Tuscany, which had been for a long time past the ardent wish of the court of Madrid, it was considered necessary to secure the consent of Austria in order to perfect this transfer. The First Consul had endeavoured to obtain it, and had been successful. The duchy of Tuscany had been, moreover, erected into the kingdom of Etruria. The old reigning duke of Parma, a very devout prince, opposed to all the novelties of the day, was the brother, as we have already said, of the queen of Spain. His son, a young man very badly educated and brought up, had married an infanta, and resided at the Escorial. It was for this young married couple that the kingdom of Etruria was intended. Nevertheless, the First Consul having only promised this kingdom in exchange for the duchy of Parma, was not bound to deliver over the one, until the other was vacated, and that vacation could not take place, until the death or abdication of the old reigning duke; but this old duke had no thought of dying or abdicating. Notwithstanding the interest which the First Consul had to be disencumbered of such a tenant in Italy, he consented to tolerate him in Parma, by placing the infants immediately upon the throne of Etruria. He only required that they should come to Paris to receive the crown from his hands, as formerly the vassal monarchs repaired to ancient Rome, to receive the crown from the hands of the People-King. It was an extraordinary and imposing spectacle, which he desired to afford to Republican France. These young princes then quitted Madrid on their journey to Paris, at the very moment when their parents set out on the road to Badajos, in order to afford the favourite an opportunity of displaying himself at the head of an army.

Such were the complaisant means adopted by the First Consul to arouse the zeal of the court of Spain, and by which he hoped to make it co-operate in his designs.

At this moment every eye was turned towards Egypt. The

attention, the efforts, the hopes, and the fears of the two great belligerent powers, France and England, were directed to that country. It appeared as if these two nations, before laying down their arms, wished each, to make a last desperate effort to bring to as glorious and advantageous a termination as possible, the terrible war which had ravaged the whole world for the last ten years.

We have left Ganteaume endeavouring to get out of Brest, on the 3rd Pluviôse, 1801 (23rd of January), during a violent storm. The winds had been for a long time either light and baffling, or adverse. At length, during a gale from the north-west, which blew dead on shore, he had set sail in obedience to the commands of the aide-de-camp of the First Consul, Savary, who was at Brest, commissioned there to overcome all obstacles. This may have been very imprudent; but what was to be done in the presence of an enemy's fleet, which closely and incessantly blockaded the harbour of Brest, and only withdrew when cruising any longer became impossible, on account of the weather. It was necessary either to give up all thoughts of quitting the port, or to leave it when a gale drove the English to a distance. The squadron consisted of seven ships, two frigates and a brig, all fast sailing vessels, carrying 4000 troops, an immense quantity of stores, and numerous workmen, accompanied by their families, who were under the impression that they were bound for St. Domingo. They extinguished the lights on board the vessels of the squadron, that the enemy might not perceive them, and they hoisted sail in the greatest apprehension. A north-west wind was, of all others, the most dangerous to get out of Brest. It blew at the moment a tremendous gale, but fortunately it only reached its utmost point of violence, when they had cleared the banks, and had fairly got out to sea. They experienced terrific squalls with a frightfully heavy sea. The squadron sailed in order of battle, the admiral's ship, *Indivisible*, leading the van. She was followed by the *Formidable*, which carried the flag of rear-admiral Linois; the remainder of the division followed, each vessel being ready for action should the enemy heave in sight. They had hardly got out to sea when the wind, still increasing in fury, rent to shreds the three topsails of the *Formidable*. The ship *Constitution* lost her main top-masts. The *Dix-Août* and *Jean-Bart*, which were close upon her, took their positions upon the larboard and starboard, and kept her in sight till the following morning, in order to render her any assistance she might require. The brig, *Vautour*, made much water, and was on the point of foundering, but received timely assistance. In the midst of the gale and the darkness, the squadron was dispersed. The following morning at daybreak, Ganteaume, on the deck of the *Indivisible*, remained some time lying-to, with the view of rallying the squadron; but, fearing the return of the English, who had not yet made their appearance, and relying upon the rendezvous appointed to all the vessels, he set sail towards the rallying point agreed upon.



This point was fifty leagues to the westward of Cape St. Vincent, one of the most salient promontories of the western coast of Spain. The other vessels of the division, after having weathered the gale, repaired their damages at sea, by means of the stores they had on board, and subsequently all rejoined each other with the exception of the admiral's ship, which after waiting for them for some time, had set sail for the place of rendezvous. The only occurrence on the passage was the rencounter of the French frigate, the *Bravoure*, with the English frigate the *Concord*, which was watching the course of the division. Captain Dordelin, who commanded the *Bravoure*, bore up straight to the English frigate, and offered to engage her. He ran alongside of her and poured several broadsides into her, which caused frightful execution on her decks. Captain Dordelin was preparing to board her, when the English frigate continuing to manœuvre, so as to escape the danger, contrived to get clear off by making all sail.\*

The French frigate rejoined the division, and soon after, upon the meridian indicated, all the vessels assembled round the admiral's flag. They, in this manner, sailed for Gibraltar, after having escaped both the dangers of the storm and of the enemy almost by a miracle. The squadron was animated by the greatest ardour. They began to conjecture pretty shrewdly where they were bound for, and every man burned to share in the glorious mission of saving Egypt.

It was important to accelerate these movements, as at this moment the fleet of admiral Keith, assembled in the bay of Macri, upon the coast of Asia Minor, was only waiting for the last preparations of the Turks, always very tardy, to set sail, in order to transport a British army to the mouth of the Nile. It was necessary to be beforehand with them, and circumstances seemed to contribute thereto in the most fortunate manner. The English admiral St. Vincent, who commanded the blockading squadron off Brest, being too late apprised of the departure of Ganteaume, despatched admiral Calder in pursuit of him, with a force equal to that of the French division, that is to say, with seven ships and two frigates. The English, deeming it impossible that the French division would venture into the Mediterranean, in the midst of so many cruisers, deceived, moreover, by the reports which had been circulated, were under the impression that the French had gone in the direction of St. Domingo. Admiral Calder sailed, therefore, towards the Canaries, intending to proceed thence to the West Indies. During this time, Ganteaume had arrived off the straits, steering close to the coast of Africa, in order to keep out of sight of the English cruisers at Gibraltar. The wind, certainly, was not very favourable, but

---

\* The English pretend that it was the French frigate which withdrew from the action. The information I have obtained from two superior officers, who are still alive, and who were with the squadron, satisfy my mind respecting the accuracy of the details here given.

the moment was highly auspicious for the accomplishment of his purpose, as admiral Warren, who was incessantly cruising between Malta and Gibraltar, had but four ships, all the remainder of the English force being with admiral Keith, engaged in transporting the army intended for landing in Egypt. Unfortunately, Ganteaume was unaware of these circumstances, and the grave responsibility which rested upon him, caused him an irrepressible anxiety, which the cannon balls of the enemy would never have produced in his intrepid breast. Annoyed by two hostile vessels which approached him too closely, the *Sprightly*, cutter, and the *Success*, frigate, he gave them chase, and captured them both. At length he passed the straits, and bore down the Mediterranean. He had nothing more to do than to set every stitch of canvass, and make the best of his way towards the East. Admiral Warren, in fact, was lying snugly in Mahon harbour, while admiral Keith, with his hands full, and a fleet of 200 transports to look after, had not yet quitted the coast of Asia Minor. The shores of Egypt were thus perfectly accessible, and the succour for which the French were impatiently waiting, and which had been promised them so long, might have been easily conveyed to them. But Ganteaume, perpetually anxious for the safety of his squadron, and still more for the fate of the numerous troops he had on board, became apprehensive at the sight of the smallest vessel which he encountered. He imagined that there was between him and Egypt a hostile fleet, which was in fact not the case; he was, above all, alarmed at the state of his vessels, and feared that, should it be necessary to press all sail before an enemy of superior force, that he would not be able to effect it with his masts damaged by the gale, and hastily repaired at sea. He had thus lost all confidence in himself. Dissatisfied with the *Bravoure* frigate, which did not sail to his liking, he wanted to get rid of her, and send her to Toulon. Instead of sending her on to that port, and continuing himself to run along the coast of Africa, by steering a due easterly course, he committed the error of standing to the north, and getting in sight of Toulon. His intention was to escort the *Bravoure* part of the way, in order to protect her against the enemy's cruisers; an insufficient reason, certainly, as it was infinitely better to run the risk of losing the frigate than to place in jeopardy the fate of the whole enterprise. Owing to this blunder, he was perceived by admiral Warren, who instantly quitted Mahon. Ganteaume, to deceive him, pretended to give chase. The gallant captain Bergeret, in command of the ship the *Dix-Août*, outstripping the other vessels of our squadron, reconnoitred the English more closely, and only discerned four line of battle ships, and two frigates. Delighted at this discovery he thought that, being superior in force to the English, we should bear down upon them and give chase, or engage with them. But suddenly a signal was thrown out to give up the pursuit, and to rejoin the squadron. This brave

officer, overwhelmed with mortification, immediately put himself in communication with Ganteaume, assured him that his watch on the look-out was mistaken, and that the enemy's force did not exceed four ships; unavailing efforts! Ganteaume thought he distinguished seven or eight, and resolved to continue his course towards the north. It was, however, perfectly certain, as the official report of admiral Warren has since shown, that we had really only four of the enemy's ships to contend against.\* Ganteaume then bore up towards the gulf of Lyons, in order to protect the *Bravoure*, and here, again catching sight of the English squadron, ran in consternation into Toulon. There, troubles of another sort awaited him, no less than the apprehension of having incurred the anger of the First Consul, indignant at finding so important an expedition placed in jeopardy when success seemed certain. This fatal conduct lost us Egypt, which at that moment might have been saved.

In fact, whilst Ganteaume was beating to windward between the coast of Africa and Mahon, two frigates, the *Justice* and the *Egyptienne*, which left Toulon with munitions of war, and 400 troops, had sailed to the eastward, without falling in with a single English vessel, and had got into Alexandria. Two other frigates, the *Régénérée* and the *Africaine*, from Rochefort, had proceeded round the peninsula, and got safe into the Mediterranean, without encountering any accident. Unfortunately, they parted company. The *Régénérée* arrived, without any untoward occurrence, before Alexandria on the 2nd of March, 1801 (11th Ventôse, year IX.). The *Africaine* fell in with an English frigate, during the night, and stopped to engage her. She had 300 troops on board, who, desirous of taking part in the engagement, occasioned frightful confusion, and, after an heroic defence, became the cause of their defeat. She was captured by the English frigate. But, as may be seen, out of six frigates which sailed, some from Toulon, some from Rochefort, three arrived in safety, finding the coast of Egypt free from the presence of the enemy, and so easily accessible, that they entered the port of Alexandria without firing a shot; so difficult it is for vessels to meet in the immensity of the ocean; so greatly does courage stand in aid of the brave officer, who ventures to risk his flag in the achievement of a glorious enterprise!

Ganteaume put into Toulon, on the 19th of February (30th Pluviôse), overwhelmed with fatigue and anxiety, experiencing, as he wrote to the First Consul,† every imaginable torment at the same moment; and well he might, since he had placed in jeopardy, interests of the highest consequence. The First

---

\* See the report of admiral Warren, of the 23d of April, 1801, inserted in the *Moniteur* of the 27th Messidor, year IX. (double number, 296 and 297.)

† See his letter of the 19th of February (30th Pluviôse), on the very day of his arrival at Toulon, and still preserved among the archives of the Admiralty.

Consul, naturally irritable, had but little or no command of temper, when his well-laid plans were marred through incapacity or mismanagement. But he had a thorough knowledge of human nature; he knew that it was not wise, at the very moment of action, to betray indications of dissatisfaction, because, by that course, men were disheartened, instead of being reanimated; he knew that Ganteaume required to be encouraged, supported, and not driven to despair, by any of those ebullitions of anger, which, at that time, were dreaded by all as the greatest of misfortunes. Accordingly, instead of loading him with reproaches, he despatched to him his aide-de-camp, Lacuée, to comfort and console him, to place funds at his disposal, and thus to urge him to proceed again to sea without delay. His rebuke was confined to censuring Ganteaume mildly, for having quitted the coasts of Africa for the Balearic islands, and for thus having brought admiral Warren in pursuit of him.

Ganteaume was a very brave man, a good seaman, and an excellent officer. But the state of his mind at this moment proves, that responsibility affects men far more than the cannon's danger. This is highly creditable to them, as it proves that they fear still more to compromise the interests with which they are intrusted, than to risk their own lives. Ganteaume, encouraged by the First Consul, set to work; but he lost time, either in repairing the damages done to his vessels, or in waiting for a favourable wind. More than one favourable opportunity still offered, and might have been improved. Admiral Warren had set sail towards Naples and Sicily. Admiral Keith, it is true, was on his way towards Aboukir, with the English army; but it was not impossible to deceive his vigilance, and to land the French troops, either beyond Aboukir, that is to say, at Damietta, or more on this side, at twenty or twenty-five leagues to the west of Alexandria, which would have enabled our troops to re-enter Egypt, [after a few marches across the desert.

Whilst every exertion was being made by the First Consul to expedite the second departure of Ganteaume, fresh letters from Paris were urging the organisation of the squadrons of Rochefort, of Ferrol, and of Cadiz, in order to convey succour to Egypt, by each of these channels at the same time. At length Ganteaume, reanimated by the exhortation of the First Consul, mingled with numberless testimonies of kindness, again set sail on the 19th of March (28th Ventôse). But, on going out of the harbour, the ship *Constitution* grounded. Two days elapsed before she could be got afloat. On the 22nd of March (1st Germinal), the squadron, consisting of seven ships of the line, and several frigates, again hoisted sail, and proceeded towards Sardinia, without being perceived by the English.

It was very desirable that these efforts should succeed, at least in part; for our army in Egypt, left to its own resources, was threatened by the troops collected from the east and the west. Nevertheless, reduced in strength as it was, it could have conquered the multitude of its enemies, as it had already done on the fields of Aboukir and Heliopolis, if it had been properly commanded. Unfortunately, general Bonaparte was no longer at its head. Desaix and Kléber were no more.

We must now describe the state of Egypt since the day on which an assassin's arm levelled to the dust the noble and majestic Kléber, the aspect of whose countenance alone sufficed, on the banks of the Rhine, as on the banks of the Nile, to inspire courage into the hearts of our legions, and made them forget the perils, the privations, and the sorrows of expatriation. We must describe the early prosperous condition of the colony, as well as the sudden and disastrous sequel which ensued. This is imperative; for it is instructive to present to the eyes of a nation the spectacle of its reverses, as well as of its successes, that it may deduce a salutary lesson therefrom. Amid the unparalleled successes of the Consulate, the fruit of an admirable and wise course of conduct, assuredly one single misfortune cannot dim the lustre of the picture, which it is my task to delineate; but a feeling of patriotic duty impels me to inculcate upon our warriors, and upon our generals, still more than upon our soldiers, the painful lesson exhibited during the latter period of our occupation of Egypt. May it cause them to reflect upon their too natural tendency to disunion, especially where there is not a powerful arm to enforce a salutary state of subordination, and to direct against the common enemy the active energy of their minds, and the impetuosity of their passions!

At the time of Kléber's death, Egypt was, to all appearance, perfectly submitted to our arms. After having witnessed the grand vizier's army dispersed in the twinkling of an eye, and the revolt of 300,000 inhabitants of Cairo suppressed, in a few days, by a handful of soldiers, the Egyptians looked upon the French troops as invincible, and deemed their settlement on the banks of the Nile, as a decree of fate. They, besides, became familiarised with their European masters, and found that the new yoke was less burdensome than the old, as they paid less taxes than under the Mamelukes, and did not receive, at the time when the *miri* was collected, a severe bastinado, as when under the dominion of their now dispossessed co-religionists. Mourad Bey, that Mameluke prince, of so gallant and chivalrous a character, who had at length become attached to the French, held Upper Egypt in fief. He proved a faithful vassal, paid his tribute punctually, and administered with prudence the government of the Upper Nile. He was an ally upon whom we could depend. A single brigade of about 2,500 men, stationed in the



environs of Beni-sonef, and always ready to fall back on Cairo, sufficed to hold Upper Egypt ; which was a great advantage, considering the very limited number of our effective troops.

Our troops having shared the mistake of their general, at the period of the convention of El-Arisch, and having repaired it with him on the plains of Heliopolis, were still mindful of their error, and not disposed to fall into it again. Conscious that they had to render an account to the Republic of so magnificent a possession, they no longer harboured the thought of evacuating it. Besides, general Bonaparte had now arrived at supreme power ; he had explained the reasons of his departure, and was no longer considered as a deserter. Still, conceiving themselves under the care of their old general, they now entertained no sort of anxiety about the future. Thanks, indeed, to the forethought of the First Consul, who had chartered ships in various ports, a week did not pass over, without some vessels, either large or small, arriving at Alexandria ; they brought supplies of ammunition, European commodities, newspapers, private correspondence, and the government despatches. In consequence of this frequent intercourse, the parent country was, as it were, present to every one's imagination. Doubtless, emotions of regret quickly took possession of their minds, whenever any peculiar circumstances touched their feelings. On the death of Kléber, for example, when general Menou assumed the command, every one's thoughts again turned towards France. A general of brigade, in presenting his officers to Menou, asked him, if at length, he intended to lead them back to their country. Menou sharply rebuked him, and announced, in an order of the day, his formal resolution to conform to the intention of the government, which was, to keep the colony for ever—a decision to which all ranks submitted. But the reason which most prevailed with them was, that general Bonaparte was in possession of power ; and this fact formed the strongest grounds, with the old veterans of Italy, for confidence and for hope.

The troops were punctually paid ; provisions at very low prices. Instead of being paid in rations, they received payment in money. Bread was the only article which was served out to them. They thus enjoyed the advantages of low prices, combined with great abundance, frequently enjoying the luxury of poultry, instead of butchers' meat. They were in great need of cloth ; but the climate being warm, they supplied the want of it, for a principal part of their dress, by calico, of which there is abundance in Egypt. For the rest of their dress, they had taken all the cloth brought from the East in the course of trade, of whatever colour it might be. There resulted from this a little diversity in their uniforms ; and some regiments, for example, were to be seen dressed in blue, or red, or green ; but, at any rate, the men were clothed, and presented a fine, soldier-like appearance. The learned colonel Conte rendered the most

essential service to the army, by the fertility of his inventions. He had brought with him a company of *aérostiers*, the remnant of the *aérostiers* of Fleurus. It was a company of mechanics, of every trade, organised under military discipline. With their assistance, he had erected, at Cairo, machines for weaving, fulling, and carding cloth ; and, as there was plenty of wool, they hoped soon to be able completely to supersede the cloths of Europe. It was the same with gunpowder. The mills erected at Cairo, by M. Champy, already produced sufficient for all the wants of the army. The inland trade was increasing visibly. The caravans, now well protected, began to arrive from the centre of Africa. The Arabs of the Red Sea repaired to the ports of Suez and Cosséir, where they exchanged their coffee, perfumes, and dates, for the wheat and rice of Egypt. The Greeks, taking advantage of the Turkish flag, and more alert than the English cruisers, brought to Damietta, Rosetta, and Alexandria, oil, wines, and various commodities. In a word, nothing was wanting for the present, and great resources were in course of preparation for the future. The officers, perceiving that the definitive occupation of Egypt was a thing quite decided upon, made their arrangements to settle themselves down, with as little uncomfortableness as possible. Those who lived at Alexandria or at Cairo—and most of them did so—found there very commodious quarters. Syrian, Greek, and Egyptian women—some purchased of the slave-dealers, and others yielding to a voluntary inclination—came and shared their accommodations. Sorrow was banished. Two engineers had built a theatre at Cairo, in which French pieces were represented by the officers. The soldiers fared no worse than their commanders ; and, thanks to the elasticity of the French character, which adapts itself with facility to the manners of all nations, they might be seen smoking and taking coffee, in the society of the Turks and Arabs.

The financial resources of Egypt, well administered, were sufficient to provide for all the wants of the army. Egypt had paid under the Mamelukes, according as the taxes were more or less vigorously exacted, from 36,000,000 francs to 40,000,000 francs (1,440,000*l.* to 1,600,000*l.* sterling) per annum. It did not pay at this period more than 20,000,000 francs to 25,000,000 francs (800,000*l.* to 1,000,000*l.* sterling), and the collection was not so oppressive. These 20,000,000 francs or 25,000,000 francs covered the expenses of the colony, inasmuch as all the charges together seldom exceeded 1,700,000 francs (68,000*l.* sterling) per month, or 20,400,000 francs (816,000*l.* sterling) per annum. The collection having gradually improved, and having become more regular and lenient, the burdens of the population were alleviated, and the resources of the army materially augmented ; an annual surplus of from 3,000,000 francs to 4,000,000 francs (120,000*l.* to 160,000*l.* sterling) might have been calculated

upon, which would have created a little fund, applicable to meet extraordinary exigencies, and to defray the cost of erecting buildings, adapted either for utility or defence. The army still amounted to 25,000, or 26,000, including supernumeraries, and the wives and children of many of the soldiers, and civil servants. In this number there were 23,000 soldiers, 6000 of whom were less effective, but yet fit to defend the fortified posts, leaving 17,000 or 18,000 able-bodied men, capable of the most active service. The cavalry was splendid; it rivalled the Mamelukes in courage, and surpassed them in discipline. The flying artillery executed its evolutions with rapidity, and was well served. The regiment mounted on dromedaries had reached a high state of perfection. It scoured the desert with extraordinary celerity, and had given the Arabs a great distaste for pillage. The average loss from mortality, was but trifling, as only 600 men were on the sick list out of 26,000 individuals. Nevertheless, in the contingency of a protracted war, we should have been short of men; but the Greeks eagerly enlisted, as well as the Copts. The blacks were bought at a very low price, and, remarkable for their fidelity, formed excellent recruits. The army, in time, might have received into its ranks 10,000 or 12,000 faithful and brave soldiers. Confident, even to excess, of its courage and experience in war, they did not doubt but that they would be able to drive into the sea all the Turks, or the English, which might be sent against them from Asia or Europe. It is certain, that under a good commander these 18,000 men, properly concentrated, and bearing down in a body against troops fresh landed, might have remained, despite every hostile effort, masters of the Egyptian shores. But it was requisite that they should be properly commanded; this was indispensable to the success of this army, as of every other.

Let us imagine Kléber, or, who would have been better, Desaix, the prudent, valiant Desaix, left in Egypt, from whence unfortunately the affectionate regard of the First Consul, withdrew him; let us imagine Kléber, escaping from the Mussulman's poniard, administering the government of Egypt during several years! Who can doubt but that he would have converted it into a flourishing colony, and that he would have founded a magnificent empire. In a healthy climate, exempt from even a single fever, a country of an inexhaustible fertility, a submissive peasantry, warmly attached to the soil, voluntary recruits, what vast superiority in these elements over the settlement which we are, at the present day, founding in Africa!

But instead of Kléber, instead of Desaix, it was Menou, who had become commander-in-chief of the army, by right of seniority. This was an irreparable misfortune for the colony, and it was a great mistake on the part the First Consul, not to have appointed a suitable successor. In his uncertainty, as to whether an order from him would reach Egypt in due course,



he was apprehensive lest the decree which nominated a new general, should fall into the hands of the English, who might make use of it, to disorganise the existing authority. They would have given out that Menou was deprived of his command, but would have kept back the order which appointed his successor. The command would, therefore, have been left in abeyance, during a longer or shorter period of time. Nevertheless, this excuse is not sufficient to justify the First Consul, if he were aware of the utter incapacity of Menou, in a military point of view. One reason decided him in favour of this general, and that was his known zeal for the preservation and colonisation of Egypt. Menou, in fact, had warmly opposed the project of evacuation, he had combated the influence of the officers of the Rhine, and had constituted himself, in a word, the leader of the colonial party. He had even pushed his enthusiasm to such a point, as to embrace Mahometanism, and to marry a Turkish woman. He took the name of Abdallah Menou. These eccentricities were a subject of merriment to our soldiers, who are naturally addicted to raillery; but they did not injure the settlement in the eyes of the Egyptians. Menou was a man of intelligence, with a good deal of acquired knowledge, and of indefatigable application to business; a strenuous advocate for colonisation, and possessing all the qualities necessary for the discharge of administrative duties, but was nevertheless wanting in all the qualifications requisite for a general. Devoid of experience, without rapid perception and decision, he was besides, altogether unfortunate in personal appearance. He was corpulent, very short-sighted, and a most ungraceful rider. The appointment of such a chief to the command of soldiers so alert, and so hardy as the French, was most injudicious. Moreover, there was in him a want of firmness of character, so that under his feeble authority, the chiefs of the army differing in opinion, were soon a prey to the most fatal discords.

Under general Bonaparte, there was in Egypt but one mind, but one will. Under Kléber there was, for a brief moment, two parties—the colonists and the anti-colonists—those who wished to remain, and those who wished to return home. But after the affront which the English attempted to offer to our soldiers—an affront gloriously avenged at Heliopolis—after the admitted necessity of remaining, order was completely restored. Under the imposing authority of Kléber, order and union prevailed. But the interval which elapsed between the victory of Heliopolis and the death of Kléber was brief, too brief. No sooner had Menou assumed the command, than union ceased to exist.

General Reynier, an excellent officer on the staff, having served in that capacity in the armies of the Rhine, but cold, without any personal appearance, without ascendancy over the

soldiers, enjoyed, nevertheless, the general esteem of every one. He was considered as one of the officers best qualified to figure at the head of an army. After Menou, he was highest in point of seniority. On the very day of Kléber's death, a warm altercation took place between Reynier and Menou, not as to which was entitled to the command, but as to which should assume that responsibility and burden. Neither of them wished to undertake it; and, indeed, on that day, the position of matters was most alarming. They were under the apprehension that the dagger's blow, under which general Kléber had fallen, was the signal for a wide-spread insurrection, organised throughout Egypt by the influence of the Turks and the English. The heavy responsibility of the command, at so critical a juncture, was greatly to be dreaded. Menou yielded, nevertheless, to the entreaties of Reynier, and the other generals, and consented to become the chief of the colony. But they were soon enlightened about their actual situation, by the profound tranquillity which followed the death of Kléber; and the command, at first declined, was subsequently regretted. General Reynier now coveted, that which he had begun by refusing. Under his cold, retiring, and even timid exterior, there lurked excessive vanity. The authority of Menou became insupportable to him. Quiet and submissive up to that time, he became henceforward a murmurer and a caviller. He found fault with every thing. Menou had accepted the command at the pressing solicitations of his companions in arms, and had assumed the title of "Commander-in-chief *ad interim*." Reynier carped at the title adopted by Menou. At Kléber's funeral, Menou had assigned the four corners of the coffin to the generals of divisions, and followed behind, at the head of the staff. Reynier discovered in this, that he had aped the viceroy. Menou had appointed the illustrious Fourier to pronounce the eulogy over the grave of Kléber; Reynier pretended that it was a slight upon Kléber's memory, to have the panegyric pronounced by any one but the general-in-chief. Some delay in the subscription opened to erect a monument to Kléber, difficulties in the administration of his property, very slender, indeed, like that of most of our noble warriors at that period—these, and other puerilities were interpreted by Reynier, and by those who followed his example, in the most vexatious manner. We repeat these wretched tales, which would be unworthy of history, if their very insignificance were not instructive, by showing to what paltry shifts groundless discontent will sometimes stoop. Reynier, then, became an insubordinate, silly, and culpable lieutenant. He was joined by general Dumas, a friend of Kléber, chief of the general staff, who harboured in his breast all the jealousy of the army of the Rhine, against the army of Italy. The spirit of opposition then had its seat in the very staff itself. Menou would not permit

this so near to him, and resolved to deprive general Dumas of the post which he had occupied under Kléber.

The malecontents, thus disconcerted, endeavoured to parry off this blow, by deputing the prudent and brave general Friant to confer with Menou; the former, exclusively absorbed in his duties, only interfered in the hope of effecting a reconciliation. Menou, more firm than usual, would not give way, and appointed general Lagrange in the room of general Dumas. Thenceforth, coming less in contact with his enemies, he was less exposed to their annoyances: this, however, added fresh virulence to their irritation, and the disunion amongst the chiefs of the army only became the more scandalous, and the more alarming. Reflecting men lamented the shock which might be thus given to the ruling authority, a lamentable shock in any place, but still more so where the danger is imminent, and the supreme power at a distance.

Menou, a bad general, but an indefatigable administrator, laboured night and day at what he called the organisation of the colony. Some of his measures were judicious, others decidedly bad; but where he principally erred, was in attempting too much. He first set about bringing up the arrears of pay, by employing for this purpose the contribution of 10,000,000frs. imposed by Kléber upon the Egyptian cities, as a punishment for the last revolt. It was one way of maintaining peace and subordination in the army; for, at the period of the convention of El-Arisch, a tendency to insubordination had been perceptible, caused chiefly by the pay being somewhat in arrears. Menou accordingly regarded the regular payment of what was due to the soldiers, as a sure guarantee of order and discipline amongst them, and he was in the right. But he adopted the indiscreet course, of discharging the pay of the soldiers, prior to the liquidation of any other demands, without reflecting upon those unavoidable emergencies which inevitably arise during war. He directed his attention to the preparation of the bread for the troops, the quality of which he much improved. He organised hospitals, and applied himself carefully to the introduction of order in the public accounts. Menou was a man of the most sterling integrity, but rather inclined to declamation. He expatiated so often, in his orders of the day, on his intention of re-establishing strict honesty in the army, that he wounded the feelings of all the generals. These latter asked him with bitterness, if nothing but pilfering and robbery had prevailed before the government of Menou, and if integrity dated its introduction amongst them from the period when he assumed the command? In fact, it was true, that few malversations had been committed since the occupation of Egypt. Our army had captured a considerable prize after the violation of the convention of El-Arisch, in the port of Alexandria, consisting of some of the numerous vessels which came, under the Turkish flag, to transport the

army to France, and which were almost all laden with merchandise. A commission was appointed to sell it on account of the colonial treasury. Menou appeared dissatisfied with the proceedings of this commission, and with general Lanusse who had the command in Alexandria; he recalled the latter, in such a manner as reflected upon his character, and appointed general Friant in his room. General Lanusse was deeply exasperated at this, and, on his return to Cairo, increased the number of the disaffected. Menou went still further, he tried to alter the system of contributions, and in this respect committed some very serious errors. Doubtless, at a later period, a reform in the finances of Egypt would have been practicable. By means of an equitable distribution of the land revenue, and by means of some taxes judiciously levied upon articles of consumption, which could occasion no dispute in the mode of levying them, it would have been easy to relieve the Egyptian people, and to increase considerably the income of the public treasury. But at the moment, exposed as they were to attacks from without, it was not quite expedient to create further difficulties within the colony, and to make the people suffer from vexatious charges, the full benefit of which they were unable at first to appreciate. The collection of the old taxes, with a greater degree of regularity and justice, was quite sufficient to establish, between the Mamelukes and the French, a comparison extremely favourable to the latter, and to augment considerably the fund applicable to the army. Menou conceived the idea of a general assessment of property, a new system for the levying of the land tax, and above all, the exclusion of the Copts, who in Egypt farmed the revenue, and performed almost the same services as the Jews in the north of Europe. These projects, very prudent for a future period, were exceedingly inexpedient at the moment. Menou, fortunately, had not time to put all his plans into execution; but he did carry into effect that of imposing new contributions. The sheiks, *El-Beled*, municipal magistrates of Egypt, were, at certain periods, publicly invested with the municipal authority, and received, on these occasions, as presents, either pelisses of honour or shawls, from the investing governors. They made a suitable return for these gifts by presents of horses, camels, and cattle. The Mamelukes renewed this ceremony as often as possible, on account of the profit which they derived from it. Some of them even had commuted it into a money payment. Menou conceived the idea of making this measure general, and of rendering it applicable to the whole of Egypt. He imposed upon the sheiks, *El-Beled*, a tax which might amount to 2,500,000 fra. (100,000*l.* sterling). They were certainly rich enough to bear it, and even to some amongst them, this regular impost was a relaxation of taxation. But they possessed a great influence among the 2500 villages placed under their authority, and we ran the risk of turning public opinion against us when we attempted to en-

force an absolute uniform tax, without any compensation, and which, moreover, involved with it the suppression of a custom which had a very useful moral tendency. Menou, possessed with the notion of assimilating Egypt to France, which he called civilising it, conceived also a system of *octrois* (town dues). Egypt had its taxes on articles of consumption, which were collected in the *okels*, a sort of warehouses in the East, wherein is deposited every species of merchandise, in course of transit from one place to another. This mode of collection was simple and easy. Menou wished to convert it into a tax, to be levied at the gates of the cities, which are very few in number in Egypt. In addition to the disturbance which this occasioned in the general habits of the people, the immediate effect was, to raise the prices of provisions in the garrisons, to throw a considerable portion of this increase of price upon the soldiery, and thus to excite fresh murmurs. Finally, Menou determined upon levying contributions on the rich merchants who escaped the payment of the public taxes, that is to say, on the Copts, the Greeks, the Jews, the Damascenes, and the Franks, &c. He imposed on them a capitation or poll tax of 2,500,000 frs. (100,000*l.* sterling). The burden would not have been too onerous certainly, at all events for the Copts, who were enriched by the farming of the revenue. But the latter had been great sufferers by the revolt of Cairo; they were, moreover, useful, as it was to their purse that it was necessary to have recourse, when a sum of money, by way of loan, was required. It was, therefore, any thing but prudent to alienate their feelings, or those of the Greek and European merchants, who, considerably resembling us in manners, usages, and intelligence, ought to have been the natural medium of intercourse between ourselves and the Egyptians. Finally, Menou levied a legacy duty, the provisions of which he wished even to extend to the army, which became a fresh subject of complaint for the disaffected.

This mania for assimilating a colony to the parent country, with the notion that, in coming in collision with their prejudices, he was civilising it, took full possession of Menou, who, like all colonisers with confined views, are generally more anxious to see things progressing fast, than proceeding well. To complete his work, Menou established a private council, not composed of five or six military chiefs, but of about fifty civil and military officers, selected from all ranks. It was, in fact, a parliament, which ridicule alone prevented from meeting. He even established an Arabic journal for the purpose of promulgating officially to the Egyptians, and to the army, the acts of the French authorities.

In the meantime, the soldiers paid but little attention to these innovations. They lived well, laughed at Menou, but were pleased with his good nature and general solicitude for their welfare. The inhabitants were submissive, and found, after all, the yoke of the French far less onerous than that of



the Mamelukes. But there were others infinitely more irritable, and these were, the malecontents in the army. It was only by absolutely doing nothing, and avoiding every act which could expose him to their rankling venom, that Menou could have escaped censure, and even then his inaction would have been made a subject of animadversion. But Menou was too full of all his schemes of organisation, not to furnish full scope for their censoriousness. They took advantage of these, and proceeded to such lengths as even to plan the deposition of their commander-in-chief—an act of madness which would have convulsed the colony, and would have converted the army of Egypt into a prætorian band. The officers in several regiments were sounded upon the subject, but they were found so well disposed, so little inclined to revolt, that the idea was relinquished. Reynier and Dumas had brought over Lanusse to their faction, and, united, they gained over Belliard and Verdier; thus, with the exception of general Friant, all the generals of divisions soon became parties to this fatal opposition. Two old members of the convention, whom general Bonaparte had carried to Egypt, merely for the sake of giving them employment, Tallien and Isnard, were at Cairo, and, relapsing into their former habits, became the most violent of the agitators. The deposition of the commander-in-chief, being found impracticable, these generals conceived instead, the project of waiting upon Menou in a body, to state their objections to some of his measures, which were doubtless very censurable. They accordingly repaired to him, without giving any notice, and surprised Menou by their unexpected appearance. They detailed to him all their complaints, to which he listened with marks of great displeasure, but not without exhibiting a certain degree of dignity. He promised to consider some of their remarks, and was weak enough not to reprimand at once the gross impropriety of their conduct. This proceeding gave great scandal in the army, and was severely blamed. The issue was, that Isnard and Tallien suffered for all, and were shipped off to Europe.

At this juncture the order of the First Consul arrived, which confirmed Menou in his post, and invested him with the authority of commander-in-chief in a definitive manner. This expression of the supreme will came very opportunely, and had the effect of recalling a part of the disaffected to their duty. Unhappily fresh contentions arose, and matters soon relapsed into their former state.

It was in paltry disputes that these discontented minds, soured by exile, their dissensions encouraged by the imbecility of their commander, employed the time which had elapsed since the battle of Heliopolis up to the present moment, that is to say, an entire year: precious moments, which ought to have been employed in living united, and in making preparations by union to repel the formidable enemy about to land in Egypt.

The waters of the Nile were falling, and resuming their natural bed; the lately inundated parts of the country were beginning to dry. The period for landing was arrived. The month of February, 1801 (Ventôse, year IX.), was fast approaching. The English and the Turks were preparing to make new attacks upon the colony. The grand vizier, the same whom Kléber had beaten at Heliopolis, was at Gaza, between Palestine and Egypt, not having dared to make his appearance at Constantinople, since his defeat; having only 10,000 to 12,000 men left in his army, which had been eaten up by the plague, and obliged every day to fight with the mountaineers of Palestine, who had risen against such visiters. That enemy was not to be feared for a long time to come. The capitan Pacha, the enemy of the vizier, a favourite of the sultan, was cruising with some vessels, between Syria and Egypt. He was desirous of renewing the convention of El-Arisch, hoping but little to reconquer Egypt by force of arms, and greatly distrusting the English, whom he strongly suspected of wishing to wrest this fine country from the hands of the French, only in order to retain it themselves. In short, 18,000 men, concentrated at Macri, in Asia Minor, some of them English, others Hessians, Swiss, Maltese, or Neapolitans, commanded exclusively by English officers, and under excellent discipline, were about to be embarked on board Lord Keith's squadron, and landed in Egypt, under the orders of an able and distinguished general, sir Ralph Abercromby.

To these 18,000 European soldiers were to be added 6000 Albanians, whom the capitan Pacha was transporting at this moment on board his squadron; 6000 sepoys, coming from India by way of the Red Sea, and about 20,000 indifferent troops from the east, ready to join the 10,000 men under the grand vizier in Palestine. Thus there were about 60,000 soldiers whom the army of Egypt was likely to have to deal with. To oppose them, we had but 18,000 fighting men. Nevertheless, these were enough, and even more than sufficient, if the direction of them had been placed in judicious hands.

First, there was no danger of being surprised, for advices arrived from all parts, from the Archipelago, by means of Greek vessels, as well as from Upper Egypt, through Mourad Bey, and even from Europe itself, by means of the unintermitting advices of the First Consul. All these notices intimated distinctly the near approach of an expeditionary army, composed both of Orientals and Europeans. Menou, deaf to the warnings which reached him, in this critical moment did nothing which he ought to have done, and neglected what was clearly indispensable in the actual state of things.

Good policy would have at once dictated the prudence of sedulously keeping on good terms with Mourad Bey, by treating him becomingly, inasmuch as he commanded Upper Egypt, and, moreover, preferred the French to the Turks or the English.

Menou neglected this precaution, and replied to the information sent by Mourad Bey, in such a manner as to alienate him from us, had that been possible. Good policy would further have prompted Menou to take advantage of the distrust entertained by the Turks of the English, and, without a repetition of the disgraceful convention of El-Arisch, to retard their operations by a pretended negotiation, which, by engaging their attention, would have paralysed their efforts. This expedient, or, indeed, any other, never entered into the imagination of Menou.

With regard to the administrative and military measures, which the urgency of the case required, he was totally incompetent to devise any suitable to the occasion. The first thing requisite was to collect at Rosetta, at Damietta, at Ramanieh, at Cairo, and at every point where the army might have to assemble, a large stock of war supplies, which is always practicable in a country so abundant as Egypt. Menou refused to do this, declining to divert the funds from their application to the pay of the troops, which he had promised to discharge punctually to the day—a point which the difficulty of collecting the new taxes only just enabled him to accomplish at this moment. The cavalry and artillery ought to have been remounted, as they form the most efficacious means of opposing a landing army, which is usually destitute of these two branches of the service. He refused to do this, for the same financial reasons. He carried his want of foresight to such a point, as to select this moment to cut the artillery horses, which were stallions, their mettle rendering them very troublesome in harness. Lastly, Menou opposed the concentration of the troops, which the health of the soldiers rendered desirable at this season, even if no danger had threatened Egypt. Indeed, some cases of plague had already occurred. To encamp the troops, and withdraw them from the cities, was urgently necessary, independently of the propriety of keeping them more disposable for an emergency. The army, scattered over the garrisons, or uselessly collected in a body at Cairo, or employed in the collection of the *miri*, was nowhere in a position to act efficaciously. Nevertheless, by an able distribution of the 23,000 men remaining, of which number 17,000 or 18,000 were capable of active service, Menou had quite sufficient force for the defence of Egypt at every point. He might be attacked by way of Alexandria, on account of the roads of Aboukir, situated in the neighbourhood, and always preferred as a place of landing; by way of Damietta, another point fit for effecting a landing, although far less favourable than that of Aboukir; or, thirdly, by way of the Syrian frontiers, where the vizier was stationed with the wreck of his army. Of these three points, there was only one seriously menaced, which was Alexandria, and the roadstead at Aboukir—a thing easy to be foreseen, as every body was of that opinion, and it was openly



spoken of, throughout the whole army. The beach at Damietta, on the contrary, was of difficult access, and was connected by so few points with the Delta, that the invading army, even had it effected a landing, could have been easily surrounded, and soon compelled to re-embark. It was not, then, very probable that the English would approach by way of Damietta. On the side of Syria, the vizier could inspire but little apprehension. He was too weak, and was smarting too deeply under the recollection of Heliopolis, to venture to take the initiative. He would only venture to advance, after the English had succeeded in effecting a landing. In any case, it was not imprudent to let him advance, as the nearer he advanced towards us, the more he compromised himself. The paramount subject for the consideration of the general-in-chief ought, therefore, to have been the English army, the landing of which was announced shortly to take place. In this posture of affairs, a strong division ought to have been left around Alexandria, that is to say, 4000 or 8000 active troops, independently of the sailors, and the dépôts keeping guard in the garrisons. Two thousand would have sufficed at Damietta. The regiment of Dromedaries would have been enough to keep guard on the frontiers of Syria. A garrison of 3000 men at Cairo, which would have been joined by the 2000 men stationed in Upper Egypt, and reinforced by some thousand French troops in the dépôts, would have sufficed, and more than sufficed, to keep in check the population of the capital, if even the vizier had appeared before its walls. These various duties absorbed 11,000 or 12,000 men, out of the 17,000 or 18,000 effective troops. There remained a reserve of 6000 chosen men, which ought to have formed a large camp, exactly intermediate between Alexandria and Damietta. There was a spot which combined all the requisites for such a purpose; that was Ramanieh, a healthy station, on the banks of the Nile, not far from the sea, capable of being easily provisioned, situated at one day's journey from Alexandria, two days' from Damietta, and three or four from the frontiers of Syria. If Menou had established at Ramanieh his reserve of 6000 men, he might, at the first notice, have transported it, in twenty-four hours to Alexandria, in forty-eight hours to Damietta, and even, if it had been necessary, in three or four days to the frontiers of Syria. Such a force would have rendered powerless all the attempts of the enemy.

Menou did not think of any of these means, and not only did not think of them, but rejected the advice of all those who were anxious to press them upon his consideration. Good advice reached him from all sides, and especially from the generals who were opposed to him. The latter—we must do them this justice, and amongst them Reynier, more conversant than the others with great military tactics—made known to him the danger, and pointed out the measures which ought to have been taken; but they had lost all influence over the commander-in-chief by

reason of their intemperate opposition, and now that they were in the right, they were not more listened to than when they were in the wrong.

The gallant Friant, a stranger to these fatal discords, was zealously engaged in getting Alexandria into a state of defence. He had organised the sailors, and the troops in the depôts, with the view of intrusting them with the guard of the forts; but this being provided for, he had scarcely more than 2000 effective men, that he could collect upon the spot where the debarkation might take place. It was also necessary to employ part of these to guard the principal points of the coast, such as the fort of Aboukir, the forts of the Maison-Carrée, the Edko, and Rosetta. After placing garrisons at these posts, he had about 1200 men left. Fortunately, the frigate, the *Régénérée*, had brought from Rochefort, a reinforcement of 300 men, with a considerable supply of military stores. Thanks to this unexpected event, the available force of general Friant amounted to 1500 men. It may easily be conceived what assistance at this moment the squadron of general Ganteaume would have been, if, relying a little more upon fortune, that admiral had landed thus opportunely, the 4000 picked men who were on board his fleet.

General Friant, although his force was thus insufficient, only applied for two battalions more, and a regiment of cavalry. In point of fact, this force would have been sufficient, but it was foolhardy in such a conjuncture to trust to a reinforcement of only 1000 men. It is too true that the self-confidence of the army contributed very much to its defeat. Our troops had formed the habit of fighting in Egypt one against four, sometimes one against eight, and they had not formed a correct notion of the tactics of the English when effecting a landing. They thought that they could only land about 100 men at a time, without artillery and without cavalry; they thought, too, that the English could not withstand a charge of the bayonet. This was a fatal illusion. Nevertheless, the re-inforcement solicited by Friant, inconsiderable as it was, would have saved the colony: the subsequent events will establish this.

On the 28th of February, 1801 (9th Ventôse, year IX.), an English pinnace was descried not far from Alexandria, which seemed to be making a reconnoissance. Some boats were dispatched in pursuit of her, and captured her, with the officers on board, who were commissioned to make the arrangements for the landing. The papers found upon them left no longer any doubt. Immediately afterwards, the English fleet, consisting of seventy sail, hove in sight, off Alexandria, but stress of weather obliged them to stand again out to sea. Fortune left us yet another chance of saving Egypt from the hands of the English; for it was thus very improbable that any landing could be attempted

by them for several days to come. The above intelligence, transmitted by Friant to Cairo, reached that place on the 4th of March (13th Ventôse) in the afternoon. If Menou had, without loss of time, come to a prompt and rational decision, every thing might have been repaired. If he had ordered the entire army to fall back towards Alexandria, the cavalry would have reached that place in four days, the infantry in five, and thus, on the 8th or the 9th of March (17th or 18th Ventôse), from 10,000 to 12,000 men might have been assembled on the sands of Aboukir. It was possible, that by this time the English would have already disembarked their troops, but it would have been quite impossible for them to have got their artillery, ammunition, and stores on shore, or to have strengthened their position, and our troops would have arrived quite in sufficient time to have driven them into the sea. Reynier, who was at Cairo, wrote to Menou, on that very day, a letter couched in most convincing language. He advised him to disregard the vizier, who would not take the initiative in offensive operations, and also Damietta, which did not seem to be the point in danger, but to cover Alexandria, with the whole strength of his forces. Nothing could be more correct. Happen what might, he risked nothing by marching towards Ramanieh, for on his arrival at that place, if he ascertained that the danger was at Damietta, or Syria, he could, with ease, direct his steps to either one or other of these two points. Not a day would thus have been lost, and he would be so much nearer to Alexandria, where the real danger threatened. But it was indispensable to decide at once, instantly; and to set out on that very night. Menou turned a deaf ear to this, and became peremptory in his orders; whilst at the same time, he was wholly unsettled in his own notions how to act. Not being able to distinguish clearly the point really menaced, he dispatched a reinforcement to general Rampon at Damietta. He directed Reynier, with his division, towards Balbeïs, to oppose the vizier on the coast of Syria. He sent forward the division of Lanusse, towards Ramanieh; yet he did not send the whole, as he kept back the 88th demi-brigade at Cairo. He only dispatched at the moment the 17th chasseurs. General Lanusse had orders to proceed to Ramanieh, and according to the intelligence he might receive at that point, was to decide upon the expediency of advancing upon Alexandria. Menou remained in person at Cairo, with a large portion of his forces, awaiting further news in this position, so far distant from the sea-coast. Incapacity could not be carried to a greater extreme.

During this time, events succeeded each other with rapidity. The English fleet consisted of seven line-of-battle ships, a great number of frigates, brigs, and large ships belonging to the East India Company, in all seventy sail. There was on board an immense number of landing craft. As we said elsewhere, lord Keith commanded the naval forces; sir Ralph Abercromby the

troops. The spot which they fixed upon for the landing, was that which they had before chosen, that is to say, the roads of Aboukir. It was there, that our squadron had anchored in 1798; it was there, that it was discovered and destroyed by Nelson; it was there, that the Turkish squadron had landed the brave janissaries, driven into the sea by general Bonaparte, at the glorious victory of Aboukir. The English fleet, after having been obliged to keep out at sea for several days—a fatal delay for them, but which might have proved most fortunate for ourselves, if Menou had known how to profit by it, at length brought up in Aboukir roads on the 6th of March (15th Ventôse), at five leagues distance from Alexandria.

Lower Egypt, like Holland and Venice, is a country of swamps. It presents, like all countries of that description, peculiar features, which must be studied with attention, if we wish to have a clear idea of the military operations of which it may become the theatre. At the points where all the great rivers flow into the sea, sand-banks are formed in every direction round the estuary. These banks arise from the sands which are washed down by the river, and which, afterwards thrown back by the reflux of the tide, gradually settle and accumulate, under the action of these two opposing forces. They stretch out in a direction parallel to the shore, and form those bars so dreaded by mariners, always so difficult to pass in entering or leaving these rivers. They rise imperceptibly to the level of the water, then, in progress of time, above it, and exhibit the appearance of a long bank of sand, beaten against continually, from seawards, by the waves of the ocean, whilst the inland waters, from the rivers, whose current they impede, bathe them perpetually from the side of the land. The Nile, in flowing into the Mediterranean, has, before its numerous mouths, a vast semi-circle of these sand-banks. This semi-circle, which stretches out to an extent of at least seventy leagues, from Alexandria to Pelusium, is intersected near to Rosetta, Bourloz, Damietta, and Pelusium, by some channels through which the Nile forces its way towards the sea. Bathed on one side by the Mediterranean, it is watered on the other by the Lakes Maréotis, Maadié, by Lake Edko, and by the Lakes Bourloz and Menzaleh. Every landing in Egypt must necessarily be effected upon one of these sand-banks. Guided by precedent and necessity, the English selected that which forms the bank, or plain of Alexandria. This bank, about fifteen leagues in length, extends between the Mediterranean on one side, and the Lakes Mareotis and Maadié on the other; it has Alexandria built upon one of its extremities, and presents the form of a semi-circular sweep, which terminates in Rosetta. It is this sweep or bay which forms the roads of Aboukir. One of the extremities of this roadstead was defended by the fort of Aboukir, constructed by the French, its fire commanding the surrounding sands. A

succession of sand-hills skirts the whole shore, vanishing in the receding distance, on the other side of the roads, into a sandy, level plain. General Bonaparte had given orders for a fort to be built on these sand-hills. If his orders had been obeyed, all attempts at landing would have been completely frustrated.

It was in the middle of this roadstead, that the English vessels came to an anchor, ranged in two lines. They waited at anchor until the swell subsided, and permitted their boats to be launched. At length, on the 8th, in the morning (17th Ventôse), the weather being more moderate, lord Keith distributed 5000 picked men into 320 boats. These boats, arranged in two rows, under the direction of Captain Cochrane, advanced towards the shore, having, on each of their wings, a division of gun-boats. These gun-boats exchanged, with the guns on shore, a most severe cannonade.

General Friant, who had repaired to the spot, had formed his men at a short distance from the landing-place, in order to keep them sheltered from the fire of the English. He had posted a detachment of the 25th demi-brigade, with some pieces of cannon, between the fort of Aboukir, and the ground he occupied. On his left, he had stationed the 75th, two battalions strong, concealed by the sand-hills; in the centre, two squadrons of cavalry, one the 18th, and the other the 20th dragoons; lastly, on his right, the 61st demi-brigade, likewise two battalions strong, with orders to defend the lower part of the beach. His entire force was not more than 1500 men strong. Some advanced posts occupied the landing-place, and the French artillery, placed at the salient points on the land, swept the plain with their fire.

The English pulled towards the shore, the soldiers lying down in the bottoms of the boats; the sailors standing up, plying their oars with vigour, and sustaining the fire of the guns with unshaken coolness. Some of the sailors were struck down, but their places were instantly supplied by others. The whole mass, moved by one impulse, approached the shore. At length, the boats reached the beach, and the English soldiers started up from the bottoms of the boats, and sprung ashore. They formed, and rushed up the sandy slant which borders the whole roadstead. General Friant, apprised by his outposts, which fell back, came up himself to the scene of action rather too late. Nevertheless, he directed the 75th to the left, against the sand-hills, and the 61st to the right, towards the lower part of the shore. This latter regiment rushed down upon the English with impetuosity, charging them with fixed bayonets; and the latter were thus left on this side without support. The regiment pressed them vigorously, drove them into their boats, and even got into the boats with them. The grenadiers of this demi-brigade seized upon twelve of the boats, and made use of them to pour a deadly fire upon the enemy. The 75th, which receiving their orders too late, had thus given the English time



to seize upon the position on the left, now advanced precipitately to dislodge them. Exposed, by this movement, to the fire of the gunboats, it received a terrific discharge of grape-shot, which, at the first volley, killed thirty-two men, and wounded twenty. It encountered, also, at the same instant, the dreadful fire of the English infantry. This gallant demi-brigade, for a moment surprised, and not fighting, moreover, upon firm ground, advanced to the attack in some confusion. General Friant, desirous to support it, ordered a charge of cavalry upon the English centre, which was now deploying on the plain, having overcome the first obstacles. The commander of the 18th dragoons, who had been sent for several times to receive orders from the general, now came up, after having kept his men waiting. General Friant, in the midst of a shower of balls, pointed out to him the precise point where to make the attack. This officer, unfortunately infirm of purpose, did not advance direct against the enemy, but lost time in making a *détour*, made a very indifferent charge, and sacrificed the lives of many men and horses, without producing any effect upon the English, and without relieving the 75th, which was furiously attempting to repossess themselves of the sandy heights on the left. There still remained the 20th; a brave officer, named Boussart, who commanded it, charged at the head of his dragoons, and overthrew every thing which stood in his way. At this moment the 61st, which, towards the right, had remained masters of the shore, without, however, being able, alone, to overpower the mass of the enemy, collected fresh energy, followed up close to the 20th dragoons, pushed the left of the English upon their centre, and soon forced them to re-embark. The 75th, on its side, under a tremendous fire, fought with redoubled energy. If, at this instant, general Friant had had the two battalions of infantry, and the regiment of cavalry, for which he had so many times applied, it would have been all over with the English, who would have been driven into the sea. But a body of 1200 picked men, consisting of Swedes and Irish, turned the sand-hills, and took the 75th in flank. The latter was thus again compelled to give way. It retired, leaving the 61st on our right, bent fiercely upon gaining the day, but endangered by its over-excess of courage.

General Friant, perceiving that the 75th was obliged to fall back, and that the 61st might be surrounded, then ordered a retreat, which was effected in good order. The grenadiers of the 61st, flushed with success, and with the excitement of the carnage, reluctantly obeyed the orders of the general, and, in retiring, kept the English in check by their vigorous charges.

This unfortunate battle of the 8th of March (17th Ventôse), decided the fate of Egypt. The brave general Friant had, perhaps, chosen his first position a little too far from the shore; perhaps, also, he had relied too much upon the superiority of

his soldiers, and he had imagined, too lightly, that the English could not land but a small number of troops at a time. But this confidence was very excusable, and, after all, justified; for, if he had had only one or two battalions more, the English would have been repulsed, and Egypt would have been saved. But what can be said in extenuation of the commander-in-chief, who, warned of his danger two months before, through various channels, had neglected to concentrate his forces at Ramanieh, which would have enabled him to collect 10,000 men before Aboukir, on that decisive day?—who, advised again on the 4th of March, by the most positive intelligence which reached Cairo on that day, did not send forward any troops, although they might have arrived on the morning of the 8th, and accordingly would have been there in time to repel the English? What can be said of admiral Ganteaume, who might have landed 4000 men in Alexandria, on the same day that the *Régénérée* brought 300 men, who, in fact, fought on the plains of Aboukir? What can be said of so many acts of timidity, negligence, and errors of all kinds, unless it be that there are some days when every thing unites to cause the loss of battles, or the downfall of empires?

The fighting had been murderous on both sides. The English computed their loss at 1100 men, killed and wounded, out of the 5000 who had landed. We had about 400, put *hors de combat*, out of 1500 who were in the field. Our troops, then, had fought well. General Friant retired under the walls of Alexandria, and immediately sent off news, both to Menou and to the generals stationed near him, urging them to hasten up to his assistance.

Nevertheless, every thing might have been retrieved, if the time which still remained had been properly employed to bring up the forces left undisposed of, and advantage had been taken of the difficulties which the English were about to encounter, now that they had landed upon the sandy plain.

In the first place, they had to disembark the main body of their army, then to get on shore their guns, ammunition, and baggage, which would require some time. They had to advance along the sand-bank to arrive at Alexandria, with the sea on their right, the Lakes Maadié and Maréotis on their left, supported, it is true, by their gun-boats, but without any cavalry, and without any other field-pieces than those which the men could drag along. It was evident that these operations must be slow, and exceedingly difficult when they reached Alexandria, as to get out of that defile, they would be reduced either to take that city, or to proceed on the narrow spits of land which communicate with the interior of Egypt. If we wished to succeed in checking their advance, we ought to have avoided engaging in these partial and unequal actions, which only inspired them with confidence, and reduced our forces, already far too scanty in number. Even without fighting, we were sure, if we selected



a good position, to completely obstruct their passage. There was, therefore, but one sensible course to be pursued, and that was, to wait till Menou, who was now awakened to the full danger of his position, had concentrated his entire forces under the walls of Alexandria.

But general Lanusse had been sent with his division to Ramanieh. Having there become acquainted with what had taken place at Aboukir, he pressed his march towards Alexandria. He brought about 3000 men; Friant had lost 400 out of the 1500 in the battle of the 8th of March; but having drawn in all his outposts, spread between Rosetta and Alexandria, he had still 1700 or 1800 men. The forts of Alexandria were guarded by the seamen and soldiers of the dépôts. With the division of Lanusse, who was coming up, they could muster together nearly 5000 troops. The English had landed 16,000, exclusive of 2000 seamen. It would have been prudent not to have engaged in a second battle; but an accidental circumstance hurried these two generals into action.

The long sand-bank, upon which the English had landed, is separated by the Lakes Maadié and Maréotis from the inland parts of Egypt, with which it was only connected by a long spit of land, passing between the two lakes, and terminating at Ramanieh. Upon this spit the canal runs which conveys the fresh water of the Nile, down to Alexandria; this spit also forms the high road leading from Alexandria to Ramanieh. At this moment it was in danger of being occupied by the English, as they were near attaining the point where it joins the sand-bank upon which Alexandria stands. The English were occupied during the 9th, 10th, and 11th of March (18th, 19th, and 20th Ventôse), in landing and organising their forces. On the 12th, they commenced their movement in advance, marching laboriously in the sands, the artillery being dragged by the sailors of the squadron, and supported on the right and on the left by their gun-boats. On the night of the 12th they were within a short distance of the spot where the spit of land joins the site upon which Alexandria is built.

The generals Friant and Lanusse thought it dangerous to allow the English to possess themselves of this point, and abandon to them the road to Ramanieh, by which Menou must arrive. Nevertheless, supposing this road in their possession, there was still another, a long one, it is true, exceedingly difficult for the artillery; this was the bed of the Lake Maréotis itself. This lake, more or less inundated, according to the rise of the Nile, and the season of the year, left uncovered a marshy ground, upon which an army might pick a sinuous way. Consequently, they had no good reason for offering battle, when there were so many chances against them.

Nevertheless, generals Friant and Lanusse, exaggerating the danger to which their communications were exposed, determined

upon giving battle. There was one mode of materially diminishing the danger they incurred by committing this blunder, namely, by remaining on the heights, which obstructed the entire width of the sand-bank upon which the battle was fought, heights which abutted close upon the very head of the spit of land. By remaining in this position, and by employing effectually the artillery, with which they were much better provided than the English, they had the advantage of acting on the defensive; they might thus have compensated for their inferiority in numbers, and probably would have succeeded in keeping possession of this point, for the preservation of which, a second, and much to be regretted battle was about to be fought.

It was accordingly so concerted, between generals Friant and Lanusse. The latter was an officer of good natural parts, and of great intrepidity and courage. Unhappily, he was but little disposed to listen to the dictates of prudence. Mixed up, moreover, in the dissensions existing in the army, he would have exulted in gaining a battle before Menou could come up.

On the morning of the 13th of March (22nd Ventôse), the English made their appearance. They were divided into three bodies; the one which marched on the left, kept close to the margin of the lake Maadié, threatening the head of the spit of land, and was covered by the gunboats; the middle body advanced in the form of a square, having battalions in close columns on its flanks, in order to resist the French cavalry, which the English greatly dreaded; the third, which formed the right, skirted along the sea, supported like the first by gunboats.

The body destined to seize upon the head of the spit, was in advance of the two others. Lanusse, perceiving the left wing of the English venturing alone along the margin of the lake, could no longer resist the temptation of falling upon it. He committed the error of descending from the heights to attack it. But at the same instant the formidable square in the centre, which had hitherto been concealed by the sand-hills, appeared suddenly on this side. Lanusse then, compelled to deviate from his first object, marched directly against this square, which was preceded at some distance, by an advanced line of infantry. He ordered forwards the 22nd chasseurs, which charged this line of infantry at a gallop, cut it in two, and made two battalions lay down their arms. The 4th light horse coming up to the support of the 22nd, completed this first success. Whilst this was going on, the square, which had now arrived within musket shot, commenced those volleys of musketry, so well kept up, from which our army had already suffered so much on the day the enemy landed at Aboukir. The 18th light now came up, but was received with murderous discharges, which threw disorder into its ranks. At this moment the right body of the English was seen advancing, leaving the sea-shore, in order to come up to the support of the centre. Lanusse then, who had only the 69th to

support the 18th, ordered a retreat, fearing to engage in a too unequal conflict. Friant, on his side, astonished to see Lanusse descend into the plain, had followed to support him, and pushed on to the head of the dyke, against the left of the English. He was exposed for a very considerable time to an extremely sharp fire, which was met by one equally quick and effective, until he perceived the retreat of his colleague. He then fell back in his turn, to avoid being left single-handed to contend with the English. They both, after this short engagement, regained their position, which they had done wrong in quitting.

It was, after all, a mere reconnoissance, but a very superfluous one, since the army ought to have been spared, and in this skirmish a fresh loss ensued, of from 500 to 600 men; a loss very much to be deplored, as we had not, like the English, the means of reinforcement, and as we were reduced to the necessity of fighting with a force not exceeding 5000 or 6000 strong. If the losses of the English could have compensated for ours, they were severe enough to satisfy us. They had, indeed, incurred a loss of 1300 to 1400 men, killed and wounded.

It was now determined to await the arrival of Menou, who had at length decided upon directing his army upon Alexandria. He had ordered general Rampon to quit Damietta, and repair to Ramanieh, and he brought with him the main body of his troops. Nevertheless, there still remained in the province of Damietta, in the environs of Belbeïs, and Salahié, in Cairo itself, and in Upper Egypt, some troops which were not so useful at the places where they were left as they would have been at Alexandria. If Menou had caused Upper Egypt to be evacuated, confiding it to Mourad Bey, and had left the city of Cairo, but little inclined to insurrection, under the charge of the soldiers in dépôt, he would have had 2000 men additional, with which to face the enemy. Such an accession of strength was certainly not to be despised, as our paramount object was to vanquish the English. The Egyptians at that moment having no thought of revolting, did not require the precautions which were taken against them. They were only to be dreaded in the event of the French being decidedly worsted.

Menou, having reached Ramanieh, there discovered the whole extent of the danger. General Friant had sent forward two regiments of cavalry to meet him. This general thought, and very justly, that, shut up for some days within the walls of Alexandria, he should not stand in need of these regiments, and that they would be, on the contrary, eminently serviceable to Menou, to scour the country along his line of march.

Menou was compelled to make very long detours, in the bed of the lake Mareotis itself, in order to regain the plains of Alexandria. He, however, succeeded, after some trouble, particularly with his artillery. The troops arrived on the 19th and 20th of March (28th and 29th Ventôse). He arrived there himself on

the 19th, and could perceive, with his own eyes, the great blunder which had been committed, in allowing the English to effect a landing.

The latter had received some reinforcements, with guns and stores, and had established themselves upon the identical sandy heights, which Lanusse and Friant had occupied on the 13th of March. They had constructed some redoubts, and had armed them with heavy artillery. To dislodge them would be a very difficult task.

Besides, the English were very superior to us in number. They had about 17,000 or 18,000 men, against fewer than 10,000. Friant and Lanusse, since the affair of the 22nd, had scarcely 4500 fighting men. Menou did not bring with him at the utmost more than 5000 men. We had, therefore, but 10,000 men, to oppose to 18,000 occupying an intrenched position.

All the advantages which might have been ours, in the first, and even in the second affair, were now against us. Nevertheless, the most natural thing that could be done was to fight. After having, in fact, attempted to drive back the English into the sea, at first with 1500 men, afterwards with 5000, it would have been extraordinary not to have attempted it, when we had 10,000 men, in other words, all the force we could collect at one point.

We must not disguise from ourselves that there was still another course to pursue, and which should have been adopted after the first landing, and before the useless battle which generals Lanusse and Friant had fought: this was, to leave the English in the defile which they occupied; to throw up works without loss of time round Alexandria, which would have rendered it very difficult for them to carry that place; to have intrusted the guard of it to the seamen, and to the men in the dépôts, reinforced by a body of 2000 good troops, drawn from the most effective corps: afterwards, to have evacuated all the posts, with the exception of Cairo, where we might have left 3000 men as a garrison, having the citadel as a stronghold; then to have kept the field, with the rest of the army, amounting to 9000 or 10,000 men, with a view of falling upon the Turks, if they should penetrate by the way of Syria, or upon the English, if they should advance into the interior, along the narrow dykes which traverse Lower Egypt. We had the advantage over them of being able to muster all kinds of military force, comprising cavalry, artillery, and infantry, while we enjoyed exclusively the command over the provisions of the country. We might have blockaded them, and probably have forced them to re-embark. But, to effect this, an infinitely more able general than Menou was necessary, some one possessing, in a far higher degree than he did, the art of stirring up the spirit of the troops. In short, a commander was wanted, of a different stamp from him, who, having all the advantages in his favour at the beginning of the campaign, had contrived, by mismanagement, to transfer them one by one to the enemy.

Nevertheless, to fight the English now they had landed, was, at the moment, the natural course, and what might be expected from the previous events which had occurred during the campaign. But, once having resolved to risk a decisive effort, it was essential to carry it into execution with the least possible delay, in order not to afford the Turks, already on their march from Syria, time to press us too closely.

However, before giving battle, it was necessary to agree upon some plan. Menou himself was wholly incompetent to conceive one, and he was upon such a footing with his generals as barely admitted of his consulting them upon the subject. Nevertheless, the head of the staff, Lagrange, requested Lanusse and Reynier to furnish a plan. These two officers matured one, and submitted it to Menou for his approval: the latter adopted it almost mechanically.

The two armies were in presence of each other, occupying the bank of sand, about a league in width, and fifteen or eighteen in length, upon which the English had first landed. The French army was posted before Alexandria, upon a commanding elevation. Before it, was an extensive sandy plain, with here and there small eminences, which the enemy had carefully intrenched, in order to form a continued chain of positions, from the sea to the lake Maréotis. On our left, just opposite to the sea, there was an old Roman camp, a sort of square construction, still in good preservation, and a little in advance of this camp, a sandy eminence, upon which the English had thrown up a redoubt. At that spot they had stationed their right, supported by the double fire from this work, and a division of gunboats. In the middle of the field of battle, at an equal distance from the sea and from lake Maréotis, was another sandy eminence, higher and more extensive than the preceding, and likewise crowned with an intrenchment. The English had constructed this for the support of their centre. On our extreme right, towards the margin of the lakes, the ground sloped downwards to the head of the dyke, for the possession of which position the battle had been fought some days previously. A series of redoubts connected the position occupied by their centre with the head of this dyke. The English had their left wing, as well as their right, protected by a division of gunboats, introduced upon the lake Maréotis. Their front of attack, developed in its full length, extended nearly a league, was covered by heavy artillery, which had been dragged by the men to the spot, and was defended by a detachment of the English army. But the main body of the enemy was posted, ready for battle, in two lines, behind the works.

It was agreed to break up on the morning of the 21st of March (30th Ventôse), before daylight, in order the better to conceal our movements, and to be less exposed to the fire from the enemy's intrenchments. The plan of our generals was to attack



and to carry these intrenchments by a *coup de main*, then pass on, so as to attack the main body of the English army, ranged in order of battle behind. Accordingly, our left, under Lanusse, was to bear down in two columns upon the right wing of the English, which rested upon the sea-side. The first of these two columns was to advance briskly, in double quick time, against the fortification erected on the sand-hill, in advance of the Roman camp. The second, passing rapidly between this work and the sea, was to attack the Roman camp, and take it by assault. The centre of our army, commanded by general Rampon, had orders to advance considerably beyond this point of assault, to pass between the Roman camp and the great redoubt in the centre, and to attack the body of the English army beyond the works. Our right wing, composed of Reynier's and Friant's divisions, but under the command of Reynier alone, was ordered to deploy in the plain on the right, and there to feign a formidable attack near the lake Maréotis, in order to induce the English to believe that the real danger was on that side. In order to confirm them in this notion, the regiment of dromedaries was to cross the bed of the Lake Maréotis, and make an attack upon the head of the dyke. It was hoped that this diversion would render the sudden attack of Lanusse on the sea-side more easy of execution.

On the 21st. before daybreak (30th Ventôse), our troops were in motion. The regiment of dromedaries performed, with exactness, the duty which had been assigned to them. They rapidly crossed the dry parts of the lake Maréotis, alighted before the head of the dyke, carried the redoubts, and turned the guns against the enemy. This was enough to deceive the English, and draw their attention towards the lake Maréotis. But, to insure the success of the plan agreed upon, and which was to be carried out on the sea-side, a precision was necessary, such as is difficult of attainment when a manœuvre is executed in the dark, and still more unattainable, when there is not at the head one supreme directing mind to guide the enterprise, and competent to compute both time and distances.

The division of Lanusse, manœuvring in the dark, advanced without order, and created confusion among our troops in the centre. The first column, under the orders of general Silly, marched boldly to the redoubt, which was thrown up before the Roman camp. Lanusse directed it in person, and led it on to the redoubt. But suddenly he discovered that the second column had missed its way, and instead of skirting the sea-side to attack the Roman camp, had approached too close to the first. He rode towards it, for the purpose of pointing out the position assigned to it. Unfortunately, at this moment he received a wound in the thigh, which proved mortal; a most fatal event, which was to entail deplorable consequences. The troops being suddenly deprived of the command of this energetic officer, the

attack slackened. The day, which now began to dawn, enabled the English to discern the point against which they should direct their fire. Our soldiers, galled simultaneously by the fire from the gunboats, from the Roman camp, and the redoubts, evinced admirable firmness and bravery. But, ere long, all their superior officers being wounded, they were left without commanders, and fell back behind some slight eminences of sand, scarcely high enough to cover them. Meanwhile, the first column, which Lanusse had left to proceed towards the second, had just carried the first redan of the redoubt, erected on the hill towards the right. It then marched onwards against the main work, with a view to storm it, but, being baffled in this attempt, wheeled round in order to attack it on the flank. The centre of the army, under Rampon, perceiving that column foiled in its attempt, likewise turned from its object in order to support it. The 32d demi-brigade, detached from the centre, also came up to storm this fatal redoubt. These general concurrent efforts led to a sort of confusion. They pressed furiously against this obstacle, and the rapid operation, which was to have consisted in carrying, in double quick time, the line of the works, was converted into a long, obstinate attack, in which much valuable time was lost. The 21st demi-brigade, which belonged to the centre, leaving the 32d engaged before the redoubt, the possession of which was so hotly disputed, alone executed the plan originally laid down, passed the line of intrenchments, and, advancing boldly, deployed in the face of the English army. It received, and returned, a most tremendous fire. But it needed support, and Menou, during this time, incapable of commanding, paced up and down the field of battle, issuing no orders, but allowing Reynier to extend his line uselessly in the plain on the right, with a considerable force, without any duty to perform.

Menou was at this time advised to undertake with the cavalry, which was 1200 strong, and of incomparable valour, a general charge upon the mass of English foot, which the 24th had alone advanced to encounter. Menou, adopting this advice, gave orders to charge. The gallant general Roize placed himself immediately at the head of the 1200 horse, crossed rapidly the line of the enemy's destructive fire, formed by the redoubts which our infantry were in vain attempting to carry by storm, got safely over to the other side, and finding the 21st demi-brigade at close quarters with the English, fell impetuously upon them. This gallant body of cavalry first leaped the ditch which separated them from the enemy, and then dashed fiercely upon the foremost line of the English infantry, drove them back in disorder, and cut down a great number of men. The enemy was thus forced to give way. If Menou, at this moment, or rather Reynier, supplying the place of his chief, had brought up our right wing to the support of the cavalry, the centre of the English army, thereby thrown into confusion, and driven beyond the works,



would have left us a secure victory. The works, isolated, cut off from all support, would have fallen into our hands. But the case was far otherwise. The French cavalry, after having broken the enemy's line, seeing before them still other lines to overcome, and having only the 21st demi-brigade to support it, fell back, repassing under the exterminating fire of the redoubts.

From this moment the battle could not possibly have a successful issue. The left, deprived of all energy by the death of their general, poured an ineffectual fire upon the intrenched positions, which returned it with most murderous effect. The right,—deployed in the plain, near the lake Maréotis, in order to make a diversion, which had no longer any aim in view, since the engagement, now become general, had fixed each party in its respective position—in this way performed no service whatever. Without doubt an energetic general, who would have recalled it to the centre, and with this additional force have renewed general Roize's attack, might have attempted a second inroad upon the main body of the English, and thus have changed, perhaps, the fortune of the day. But general Menou gave no such commands, and Reynier, who at that moment might have taken the initiative, which he assumed inopportunately on other occasions in civil matters, confined himself solely to venting complaints at not receiving directions from the commander-in-chief. In this state of matters, the only thing which remained to be done was to retreat. Menou issued the orders, and the division fell back, presenting a bold front to the enemy, but suffering fresh losses from the fire of the works.

What a spectacle war becomes, when the lives of men, when the destiny of empires, are thus confided to incapable or disunited chiefs, and when blood is made to flow in torrents, commensurate with the inaptitude or the dissensions of those who are invested with command!

It could not be said that the battle was lost, the enemy not having made a step in advance; but it was virtually lost, inasmuch as it was not completely gained, for it was essential that our success should have been complete, to enable us to drive back the English towards Aboukir, and compel them to re-embark. The loss was great on both sides. The English had about 2000 men killed and wounded, and amongst them was the brave general Abercromby, who was carried on board the fleet in a dying state. The loss of the French was about the same. Exposed during the whole day to a downward fire, both in front and in flank, they had suffered severely. The troops displayed admirable coolness. The spirit with which the cavalry charged had filled the English with surprise and admiration. The number of officers and generals wounded during the battle was greater than usual. Generals Lanusse and Roize were killed; the general of brigade, Silly, commanding one of Lanusse's columns, had his leg carried off; general Baudot was wounded

so severely that his life was despaired of. General Destaing, also, was badly wounded. Rampon had his uniform riddled with balls.

The moral effect was still more disastrous than the physical loss. No hope now remained of being able to force the enemy to re-embark. We were about to have upon our hands, besides the English who had landed at Alexandria, the Turks, already on their march from Syria; the capitan-pacha, about to arrive with the Turkish squadron, and to disembark 6000 Albanians on the coast at Aboukir; besides 6000 Sepoys brought from India, by way of the Red Sea, and ready to land at Cosséir, upon the coast of Upper Egypt. What was to be done in the midst of so many enemies, with troops whose courage, doubtless, was unimpaired, when called upon to fight, but who, when the affairs of the colony grew desperate, were always ready to say, that the expedition was a dazzling act of folly, and that their blood was sacrificed unavailingly to a mere chimera?

In the three engagements of the 8th, 13th, and 21st of March, we had lost the services of nearly 3500 men, of whom one-third were killed, one-third severely wounded, and one-third incapable of returning to the ranks for some weeks to come. Although the army was greatly weakened, we could, nevertheless, now, as at the beginning of the campaign, manœuvre rapidly between the various bodies tending to form a junction, beat the vizir, if he should enter by way of Syria, or the capitan-pacha, if he should attempt to penetrate by way of Rosetta, or the English, if they should advance on the narrow tongues of land, which communicate with the interior of Egypt. But the 3500 men whom we had lost rendered this plan more difficult than ever. If 3000 men were left in Cairo, and 2000 or 3000 in Alexandria, only 7000 or 8000 would remain to manœuvre in the open field, even supposing that all the available forces were collected, and that the secondary posts were evacuated, without any exception. With a very resolute and able general, success would have been doubtful, yet still within the bounds of possibility; but what could be expected of Menou and his lieutenants?

One hope of retrieving our fortunes yet remained. Far from this hope being ever abandoned, its realisation was again and again announced. They reckoned on the arrival of Ganteaume with his fleet, and the troops he had on board, intended for disembarkation. Four thousand men arriving at this juncture would have saved Egypt. They had sent to the admiral a despatch boat, to point out to him a spot on the coast of Africa, twenty or thirty leagues to the west of Alexandria, upon which it was possible to land, far out of sight of the English. Three thousand men might, in that case, have been left in Alexandria, and, withdrawing those troops which could be spared from Cairo, we might have manœuvred with 10,000 or 11,000 in the open field. But Ganteaume, although far superior to Menou, did not act much

better in the present instance. After having repaired, at Toulon, the damage which his fleet had sustained in quitting Brest, he had, as we have seen, sailed from Toulon on the 19th of March (28th Ventôse), had re-entered that port on account of the stranding of the ship *Constitution*, and had again put to sea on the 22nd of March (1st Germinal), and made sail towards Sardinia. A slight favourable breeze, a bold resolution, might have wafted him to the shores of Egypt, as he had adroitly escaped admiral Warren, by steering a feigned course. He was already only fifteen leagues from cape Carbonara, the extreme point of Sardinia, and just about to enter the channel which separates Sicily from Africa. Unfortunately, during the evening of the 26th of March (5th Germinal), one of his captains, in command of the *Dix-Août*, in the absence of captain Bergeret, who was ill, most unskilfully ran foul of the *Formidable*, received considerable injury, and caused no less severe damage to the vessel against which she had struck. Alarmed at the extent of the damage, Ganteaume thought himself no longer in a condition to remain at sea, and put back to Toulon on the 5th of April (15th Germinal), fifteen days after the battle of Canopus.

They were, of course, ignorant of these circumstances in Egypt, and, notwithstanding the time elapsed, they still clung to the last ray of hope. At the appearance of the smallest sail, they flocked to see if it were not Ganteaume. In this state of anxiety, they took no decisive measures, but remained in a fatal state of inaction. Menou only caused some works to be erected around Alexandria, to repel any attack which the English might make. He had given orders for the evacuation of Upper Egypt, whence he withdrew Donzelot's brigade, to reinforce the other troops at Cairo. He had brought some troops from Alexandria to Ramanieh, to watch the movements making in the neighbourhood of Rosetta. To add to the misfortune, Mourad Bey, whose fidelity had not been shaken for an instant, had just died of the plague, and had transferred his Mamelukes to Osman Bey, upon whom we could no longer rely. The plague commenced its ravages at Cairo. Every thing was proceeding as badly as could be, and portended a fatal conclusion.

The English, on their side, fearing the army before them, would hazard nothing. They preferred advancing slowly but surely. They were waiting, moreover, till their allies, the Turks, whom they greatly distrusted, were in a position to support them. They had now been a month on land, without having attempted any other enterprise than that of capturing the fort of Aboukir, which had been bravely defended, but which had yielded to the terrific fire from their ships. At length, towards the beginning of April (middle of Germinal), they determined to put an end to this state of inaction and the sort of blockade in which they were reduced to live. Colonel Spencer was ordered to cross over the roadstead of Aboukir by sea, with a body of some

thousand English, and the 6000 Albanians of the capitan-pacha, and to effect a landing at Rosetta. The object of this, was thereby to open for themselves an access to the interior of the Delta, to procure fresh provisions, of which they were in great need, and to lend a hand to the vizir, who was advancing from the other extremity of the Delta, by the Syrian frontier. There were at Rosetta only some few hundred French, who could oppose no resistance to this attempt, and these fell back by ascending the Nile. They joined at El Aft, a little before Ramanieh, a small body of troops despatched from Alexandria. This body was composed of the 21st light and a company of artillery. The English and the Turks, now masters of the mouth of the Nile, whence provisions could reach them, having access to the interior of Egypt, thought at length of taking advantage of their successes, but without being in too much haste, for they still waited twenty days before they marched forwards. General Hutchinson, who had succeeded Abercromby in the command, did not venture to weaken his force encamped before Alexandria. He had sent scarcely 6000 English and 6000 Turks to Rosetta, although reinforcements had reached him, to make good his losses, and his available force now amounted to 20,000 men. If general Menou, employing advantageously his time, and devoting the month which had elapsed, to the construction around Alexandria of the defensive works which were indispensable—had thus husbanded his forces, so as to leave there but few troops; if he had directed against Ramanieh about 6000 men, and drawn to this point all the troops which were not absolutely necessary at Cairo; he might have brought 8000 or 9000 men into the field against the English, who had now just made their appearance at Rosetta. This number would have sufficed to drive them back to the mouths of the Nile; it would have revived the spirit of the army, would have secured the fidelity of the Egyptians, which had been shaken, would have retarded the march of the vizir, would have reduced the English to a positive state of blockade, upon the sands of Alexandria, and thus have restored fortune to our arms. It was, indeed, the last available opportunity. This movement was suggested to him; but, always timid, he only half followed the advice which had been given to him. He sent general Valentin to Ramanieh, with a force which was pronounced insufficient. He then despatched a second force, under the command of general Lagrange, chief of the staff. Both united only amounted to little more than 4000 men. But he did not order the troops down from Cairo, and general Lagrange, who was, nevertheless, a gallant officer, was not equal to the task of maintaining with so small a force his position, before 6000 English and 6000 Turks. Menou ought to have collected there 8000 men at least, under his best general. He could have accomplished this by a vigorous concentration of his forces, and by sacrificing the minor points to the paramount object in view.

General Morand, who commanded the first detachment directed upon Rosetta, had stationed himself at El Aft, on the banks of the Nile, near the town of Fouéh, in a position which possessed some advantages for defence. At this spot general Lagrange joined him. The English and the Turks, masters of Rosetta and of the mouths of the Nile, had covered the river with their gunboats, and would have soon carried the small open town of Fouéh. It was therefore necessary to fall back upon Ramanieh during the night of the 8th of May (18th Floréal). The site of Ramanieh did not offer any advantages of consequence for defensive operations, and the strength of the place scarcely counterbalanced the numerical superiority of the enemy. Nevertheless, if it were expedient to make at any spot a desperate defence, Ramanieh was that spot. For in case that position were lost, the detached body, under general Lagrange, would be separated from Alexandria, and compelled to fall back upon Cairo. Thus the French army would be cut in two, one half being shut up in Alexandria and the other in Cairo. If, when entire, it was unequal to dispute the possession of the field with the English, it would then be quite impossible when cut in two. In this extremity there would be no resource left but to sign a capitulation. The loss of Ramanieh was, in point of fact, therefore, the definitive loss of Egypt. Menou wrote to general Lagrange, that he was hastening with 2000 men to his assistance, which proves that he had at least that number at his disposal. There were not fewer than 3000 at Cairo, consequently 9000, or at least 8000 men, might have been collected at Ramanieh. There, in the open field, with an excellent cavalry and a splendid light artillery, and with a determination to conquer or die, they were certain of triumphing. But Menou did not make his appearance, and Belliard, who had the command at Cairo, received no orders. General Lagrange, at the head of the 4000 men who were at his disposal, sheltered his rear at Ramanieh, on the Nile, which waters, as it flows by, the habitations of this little town. In this position, he had in his rear the English gunboats, which occupied the river, and which poured a shower of shot into the French camp; he had in his front, on the level sand, without any other shelter to protect him than some very slight field-works, the main body of the enemy, consisting of English and Turks. Their numbers might be about 12,000, against 4000 French. The danger was imminent; but it was better to fight, and if overpowered to surrender at night, on the field of battle, after having fought during the whole day, than to abandon such a position without a contest; 4000 men, all seasoned warriors and eager to defend themselves, had yet many chances of success. But the chief of the staff of Menou, who, although greatly devoted to the views of that general and to the preservation of the colony, did not foresee the consequences of this retreat, evacuated Ramanieh on the 10th of May (20th Floréal), in the



evening, and fell back on Cairo. He arrived there on the morning of the 14th (24th Floréal). He sacrificed at Ramanieh magazines of immense value, and what was more important still, the communications of the army.

From that day nothing that occurred in Egypt is worth recording, or deserving our notice. The men there sunk ignominiously with fortune, even beneath themselves. There was exhibited throughout, the most shameless imbecility coupled with the most deplorable incapacity. But, when we say the men, it is of the chiefs alone that we intend to speak; for the soldiers, and the subordinate officers, always admirable in their conduct in the presence of the enemy, were ready to die in the field, even to the last man. Never, on any single occasion, did they fail to maintain their former reputation and glory.

At Cairo, as at Alexandria, all that remained to be done was to capitulate. At best, they could only retard the capitulation; still to retard a capitulation is often of the utmost importance. In appearance, we only seem to be defending our honour, but often, in reality, we save our country. Masséna, by prolonging the defence of Genoa, brought the battle of Marengo within the scope of possibility. The generals in possession of Cairo and Alexandria, by protracting a hopeless resistance, might still be seconding effectually the serious negotiations now pending between France and England. They were not aware of this, it is true; therefore, when unconscious of the services which we may render to our country by prolonging a defence, we should listen to the voice of honour, which commands us to hold out to the last extremity. Of these two generals now blockaded, the most unfortunate was Menou, since he had committed the greater faults; yet he, by persisting in procrastinating the surrender of Alexandria, was still instrumental, as we shall see, in furthering the interests of France. This, at a future period, was his consolation, and his chief excuse with the First Consul.

When the troops detached at Ramanieh re-entered Cairo, they had to deliberate what course to take. General Belliard was, by his rank, the commander-in-chief. He was a prudent man, but more remarkable for prudence than for decision. He called a council of war. There were 7000 men left, effective troops, besides 5000 or 6000 sick and wounded, or persons employed about the army. The plague was raging with violence; there were but little money and provisions, and a city of immense extent to defend. Seven thousand men were insufficient to guard the whole compass. In no part of the whole *enceinte* was there any work, fit to make a resistance against European engineers. The citadel had, it is true, an intrenchment, but quite incapable of containing 12,000 Frenchmen, and wholly unable to resist the heavy artillery of the English. Such a post was only calculated for protection against the population of Cairo. There were obviously but two courses to follow: either to endeavour by a bold

march to descend into Lower Egypt, to accomplish the passage of the Nile by surprise, and to rejoin Menou in the neighbourhood of Alexandria, or to retire to Damietta, which would have been more sure and more easy, especially on account of the immense multitude of persons attached to the army, which they would be obliged to carry with them. Our force would there have been in the midst of lagoons, which only communicated with the Delta by very narrow tongues of land, and 7000 men might easily have kept their ground for a length of time against an enemy two or three times superior in number. They were certain of procuring in great abundance all kinds of supplies; for the province was covered with cattle, the city of Damietta was well stocked with grain, and the lake Menzaleh abounded with the finest fish, the kind of food best adapted for the troops. As it was only a question of time, when to capitulate, the city of Damietta would have enabled them to put off for six months this lamentable result. The officer of engineers, Hautpoul, suggested this wise course; but, to adopt it, it was necessary to decide upon a very difficult step, the evacuation of Cairo. General Belliard, who was capable a few days afterwards of giving up the city to the enemy by means of a deplorable capitulation, would not consent to do it on that day voluntarily, when urged to do so by officers of sound military judgment. He accordingly determined to remain in the capital of Egypt, without exactly knowing what he intended to do. By the left bank of the Nile, the English and the Turks were ascending from Ramanieh to Cairo; by the right bank, the grand vizir with 25,000 to 30,000 followers, mustered from the different oriental troops, was advancing from the coast of Syria in the direction of Cairo, by the road of Belbeïs. General Belliard, remembering the glories of Heliopolis, was desirous of marching out to meet the vizir, on the same road which Kléber had taken. He set out at the head of 6000 men, and advanced towards the heights of Elmenair, about the distance of two days' march. Being often surrounded by a cloud of horsemen, Belliard sent after them his light artillery, which, here and there, just reached some of them with its balls, but this was the only result that could be obtained. The Turks, well commanded on this occasion, would not engage in a second battle of Heliopolis. There was but one mode of getting at them, and that was to fall upon their camp at Belbeïs. But general Belliard, received at all the villages by volleys of musketry, perceiving his number of wounded increase at each step, and the distance widen which separated him from Cairo, began to fear that the English and the Turks might enter that city during his absence. He should have foreseen this danger before he quitted it, and have put the question to himself, whether there was time to cross to Belbeïs. After leaving Cairo, without having made up his mind as to what he intended to do, general Belliard returned thither in the same state



of indecision, after a military operation unattended by any result, and which made him appear, in the eyes of the inhabitants, as if he had been beaten. Like the inhabitants of all countries recently brought under submission, the Egyptians turned with fortune, and, although not dissatisfied with the French, they were inclined to abandon us. Nevertheless, there was no apprehension of an insurrection, unless the city of Cairo were condemned to the horrors of a siege.

The French army, disgusted with the humiliations to which the incapacity of its generals had exposed it, was completely repossessed with the notions which led to the convention of El Arisch. The troops consoled themselves in their misfortunes dreaming of a return to France. If a resolute and able general had set them such an example as Masséna did the garrison of Genoa, they would have followed it. But nothing of this sort was to be anticipated from general Belliard. Hemmed in on the left bank of the Nile by the Anglo-Turkish army, which had advanced from Ramanieh; upon the right bank by the vizir, who had accompanied it step by step; he proposed to the enemy a suspension of arms, which was eagerly acceded to, as the English were more bent on securing substantial advantages than mere renown. That which they were most anxious for was the evacuation of Egypt, no matter in what way it was accomplished. General Belliard assembled a council of war, at which a very stormy discussion ensued. Great complaints were raised against his conduct as commander of the division at Cairo. He was told that he knew not when to abandon Cairo in time, and take up a position at Damietta, nor to maintain himself in the capital of Egypt by well combined operations; that he had only made a ridiculous *sortie*, to fight with the vizir, without succeeding in coming up with him; and that, not knowing which way to turn himself, he now applied to his officers, and asked them whether he should negotiate or fight to the last, when he had already settled the question himself by the spontaneous opening of the negotiations. All these reproaches were levelled at him with bitterness, especially by general Lagrange, a friend of Menou's, and a strong advocate for the preservation of Egypt. The generals Valentin, Duranteau, and Dupas, took the same side as general Lagrange, and they all maintained that, for the honour of their colours, it was absolutely necessary to fight. Unfortunately, this was no longer practicable, without cruelty to the army, more especially to that numerous portion of sick and supernumeraries which followed it. They had before them more than 40,000 enemies, exclusive of the sepoys, who, now landed at Cosséir, were about to descend the Nile with the Mamelukes, who, since the death of Mourad Bey, had thrown off their allegiance. In our rear we had a semi-barbarous population of 300,000 souls, infected with the plague, threatened with famine, and ready, to a man, to rise up against the French. The *enceinte* was too extensive to defend, or to keep guarded by 7000 men, and too

weak to resist the European engineers. The place might be carried, and every Frenchman put to the sword, after an assault. In vain some of the officers raised their voice against a step that would tarnish the honour of our arms. There was no alternative but to surrender. General Belliard, wishing to show himself ready for any emergency, again mooted the question, whether a retreat to Damietta was practicable; a question which it was then too late to discuss. He also made another suggestion equally singular, to wit, whether they could seek refuge in Upper Egypt. This latter proposal was downright folly; it evinced but the miserable cunning of weakness, anxious to conceal its confusion under a false semblance of boldness. It was, therefore, resolved to capitulate; nothing else could be done, unless they all wished to be put to the sword, after a furious assault.

Commissioners were sent to the camp of the English and the Turks, in order to propose a capitulation. The enemy's generals accepted this proposal with joy; so much did they fear, even at this moment, a change of fortune. They acceded to the most favourable conditions for the army. It was agreed that our troops should retire with all the honours of war, with arms, baggage, artillery, and horses, in short, with all they possessed; that they should be transported back to France, and victualled, during the voyage, at the expense of England. Such Egyptians as might wish to follow the army (and there were a considerable number who, by their connexion with the French, had compromised themselves), were to be permitted to join them. It was moreover stipulated, that they should be allowed to dispose of their property.

This capitulation was signed on the 27th of June, 1801, and ratified on the 28th (8th and 9th Messidor, year IX.) The pride of the old veterans of Egypt and of Italy was deeply wounded. They were about to return to France, not as they had entered it in 1798, after the triumphs of Castiglione, Arcola, and Rivoli, proud of their glory, and of the services rendered to the Republic; they were about to return conquered, but still to return; and, for hearts that had suffered from a lengthened exile, this was yet a joy which quite bewildered them, even in their reverses. There was, in the recesses of their breasts, a deep-seated satisfaction, which they did not avow, but which their very countenances betrayed. The commanders alone were thoughtful, meditating upon the judgment which the First Consul would pronounce upon their conduct. The despatches, which conveyed the news of the capitulation were couched in terms of the most humiliating anxiety. They selected, as the bearers of these despatches, those individuals who, in their personal acts, had been most exempt from blame. These were Hautpoul, the officer of engineers, and Champy, the director of the powder-mills, who had both been so useful to the colony.

Menou was shut up in Alexandria, and, like Belliard, had no alternative but to surrender. There could be, between the

fate of one and the other, but a mere difference in point of time. Some cases of plague had appeared in Alexandria; provisions were becoming scarce, in consequence of the error which had been committed, in not laying in a stock of supplies, before the siege commenced. It is true that the Arabian caravans, attracted by the hope of gain, still supplied them with some meat, butter and cheese, and some grain. But wheat was much wanted, and they were under the necessity of making the bread partly of rice. The scurvy diminished daily the number of our able-bodied troops. The English, in order completely to insulate the place, conceived the project of emptying the lake Maadié into the lake Maréotis, which was half dried up, and thus to surround Alexandria with an unbroken sea of water, and to encircle it with gunboats. For this purpose they had cut the dyke, which runs from Alexandria to Ramanieh, and which forms the separation between the two lakes; but, as the difference of the level was but nine feet, some time elapsed before the water of the one lake could be drawn off into the other; and, moreover, the operation, which was desirable with the object in view of separating general Belliard from general Menou, was no longer of the same utility, since the recent events at Cairo. If it extended the sphere of action for the gunboats, it was also advantageous for the French, by contracting the front of attack, without even depriving them of their communications with the caravans, as the long bank of sand upon which Alexandria is situated, is connected at the western extremity with the desert of Lybia. The English, however, were desirous of completing the investment of the place; and for that purpose they embarked troops in their gunboats, and about the middle of August (end of Thermidor) attempted a landing, not far from the town of Marabout. They undertook also the siege of the fort of that name in a regular form. From that moment the place, completely invested, could not long hold out.

The unfortunate Menou, thus reduced to inaction, having now leisure to reflect on his errors, with blame showered upon him from all sides, consoled himself, nevertheless, with the idea of an heroic resistance, similar to that of Masséna in Genoa. He wrote to the First Consul, and assured him that a memorable defence would be made. Generals Dumas and Reynier remained without any troops at Alexandria. They there made use of the most offensive language and, even in these closing scenes, could not assume a becoming deportment. Menou caused them one night to be put under arrest, in the most public manner, and ordered them to be shipped off to France. This tardy act of vigour, when all was virtually over, produced but little effect. The army, with great good sense, severely blamed Reynier and Dumas, but entertained a very indifferent opinion of Menou. The only favour the army bestowed upon him was not to detest him. Listening coldly to his procla-

mations, in which he announced his resolution to die rather than surrender, the army was ready, if necessary, to fight to the last extremity, but hardly thought it worth while in the position in which it was. They comprehended too well the consequences of what had occurred at Cairo, not to foresee an approaching capitulation; at Alexandria, as at Cairo, they consoled themselves for their reverses by dwelling upon the hope of soon revisiting France.

From that day, nothing further of importance marked the presence of the French in Egypt; the expedition was in a manner at an end. Admired as a prodigious act of boldness and talent by some, it was, on the contrary, condemned by others as a brilliant chimera, especially by those who affect to weigh every thing in the balance of a cold and passionless reasoning.

This latter judgment, though it might bear the semblance of wisdom, is at the bottom, neither just nor founded in good sense.

Napoleon, in his long and prodigious career, never conceived any thing more grand, nor which could indeed be more truly useful. Doubtless, if we consider that we have not even retained possession of the Rhine and the Alps, it must be admitted that Egypt, even if we had occupied it fifteen years, would have been, at a later period, wrested from us, like our continental frontiers; like that ancient and magnificent possession, the Isle of France, for which we were not indebted to the wars of the Revolution. But to judge of things by this rule, we might go so far as to inquire, whether the conquest of the Rhine was not itself a folly, a chimera! In order to form a correct opinion on this question, we must picture to ourselves our protracted wars, brought to a totally different termination from that which we actually witnessed, and ask ourselves whether, in that case, the possession of Egypt was possible, desirable, and of immense importance? To the question put upon this footing, the answer cannot be doubtful. In the first place, England was almost reconciled, in 1801, to our retaining Egypt at the price of equivalent compensations. These equivalents, which were communicated to our representative, had in them nothing exorbitant. It is beyond a doubt that, during the maritime peace which ensued, the conclusion of which we shall soon make known, the First Consul, foreseeing the short duration of the peace, would have sent immense resources to the mouth of the Nile, both of men and military stores; and it is certain that the splendid army sent to St. Domingo, whither it was despatched to seek an indemnification for lost Egypt, would have sufficed to protect our new settlement for a long time against any attacks. A general like Decaen, or St. Cyr, combining military experience with the science of administrative government, with, not only the 22,000

men which remained in Egypt of the first expedition, but the 30,000 which perished unavailingly at St. Domingo ; established with 50,000 Frenchmen, and an immense stock of stores, in a perfectly healthy climate, upon a soil of inexhaustible fertility, cultivated by a peasantry perfectly submissive to their masters, and whose muskets were never seen by the side of the plough—such a general we say as Decaen, or St. Cyr, with such means at command, would have victoriously defended Egypt, and would have founded a magnificent colony.

Success was unquestionably attainable. We will add, that in the maritime and commercial struggle which France and England maintained against each other, the attempt was, in some degree, imperative upon us. England had just, in fact, conquered the continent of the Indies, and had thus acquired a supremacy in the Eastern seas. France, up to that period her rival, could not yield such a supremacy without disputing it. Did she not owe it to her glory, to her destiny, to struggle for it? To this the politician and the patriot must make the same reply. Yes, it was incumbent on us, to carry our arms into those regions of the East, the vast field of the ambition of the maritime nations; it was meet that we should strive to acquire a possession which could counterbalance those of the English. This truth being once admitted, let the wide world be searched, and where will be found any acquisition better adapted than Egypt to the end contemplated? It surpassed in value the finest countries; it was conterminous with the richest, the most fertile, those which furnish the most ample resources for foreign trade. It brought back to the Mediterranean, of which we were at that time the masters, the commerce of the East; it was, in one word, an equivalent for India; and, at any rate, it was the high road to it from Europe. The conquest of Egypt, then, was of immense importance to France, and would have contributed to the independence of the seas, and to general civilisation. Accordingly, as will be seen elsewhere, our success was more than once desired by the cabinets of Europe, during those brief intervals, when hatred no longer disturbed the peace of nations. For such a purpose it would have been worth while to sacrifice an army, and not only that army which was the first time despatched to Egypt, but those which were sent at a later period, to perish unavailingly in St. Domingo, in Calabria, and in Spain. Would to Heaven, that in the aspirations of his vast imagination, Napoleon had never conceived any thing more rash and unadvised!



## BOOK XI.

---

### GENERAL PEACE.

**Last unsuccessful Attempt of Ganteaume to put to Sea—He touches at Derne, but dares not land two thousand Men whom he had on Board, and puts back to Toulon—Capture of the Swiftsure on the passage—Admiral Linois, sent from Toulon to Cadiz, is obliged to cast Anchor in the Bay of Algéziras—Brilliant Engagement off Algéziras—A combined French and Spanish Squadron sails from Cadiz to assist Linois' Division—Return of the combined Fleet to Cadiz—Action between the Rear-Division and Admiral, Sanmarez—Dreadful Mistake of two Spanish Ships, which, in the Night, taking each other for Enemies, fight with Desperation, and are both blown up—Exploit of Captain Troude—Short Campaign of the Prince of Peace against Portugal—The Court of Lisbon hastens to send a Negotiator to Badajoz, and to submit to the joint Requisitions of France and Spain—Course of European Affairs since the Treaty of Lunéville—Increasing Influence of France—Visit to Paris of the Infants of Spain, destined for the Throne of Etruria—Renewal of the Negotiation in London, between M. Otto and Lord Hawkesbury—The English present the Question in a new Shape—They demand Ceylon in the East Indies, Martinique or Trinidad in the West Indies, Malta in the Mediterranean—The First Consul answers these Pretensions by threatening to seize upon Portugal, and, in case of need, to invade England—Warm Altercation between the *Moniteur* and the English Newspapers—The British Cabinet gives up Malta—Renews all its Pretensions, and demands the Spanish Island of Trinidad—The First Consul, to save the Possessions of an allied Court, offers the French Island of Tobago—It is rejected by the British Cabinet—Silly Conduct of the Prince of Peace, which furnishes an unexpected Solution of the Difficulty. This Prince treats with the Court of Lisbon, without concerting with France, and thus deprives the French Legation of the Argument drawn from the Dangers of Portugal—Irritation of the First Consul, and Threats of War against Spain—M. de Talleyrand proposes to the First Consul to finish the Negotiation at the Expense of the Spaniards, by giving up the Island of Trinidad to the English—M. Otto is authorised to make this Concession, but only in the last Extremity—During the Negotiation, Nelson makes the greatest Efforts to destroy our Flotilla at Boulogne—Splendid Actions off Boulogne, fought by Admiral Latouche-Treville with Nelson—Defeat of the English—Joy in France, Alarm in England, in consequence of these two Engagements—Reciprocal Tendency to a Reconciliation—The last Difficulties are overcome, and Peace is concluded, in the Form of Preliminaries, by the Sacrifice of the Island of Trinidad—Unbounded Joy in England and France—Colonel Lauriston, sent to London with the Ratification of the First Consul, is drawn about in Triumph for several Hours—Meeting of a Congress in the City of Amiens to conclude a definitive Peace—Series of Treaties successively signed—Peace with Portugal, the Ottoman Porte, Bavaria, Russia, &c.—Fête in Celebration of the Peace fixed for 18th Brumaire—Lord Cornwallis, plenipotentiary to the Congress of Amiens, is present at that Fête—His Reception by the People of Paris—Banquet in the City of London—Extraordinary Demonstrations of Sympathy reciprocated at this Moment by the two Nations.**





## BOOK XI.

## GENERAL PEACE.

WHILE the army in Egypt was sinking for want of an able commander, and for want of seasonable succour, admiral Ganteaume made a third attempt to run out of the port of Toulon. The First Consul had scarcely allowed time for repairing the damage sustained by the *Dix-Août* and the *Indomptable*, in running foul of each other, but had obliged him to put to sea again almost immediately. Admiral Ganteaume had sailed on the 25th of April (5th Floréal). He had orders to bear up for the island of Elba, so as to make, in passing, a demonstration upon Porto Ferrajo, and facilitate its occupation by the French troops. The First Consul made a point of retaking that island, the possession of which was secured to France by treaties with Naples and Etruria, and in which there was a small garrison, half Tuscan, half English. The admiral obeyed, appeared off Elba, fired a few shot at Porto Ferrajo, and passed on, lest he should expose himself to damages which would have rendered it impossible for him to have fulfilled his mission. Had he proceeded direct to Egypt, he might still have been the saviour of the army there; for, as we have seen, the position of Ramanieh was not lost till the 10th of May (20th Floréal). There was time, therefore, sailing as he did on the 25th of April, to prevent the army from being cut in two, and from being obliged to capitulate, one division after the other. To accomplish this, he ought not to have lost a moment. But a sort of fatality attended all the operations of admiral Ganteaume. We have seen him getting luckily out of Brest, arriving still more luckily in the Mediterranean, losing confidence all at once, taking four ships for eight, and running into Toulon. We have seen him sail from that port in March, escape admiral Warren, and when beyond the southernmost point of Sardinia, once more put back in consequence of the *Dix-Août* and the *Indomptable* running foul of each other. This was not the end of his misfortunes. Scarcely had he lost sight of Elba, when a contagious disease, broke out in his squadron. Whether owing to the weariness of the troops, which had been long on board, or to ill luck, this disease suddenly threw on the sick list, a great

part of the soldiers, and of the crews. It was deemed useless and imprudent to carry such a number of sick to Egypt, and admiral Ganteaume resolved to divide his squadron. Consigning three ships to the care of admiral Linois, he put the sick soldiers and sailors on board, and despatched them to Toulon. He proceeded, in fulfilment of his mission, with four ships of the line and two frigates, having on board 2000 land troops only, and steered for Egypt. But he was not in time; for it was now nearly the middle of May, and at that period the French army was lost, since generals Belliard and Menou were separated from one another, in consequence of the abandonment of Ramanieh. Admiral Ganteaume was ignorant of this. He passed Sardinia and Sicily, appeared in the channel of Candia, contrived several times to give the enemy the slip, even sailed up the Archipelago to escape them, and at length came to an anchor off the coast of Africa, a few days' march to the west of Alexandria. The point which he had chosen was Derne, pointed out in his instructions as a proper place for landing. It was imagined that, by supplying the troops with provisions and money to hire camels from the Arabs, they would be enabled to cross the desert and to reach Alexandria in a few marches. This was but a vague conjecture. Admiral Ganteaume had been at anchor a few hours and hoisted out part of his boats, when the inhabitants hastened to the beach, and kept up a smart fire of musketry upon them. Jérôme Bonaparte, the youngest brother of the First Consul, was among the troops which were going to land. Efforts were made in vain to conciliate and win over the natives. The French would have been obliged to destroy their little town of Derne, and to march to Alexandria without water, and almost without provisions, fighting the whole way. It would have been a mad enterprise, and moreover without object, for 1000 men at most, out of the 2000, could have succeeded in reaching the place of their destination. It would not have been worth while to sacrifice so many brave men, for the sake of so small a reinforcement. Besides, an event, easy to be foreseen, put an end to all doubts. The admiral thought that he perceived the English fleet; he no longer deliberated, hoisted his boats on board, and slipped his cables, without taking time to weigh anchor, lest he should be attacked at his moorings. He set sail, and was not overtaken by the enemy.

Fortune, which had used him roughly, for, as it has often been observed, she favours only spirits daring enough to trust to her, had, however, some compensation in reserve for him. In running through the channel of Candia, he fell in with an English ship of the line: it was the *Swiftsure*. To give chase to her, to surround, rake, and capture her, was an affair of a few moments. It was on the 24th of June (5th Messidor), that he met with this good luck. Admiral Ganteaume entered Toulon with this species of trophy, a poor amends for so much ill-success. The

First Consul, disposed to be indulgent towards men who had shared great dangers with him, was pleased to accept this compensation, and to announce it in the *Moniteur*.

However, all these movements at sea were destined to terminate in a manner, less mortifying for our navy. While admiral Ganteaume was returning to Toulon, admiral Linois, who had put into that port to land his soldiers and sailors sick of the fever, had again sailed, according to express orders from the First Consul. He lost no time in lime-washing the interior of his ships, in exchanging the sick for fresh troops, in recruiting his crews with able seamen, and got under weigh for his new destination. A despatch, which he was not to open till he got out to sea, directed him to proceed forthwith to Cadiz, to join the six ships commissioned in that port by admiral Dumanoir, and the five ships from Ferrol, which, with the three under his command, would form a squadron of thirteen ships of the line. It was possible that the Rochefort squadron under admiral Bruix might have arrived there. In this case, a fleet of more than twenty sail would be collected, and this fleet, which would be master of the Mediterranean for some months, was to take on board the troops at Otranto, and to carry immense succours to Egypt. It was not yet known in France that it was too late, and that Alexandria was the only place at that moment left to defend. To save this last point, however, was not a matter of indifference.

Admiral Linois, in implicit obedience to these orders, made sail for Cadiz. By the way, he gave chase to several English frigates, which he had well nigh taken, encountered contrary winds at the entrance of the Straits, and at length entered them in the beginning of July (middle of Messidor). Having been apprised by signals that the English Gibraltar fleet was watching off Cadiz, he put into the Spanish port of Algéziras in the evening of the 4th of July (15th Messidor).

Near the Straits of Gibraltar, that is to say, towards the southernmost point of the Peninsula, the mountainous coast of Spain opens, and, assuming the shape of a horse-shoe, forms a deep bay, the mouth of which faces the south. On one side of this bay lies Algéziras, on the other Gibraltar, so that Algéziras and Gibraltar are situated opposite to each other, at the distance of 4000 fathoms, or nearly a league and a half. All that passes at Gibraltar may be distinctly seen from Algéziras by means of an ordinary telescope. There was not a single English ship in the bay, but rear-admiral Saumarez was not far distant. With seven ships, he was watching the port of Cadiz, where at this moment several divisions, either French or Spanish, were collected. Informed of all that was passing, he lost no time in seizing the opportunity thus offered for destroying Linois' division, as he had seven ships to oppose to three. He had, it is true, detached one of these seven, the *Superb*, to

watch the mouth of the Guadalquivir. He made a signal for her to rejoin him ; but the wind being unfavourable for the return of the *Superb*, he steered for Algéziras with six sail of the line and one frigate.

Admiral Linois, on his part, had been warned by the Spanish authorities of the danger which threatened him, and he had recourse to the only precautions which the nature of the situation allowed him to take. The coast of Algéziras, in the bay of the same name, situated, as we have just said, opposite to Gibraltar, forms a roadstead rather than a harbour. It has no projecting points, being quite straight, and running from north to south, without any creek in which vessels can take shelter, only, at the two extremities of this roadstead, there are two batteries : the one to the north of Algéziras, on an elevated point of the coast, known by the name of the battery of St. Jago ; the other, to the south of Algéziras, on an islet called Green Island. The battery of St. Jago mounted five eighteen-pounders, and that of Green Island, seven twenty-four pounders. This was no great help, especially on account of Spanish negligence, which had left all the posts along the coast, without gunners and without ammunition. Admiral Linois, however, put himself in communication with the local authorities, who did their best to assist the French. He ranged his three ships, and his frigate along the shore, supporting the extremities of this very short line, upon the two fortified positions of St. Jago and Green Island. First lay the *Formidable*, which, placed northernmost, was supported by the battery of St. Jago, then the *Desaix*, in the middle, and lastly the *Indomptable*, which was the southernmost, near the battery of Green Island. Between the *Desaix* and Green Island was stationed the *Muiron* frigate. Some Spanish gunboats were intermingled with the French ships.

On the 6th of July, 1801 (17th Messidor, year IX.), rear-admiral Saumarez, having left his station off Cadiz, bore up with a west-north-west wind for the bay of Algéziras, doubled cape Carnero, entered the bay, and made for the French line lying at its moorings. The wind, which was unfavourable for the approach of the English ships, separated them from one another, and luckily prevented them from acting with all the concert desirable. The *Venerable*, which had headed the column, was left behind. The *Pompey* took her place, ran along our line, passing successively under the fire of the battery of Green Island, of the *Muiron* frigate, of the *Indomptable*, the *Desaix*, and the *Formidable*, discharging her broadsides into each of them, and taking up a position within musket-shot of our admiral's ship the *Formidable*, on board of which Linois had hoisted his flag. An obstinate fight ensued between these two antagonists, almost within point-blank range. The *Venerable* hitherto unable to beat up to the scene of action, endeavoured to approach for the purpose of assisting the *Pompey*. The *Audacious*, the third of the

English ships, destined to attack the *Desaix*, could not get so far to windward, but anchoring abreast of the *Indomptable*, the southernmost French ship, opened a heavy fire upon her. The *Cæsar* and the *Spencer*, the fourth and fifth English ships, were one of them astern, the other carried to the extremity of the bay by the wind which blew from west to east. The sixth and last, the *Hannibal*, was at first driven towards Gibraltar, but, after many manœuvres to approach Algéziras, tacked in shore, and kept a close luff, to turn our flag-ship the *Formidable*, and get between her and the land. The engagement with such as could come up was most obstinate. The English ships had severally cast anchor, that they might not drift from Algéziras towards Gibraltar. Our flag-ship had two enemies upon her at once, the *Pompey* and the *Venerable*, and would soon have had a third, if the *Hannibal* had succeeded in taking a position between her and the shore. The captain of the *Formidable*, the gallant Lalonde, was killed by a cannon-ball. An extremely animated fire was kept up, amidst shouts of *Vive la République! Vive le Premier Consul!* Admiral Linois, who was on board the *Formidable*, bringing his broadside opportunely to bear on the *Pompey*, which presented only her stem to him, succeeded in raking, dismasting, and almost completely disabling her. Availing himself, at the same time, of a change in the wind which had veered to the east, and blew towards Algéziras, he made a signal to his captains to cut their cables, and to suffer their ships to drift aground, so as to prevent the English from getting between us and the shore, and placing us between two fires, as Nelson had done in the battle of Aboukir. This grounding could not be attended with much danger to the French ships, for it was then ebb-tide, and at high water they were sure to be got off again with ease. This order, seasonably given, saved the division. The *Formidable*, after she had quite disabled the *Pompey*, took the ground without any severe shock; for the breeze in changing its direction had lulled. In thus avoiding the danger with which she was threatened by the *Hannibal*, she gained a formidable position with regard to that antagonist. Besides, the *Hannibal* in performing her manœuvre, had herself grounded, and lay immovable under the double fire of the *Formidable* and the battery of St. Jago. The *Hannibal* made every effort to escape from this perilous situation; but as the tide ebbed, she became irremediably fixed in her position. She was exposed to a tremendous fire from all quarters, as well from the shore, as from the *Formidable* and the Spanish gunboats. She sunk one or two of these gunboats; but her fire was not a match for that which was poured into her. Admiral Linois, thinking that the battery of St. Jago was not worked with sufficient spirit, landed general Devaux with a detachment of the French troops, which he had on board. The fire of that battery was then redoubled, and the *Hannibal* was overwhelmed.



But a new adversary was at hand to complete her defeat. The second French ship, the *Desaix*, stationed next to the *Formidable*, in obeying the order to drift to shore, had in consequence of the breeze almost dying away, executed that manœuvre slowly, and was still a little astern of the line, equally in sight of the Hannibal, and the Pompey, which the *Formidable*, in drifting away, had exposed to her fire. The *Desaix*, taking advantage of this position, poured a first broadside into the Pompey, and handled her so roughly as to oblige her to strike her flag, and then turned all her guns upon the Hannibal. Her balls, grazing the side of our admiral's ship, the *Formidable*, made dreadful havoc on board the Hannibal. The latter, incapable of further resistance, also struck her flag. Consequently two English ships out of six, had been obliged to surrender. The four others, by dint of manœuvres, had got into line again, and near enough to engage the *Desaix* and the *Indomptable*. The *Desaix*, before she grounded, had made head against them, while the *Indomptable* and the *Muiron* frigate, slowly drifting towards the shore, answered them by a well-directed fire. These last two ships had placed themselves under the battery of Green Island, the guns of which were worked by French soldiers, who were landed for that purpose.

The battle had now raged for several hours with the greatest energy. Admiral Saumarez, having lost two ships out of six, and having no hope of any result from the action, for he could not get closer to the French without running the risk of grounding along with them, threw out the signal for retreat, leaving us in possession of the Hannibal, but determined to carry off the Pompey, which, quite dismasted, lay like a hulk on the scene of action. Admiral Saumarez, having sent to Gibraltar for boats, succeeded in towing off the hull of the Pompey, which our ships, being aground, could not retake. The Hannibal remained our prize.

Such was the battle of Algéziras, in which three French ships fought six English, destroyed two, and kept one of the two their prize. The French were overjoyed, though they had sustained severe loss. Captain Lalonde of the *Formidable* was killed; and Captain Moncousu of the *Indomptable* had fallen gloriously. We numbered about 200 killed and 300 wounded, in all 500 officers and seamen killed and wounded, out of 2000 who were on board the squadron. But the loss of the English in killed and wounded amounted to 900 men; and their ships were completely riddled.

Glorious as was this action, the business was not quite over. Our ships had sustained so much damage, that it was absolutely necessary to withdraw from the anchorage of Algéziras. Admiral Saumarez enraged, and vowing to revenge himself the moment Linois should leave his place of refuge, and sail for Cadiz, made great preparations. He employed the vast re-

sources of the port of Gibraltar, to put his division into fighting condition, and even prepared fire-ships, resolved at least to burn the French ships, if he could not draw them out to sea. Admiral Linois had but the resources of Algéziras, which were little better than none, for repairing his damages. The arsenal of Cadiz, indeed, was not far off, but it was no easy matter to bring materials thence by sea on account of the English, nor by land on account of the difficulty of transit; and yet the spars and rigging of the French ships were destroyed, and several of their masts were carried away, or much damaged. Admiral Linois made every possible exertion to make them fit for putting to sea again. Scarcely any thing was to be found for dressing the wounded. The French consuls in the neighbouring ports had been obliged to send surgeons and medicines overland by post.

At this moment, the Spanish squadron which had come from Ferrol, was at Cadiz, besides the six ships given to France, and equipped in haste by admiral Dumanoir. The force of these two divisions, in point of number, was certainly very satisfactory; but the Spanish navy, always worthy by its bravery of the illustrious nation to which it belonged, had experienced also the effect of the general negligence, which paralysed all the resources of the kingdom. The division of the French admiral Dumanoir, scantily manned with sailors of all countries, could not impart much confidence. None of the ships which composed it equalled those of Linois' division, trained by long cruises, and elated with their recent victory.

It required the most earnest solicitations to induce the Spanish admiral Massaredo, commanding at Cadiz, and very ill-disposed towards us, to afford succour to admiral Linois. On the 9th of July (20th Messidor), he despatched admiral Moreno, an excellent officer, of great valour and experience, to Algéziras, with the five Spanish ships from Ferrol, one of the six ships given to Dumanoir, the *San Antonio*, and six frigates. This squadron carried stores destined for Linois' division. In one day it reached the roadstead of Algéziras.

Men were kept at work night and day, in repairing the three ships which had fought so glorious an engagement. These three ships had been got afloat at the first flood-tide. Their rigging was refitted in the best and speediest possible manner; top-masts were made for them out of top-gallant-masts, and by the morning of the 12th, they were ready for sea. The same pains were bestowed on the Hannibal, which had been taken from the English, and which was also to be carried into Cadiz.

On the morning of the 12th, the combined squadron got under weigh, with an east-north-east wind, which carried it out of the bay of Algéziras into the Straits. It sailed in order of battle, the two largest Spanish ships, the *San Carlos* and the *Santa Hermenegilda*, both of 112 guns forming the rear division.

The two admirals were, according to the custom of the Spanish navy, on board one of the frigates. This was the *Sabina*. Towards nightfall the wind lulled. They would not return to the anchorage of Algéziras, because that position was a dangerous one to take, in presence of an enemy's division, and moreover, because there was reason to apprehend the arrival of the reinforcements, expected every moment by the English squadron. It was determined, however, to leave behind the *Hannibal*, which could not make any progress, though towed by the *Indienne* frigate. She was sent back to the road of Algéziras. The combined squadron lay-to, hoping that the wind would freshen in the course of the night. Admiral Saumarez, on his part, had given orders for sailing. He had lost the *Hannibal*; the *Pompey* was unfit for service; he had, therefore, no more than four of the six ships which had fought at Algéziras. But he had been rejoined by the *Superb*, which made up a division of five sail of the line, besides several frigates, and some light vessels provided with combustibles. He had carried his rancour so far, as to put on board his ships furnaces for red-hot shot. Though he had but five large ships, and the allies nine, he resolved to run every risk to repair the humiliating check of Algéziras, and to spare himself the dreaded censure of the Admiralty. He followed the united French and Spanish squadron at a very small distance, ready to seize the first opportunity that might occur to fall upon the rear-division.

About midnight, the wind having freshened, the combined squadron again made sail for Cadiz. Its order was somewhat changed. The rear division was formed of three ships, ranged in a single line, the *San Carlos* on the right, the *Santa Hermenegilda* in the middle, and the *San Antonio*, a seventy-four, now French, on the left. They sailed in this manner abreast, at very short distances from each other. The night was extremely dark. Admiral Saumarez ordered the *Superb*, an excellent sailer, to crowd all sail and to attack our rear division. The *Superb* soon overtook the combined squadron. She had extinguished her lights, that she might be the less liable to be perceived, keeping a little astern of the *San Carlos* on her lee. She poured a whole broadside into her, and continuing without intermission, gave her a second and a third, firing red-hot balls. The *San Carlos* instantly took fire. The *Superb*, perceiving this, kept astern, slackened sail, and remained at some distance. The *San Carlos*, in flames, being badly handled in the confusion, drifted to leeward, and instead of keeping in line, soon fell astern of her two neighbours. She fired in all directions; her balls reached the *Santa Hermenegilda*, the crew of which, mistaking her for the headmost ship of the English column, poured all their fire into her. At this critical moment a frightful mistake was committed by the crews of the two Spanish ships, who each mistook the other's ship for the enemy's.

The two ships brought up alongside, and approaching so close as actually to run foul of each other's rigging, entered furiously into an obstinate engagement. The fire now become more violent on board the *San Carlos*, soon communicated to the *Santa Hermenegilda*, and these two ships, in this condition, continued to pour heavy broadsides into each other without intermission. Both squadrons in the utter darkness of the night, were equally ignorant of what was going on; and with the exception of the *Superb*, who must have been conscious of this fatal mistake, since she was the cause of it, no vessel dared to come near, not knowing which was Spanish, or which was English, nor which they ought to assist, or to attack. The French ship the *San Antonio* had removed from this dangerous proximity. The conflagration soon increased to an awful height, spreading a lurid light over the whole surface of the sea. It would appear that the fatal delusion, which armed these brave Spaniards against each other, was now dissipated, but too late—the *San Carlos* blew up with a frightful explosion. A few minutes afterwards the *Santa Hermenegilda* also blew up, spreading terror throughout the crews of the two squadrons, who were perfectly ignorant which of the ships had perished by this catastrophe.

The *Superb* perceiving the *San Antonio* separated from the two others, bore up towards her, and boldly engaged her. This ship, recently put into commission, defended herself without that order and coolness, which are indispensable to put in motion these gigantic engines of warfare. She suffered most severely, and two new adversaries, the *Cæsar* and the *Venerable*, coming up at the moment, rendered her defeat inevitable. She struck her flag after having been made a complete wreck.

Admiral Saumarez thus cruelly revenged himself, without, however, acquiring much glory for himself, but with considerable damage to the Spanish fleet. The two admirals, Linois and Moreno, on board the *Sabina*, had kept as near as possible to this frightful scene. Being unable to distinguish, in the darkness, what was going on, or to give the requisite orders, they suffered the most intense anxiety. At break of day, they found themselves a short distance from Cadiz, with their squadron rallied, but diminished in number by three ships, the *San Carlos* and the *Santa Hermenegilda*, which had both blown up, and the *San Antonio*, which had been captured. A fourth ship, belonging to the combined fleet had kept in the rear, this was the *Formidable*, admiral Linois' flag-ship, which had been crowned with glory at the battle of Algéziras, but which still suffered from the effects of that engagement. Being compelled to carry short sail, owing to the loss of some of her masts, therefore sailing slowly, being near the two burning ships, and dreading the fatal mistakes of the night, she had kept in the rear, not deeming it in her power to be of any assistance, to

either of the vessels in action. In this way, she became a little separated from the squadron. Being descried in the morning in her isolated position, she was surrounded by the English, and attacked by one frigate and three ships. Admiral Linois on leaving her, and hoisting his flag on board the *Sabina*, had appointed one of his lieutenants, captain Troude, to the command of the *Formidable*. This able and valiant officer, considering with a rare presence of mind, that if he tried to escape by making all sail, he would be run down by the ships which were better rigged than his own, resolved to seek his safety in a skilful manœuvre, and a vigorous engagement. His crew participated in his feelings, and not one amongst them would consent to lose the laurels won at Algéziras. They were veteran tars, disciplined by a long voyage, and accustomed to fighting, a point still more essential at sea than on land. Their worthy captain, Troude, did not wait till all his adversaries, who were in chase of the *Formidable*, should be united against her, but bore right down upon the nearest, which was the Thames frigate. He came close up to her, and with his superior weight of metal, poured into her such a terrible fire, as soon sickened her of so unequal a contest. The Venerable, an English seventy-four, came up at full sail after her. Captain Troude, feeling still conscious that he was superior to her also (the *Formidable* carrying eighty guns), waited till she came up, to engage with her, whilst the two other English ships tried to gain upon her on the wind, and to cut off her retreat into Cadiz. Working his ship in a seaman-like manner, he brought his overwhelming broadside, bristling with guns, to bear upon the unprotected forecastle of the Venerable, and making, by a skilful manœuvre, the superiority of his weight of metal produce its full effect, he riddled her with balls, shot away one mast, then a second, then a third, and after having raked her fore and aft like a hulk, lodged several dangerous shots in her hull, between wind and water, which put her in imminent danger of sinking. This unfortunate ship, fearfully disabled, excited the alarm of the rest of the English division. The Thames frigate returned to afford her assistance; the two other English ships, which had endeavoured to place themselves between Cadiz and the *Formidable*, soon put about. They were desirous of saving the crew of the Venerable, which they were afraid would go down, and at the same time overwhelming the French ship, which made so noble a resistance. The latter trusting to his seamanship and his good fortune, fired successively into them the most rapid and well-directed broadsides; he discouraged them, and sent them off to the Venerable, ready to turn bottom upwards, if they did not speedily arrive to her assistance.

The gallant captain Troude, having got rid of his numerous enemies, proceeded in triumph towards the port of Cadiz. A multitude of Spaniards, attracted by the firing, and the explo-



sions during the night, had crowded to the beach. They had witnessed the danger and the triumph of the French ship, and, in spite of a very natural grief, for the loss of the two Spanish vessels, which was already known, they filled the air with acclamations at the sight of the *Formidable*, returning victoriously into the harbour.

The English could not deny that the glory of these engagements was on our side; and as respected the actual loss, it was equally divided. If the French had lost one ship and the Spaniards two, the English had left one vessel in our power, and had two so disabled, as to be rendered quite unfit for further service. But for the accidental occurrences of the night, they might be considered as having been quite beaten, in these several encounters. The battle of Algéziras, and the return of the *Formidable* into port, were amongst the most distinguished exploits known in the annals of our naval history. But the Spaniards were dejected, as, though their admiral, Moreno, had conducted himself well, a brilliant action did not compensate to them for the loss of the *San Carlos* and the *Santa Hermenegilda*.

However, the events in Portugal afforded them some consolation. We last left the prince of Peace, preparing to commence the war against Portugal, at the head of the combined forces of the two nations, with the view, as we have already fully explained, of influencing the negotiations at London.

In conformity with the plan agreed upon, the Spaniards were to carry on their operations upon the left bank of the Tagus, and the French on the right. Thirty thousand Spaniards were assembled before Badajoz, upon the frontiers of Alentejo. Fifteen thousand French were marching, by way of Salamanca, upon Tras-os-montes. Thanks to the energetic efforts made, to the loans advanced by the clergy, and to the general sacrifices made by all branches of the service, the equipment of 30,000 Spaniards had been provided for. But the train of artillery was greatly behindhand. Nevertheless, the prince of Peace, counting with reason upon the moral effect of the union of the French with the Spaniards, was anxious to proceed at once to hostilities, and eager to gather his first laurels. He could not help wishing to carry off all the honours of the campaign, and to keep the French in reserve, only as a resource to fall back upon in case of reverses. We could well afford to leave the prince of Peace the enjoyment of such a gratification. The French, at that moment, were not careering after glory, but solicitous about useful results; and these results consisted in the occupation of one or two provinces of Portugal, in order to hold fresh securities against England. However easy of attainment the object of the war might seem, there was still a danger to be feared, and that was, that it might be taken up by the national prejudices of the Portuguese. The hatred of the latter



against the Spaniards, might have produced disastrous results, if the approach of the French, advancing some few days' marches in the rear, had not dissipated these feeble wishes to offer a resistance. The prince of Peace hastened, therefore, to pass the frontier, and to attack the fortified places in Portugal, with field pieces for want of battering guns. He took possession of Olivenza and Jurumenha, without difficulty. But the garrisons of Elvas and Campo Mayor, shut themselves up within their walls, and made a show of defending themselves. The prince of Peace ordered these places to be invested, and, during this time, marched forward to meet the Portuguese army, under the command of the duke of Alafoëns. The Portuguese, unable to keep their ground anywhere, fled towards the Tagus. The garrisons which were besieged then threw open their gates. Campo Mayor surrendered; and the siege of Elvas was undertaken in regular form, with a park of artillery, now arrived from Seville. The prince of Peace pursued the enemy triumphantly, over-run rapidly Azumar, Alegrete, Portalegre, Castello-de-Vide, Flor de Rosa, and at length crossed the Tagus, behind which the Portuguese hastened to seek refuge. He had succeeded in making himself master of almost the whole of the province of Alentejo. The French had not yet passed the frontiers of Portugal, and it was manifest, that if the Spaniards single-handed had obtained such results, the Spaniards and the French united, must inevitably, in a very few days, make themselves masters of Lisbon and Oporto. The court of Portugal, which had hitherto refused to believe that the threatened attack was contemplated in earnest, now perceiving the events which were taking place, hastened to make her submission, and to despatch M. Pinto de Souza to the Spanish head-quarters, with orders to subscribe to any conditions which it might be the pleasure of the combined armies to impose upon her. The prince of Peace, wishing to make his royal masters the witnesses of his glory, induced the king and queen to go to Badajoz, to distribute the rewards to the army, and to hold there a sort of congress. In this way, a court, formerly so illustrious, but at present dishonoured by a dissolute queen, by an incapable and all-powerful favourite, tried to indulge in the illusion of directing mighty affairs. Lucien Bonaparte had followed the king and the queen to Badajoz. Such was the state of matters at the end of June, and the beginning of July.

The engagements of Algéziras, and of Cadiz, which were fought with a view of giving confidence to our navy; the brief campaign of Portugal, which established the decisive influence of the First Consul in the Peninsula, and proved that he had the power of treating Portugal like Naples, Tuscany, and Holland, compensated up to a certain point, for the unfavourable tidings as yet received from Egypt. Neither the battle of Canopus, nor the capitulation already signed at Cairo, nor the capitu-

lation subsequently rendered inevitable at Alexandria, were as yet known. Intelligence by sea was not transmitted at that time, with the same rapidity as at the present day; a month at least, and sometimes longer, was required to convey to Marseilles the news of an event which had happened on the Nile. The only fact known respecting the affairs of Egypt, 'was the landing of the English, and their first skirmishes upon the sands of Alexandria; no idea could be formed of the events which followed; and the ultimate result of the contest was involved in the greatest doubt. The weight which France could cast into the scale of the pending negotiations, was no ways diminished; on the contrary, it was increased, by the influence which she each successive day acquired in Europe.

The treaty of Lunéville produced, in fact, its inevitable consequences. Austria disarmed, and henceforward powerless in the eyes of all Europe, left full scope to our designs. Russia, since the death of Paul I. and the accession of Alexander, was no longer, it is true, inclined to take any energetic measures hostile to England, but, at the same time, did not oppose the views of France in the west. Indeed, the First Consul took no pains to conceal his views. He had recently converted Piedmont, by a simple decree, into French departments, without giving himself a thought about any objections urged by the Russian ambassador. He had declared that, with respect to Naples, the treaty of Florence should be the basis of the rule by which the affairs of that kingdom should be adjusted. Genoa had just submitted her constitution to him, that he might introduce some alterations, calculated to strengthen the executive authority. The Cisalpine Republic, composed of Lombardy, the Duchy of Modena, and the Legations, constituted a first time by the treaty of Campo Formio, and a second time by the treaty of Lunéville, was now newly organised into the state of an ally, dependent upon France. Holland, after the example of Liguria, submitted her constitution to the First Consul, in order to confer greater power on the government, a sort of reform, which was effected, at that time, in all the Republics, ancillary to the French Republic. In short, the minor negotiators, who not long since sought support from M. de Kalitscheff, the haughty minister of Paul I., now regretted having sought this protection, and solicited from the favour of the First Consul alone, an amelioration of their condition. The representatives of the princes of Germany especially, manifested, in this respect, the greatest eagerness. The treaty of Lunéville had settled the principle of the secularisation of the Ecclesiastical States, and the division of these states amongst the hereditary princes. Every feeling of ambition was roused by this approaching distribution. The great, as well as the minor powers, alike aspired to obtain the most advantageous share. Austria, and Prussia, although their losses on the left bank of

the Rhine had been very trifling, were anxious to participate in the promised indemnities. Bavaria, Wurtemberg, Baden, and the house of Orange, besieged the new chief of France with their solicitations, inasmuch, as being the principal party to the treaty of Lunéville, he would have the greatest influence upon the execution of that treaty. Prussia herself, represented at Paris by M. de Luchesini, did not disdain to stoop to play the part of a suppliant, and to give additional lustre to the dignity of the First Consul, by the humility of her solicitations. Thus, although the six months which had elapsed since the signature was affixed to the treaty at Lunéville had been marked by reverses in Egypt—reverses, it is true, imperfectly known in Europe—still, during that time, the ascendancy of the French government had been maintained, and the course of events only served to render her power more evident, and more preponderating. This combination of circumstances must have its due influence upon the negotiation at London, which had been allowed to languish for a moment, but which was about to be resumed with renewed activity, owing to the singularly coincident views of the two governments. The First Consul, on hearing of the first proceedings of Menou, deemed the campaign quite lost, and he was anxious to conclude peace at London before the catastrophe, which he foresaw, could take place. The English ministers, not being in a position, like him, to form a correct opinion on the issue of events, and moreover, apprehensive of some vigorous effort of the army of Egypt, so renowned for its valour, were desirous of taking advantage of the first appearance of success to press the negotiations; so that both nations, as they had before felt inclined to temporise, now concurred in wishing to conclude peace.

But before we again enter into the intricacies of this vast negotiation, wherein the greatest interests of the universe were about to be discussed, we must relate an event which absorbed at this moment the undivided attention of all Paris, and which completed the unparalleled spectacle which Consular France exhibited at that period.

The Infants of Parma, appointed to reign over Tuscany, had quitted Madrid at the moment when the royal family set out for Badajoz, and they had just arrived on the frontiers of the Pyrenees. The First Consul considered it of great importance that they should visit Paris, before they were sent to Florence to take possession of the new throne of Etruria. All kinds of contrasts pleased the active and enlarged mind of general Bonaparte. He delighted in this truly Roman scene, representing a king created by himself, with his own republican hands; he was pleased, above all, in being able to show that he did not fear the presence of a Bourbon, and that his glory placed him in a proud position, far above any comparison with the ancient dynasty, whose place he filled. He delighted, also, in dis-

playing, before the eyes of the whole world, even in Paris, which had been but recently the theatre of a sanguinary revolution, a pageantry, an elegance worthy of royalty. All this must necessarily tend to mark distinctly the sudden change which had taken place in France, under his restorative authority.

That attentive and minute foresight, which he knew how to apply to a great military operation, he did not disdain to employ in those magnificent pageants, in which he himself personally, and the glory by which he was surrounded, were to be the most conspicuous objects. He took pains to regulate the smallest details, to provide every thing suitable to the occasion, to marshal every one in his proper place ; and this was necessary in an entirely novel state of social order, created out of the wrecks of a whole world destroyed. Every thing had to be adjusted anew, not excepting etiquette, with which even republics cannot dispense.

The three Consuls deliberated, for a long time, upon the mode in which the king and queen of Etruria should be received in France, and upon the ceremonial which should be observed in respect to them. In order to obviate many difficulties, it was agreed that they should be received, under the assumed title of count and countess of Leghorn ; that they should be treated as illustrious guests, following the precedent during the last century, in the case of the young czar, Paul I., and that of the emperor of Austria, Joseph II. The difficulties, to which the official rank of the king and queen would have given rise, were thus, by means of the incognito, completely removed. The necessary orders were accordingly issued to the respective civil and military authorities in the departments upon the line of road.

Novelty delights the people in all ages. This was one, and one of the most surprising, to see a king and a queen, after a twelve years' revolution, which had overturned, or threatened so many thrones ; it was one, moreover, very flattering for the French nation, since this king and queen were the fruits of their victories. In every place where the Infants appeared, they excited the liveliest transports of joy. They were received with every demonstration of regard and respect. No unpleasantness on their journey brought to their recollection that they were travelling in a country which, not long previous, was convulsed to the very centre. The Royalists, who were not in any way flattered by this monarchical work of the French Republic, were the only parties which seized upon the present occasion to manifest any spiteful feeling ; at the theatre at Bordeaux they shouted violently, and with marked emphasis, "*Vive le roi !*" The people responded to this cry, "*A bas les rois !*"

The First Consul himself, by means of letters issued from his cabinet, moderated the over-excessive zeal of the prefects, as he

did not wish to magnify this royal progress into an event of too great importance. In June the young princes arrived in Paris, where their stay was to extend to a whole month. They were to take up their residence at the house of the Spanish ambassador. The First Consul, although a simple temporary magistrate of the Republic, represented the French nation; before this prerogative all the privileges of the blood royal gave way. It was arranged that the two young sovereigns, having given previous intimation to the First Consul, should pay him the first visit; and that he should return it on the following day. The second and third consuls, who could not claim to be in the same degree the representatives of France, were to make the first visit to the Infants. Thus, with respect to the latter, the following order of birth and rank was established. On the day conducted to Leghorn were the count and countess of Leghorn were Azara. The First Consul, on his arrival by the Spanish ambassador, count exclusively military household which he had adopted. The count of Leghorn, put somewhat out of countenance, threw himself like a child into the arms of the First Consul, who, on his side, embraced him warmly. He treated this young couple with a paternal kindness, and with the most delicate attention, maintaining over them, nevertheless, all the superiority which power, glory, and years, naturally confer. On the following day, the First Consul returned their visit at the house of the ambassador. The Consuls, Cambacérès and Lebrun, performed, on their parts, the duties prescribed to them, and received from the young princes, the marks of courtesy which were due to them.

It was arranged that the First Consul should present the count and countess of Leghorn to the people of Paris at the Opera. On the day appointed for this introduction, he was suffering from indisposition. The Consul Cambacérès, supplied his place, and escorted the Infants to the Opera. Upon entering the Consul's box, he took the count of Leghorn by the hand, and presented him to the audience, who responded by the most unanimous applause, wholly free from any malicious or offensive meaning. Nevertheless, the idle part of the city, accustomed to give vent to their thoughts, by such fetched constructions put upon the most ordinary occurrences, interpreted the journey of the princes of Spain to Paris in a hundred different ways. Those who only aimed at uttering a witty saying declared, that the Consul Cambacérès had just presented the Bourbons to the French nation. The royalists who persisted in expecting from general Bonaparte, that he could not, and would not do, gave out that this was, on his part, one mode of preparing the minds of the people for the restoration of the ancient dynasty. The republicans, on the contrary, alleged that he was aiming, by these regal pageants, to

accustom France to the re-establishment of a monarchy, but for his own benefit.

The ministers received orders to lavish entertainments upon the princely visitors. M. de Talleyrand did not require these wishes to be intimated to him. Justly considered a model of taste and elegance under the ancient régime, he was still better entitled to this distinction under the new state of things, and he gave, at the château of Neuilly, a *fête* of a most magnificent description, where the *élite* of French society assembled, and where names, long banished from the circles of the capital, were eminently conspicuous. At night, in the midst of a brilliant illumination, a representation of the city of Florence appeared, executed with marvellous ingenuity. The Tuscan people were depicted dancing and singing upon the celebrated Plaza of the Palazzo Vecchio, offering flowers to the young sovereigns, and triumphal crowns to the First Consul. This magnificent spectacle had cost a very considerable sum. It combined all the prodigality of the Directory, with the elegance of other times, and that regard to decorum which was now so new, and which a severe master was striving to impress upon the manners of revolutionary France. The minister of war followed the example of the minister of foreign affairs, and gave a military fête, in commemoration of the anniversary of the battle of Marengo. The minister of the interior, and the second and third consuls, gave, in succession, magnificent entertainments to the royal princes, and, during an entire month, the capital presented the appearance of continual rejoicing. The First Consul, however, did not wish the Infants to be present at the republican solemnities of the month of July, and he accordingly made the necessary arrangements for their departure from Paris, previous to the anniversary of the 14th of July.

Whilst these brilliant spectacles were being given, he endeavoured to instil some good advice into the minds of the royal pair who were about to reign over Tuscany. But he was struck with the incapacity of the young prince, who, when he was on a visit to Malmaison, gave himself up in the aides-de-camp's waiting-room to amusements, scarcely pardonable in a raw youth. The princess alone seemed intelligent, and attentive to the advice bestowed by the First Consul. The latter augured indifferently of these new sovereigns, destined to rule a portion of Italy, and clearly perceived that he would frequently be required to interfere in the affairs of their kingdom. "You see," said he, quite publicly, to several members of the government; "you see what these princes are, sprung from the old blood, and especially those who have been educated and brought up at the southern courts. How can we intrust them with the government of nations! However, there is no harm in having exhibited, to the French people, this specimen of the Bourbons. They may judge by them, whether the members of the ancient



dynasties are competent to deal with the difficulties inseparable from an active age like the present." Every one, in fact, on seeing the young prince, had made the same remark as the First Consul. General Clarke was appointed Mentor to these two sovereigns, under the title of Minister of France, at the court of Etruria.

Amidst this vast pressure of public business, amidst these fêtes, which, themselves, amounted almost to public business, the important subject of the maritime peace was not neglected. The negotiations entered into at London, between lord Hawkesbury and M. Otto, had transpired. They were kept less secret, since both parties were more anxious to arrive at a conclusion. As we have said before, the desire to bring them to a termination had succeeded the wish to temporise, as the First Consul augured badly from the events which were occurring on the banks of the Nile, and the British government was apprehensive of some unexpected exploit on the part of the army of Egypt. The new English minister was very desirous of peace, as that was the sole object of his assuming office. If, indeed, the war was still to be carried on, Mr. Pitt was far fitter than Mr. Addington to be at the head of affairs. All the events which had happened, whether in the north or in the east, however much they had improved the relative position of England, were viewed by the English ministers, as furnishing them rather with means of negotiating a more advantageous peace, which they could better defend in parliament, than with reasons for desiring it less earnestly. On the contrary, they considered the opportunity most favourable, and were anxious to avoid the error with which Mr. Pitt had been so much reproached, in not having treated before the battles of Marengo and Hohenlinden. The king of England, as we have seen, had come round to pacific views, influenced by esteem for the First Consul, and perhaps slightly by a feeling of irritation against Mr. Pitt. The people, suffering severely from the scarcity, fond of novelty, looked forward to the end of the war for an improvement in their condition. Reflecting men, without any exception, thought that a ten years' sanguinary struggle was quite long enough, and that they ought not, by obstinately persisting in protracting it longer, to furnish France with a pretence for further aggrandizement. Moreover, they were not free from anxiety at London concerning the preparations for an invasion, which were perceptible along the coasts of the Channel. One class of men only, those who in England were engaged in great mercantile and privateering speculations, and who had subscribed to the enormous loans of Mr. Pitt, perceiving that peace, by throwing open the seas to the flags of all nations, and particularly to that of France, would deprive them of the commercial monopoly which they enjoyed, and would put an end to the present great financial operations, were but little inclined towards the pa-

cific policy of Mr. Addington. They were wholly devoted to Mr. Pitt, and to his system of policy ; they even encouraged a feeling in favour of war, when Mr. Pitt himself began to consider peace as necessary. But these rich speculators, in the City, were compelled to give way, when the clamour of the people and of the farmers was opposed to them, and above all, when the unanimous opinion of reflecting men was ranged against them.

The English ministry, therefore, was not only resolved to negotiate, but to negotiate promptly, to enable them to lay the result of their negotiations before parliament at the ensuing session, that is to say, in the autumn. They had just effected an arrangement with Russia upon advantageous terms. England had only to adjust with that cabinet a simple question of maritime law. She had made some concessions to the new emperor, and she had also exacted some from Russia, which this young inexperienced prince, anxious to satisfy the party which had placed him on the throne, and still more anxious to devote himself tranquilly to his projects of reform in the interior of his dominions, had had the weakness to allow her to extort from him. Upon the four essential principles of maritime law, which had been in dispute, Russia had abandoned two, and established two. By a convention concluded on the 17th of June, between the vice-chancellor Panin and lord St. Helens, the following stipulations had been agreed upon :

1st. Neutral bottoms were to be allowed freely to navigate between all the ports in the world, even those of belligerent nations. They were to be allowed to import every thing, according to usage, except articles contraband of war. The definition of this contraband was decidedly favourable to Russian interests ; inasmuch as grain and naval stores, formerly prohibited to neutral vessels, were no longer to be treated as articles contraband of war. This was of vast importance to Russia, which produces hemp, tar, pitch, iron, masts, and corn. Upon this point, one of the most important in maritime law, Russia had advocated the liberties of commerce in general, while defending her own individual interests.

2ndly. The flag was not to cover the merchandise, unless this merchandise had been acquired by, or become the property of, a neutral trader. Thus coffee coming from the French colonies, was not liable to seizure, if it had become Danish or Russian property. It is true, that in practice, this reservation saved a portion of the neutral trade ; but Russia sacrificed the first principle of maritime law, that, *the flag covers the merchandise* ; and she did not maintain the noble character which she had assumed, under Paul and Catherine. The protection of the weak, which she was so ambitious of displaying on the continent, was lamentably forgotten on the seas.

3rdly. The neutrals, although allowed freely to navigate, were not, according to custom, to attempt to enter a blockaded

port, that is to say, a port *blockaded bonâ fide*, the breaking of which was attended with danger. Upon this point, the great principle of a real blockade was rigorously maintained.

4thly, and finally. The right of search, the origin of so many disputes, the proximate cause of the last league of the northern powers, was construed in a manner, but little honourable to the neutral flag. Thus, it had always been contended that merchant vessels, convoyed by a ship of war of the state to which they belonged, which by its presence proved their nationality, and above all the absence of all articles of contraband on board, should not be searched. The dignity of the flag of the state did not allow, in fact, that the captain of a ship, perhaps an admiral, should be detained by a privateer, provided only with a letter of marque. The Russian cabinet thought to save the dignity of the flag by means of a nice distinction. It was declared that the right of search, with respect to merchant vessels under convoy, should no longer be exercised by all vessels indiscriminately, but by vessels of war only. A privateer furnished with a simple letter of marque, was no longer to have the right to detain and question a convoy escorted by a vessel of war. The right of search, consequently, could only for the future, be exercised by one equal, upon another equal. Doubtless, by this means some inconvenience was avoided, but the ground upon which the principle rested was sacrificed, and it was so much the more discreditable to the court of St. Petersburg, as this was the very one of the four questions in dispute, for which Copenhagen had, just three months before, been bombarded, and for which Paul I. had endeavoured to excite all Europe against England.

Thus Russia had established two of the great principles of maritime law, and had sacrificed two. But England, we must recollect, had made concessions, and in her anxiety to obtain peace, had lowered some of the haughty pretensions set up by Mr. Pitt. The Danes, the Swedes, and the Prussians, were invited to give in their adhesion to this convention.

Having thus made terms with Russia, and having obtained, at the outset, some successes in Egypt, England was only desirous of concluding, through this improvement in her position, a speedier peace with France. Lord Hawkesbury sent for M. Otto to the Foreign Office, and authorised him to submit to the First Consul the following proposal: "Egypt is at this moment invaded by our troops," said he to him, "considerable reinforcements must soon reach them; their success is very probable. Nevertheless, the contest is not over, we admit it. Let us stop the effusion of blood; let us agree on both sides not to attempt the permanent occupation of Egypt, which we will both evacuate, and restore to the Porte."

While making this proposal, lord Hawkesbury asserted England's right to keep Malta, "as that island," he added, "was only to be evacuated by England, in the event of the voluntary

evacuation of Egypt by France. This abandonment being now no longer a voluntary concession on the part of France, but a compulsory act, superinduced by the events of the war, there no longer existed any reason for ceding Malta as an equivalent."

In the East Indies the English minister still wished for Ceylon, but he limited his pretensions to that island. He offered to restore the Cape of Good Hope to Holland, as well as the territories in South America which had been taken from her, such as Surinam, Demerara, Berbice, and Essequibo. But he demanded a large island in the West Indies, Martinique or Trinidad, either one or the other, at the discretion of France.

Thus the final result of these ten years of war would be, to give England, besides Hindostan, the island of Ceylon in the Indian ocean, Trinidad or Martinique in the West Indies, and the island of Malta in the Mediterranean. The French cabinet would have, in this way, to make a fine concession to English pride, in each of the three most important seas.

The First Consul immediately replied to the propositions made by the English ministers. Great stress had been laid upon the events in Egypt to support the pretensions of the English ; he, to force them to lower these pretensions, dwelt strongly upon the events which were taking place in Portugal. "Lisbon and Oporto," he replied to lord Hawkesbury, through the medium of M. Otto, "will soon belong to us, if we feel disposed to appropriate them ; a treaty is negotiating at this moment at Badajoz, having for its object to spare the provinces of the most faithful ally of Great Britain. Portugal proposes, in order to ransom her states, to exclude the English from all her ports, to pay besides, a heavy contribution for the expenses of the war, and Spain appears rather disposed to consent to this concession. But every thing depends on the First Consul. He can assent to, or negative this treaty ; and he is about to reject it, he is about to take possession of the chief provinces of Portugal, unless England consents to peace, and upon reasonable and moderate terms. The English require the evacuation of Egypt by the French, be it so ; but let England on her side abandon Malta, let her no longer require Martinique nor Trinidad, but content herself with the island of Ceylon, a very fine acquisition, which forms a noble appendage to the magnificent empire of the Indies."

The English negotiator replied to these proposals in terms but little satisfactory for Portugal, but which confirmed what was already known, that England cared but very little for the allies, whom she had compromised. "If the First Consul should invade the states of Portugal in Europe," rejoined lord Hawkesbury, "England will invade the territories of Portugal beyond the seas. She will take the Azores and Brazil, and will provide herself with pledges, which in her hands, are of far greater value than the Portuguese continent in the hands of the French." Which plainly signified, that instead of defending her ally, Eng-

land sought to revenge herself upon this very ally, for the new acquisitions which her rival might make.

The First Consul perceived that it was necessary to assume an energetic tone on this occasion, and show the feelings which existed at the very bottom of his heart, that is to say, his determination to struggle hand to foot with England, until he should bring her to moderate terms. He declared that he never would, upon any condition whatever, give up Malta ; that Trinidad belonged to an ally, whose interests he would defend even as his own ; that he would not allow the English to have this latter colony ; that they ought to be satisfied with Ceylon, which rendered perfect and ample the conquest of the Indies, and that, moreover, none of the contested points, with the exception of the island of Malta, was to be placed in comparison with the suffering which would be inflicted on the world, by the shedding of one single drop of that blood which was about to flow.

To these diplomatic explanations, he added the public declarations made in the *Moniteur*, with a detailed account of the armaments which he was preparing on the coast of Boulogne.

Divisions of gunboats, in fact, left the ports of the Calvados, the Lower Seine, the Somme, and the Scheldt, to proceed, by coasting, along the coast to Boulogne, and many had already succeeded in reaching that port, in spite of the vigilance of the English cruisers. The First Consul had not as yet decided upon a plan, as he did at a later period,\* of a descent upon England ; but he wanted to intimidate that nation, by the notoriety and extent of his preparations ; and, in short, he had made up his mind to complete these arrangements, and to carry his menaces into effect, if the rupture should ultimately take place. He entered into an elaborate exposition of his views in this respect in a cabinet council, at which the consuls only were present. Having the fullest confidence in the devotion of his colleagues, Lebrun and Cambacérès, he unveiled all his thoughts to them. He admitted to them, that with the armaments actually collected at Boulogne, there was scarcely a sufficient force to attempt a descent on Great Britain, which was one of the most arduous operations in warfare ; that his only object in making these preparations was to give England clearly to understand what was intended, that is to say, a direct invasion, upon the success of which he, general Bonaparte, would not hesitate to risk his life, his glory, and his fortune ; that if he did not succeed in obtaining reasonable concessions from the British cabinet, his resolution was taken ; he would complete the flotilla at Boulogne, to enable it to transport 100,000 men, and would embark himself in this flotilla, to encounter all the chances of a terrible but decisive blow.

---

\* This first attempt of a flotilla, in 1801, must not be confounded with the grand naval and military preparations, known under the celebrated name of the "Camp of Boulogne," and which took place in the year 1804.



Desirous also of enlisting public opinion in England, and even throughout Europe, on his side, he followed up the diplomatic notes, which were addressed to the English ministers, with a series of articles in the *Moniteur*, which were addressed to the European public at large. In these articles, which were models of close and cogent reasoning, of his own composition, and devoured by readers of all nations, spectators of this singular scene, he flattered the present English ministers, representing them as wise, discreet, and well-intentioned men, but still intimidated by the ex-ministers, Mr. Pitt, and especially Mr. Windham. The latter, particularly, he loaded with sarcasms, as he considered him as the chief of the war party. In these articles, he endeavoured to tranquillise Europe respecting the ambition of France, and to show that his conquests were scarcely equivalent to the acquisitions which Prussia, Austria, and Russia, had made at the time of the partition of Poland; that, moreover, she had restored an extent of territory three or four-fold greater than she had retained; that England, in return, ought to restore a large portion of her conquests; that by keeping the continent of India, she remained in possession of a magnificent empire, compared to which the islands in dispute were utterly insignificant; that it was not worth while for the sake of these islands, to continue shedding the best blood of mankind; that if France, it was true, seemed to insist upon them so strongly, it was only from a sense of honour, to defend her allies, to preserve at least some harbours of refuge in remote seas: that, moreover, if England persisted in continuing the war, she had it in her power, undoubtedly, to conquer other colonies, but she possessed already more than sufficed for her commerce; that France, around the whole of her frontiers, had many highly valuable acquisitions which she could make, obvious to all the world without especially pointing them out, since her troops occupied Holland, Switzerland, Piedmont, Naples, and Portugal; and that, in short, the struggle might be brought to a more simple issue, by limiting it to a single-handed engagement between France and England. The general, in handling his pen, took care to avoid wounding the pride of the British nation; but he gave them to understand, that an invasion would be his last resource, and that if the English ministers wished to finish the war only by the extermination of one of the two nations, there was not a Frenchman who was unwilling to make a last and vigorous effort to decide this long quarrel, in a manner that would redound to the eternal glory, and everlasting benefit of France. "But why," said he, "why place the question upon this dangerous footing? why not put an end to the woes of humanity? why leave in this way, to the hazard of war, the fate of two mighty nations?" The First Consul concluded one of these articles in the following most remark-



able and most beautiful language, which, at a future period, became so painfully applicable to himself. "Happy," he exclaimed, "thrice happy are those nations, which, having attained the summit of prosperity, are blessed with wise rulers, who do not expose the many advantages they enjoy to the caprice, and the vicissitudes of fortune."

These articles, distinguished by their vigorous, nervous, and logical arguments, attracted general attention, and produced a deep sensation in men's minds. No government had ever held this open and electrifying language.

The arguments of the First Consul, seconded by very serious demonstrations upon the coasts of France, were calculated to produce, and, in fact, did produce great effect on the other side of the Channel. The formal declaration that France would never concede Malta, had made a great impression, and the British government intimated that they were willing to give it up, on condition that it should be restored to the order of Saint John of Jerusalem, but then, in that case they demanded the Cape of Good Hope. They would also yield Trinidad, and even Martinique, if they obtained a part of the Dutch continent of America, that is to say, Demerara, Berbice, or Essequibo.

The abandonment of Malta was a step gained in the negotiation. The First Consul insisted upon neither giving up Malta, nor the Cape, nor the continental possessions of the Dutch in America. In his opinion, Malta could only be considered as an equivalent for Egypt, in case France retained that conquest; since now the question of the cession of Egypt to France could no longer be entertained, the retention of Malta by the English could not be admitted, nor any similar equivalent.

At last, the English cabinet ceased to insist either upon Malta, or the Cape as a compensation for Malta. They revived, however, their demands for one of the great West India islands, and as they could no longer venture to mention the French island of Martinique, they demanded the Spanish island of Trinidad.

The First Consul was not a whit more inclined to yield Trinidad than Martinique. The former was a Spanish colony, which would furnish the English with a dangerous foot-hold upon the vast continent of South America. He even went so far, in his honourable intentions towards an ally of France, as to offer the small French island of Tobago in lieu of Trinidad. It was not very important, but England had a great interest in it, as all the planters were English. With a feeling of noble pride, only permissible to one who had raised his country to the highest pitch of greatness and of glory, he added, "It is a French colony, this acquisition must touch the vanity of the English, who will be flattered by retaining one trophy of conquest made

over us in the colonies, and thus peace will be more easy of attainment.”\*

By this time, the end of July had arrived, and the month of August, 1801, was approaching.

Great activity prevailed on both sides. The preparations going forward on the coast of France were emulated on the coast of England. The militia was called out, and exercised; carriages were constructed for the conveyance of troops, to enable them to be collected more rapidly at the point menaced. The English journals of the war party held the most violent language. In some of the editorial articles, the violence of which was supposed to be encouraged by Mr. Windham, they went so far as to excite the English people against M. Otto, and against the French prisoners. M. Otto demanded his passports immediately, and the First Consul caused forthwith the most threatening language to be adopted by the *Moniteur*.

Lord Hawkesbury repaired instantly to M. Otto, entreated him to remain, and, with much difficulty, at length prevailed upon him to do so, by holding out a hope of a speedy accommodation. But the animosity of the nation seemed to be roused, and a rupture was anticipated. All the moderate men in England dreaded it, and endeavoured to prevent it. They despaired of the success of their efforts, as the First Consul would not yield, on any terms, the possessions of his allies, which the English still persisted in requiring.

But whilst he was defending so nobly the colonies of Spain, the prince of Peace, with all the inconsistency of a vain and frivolous favourite, induced his master to adopt the most unfortunate line of conduct, and released the First Consul from all friendly engagements with Spain.

It has, doubtless, not been forgotten, that M. de Pinto, the

\* Extract from a letter of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to M. Otto, Commissioner of the French Republic in London :—

“ 20th Thermidor, year IX. (8th August, 1801.)

“ With respect to America you will be guided by the positive instructions contained in my note, and I beg further to add :—

“ The British government desires to retain in the West Indies one of the islands which she has recently acquired, and this under the pretext, that it will be essential to the preservation of her former possessions. Now, in no point of view can this argument apply to the island of Trinidad. Avoid, therefore, any discussion upon that point. Trinidad, by its position, would be, not a means of defence for the English colonies, but a position for the attack of the Spanish continent. The acquisition of the island, would be for the British government of a value and importance hardly to be conceived. The discussion can only fall upon Curaçao, Tobago, St. Lucia, or some other island of that class. Although these two latter are French, still this government might be induced to relinquish one, and the vanity of England may be flattered by thus preserving a trophy, as it were, of one of their conquests over us. You will not fail, citizen, to extol the value of the island, the cession of which may be consented to on our part, especially if it should be Tobago. That island belonged, not long ago, to the English, is now only inhabited by English planters, and all its connexions are English. It has a virgin soil, and its trade is capable of being greatly developed.”

Portuguese envoy, had arrived at the Spanish head-quarters, in order to make submission to the will of France and Spain. The prince of Peace was eager to terminate a campaign, the opening of which had been so easy and brilliant, but which, in its further prosecution, might encounter difficulties, which would be insurmountable without the support of France. If, for instance, it should be necessary to occupy Lisbon or Oporto, the assistance of our soldiers would be indispensable. The undertaking of a simply ostentatious enterprise might become a serious affair, and require a fresh body of French troops. Even foreseeing such a contingency, the First Consul had, of his own accord, ordered 10,000 additional men to advance, which would increase the total number of French troops, now in Spain, to 25,000 men. But the prince of Peace, who had thoughtlessly summoned our troops as his auxiliaries, took alarm, in the same unreflecting manner, at their presence. Nevertheless, they had observed the most perfect discipline, and had exhibited towards the clergy, the churches, the ceremonies of religion, a reverence wholly foreign to their habits, and which general Bonaparte alone could have inspired into their minds. But now that they were actually on the soil of Spain, their presence excited apprehension to a ridiculous degree. Either Spain should not have required them to proceed thither, or, being there at her own express desire, they should have been employed to accomplish the object in view. Now, this object could not have been merely to disperse some bands of Portuguese, to obtain some few millions of contributions, or even to close the ports of Portugal to the vessels of England; it was clearly to seize upon valuable pledges, which might be used to extort from the English, the restitutions which she otherwise refused to make. For that purpose, it was requisite to occupy certain provinces of Portugal, more especially that of which Oporto was the capital. This was the most effectual mode of working upon the British cabinet, by a pressure upon the great merchants in the City, who were deeply interested in the Oporto trade. The matter had been thus concerted between the governments of Paris and Madrid. In defiance, however, of every thing which had been agreed upon, the prince of Peace took it into his head to accept the conditions of Portugal, and to be satisfied, on behalf of Spain, with the cession of Olivenza, a fortified place, with a contribution of about 20,000,000 or 30,000,000 francs to France, and for the two allied powers jointly, with the closing of the ports of Portugal against all English vessels, whether merchant ships or ships of war. For such conditions as these, the campaign, just over, was perfectly puerile. It was merely a pastime, suggested to amuse a favourite satiated with royal favours, who was seeking military glory, in the most ridiculous manner, by means perfectly on a level with his idle and guilty levity.

The prince of Peace roused, in his royal masters, paternal feelings, easily to be excited in their breasts; but it must be

added that these feelings were excited either too soon, or too late. He filled them with alarm at the presence of the French—an alarm, we must again say, felt too late, and perfectly groundless, for it could not enter into the imagination of any one, that 15,000 French troops could conquer Spain, or even prolong their stay in the country, in a manner to create uneasiness. Such a course presupposed projects, the very germ of which did not even exist in the mind of the First Consul, and which were only conceived at a succeeding period, and subsequently to events wholly unexpected, which, at that time, neither he nor any one anticipated. At that moment he was absorbed in one object—to extort from England one more island, and that island a Spanish colony.

In accepting the conditions submitted by the court of Lisbon, which were confined merely to the surrender of Olivenza to the Spaniards, to the payment of 20,000,000 francs to the French, and to the exclusion of the English flag from the ports of Portugal, precautions had been taken to prepare two copies of a treaty, one to be executed by Spain, and the other by France. The prince of Peace affixed his signature to that which related to his court, which was dated at Badajoz, as all these events took place in that city. He afterwards caused it to be ratified by the king, who was on the spot. Lucien, on his part, signed the copy destined for France, and sent it immediately to Paris, for his brother's ratification.

The First Consul received these communications, at the moment when the excitement of the negotiations at London was at its greatest height. The exasperation which they caused may be easily conceived. Although the natural affection which he felt for his family, often even to weakness, prevailed with him to a great degree, he had less command over his temper with his relatives, than with other persons; and certainly, on an occasion like the present, he might well be pardoned for giving way to it. This he did in the most unrestrained manner, and gave vent to the most violent paroxysm of anger against his brother Lucien.

Still he clung to the hope that the treaty would not be ratified. Extraordinary couriers were sent off to Badajoz to declare that France refused her ratification, and the same intimation was given to Spain. But these couriers found that the treaty had been already ratified by Charles IV., and the engaged ment had become irrevocable. Lucien was quite confounded and disheartened at the perplexing, nay, humiliating position which was thus reserved for him in Spain. His brother's indignation produced in him a fit of ill-humour not uncommon with him, and he tendered his resignation to the minister of foreign affairs. The prince of Peace, on his side, became insolent. He indulged in language, which was both idle and ridiculous, when applied to a man like the one who at that time

governed France. He first declared, that all hostilities against Portugal were at an end, then insisted upon the withdrawal of the French army, and even added this very imprudent declaration, that if fresh troops should pass the frontier of the Pyrenees, their entrance into Spain would be considered as a violation of territory. He claimed, moreover, the return of the Spanish fleet shut up in Brest, and a speedy conclusion of general peace, in order to bring to a termination, as soon as possible, an alliance which was become irksome to the court of Madrid.\* We ought to mention, however, that the frightful misfortune which had just befallen the two Spanish ships, had damped the spirits of the nation, and had contributed to this angry feeling, which manifested itself in a manner so intemperate and so very prejudicial to the interests of both cabinets.

The First Consul, now provoked to the highest pitch of irritation, immediately caused an answer to be sent to the effect, that the French would remain in the Peninsula until peace was signed distinctly between France and Portugal; that if the army of the prince of Peace made one single step nearer to the 15,000 French troops stationed at Salamanca, he would consider it as a declaration of war, and that if, in addition to unbecoming language, they ventured to commit one single act of hostility, the knell of the Spanish monarchy was inevitably rung.†

---

\* Letter of the 26th of July.

† The First Consul was in the habit of sending brief and striking notes, with the view of furnishing materials to his ministers, to enable them to transmit the necessary instructions to the ambassadors abroad. The following is the note forwarded to the foreign office, to serve as the groundwork of the despatch, which was to be sent to Madrid. M. Caillard was acting for M. de Talleyrand, who was absent at a watering place:—

To the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

“21st Messidor, year IX. (10th July, 1801.)”

“Citizen Minister,—Please to desire the ambassador at Madrid to repair to that court, and endeavour to exhibit all the temper which is requisite under the circumstances. He will state:

“That I have read the note of the general prince of Peace; that it is so ridiculous, that it does not merit a serious reply; but that if this prince, bought over by England, should induce the king and the queen to take measures at variance with the honour and the interests of the Republic, the knell of the Spanish monarchy is rung.

“That my intention is, to keep the French troops in Spain until peace is made between the Republic and Portugal;

“That the slightest movement of the Spanish troops, with an intention of advancing nearer to the French forces, will be considered as a declaration of war;

“That, at the same time, I am disposed to do every thing in my power to reconcile the interests of the Republic with the conduct and inclinations of his Catholic majesty;

“That, whatever may be the consequence, I will never consent to articles five and six;

“That I am not averse to a renewal of the negotiations between the Republic and M. Pinto, with a protocol of the negotiations drawn up day by day;

“That the ambassador must endeavour to make the prince of Peace clearly

He enjoined Lucien to return to Madrid, to reassume there his character of ambassador, and to wait for further orders. This was sufficient to intimidate and check the unworthy courtier, who thus compromised with so much levity the most important interests in the world. Shortly afterwards, in fact, he wrote the most submissive letters, in order to regain the favour of the man, whose personal influence and authority over the court of Spain he so much dreaded.

Nevertheless, it was necessary to come to some decision upon the steps to be taken, in consequence of this strange and inconceivable conduct of the cabinet of Madrid. M. de Talleyrand was at that moment absent on account of his health; he was at the waters. The First Consul forwarded all the papers to him, and received in reply a very sensible letter, containing his advice upon this serious affair.

A paper war, in M. de Talleyrand's opinion, would lead to nothing, whatever triumph we might obtain by our arguments, founded upon positive engagements entered into, and promises made, on both sides. A war against Spain, besides that it would retard the end in view, which was the general pacification of Europe, besides that it was at variance with the true policy

understand, as well as the king and queen, that words, and even offensive notes, where friendship subsists to the extent it does between us, may be passed over as mere family differences, but that the slightest act, or the slightest demonstration, would be irremediable;

"That, as regards the king of Etruria, a minister has been tendered to him, because he has no one near his person; and to govern men, some little knowledge of the art is requisite; that, nevertheless, in the expectation that he will find at Parma men qualified to advise him, I have waived this point for the present;

"That, as regards the French troops in Tuscany, it is expedient to leave them there for two or three months, until the king of Etruria can himself organise his own army;

"That affairs of state can be carried on without giving way to excitement, and that, moreover, my desire to do something agreeable to the house of Spain would be badly requited, if the king allowed the corrupting bribes of England, at the moment when we are in sight of harbour, after so many anxieties and troubles, to disunite our two great nations; that the consequences must be fatal and terrible;

"That, at this very moment, less precipitation in making peace with Portugal would have contributed greatly to accelerate peace with England, &c. &c.

"You know this cabinet; you will, therefore, in your despatch, urge every thing which may serve to gain time, prevent precipitate measures, procure a renewal of the negotiations, and at the same time produce an effect, by representing clearly to the cabinet of Madrid the very serious position of affairs, and the fatal consequences of any inconsiderate proceeding.

"Give the ambassador of the Republic to understand that, if Portugal would consent to leave the province of Alentejo in the possession of Spain until the peace, that would be a *mezzo termine*, since by that course Spain would perceive, that the strict letter of the preliminary treaty would be complied with.

"I would as soon accept nothing, as I would 15,000,000 frs. in fifteen months.

"Despatch the courier, whom I now send you, directly to Madrid.

"BONAPARTE."



of France, would be perfectly ridiculous in the present miserable state of the Spanish monarchy, with our troops in the heart of the kingdom, and its squadron at Brest. There was one much more natural way to retaliate by way of punishment ; and that was to cede to the English the Spanish island of Trinidad, the last and only difficulty, by which the peace of the world was delayed. Spain had, in fact, quite absolved us from any obligation or devotion towards her. In this case, added M. de Talleyrand, we must lose time in Madrid, and gain it in London, by pushing forward the negotiation with England by the concession of Trinidad.\*

---

\* We here insert the following curious letter from M. de Talleyrand :—

“ 20th Messidor, year IX. (9th July, 1801).

“ General,—I have just perused, with all the attention I am capable of, the letters relating to Spain. If it were our object to make it a matter of controversy, we could easily prove ourselves to be in the right, merely by referring to the words of the three or four treaties which we have made with that power during the past year ; those pages would establish our case. We must see if the present is not a favourable moment for coming to some definite determination respecting the conduct we should pursue towards this scurvy ally.

“ I set out with the following data : Spain, to make use of one of her own expressions, has *hypocritically* made war against Portugal ; she wishes definitively to make peace. The prince of the Peace is, by what they tell us, and which I can easily believe, carrying on secret conferences with England ; the Directory thought him bought over by that power. The king and the queen are at the beck of the prince ; he was only a favourite, now, he is in their opinion quite a statesman, and a great military man. Lucien is in an embarrassing position, from which we must positively extricate him. The prince makes use, adroitly enough, in his notes, of these words,—‘ *The king has made up his mind to go to war against his children.*’ This expression will tell on public opinion. A rupture with Spain is a threat perfectly ridiculous, since we have her ships at Brest, and our troops are in the heart of the kingdom. It appears to me, that this is just our position with Spain : this being the case, what are we to do ?

“ I now plainly perceive that, for the last two years, I have no longer been in the habit of thinking by myself, alone, unaided. Not being with you, my imagination and judgment are without their guide ; therefore, I am probably about to write very miserable stuff ; but it is not my fault, I am no longer completely myself when I am distant from you.

“ It appears to me that Spain, which on all occasions, when peace was being arranged, has been a clog upon the cabinet of Versailles, by reason of her extravagant pretensions, has relieved us surprisingly in this particular instance. She has herself even pointed out the conduct which we ought to pursue ; we can now do with England that which she has done with Portugal ; she sacrifices the interests of her ally, and by so doing places at our disposal the island of Trinidad in our negotiations with England. If you should take this view of the case, the negotiation in London must be pushed forward, while at Madrid we must have recourse to diplomacy, or rather hair-splitting, taking care to carry on the discussion by fair words, by friendly explanations, by tranquillising them respecting the fate of the king of Tuscany, and by dwelling upon the interests of the alliance, &c. &c. ; in one word, lose time in Madrid, and precipitate matters in London.

“ To change our ambassador in these circumstances would be to attract attention, and this must be avoided, if you adopt, as I suggest, a temporising

This opinion was founded on reason, and appeared so to the First Consul. However, deeming it a point of honour to defend even an ally who had broken faith, he informed M. Otto of these new views respecting Trinidad, and evinced a disposition to make a sacrifice of it, yet not immediately, only at the last extremity, when there was no other alternative but to come to a rupture. He instructed him to attempt again to induce England to accept the French island of Tobago in lieu of Trinidad.

Unfortunately, the incomprehensible conduct of the prince of the Peace, had greatly damped our negotiator. Recent news, that of the capitulation of general Belliard at Cairo, damped him still further. Nevertheless, Menou holding out in Alexandria, still left a doubt favourable to our pretensions. To our flotilla of Boulogne was due the honour of bringing to a termination all the difficulties of this long negotiation.

The attention of the people of England had never been diverted from the preparations made on the coast of the Channel. In order to reassure them, the English Admiralty had recalled Nelson from the Baltic, and had given him the command of the naval forces stationed on that coast. These forces consisted of frigates, brigs, cutters, and light vessels of every description. The daring spirit of this celebrated English seaman inspired the hope that he would soon destroy the French flotilla by some desperate enterprise. On the 4th of August (16th Thermidor) he made his appearance off Boulogne, with about thirty small vessels. He had hoisted his flag on board the Medusa frigate, and took up his position about two miles from our line, that is to say, out of the range of our artillery, but just within the reach of our large mortars. His object was to bombard our flotilla. This was under the command of a brave seaman, endowed with a natural genius and ardour for warfare, and destined, if he had lived, to rise to the highest honours; it was the well-known admiral, Latouche Tréville. Every day he exercised his gunboats, accustoming his soldiers and sailors to embark and disembark at a moment's notice, and to perform their manœuvres together, with rapidity and precision. On the 4th, our flotilla was formed into three divisions, showing a single line of broadside, parallel to the

---

course. Suppose you were to allow Lucien to proceed to Cadiz, to inspect the armaments, and visit the different ports! During this journey, the business with England would be going forward; you would not allow England to make conditions for Portugal, and he would be back at Madrid, in time to treat definitively concerning that peace.

"I fear, General, that you will find my opinion rather smacks of the shower baths and the waters, which I take very regularly. Seventeen days hence I shall be another man, and I shall then be very happy to reiterate to you the assurance of my attachment and respect.

"CH. MAUR. TALLEYRAND."

shore, and anchored at about a quarter of a mile from the coast. It consisted of large gunboats, supported at intervals by brigs. Three battalions of infantry were on board these vessels of every description, in order to second the bravery of our sailors.

Nelson ranged a division of bomb vessels in front of his squadron, and opened his fire at five o'clock in the morning. He hoped, by an overwhelming shower of bombs, to destroy our flotilla, or at least to compel it to re-enter the port. He discharged an immense number of shells and balls during the whole day. These projectiles, cast from enormous mortars, for the most part passed beyond our line, and fell innocuous on the sands. Our soldiers and sailors, unmoved by this continued fire, which, after all, was more alarming than destructive, exhibited the most exemplary firmness, and even indulged in merriment. Unfortunately, we had no means of returning the fire. Our bomb-vessels, built in haste, could not stand the recoil of the mortars, and only fired a few ill-directed rounds. The powder, taken from the old stores in our arsenals, was of very bad quality, and did not carry the projectiles to a sufficient distance. The French crews eagerly begged that they might be allowed to advance, either to get within gunshot, or to board the enemy. But our gunboats, awkwardly built, and deficient in those requisites which subsequent experience has supplied in that branch of the service, were not easy to manœuvre against a north-east wind, which was blowing at the time. They would have drifted, by the wind and by the current, upon the English line, and to get back to the coast, would have exposed their beams to the enemy's fire, which they would have been unable to return, as their guns were placed forwards, in the bows. We were, therefore, under the necessity of remaining exposed to this shower of projectiles, which lasted six hours. Our soldiers, both ashore and on board, bore it courageously, and laughed heartily to see the shells passing over their heads. Their gallant commander, Latouche Tréville, was stationed in the midst, in company with colonel Savary, aide-de-camp to the First Consul. Thousands of shells were thrown in amongst them, and, by a sort of miracle, no one was seriously wounded. Two of our gunboats were sunk, without, however, the loss of a single man. One gunboat, the *Méchante*, commanded by captain Margoli, was completely shot through and through. This gallant officer put his crew on board other boats, and then keeping two sailors with him, made for the land, his vessel fast filling with water in every part, and ran her ashore before she had time to go down.

The English, in spite of the disadvantage of our position, and the bad quality of our gunpowder, had suffered more than ourselves. They had three or four men killed by the bursting of our bombs.

Nelson retired, boiling with rage and mortification, threatening

to revenge himself in a few days, and to return with means for our certain destruction.

Accordingly, he was expected every day, again to make his appearance, and the French admiral made due preparations for giving him a warm reception. He reinforced his line, provided his vessels with better ammunition, animated the courage of his sailors and soldiers, who were fired with ardour, and quite elated with having braved the English upon their own element. Three picked battalions, selected from the 46th, 57th, and 108th demi-brigades, were placed on board the flotilla, to serve in the same way as in the battle of the 4th.

Twelve days afterwards, on the 16th of August (28th Thermidor), Nelson appeared with a naval division much more considerable than the first. Every thing gave indication of his intention to make a serious attack at close quarters. The French desired nothing better.

Nelson had thirty-five sail, a great number of boats, and 2000 picked men. At the close of the day, he ranged his boats round the Medusa, distributed his men, and issued his instructions. These boats, manned by English marines, were during the night to row towards our line, and make themselves masters of it by boarding. They were formed into four divisions. A fifth division, consisting of bomb vessels, was to be stationed, not opposite to our flotilla, a position in which they had done but little execution during the bombardment of the 4th of August, but on the side of our flotilla, so as to take it in flank.

Towards midnight, these four divisions, under the command of four gallant officers, captains Somerville, Parker, Cotgrave, and Jones, put off rapidly towards the coast of Boulogne. A small French vessel manned by only eight men, had been placed as an advanced look-out. She was surrounded and boarded, but bravely defended herself before she struck, and the noise of her musketry served to give notice of the presence of the enemy.

The four English divisions approached as fast as oars could impel them. As soon as they were perceived, we opened a fire of musketry and grape upon them. The foremost division, that commanded by captain Somerville, was carried away by the tide to the eastward, out of its course, far beyond our right wing, which it had orders to attack. The two divisions of the centre, commanded by captains Parker and Cotgrave, rowing direct against the middle of our line of defence, were the first to reach it, about one o'clock in the morning, and manfully attacked us. The division under captain Parker, after having exchanged a very brisk fire with our line, made for one of our large brigs, which had been stationed in the midst of our boats, in order to support them. It was the *Etna*, under the command of captain Pevrieu. Six pinnaces surrounded her with the intention of boarding her. The English boldly scaled her sides, headed by their officers; but they were received by two hundred infantry soldiers,

and driven into the sea at the point of the bayonet. The brave Pevrieu, having successively to deal with two English sailors, although wounded, first by a poniard and afterwards by a pike, killed them both. In a short time the assailants were thrown overboard, and a fire was poured into the pinnaces, which killed the greater part of the crews. Our boats resisted with equal gallantry the other assailants who attempted to board them, and repulsed the enemy with axes and bayonets. At a short distance, the division under the command of captain Cotgrave, bravely attacked the French line of boats, but without any better success. A large gunboat, the *Surprise*, surrounded by four pinnaces, sunk the foremost of them, captured the second, and compelled the others to sheer off. The soldiers emulated the sailors in this kind of fighting, which was perfectly suited to their lively and daring character.

Whilst the second and third divisions of the English met with this reception, the first, which was intended to attack our right wing, carried away to the eastward by the tide, as we have just seen, could not reach the scene of action till a very late hour. Making great exertions to get back from the eastward to the westward, it seemed to threaten our line of defence, and to be endeavouring to get between the land and our vessels, a manœuvre frequently practised by the English. This was, however, a consequence of their position, rather than a plan calculated upon. But some detachments of the 108th, posted on the shore, directed upon them a most effective fire. The English seamen, without being discouraged, fell upon the *Volcan* gunboat, which guarded the extreme right of our line. The ensign who commanded it, whose name was Guérout, an energetic officer, met the boarders at the head of his sailors and of some soldiers of the line. He had an obstinate contest to maintain. Whilst he was defending himself on the deck of his gunboat, the English vessels which surrounded her, endeavoured to cut the cables, to carry away the boat itself. Fortunately, one was an iron cable, and resisted all the efforts made to break it. The firing kept up from the other French boats and the shore, at length compelled the English to quit their hold of her. The attack upon this point, was thus successfully repulsed, as well as those upon the two others.

Day began to dawn; the fourth division of the enemy appointed to bear down upon our left, having to row a considerable distance to the westward against the tide, which carried it to the eastward, did not arrive in time. The bomb vessels of Nelson, also, owing to the darkness of the night, had not done us much injury. The English were repulsed at all points, the sea was covered with their dead bodies, and a considerable number of their vessels were taken or sunk. The daylight becoming every moment stronger, rendered their retreat necessary. They retired about four o'clock in the morning. The sun appeared on the horizon as they withdrew from the scene

of action. On this occasion it was not an unsuccessful attempt, it was a positive defeat.

The crews of our vessels were highly elated; they had not lost many men, and the English, on the contrary, had suffered considerable loss. That which added still more to the delight occasioned by this brilliant action, was, that we had beaten Nelson in person, and had shown how vain were all the threats of destruction which he had publicly uttered against our flotilla.

A very different effect was produced on the other side of the Channel; and although this engagement with our vessels at anchor did not prove fully what such a flotilla could accomplish at sea, when carrying 100,000 men, nevertheless, the confidence of the English in the enterprising genius of Nelson was greatly diminished, and the unknown danger which threatened them alarmed them still more.

But the vicissitudes of this important negotiation were approaching their conclusion. The conduct of the Spanish cabinet having determined the First Consul, he at length gave M. Otto authority to concede Trinidad. This concession and the two engagements off Boulogne put an end to all hesitation on the part of the British cabinet. It consented, thereupon, to the proposed basis, reserving some questions of detail, which still stood over to be settled. The English ministers wished, in restoring Malta to the order of St. John of Jerusalem, to stipulate that the island should be placed under the protection of some power, which would guarantee its independence; as they had but little reliance upon the strength of the order to defend it, even if the knights succeeded in reconstituting the order. They did not agree with us, upon the question of who should be the guaranteeing power. The Pope, the court of Naples, Russia, had each been suggested in succession, and rejected. Lastly, the form of words employed in the treaty gave rise to some difficulties. As the effect of this treaty upon public opinion would be very considerable in both countries, there was as much attention paid to appearance as to reality. England had no objection to recite in the treaty the numerous possessions which she restored to France and to her allies, but at the same time she insisted that those which were definitively acquired by her should be also specified. This demand was a reasonable one, more so than that of the First Consul, who wished that the possessions restored to France, to Holland, and Spain, should alone be enumerated, and that the silence observed with regard to the others should be the tacit mode by which England should acquire her right to them.

Besides these difficulties, not very serious in the main, others quite collateral, such as those relating to the prisoners, to the debts, to property sequestrated, and above all, to the allies of the contracting parties, and the part which should be assigned to them in the protocol, came under consideration. However, the



negotiators were anxious to bring them to a termination, and to put an end to the anxiety of the whole world. On the one side, the English cabinet was anxious to bring them to a conclusion before the meeting of parliament; and on the other, the First Consul was afraid, every moment, of receiving the news of the surrender of Alexandria, as the protracted resistance of that place still left a doubt hovering, which was favourable to the negotiation. Impatient for great results, he sighed for the day when he could pronounce to listening France a word so new, so magical, not a peace with Austria, with Prussia, with Russia, but a general peace with the whole world.

It was accordingly agreed to secure immediately the mighty results obtained, and to defer to a future negotiation the difficulties of form and of detail. For that purpose, it was proposed to draw up at once the preliminaries of peace, and, immediately after the signature of these preliminaries, to empower plenipotentiaries to agree upon a definitive treaty at leisure. Every difficulty which was not a fundamental one, and the solution of which involved delay, was therefore to be settled by the definitive treaty. In order to be more certain of bringing matters to a speedy issue, the First Consul wished to bind down the negotiators to a fixed period. It was now the middle of September, 1801 (end of Fructidor, year IX.): he gave them until the 2nd of October (10 Vendémiaire, year IX.). At the expiration of that term, he was resolved, he said, to take advantage of the autumn fogs, in the execution of his designs against the coasts of Ireland and England. This was expressed with all the regard due to the feelings of a proud and powerful nation, but in such a decided tone as left no doubt of his intentions.

The two negotiators, M. Otto and lord Hawkesbury, were honourable men, and both anxious for peace. They were desirous of it, not only for itself, but also from a natural and very legitimate ambition, to place their names at the foot of one of the most celebrated treaties in the history of the world. Thus every facility compatible with their instructions was rendered by them for the adjustment of the preliminaries.

It was agreed that England should restore to France and to her allies, that is to say, Spain and Holland, all the maritime conquests which she had made, *with the exception of the islands of Ceylon and Trinidad, which she had definitively acquired.*

Such was the form of language, adopted to conciliate the honourable pride of the two nations. In short, England retained the continent of India, which she had conquered from the Indian princes; the island of Ceylon, captured from the Dutch, a necessary appendage to that vast continent; and the island of Trinidad, taken in the West Indies from the Spaniards. These acquisitions might well satisfy the greatest craving of national ambition. She restored the Cape, Demerara, Berbice, Essequibo, and Surinam to the Dutch; Martinique and Guadaloupe, to the

French ; Minorca to the Spaniards ; and Malta to the order of St. John of Jerusalem. With regard to the last point, the guaranteeing power was to be named in a definitive treaty. England evacuated Porto Ferrajo, which, with the island of Elba, was to be again restored to the French. As an equivalent, the French were to evacuate the territory of Naples, that is, the Gulf of Tarento.

Finally, the troops of both nations were to be withdrawn from Egypt, and that province was to be restored to the Porte. The independence of Portugal was guaranteed.

If we would consider only the main points, leaving aside these minor restitutions, so much the subjects of dispute, and which neither greatly diminished nor added to the general result, the following may be stated as the effect of the treaty. In this ten years' struggle, England had acquired the empire of the Indies, without the acquisition of Egypt by France being now thrown into the scale to counterbalance it. But on the other hand, France had changed the face of Europe for her advantage : she had gained a formidable line of territory on the Alps and on the Rhine, removed Austria for ever from her frontiers by the acquisition of the Netherlands : she had wrested from that power the object which she perpetually coveted, that is to say, Italy, which had almost entirely passed under the French dominion. She had by the principle laid down in the secularisations, considerably weakened the imperial house of Germany for the benefit of the house of Brandenburg. She had signally worsted Russia in her attempt to intermeddle in the affairs of the West. She was all-powerful in Switzerland, Holland, Spain, and Italy. No power throughout the world exercised an influence equal to hers ; and if England had aggrandised herself on the ocean, France, on the other hand, added the coasts of Holland, Flanders, Spain, and Italy, to her territory ; countries completely subjected to her dominion and authority. These were vast means for the attainment of maritime power.

All this was secured to us by England, when she signed the preliminaries of peace in London, at the price, it is true, of the continent of India. France could well afford to consent to this. Our allies, vigorously defended by us, recovered almost all that the war had cost them. Spain was deprived of Trinidad, in consequence of her own misconduct, but she gained Olivenza in Portugal, and Tuscany in Italy. Holland relinquished Ceylon, but she recovered her Indian colonies, the Cape and the Guyanas ; she was, moreover, rid of the stadtholder.

Such were the consequences of this peace, the most glorious in the annals of France. It was natural that the French negotiator should feel impatient to conclude it. The 30th of September had arrived, and some difficulties in the drawing up of the instrument still delayed its execution. All these difficulties were overcome, and at length, on the night of the 1st of October, just on the eve of the day, fixed upon as the fatal term

by the First Consul, M. Otto had the satisfaction to place his signature at the foot of the preliminaries of peace—a satisfaction, indeed, as exquisite as it was unparalleled in the history of France, for never before had any negotiator the happiness of securing equal glory and advantages to his country.

It was agreed that this news should remain secret for forty-eight hours, so as to allow the courier of the French embassy time to be the first to announce it to our government. This fortunate courier started from London on the night of the 1st of October, and reached Malmaison at four o'clock in the afternoon of the 3rd (11th Vendémiaire). At that moment, the three consuls were assembled at a cabinet council. On opening the despatches, the excitement was very great; all other business was postponed; and the consuls embraced each other. The First Consul, who gladly threw aside all reserve, when in company with those who possessed his entire confidence, gave vent to the inmost feelings of his heart. So many and various results, obtained in so short a time—order, victory, peace restored to France by his genius, and by his indefatigable efforts, and all this accomplished in two years—certainly these were benefits which justly entitled him to feel very proud, and supremely happy. In these effusions of mutual satisfaction, Cambacérès said to him, “Now that we have made peace with England, we have only to conclude a treaty of commerce, and all cause for future dissension between the two countries will be removed.” “Not quite so fast,” rejoined the First Consul, with spirit; “political peace is concluded, so much the better; let us enjoy it. As for a commercial peace, we will make one, if we can. But I will not, upon any consideration whatever, sacrifice French industry. I remember the distress of 1786.” This peculiar and instinctive regard for the interests of French industry must have been very strongly implanted in him to betray itself at such a moment. But the consul, Cambacérès, with his usual sagacity, had touched upon the difficulty which, at a subsequent period, was again to embroil the two nations.

The news was instantly transmitted to Paris, to be made known to the public. Late in the afternoon, the discharges of artillery resounded throughout the whole city, and every body inquired, what happy event occasioned these rejoicings. The people rushed to the public places, where the commissaries of the government had orders to promulgate the news that the preliminaries of peace were signed. The welcome intelligence was proclaimed the same evening at all the theatres, amidst such acclamations of joy as had not been witnessed for a long time. This joy was natural, since peace with England was, in reality, the general peace; it consolidated the repose of the continent, removed the cause of all the European coalitions, and opened the field of the whole world to the enterprise of our industry and our commerce. There was a general illumination in Paris at night.

The First Consul immediately signed the ratification of the preliminary treaty, and selected his aide-de-camp, Lauriston, to carry it to London. If the joy in France was great and universal, in England it was carried almost to a degree of madness. The news, at first concealed by the negotiators, had at length transpired, and it was found necessary to communicate it to the lord mayor by an official letter. This letter produced so much the more effect, as, a few hours previously, the report of a rupture of the negotiations was generally circulated. The people immediately gave themselves up unrestrainedly to those immoderate transports of delight, so characteristic of the susceptibility of the English nation. The stage-coaches, on leaving London, had these words chalked upon them, in large letters: "PEACE WITH FRANCE." They were stopped at every town, the horses taken out, and the carriages drawn in triumph by the people. They imagined that all their sufferings during the scarcity and high prices would vanish at once. They idly dreamt of unknown, immense, of almost inconceivable prosperity. There are seasons when nations, like individuals, wearied with hating each other, feel a desire for a reconciliation, however transient, however delusive it may be. At this moment, unhappily so brief, the English people almost deceived themselves into the belief that they loved France. They idolised the hero, the sage, who governed it, and shouted, with transport, "Long live Bonaparte!"

Such is human joy: the measure of its strength and intensity must ever depend upon our ignorance of the future. Let us render thanks to the wisdom of God, for thus closing to us the book of human destiny! How all hearts on that day would have been chilled, if, the veil which concealed the future, being suddenly withdrawn, the English and the French could have seen, in the vista of futurity, a long fifteen years of deadly hatred, a desolating war, during which both the continent and the ocean were to be deluged with the blood of the two nations! France, too, how she would have been struck with dismay, if, at the moment when she deemed herself on the pinnacle of greatness—a greatness regarded as permanent—she had read, on a leaf of the fearful book of fate the treaties of 1815! And this hero, too, so victorious, so prudent, who then governed it, how he would have been startled, struck with consternation, if, in the very midst of all his mighty deeds, he could have perceived his glaring faults; if, at the summit of the best-deserved prosperity, he could have foreseen his frightful fall, his martyrdom! Oh! yes; Providence, in its profound wisdom, has done right only to disclose the present to man; this is enough for his feeble mind; and we, who now know all, both that which happened then, and that which has been fulfilled since, let us try to envelop ourselves, for one moment, in the ignorance of the time, that we may comprehend, that we may participate in these joyful, these deep emotions.

A slight doubt still existed in London, and somewhat disturbed

the joy of the English, as the ratifications of the First Consul had not arrived, and they were apprehensive of some unexpected resolution on the part of this ruler, who was always so prompt, so proud, so exacting in every thing relating to his country. This was a painful suspense; but suddenly it was known in London that one of his own aides-de-camp, one of his companions in arms, had arrived at the house of M. Otto, and that he was the bearer of the treaty ratified. The people being now relieved from the only doubt which restrained them, their joy no longer knew any bounds. They rushed in crowds to M. Otto's, and found him just entering a carriage with colonel Lauriston, and about to proceed to lord Hawkesbury's, for the purpose of exchanging the ratifications. They instantly unharnessed the horses, and drew the carriage, with these two Frenchmen in it, to lord Hawkesbury's.

From lord Hawkesbury's the two negotiators had to proceed to the prime minister, Mr. Addington, and afterwards to the Admiralty, to pay a visit to lord St. Vincent; the people insisted upon drawing one minister in his carriage, to the house of his colleague. At length at the Admiralty, the crowd and the confusion had become so great, that lord St. Vincent, apprehensive of some accident, proceeded in person in front of the *cortége*, lest the carriage should be upset, and this extravagant joy end in some deplorable accident. Several days passed in this state of excitement, and in demonstrations of extraordinary satisfaction.

One circumstance worthy of remark is, that a few hours after the signature of the preliminaries, a courier arrived from Egypt, bringing the news of the surrender of Alexandria, which took place on the 30th of August, 1801 (12th Fructidor). "This courier," said lord Hawkesbury to M. Otto, "has reached us eight hours after the signature of the treaty; so much the better! if he had arrived sooner, we should have been compelled, out of deference to public opinion, to have demanded better terms, and the negotiation would probably have been broken off. Peace is of more consequence than an island more or less." This minister, an honourable man, was in the right. But the incident proves that the defence of Alexandria had been of utility, and that, even in a desperate cause, we should always be guided by the voice of honour, which counsels resistance for the longest possible period.

It was agreed that the plenipotentiaries should meet at the city of Amiens, an intermediate distance between London and Paris, in order to draw up a definitive treaty. The British cabinet selected a venerable and distinguished officer, lord Cornwallis, one of the most celebrated men of that period in Great Britain, to negotiate this final treaty. Lord Cornwallis had commanded the British armies both in America and India: he had been governor-general of Bengal, and afterwards lord-lieutenant of Ireland at the close of the last century. It was arranged that



lord Cornwallis should repair to Paris, to pay his respects to the First Consul, previously to his proceeding to the place fixed upon for the negotiations.

The First Consul, on his part, selected his brother Joseph, for whom his affection was very great, and who by the amenity of his manners, and the mildness of his character, was eminently qualified to act the part of a pacificator, which had been on more than one occasion assigned to him. Joseph had signed the peace with the United States at Morfontaine, with Austria at Lunéville; he was now about to sign it with England at Amiens. The First Consul thus made his brother gather the fruits which he had himself cultivated with his own triumphant hands. M. de Talleyrand, perceiving all the public and ostensible honour of these treaties devolving upon a person who was almost uninitiated in the arts of diplomacy, could not help experiencing a transitory feeling of vexation, which, although he made every effort to conceal it, did not, nevertheless, escape the invidious, and vigilant observation of the diplomatists residing in Paris, and it served for the subject of more than one despatch. But the wary minister was conscious that it was politic not to make enemies of the family of the First Consul, that, moreover, after the part properly due to general Bonaparte was apportioned to that illustrious man, if then any portion of the glory of these brilliant negotiations still remained to be allotted to any one, the European public would, only in justice, decree it to the minister of foreign affairs.

The negotiations commenced with the different States, and not yet concluded, were almost immediately brought to a termination. The First Consul understood perfectly the art of producing powerful effects upon the minds of men, inasmuch as he himself possessed great imagination. He settled at once all the difficulties with the various courts, thus endeavouring to overwhelm France with joy of all kinds, and, by means of one event following in quick succession after another, to amaze, and intoxicate her, by the extraordinary results thus rapidly developed.

He settled affairs with Portugal, and authorised his brother Lucien to sign at Madrid the conditions at first refused at Badajoz, with the exception of some insignificant modifications. He no longer insisted upon the occupation of one of the Portuguese provinces; as, the basis of the peace with England having been agreed upon since the relinquishment of Trinidad, there was no longer any motive for retaining the pledges with which he was at first anxious to provide himself. An agreement was come to, respecting the expenses of the war; we also secured some commercial advantages for our trade, such as, for instance, the immediate introduction of our cloths; and, with regard to our own products, we were placed upon the footing of the most favoured nation. The exclusion of English merchant vessels



and ships of war until the conclusion of peace was formally stipulated.

The evacuation of Egypt terminated all the difficulties subsisting with the Ottoman Porte. M. de Talleyrand concluded, at Paris, preliminaries of peace with the minister of the sultan, which stipulated the restoration of Egypt to the Porte, the re-establishment of the relations formerly existing betwixt her and France, and the revival of all the previous treaties of commerce and navigation.

Similar conventions were concluded with the regencies of Tunis and Algiers.

A treaty was signed with Bavaria, the effect of which was to replace her, with regard to the Republic, in the same friendly alliance, which formerly subsisted between this court and the ancient French monarchy, at the period when the latter extended her protection to all the German powers of the second order against the ambition of the house of Austria. It was a virtual renewal of the treaties of Westphalia and Teschen. Bavaria abandoned, in a formal manner, all that she formerly possessed on the left bank of the Rhine. In return, France promised to employ all her influence, in the negotiations, for the settlement of German affairs, in order to procure for Bavaria an adequate indemnity, advantageously situated. France, moreover, guaranteed to her the integrity of her territory.

Finally, to finish this great work of the general pacification of Europe, a treaty with Russia, which established a peace *de jure*, which already existed *de facto*, was signed, after long discussions, by M. de Markoff and M. de Talleyrand. The new emperor had shown, as we have seen, less energy in resisting the maritime pretensions of England, but, at the same time, less ostentation, less peremptoriness in his manner of granting protection to the minor German and Italian States, which had been parties to the coalition against France. Alexander had never raised any difficulties with regard to Egypt, but, at all events, they had been put an end to by recent events. He no longer laid claim to the title of Grand Master of the Knights of Malta, which rendered the reconstitution of the order upon its former footing easily practicable, in conformity with the arrangements entered into with England. The only serious difference of opinion, that had arisen with Alexander, regarded Naples and Piedmont. By persisting in our views, and gaining time, the chief difficulties connected with these two States had been overcome. The evacuation of the roadstead of Tarento had just been promised to the English. Russia deemed this satisfactory, and regarded it as the fulfilment of a condition to which she was honourably pledged, namely, the integrity of the Neapolitan States. She was silent respecting the island of Elba. With respect to Piedmont, every succeeding day that the English refrained from alluding to that point had emboldened the First

Consul to refuse the surrender of that important province to the king of Sardinia. Russia expostulated, referring especially to the promises made to her upon this subject. The First Consul replied, that Russia had also promised him to maintain the maritime law inviolate, in all its purity and force, and that she had suffered England to encroach upon it. An article was agreed upon, by which they pledged themselves in a friendly manner, and with a mutual good understanding, to take into favourable consideration the interests of his majesty the king of Sardinia, and *to respect them in so far as might be compatible with the actual state of things*. This was taking a great liberty in respect to this prince, and especially that of indemnifying him one day with the duchy of Parma, or of Piacenza, as the First Consul had it then in his thoughts to do. The conduct of the king of Sardinia, his devotion to the English during the last campaign of Egypt, had deeply irritated the chief of the French government. The latter, nevertheless, had more substantial reasons to influence him than mere anger. He attached importance to Piedmont as being in his opinion the finest of all the Italian provinces for us, as it would always enable us to debouch in Italy, and to keep an army there continually. It would be, in short, for France, what the Milanese had long been for Austria.

Our views concerning the affairs of Germany had always coincided with those of Russia; there was, consequently, no difficulty in that respect.

The treaty was accordingly drawn up in conformity with these terms, in concert with the new negotiator, M. de Markoff, recently arrived from St. Petersburg. A public treaty was first signed, in which it was recited, without any condition, that a good understanding was restored between the two governments, and that they would not allow emigrants, subjects of either nation, to be guilty of secret offences punishable in their native countries. This article was aimed at the Poles on the one side and the Bourbons on the other. To this public treaty was added a secret convention, in which it was declared, that the two Empires, having acted in unison during their intervention in the affairs of Germany, at the period of the treaty of Teschen, now again combined their influence, to bring about in Germany such territorial arrangements as would be most conducive to the equipoise of Europe; that France, especially, should endeavour to procure an advantageous indemnity for the elector of Bavaria, the grand duke of Wurtemberg, and the grand duke of Baden, (this latter had been added to the list of *protégés* of Russia, on account of the new empress, who was a princess of Baden); that the States of Naples should be evacuated at the maritime peace, and should enjoy a neutrality, in the event of war; and, finally, that they should come to a friendly understanding respecting the interests of the king of Sardinia, at the

proper season, *and in the mode most compatible with the present state of affairs.*

The First Consul immediately despatched his aide-de-camp, Caulaincourt, to St. Petersburg, as the bearer of a letter to the young emperor, couched in delicate and courteous terms, in which he congratulated him on the peace now concluded, communicated to him with a sort of complacency, a multitude of details, and appeared as if, for the future, he was willing to unite mutually with him in the direction of the affairs of the whole world. M. de Caulaincourt was to replace Duroc, (who had returned in rather too much haste from St. Petersburg,) until a permanent ambassador should be appointed. The First Consul had sent to Duroc a considerable sum of money, with orders to attend the coronation of the emperor, and to represent France with becoming splendour. This letter did not reach St. Petersburg until after the departure of Duroc, who had been induced to take this step from another motive. Alexander had desired an invitation to be sent to him to attend at his coronation, but M. de Panin had not forwarded this invitation. At a later period, an explanation took place upon this subject, and the emperor, irritated at his orders not having been executed, ordered M. de Panin to retire to his estate, and appointed M. de Kotschoubey, one of the members of his secret council, in his stead. The young emperor began to get rid of the men who had contributed to his accession, and who were desirous of influencing him, in favour of an exclusively English course of policy. Every thing then portended an amicable state of relations with Russia. The seductive and flattering attentions of the First Consul only contributed to render this result the more certain.

These various treaties, which completed the pacification of the whole world, were signed about the same time as the preliminaries of London. Public satisfaction was at its height, and it was determined to give a grand fête, in celebration of the general peace. It was fixed for the 18th Brumaire. A better day could not have been fixed upon, inasmuch as it was to the Revolution of the 18th Brumaire that all these brilliant results were to be ascribed. Lord Cornwallis was invited to be present. He arrived in Paris on the 16th Brumaire (7th of November), accompanied by a great number of his countrymen. No sooner had the preliminaries of peace been subscribed, than the applications to M. Otto for passports for France increased to a surprising degree. Three hundred had been transmitted to him. These were not sufficient; it was found necessary to supply him with an unlimited number. Owners of vessels, with the object of despatching them for French commodities, and of importing English goods into France, evinced the same eagerness to obtain safe-conducts. All these demands were granted with the most perfect good-will, and

the relations between the two countries were re-established immediately, with incredible promptitude and alacrity. By the 18th Brumaire, Paris was already filled with English, impatient to visit that new France, which had become suddenly so renowned, and to see, above all, the man who was the admiration of England, and of the whole world. The illustrious Fox was one of the first who hastened to start for France. On the day of the *fête*, which was rendered beautiful by the peaceful and profound joy which reigned throughout all classes of citizens, carriages were prohibited from passing through the public streets. An exception was made in favour of lord Cornwallis. The crowd opened, and gave way with respect to the honourable and gallant representative of the British nation, who had just concluded the peace. He was astonished to find France so very different from the hideous descriptions given of it by the French emigrants in London. All his countrymen participated in the same feelings, and gave expression to them with unrepressed admiration.

Whilst this *fête* was being celebrated at Paris, a magnificent banquet was given in the city of London, and there, amid the loudest acclamations, the following toasts were proposed :

“ The King of Great Britain !”

“ The Prince of Wales !”

“ To the liberty and prosperity of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland !”

“ TO THE FIRST CONSUL, BONAPARTE, AND TO THE LIBERTY AND HAPPINESS OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC !”

Unanimous and vociferous shouts of applause accompanied this last toast.

France had thus concluded peace with all the nations of the globe. There was still one other peace to establish, a peace fully as difficult of accomplishment as the rest, since it required quite a different genius to that which commands in the field of battle, and was besides still more desirable, since it was to re-establish repose in the minds of men, and union in the hearts of families. This peace was that of the Republic with the Church. The moment is now arrived, to recapitulate the difficult negotiations which were in train with the representative of the Holy See upon this important subject.



## BOOK XII.

### THE CONCORDAT.

**The Catholic Church during the French Revolution—Civil Constitution of the Clergy decreed by the Constituent Assembly—Assimilation of the Administration of Religion to that of the Realm—One Diocese established for each Department—Election of Bishops by their Flocks, and dispensing with the Canonical Law—An Oath of Fidelity to this Constitution required from the Clergy—Refusal of the Oath and Schism—Different Classes of Priests, their Character and Influence—Inconvenience of this State of Things—The Means which it furnished to the Enemies of the Revolution to trouble the Repose of Families—Different Systems proposed to remedy the Evil System of Inaction—System of a French Church of which the First Consul was to be the Head—System of strong Encouragement to Protestantism—Opinions of the First Consul on the various Systems proposed—He forms the Plan of re-establishing the Catholic Religion, rendering its Discipline in harmony with the new Institutions of France. He wishes for the Deposition of the ancient titular Bishops, a Limitation comprising sixty Sees in place of 158—The Founding a new Clergy composed of respectable Priests of all Classes; the State to have the Management of the Forms of Worship—Salaries for the Priests in Lieu of Endowments in Lands—The Sanction by the Church of the Sale of National Property—Friendly Relations between Pope Pius VII. and the First Consul—Monsignor Spina charged with the Negotiations at Paris, retards the Negotiation through the temporal Interest of the Holy See—Secret Desire to have the Legations back—Monsignor Spina feels the Necessity of Despatch—He confers with Abbé Bernier, charged to treat on the Part of France—Difficulties of the Plan proposed to the Court of Rome—The First Consul sends his Project to Rome, and demands an Explanation from the Pope—Three Cardinals consulted—The Pope, after this Consultation, wishes the Catholic Religion to be declared the Religion of the State, that he should not be required to depose the ancient titular Bishops, nor sanction otherwise than by his Silence the Sale of the Property of the Church, &c.—Debates with M. de Cacault, Minister from France to Rome—The First Consul, fatigued by these Delays, commands M. de Cacault to quit Rome in Five Days, unless the Concordat be adopted within that Time—Terrors of the Pope and Cardinal Gonsalvi—M. de Cacault suggests to the pontifical Cabinet the Idea of sending Cardinal Gonsalvi to Paris—His Departure for France and his Fears—His Arrival at Paris—His gracious Reception by the First Consul—Conferences with Abbé Bernier—Understanding on the Principle of a State Religion—The Catholic Religion declared to be the Religion of the Majority of Frenchmen—All the other Conditions of the First Consul relative to the Deposition of the ancient Titulars, the new Circumscriptions of the Sees, the Sale of the Property of the Church, are accepted, saving some Change of Terms in the Compilation—Definitive Agreement on all Points—Efforts made at the last Moment by the Adversaries of the Re-establishment of Worship to hinder the First Consul from signing the Concordat—He persists—Signature given July 15, 1801—Return of Cardinal Gonsalvi to Rome—Satisfaction of the Pope—Solemnity of the Ratifications—Choice of Cardinal Caprara as legate *a latere*—The First Consul would have wished to celebrate on the 18th Brumaire Peace with the Church, at the same Time as Peace with all the European Powers—Necessity of applying to the ancient Titulars, to obtain their Resignations causes Delay—A Demand for their Resignation addressed by the Pope to all the old Bishops, constitutional or not—Wise Submission of the constitutional Bishops—Noble Resignation of the Members of the old Clergy—Admirable Replies—The only Resistance is from the emigrant Bishops in London—Every thing is ready for the Re-establishment of Religion in France, but a sharp Opposition in the Tribune causes new Delay—Necessity of overcoming this Opposition before going further.**





## BOOK XII.

## THE CONCORDAT.

**THE** First Consul would have wished that the anniversary of the 18th Brumaire, dedicated to the celebration of peace between France and the rest of Europe, should also be signalised by the reconciliation of France with the Church. He had made every effort in order that the negotiations in progress with the Holy See might be brought to a conclusion in due time, in order to admit of religious ceremonies being introduced into the national rejoicings. But it is a much less easy matter to treat with the spiritual power than with the temporal; the winning of battles is not enough for the purpose: and it is the distinguished privilege of the human mind that force is unable to overcome its energies unless attended by persuasion.

It was this arduous task of combining persuasion with force, that the conqueror of Marengo and Rivoli had taken in hand with reference to the Roman Church, in order to bring about a reconciliation between it and the French Republic.

As we have already so often said, the Revolution had fallen into excess in many things. To cause it to retrograde in reference to these matters without advancing beyond or stopping short of the desired end, was a legitimate and salutary reaction, which the First Consul had undertaken, and which, at the time, he managed to place in a most favourable light by the wisdom and ability he employed for that purpose. Religion was evidently one of the things with regard to which the Revolution had exceeded all just and reasonable bounds. In no instance was the mischief to be repaired so extensive as in this.

Under the old monarchy there had existed a powerful clergy in possession of a great part of the soil, men who did not contribute to any of the public expenses, who gave donations, only at their pleasure, to the royal treasury, who were a constituted political body, and who formed one of the three orders which, in the States General, gave expression to the national will. The Revolution had swept away the clergy with their fortunes, their influence, and their privileges; it had swept them away, and with them the nobility, the parliaments, and the throne itself. It was impossible it could have done otherwise. A priesthood,

whose members were landed proprietors, and endowed with political power, might have been suitable to the state of society of the middle ages, and have been conducive in that era to the spread of civilisation, but was an anomaly in the eighteenth century. The Constituent Assembly had done well in abolishing such a priesthood, and in substituting for it a clergy who were to be employed in religious duties alone, and who, having no participation in the government of the country, were to be paid by fixed stipends in lieu of rents from land. But it was requiring a great deal of the Holy See to accord its approbation to such changes. Had the object been to prevail with the supreme pontiff, the government should have stopped when they pensioned the clergy, and not have given his Holiness a legitimate pretext for saying, that they attacked religion itself in all that it held most immutable and sacred. The Constituent Assembly, impelled by that taste for regularity of system, so natural to the minds of reformers, did not hesitate to assimilate the administration of the Church government to that of the State. Some dioceses were too extensive, others too limited ; the Constituent Assembly, therefore, wished that the boundaries of the ecclesiastical jurisdictions should be placed on the same footing as the administrative, and created one diocese for each department, and as it made all civil and judicial offices elective, it wished to make the ecclesiastical office elective also. This arrangement appeared to it, to be in conformity with the practice of the early ages of the primitive church, when bishops were chosen by their flocks. It suppressed, at the same time, the canonical institution, in virtue of which the election of bishops must be confirmed by the Pope, and on this basis was raised what was termed the civil constitution of the clergy. The men who wrought these changes were actuated by the most pious intentions. They were true believers, fervent jansénists, but narrow in their views, and addicted to theological casuistries; they were necessarily dangerous guides in the conduct of human affairs. To make their fault complete, they exacted from the French clergy an oath of fidelity to the civil constitution, a step that could have no other effect than to suggest conscientious scruples to the sincere, and a pretext to the ill-disposed among the clergy, and thus to pave the way to schism. Rome, already aggrieved by the misfortunes of the throne, was soon irritated by the prostration of the altar. She interdicted the oath. One section of the clergy, obedient to her command, refused to take it; another section consented to it, and formed, under the title of sworn (*assermenté*) or constitutional clergy, the section that was recognised by the State, and was the only one licensed to perform religious duties. Hitherto, the government had not proscribed the priests, it was content to interdict to some the administration of religious rites, and to invest others with that privilege. But the discarded priests were generally pre-

ferred by strict Catholics; conscience in matters of religion being susceptible, easily alarmed, and, above all, distrustful of power.

It inclined to those ecclesiastics who were believed to be orthodox, and who seemed to be persecuted. It held aloof instinctively from those whose orthodoxy was doubted, and who had the countenance of government. Thus were there at the same time a public form of worship and a clandestine one, the latter having more followers than the former. The party opposed to the Revolution, leaguings with the religious party, so outraged, succeeded in covering religion itself, with all the faults of the spirit of faction. This schism led to the horrors of a frightful civil war in La Vendée. The revolutionary government, in the meantime, was not idle, it did not stop at the simple prohibition of ecclesiastical functions, but proceeded ere long to persecution. It proscribed the clergy, and transported them. Next came the abolition of all forms of worship, and, in their stead, the worship of the Supreme Being. All priests, henceforward, sworn or unsworn, were treated alike, and were made to share the same death of the scaffold with royalists, constitutionalists, girondins, and montagnards.

Under the Directory this sanguinary proscription ceased. A variable line of policy, at one time inclining to indifference, at another to rigour, still kept the proscribed Church in a state of anxious suspense. The First Consul, by his power, and by the evidently good intentions he displayed towards repairing the mischief inflicted, inspiring with confidence those who had suffered, on whatever ground it might have been, recalled the ministers of religion from their hiding-places, or from exile.

Their return, however, only showed the schism that had prevailed in a stronger and, perhaps, a more disagreeable light. In order to do away with the difficulty of the oath, the First Consul ceased to exact it, substituting for it a simple promise of submission to the laws. This promise, which could not alarm the consciences of the priests, induced them to return, but had added, in a manner, new divisions to those already in existence, by creating amongst the clergy an additional class.

There were the constitutional, or *sworn* priests, legally invested with the sacerdotal functions, and in possession of the religious edifices, which had been restored to them by a decree of the consuls. There were the *unsworn* priests, who, having always refused to take the oath, and after having lived in exile, or in prison, re-appeared in great numbers at the beginning of the Consulate, who officiated in private houses, and proclaimed the worship as performed in the churches to be uncanonical. Those unsworn priests were again subdivided, into those who had not given the promise, and those who had. The latter were not fully approved of as orthodox. An appeal was made to Rome, but out of deference to the First Consul she declined to give any explanation. However, cardinal Maury, who had withdrawn

to the States of the Church, where he had been created bishop of Montefiascone, and who was the representative of the royalist party at the court of Rome, not wishing, at least just then, to favour the submission of the priests to the new government, had given his own interpretation to the Pope's silence, and forwarded disapproving letters to France, which gave fresh life to conscientious scruples.

The priests thus divided amongst themselves had, each party its hierarchy. The constitutional priests obeyed the bishops elected under the civil constitution. Some of these having died a natural, some a violent death, their places were filled up by bishops, who, not having been regularly elected, in the midst of a proscription, which struck at all forms of worship alike, had usurped their powers, or had procured an election by clandestine chapters, religious coteries, destitute of any authority, legal or moral. Thus the powers of the constitutional bishops themselves, regarded in reference to the civil constitution, were contested by some of their own body, and stamped with discredit. Among this body there were some respectable men, but in general they had lost the confidence of the strictly religious portion of the community, because they were known to be at variance with Rome, and because they had, by meddling in the religious and political squabbles of the day, lowered the dignity of their sacred calling. Several of them were violent declaimers at the clubs, and profligate in their lives. The good amongst them were sincere priests, whom jansenist fury had driven into schism.

The so-called orthodox clergy had also bishops of their own, who exercised an authority less public but more real, and highly dangerous. The *unsworn* bishops had almost all emigrated. They had repaired to Italy, to Spain, to Germany, the greatest number, however, went to England, whither they were attracted by the subsidies afforded by the British government. In correspondence with their dioceses, through the agency of grand-vicars, chosen by themselves and approved of by Rome, they governed their sees, though in exile, with the feelings that exile inspires, and in too many instances for the benefit of the enemies of France. Many of these bishops had died off in the course of ten years, but their sees were all filled by concealed administrators, deriving their power from the court of Rome.

Thus was one of the wisest and most time-honoured precautions of the Gallican church, that of administering vacant sees by the chapters, and not by the agents of the Holy See, completely rendered nugatory. The Gallican church was thus stripped of its independence, for it fell under the direct control of Rome, when it had ceased to be governed by the bishops implicated in the emigration. A very short time would have sufficed, on the demise of the few remaining emigrant bishops, to have placed the entire Gallican church under ultramontane control.

There are men, whom the moral aspect of a social community, rent by sects without number, affects but little; who affirm that the government should either treat with disdain, as foreign to its policy, or respect as sacred, all religious dissidences alike. There are, however, grounds which forbid the exercise of such a haughty indifference, to wit, when society is thereby disturbed, and disorganisation threatens to follow.

Each of these sections of the clergy endeavoured to establish its power over the consciences of the faithful. The constitutional clergy had but little power, they were merely a subject of recrimination for the Jacobins, who were in the habit of declaring, that the Revolution was at all points sacrificed, more especially in the persons of the very priests who had espoused its cause. In this particular, however, the government could have no power to dispose of religious convictions in favour of one section of the clergy or of another. But the conduct of the so-called orthodox clergy, in reference to their flocks, was subversive of all established order, its object being to alienate from the government all those who, wearied by civil dissensions, were inclined to rally round the First Consul, and, had it been possible to have aroused the bad passions that had given birth to the civil war in La Vendée, once more, it would have done so. Through its exertions, that country was still harassed by vague distrust and discontent. It kept the south, which was in a less settled state than La Vendée, in commotion; and in the mountains of the centre of France, gathered in tumultuous crowds the population around the orthodox priests.

On every side, this class of the clergy were alarming consciences and disturbing the peace of families. They persuaded all those who had been married or baptised by the sworn priests that they were not within the pale of the true Catholic communion, and that they ought to be rebaptised and remarried, if they wished to become true Christians, or abandon the state of concubinage in which they were living. In this way the social position of families was made questionable, not in a legal, but in a religious point of view. There were more than 10,000 married priests, who, hurried away by the vertigo of the day, or impelled even by terror, had sought in marriage, the gratification of passions which they were unable to control; others, an escape from the scaffold, which they purchased by the abjuration of their vows. They had become fathers of numerous families, for whom there could be no protection from public scorn, so long as the pardon of the Church was withheld from them.

The purchasers of national property, a class for whose protection the government felt the deepest interest, were living in a state of oppression and anxiety. Even on their death-bed they were exposed to perfidious suggestions, and threats of eternal damnation, if they did not consent to such arrangements



of their affairs as would strip them of all they possessed. Confession thus became a powerful weapon in the hands of the emigrant priests, for attacking the rights of property and public credit, and, in a word, one of the most essential principles of the Revolution, namely, the inviolability of the sale of national property. State policy and the laws were alike powerless in dealing with evils of this description. These were disorders which no government could afford to look on with indifference. When religious sects, springing up and spreading over a vast soil, like that of America, succeed each other in endless variety, without leaving behind them any thing more than the fleeting remembrance of ridiculous inventions or indecent practices, one can conceive that, to a certain extent, the State may remain indifferent and inactive. Society presents a deplorable moral aspect, but public order is not seriously compromised. But it was different in France in 1801, amidst the remnants of old French society. It was impossible, without incurring the greatest peril to intrust the cure of souls to inimical factions. It would have been wrong to leave in their hands the torches of civil war, with the power of applying them, whenever they thought proper, to the inflammable materials always at hand in La Vendée, Brittany, and the Cevennes. It would never do to allow them to disturb the repose of families, to besiege the bed of the dying, for the purpose of extorting iniquitous stipulations, to decry public credit, or, in a word, to shake the tenure of one entire class of property, and that the very one which the Revolution had pledged itself to maintain for ever inviolable.

The First Consul's views of the constitution of society were too just and too profound for him to be regardless of the religious disorders of France at this period ; moreover, he had other motives, and these of a more exalted character, than those we have just pointed out, for interfering ; if any there can be more exalted than public order and the repose of families. There must be a religious faith, and a form of worship in every human society. Man, thrown into the midst of this universe, without knowing whence he comes, whither he goes, why he suffers, or even why he exists, what rewards, or what punishments will attend the long warfare of life—beset by the contradictions of his fellow-mortals—some affirming, on the one hand, that there is a God, the great and intelligent Author of all things ; and some, on the other, averring that there is no God ; one man maintaining that there is good and evil, by which he is to regulate his conduct ; and another, that there is neither good nor evil, but that these are only selfish inventions of the powerful of the earth :—man, in the midst of these contradictions, experiences the imperative, the irresistible want, in relation to all these objects, of adopting a fixed and unalterable belief on all these points. Whether true or false, sublime or ridiculous, a religion he must have. Everywhere, in all ages, in all countries,

in ancient as in modern times ; in civilised as well as in barbarous nations, we find him a worshipper at some altar, be it venerable, degraded, or blood-stained. Whenever a country is without an established form of belief, a thousand sects, addicted to fierce disputation, as in America, or a thousand shameful superstitions, as in China, agitate and degrade the human mind ; or, as was the case in France in '93, when a passing storm swept away the ancient religion of the land ; we find man, who, but the day before, abjured for ever all belief, belying himself by the mad worship of the goddess Reason, inaugurated in the presence of the reeking scaffold, and thus proving his vow to have been as vain as it was impious. To judge man, then, by his ordinary and invariable conduct, he has need of a religious creed. This being granted, what can be more desirable for a civilised community than a national religion, founded on the feelings of the human heart, in conformity with pure morality, hallowed by time, and which, without intolerance or persecution, can reunite, if not all, at least the majority of the citizens, at the foot of an ancient and venerated altar. Such a creed cannot be invented ; it must be the growth of ages. A sublime philosopher may found a new philosophy, which will shed its influence on the minds of men in the age over which he throws lustre. He may make men think, but he cannot teach them to believe. A warrior covered with glory may found an empire, but he cannot found a religion. In former times, sages and heroes, no doubt, have been able to enslave the minds of men, and impose a belief upon them, by asserting their own immediate relation with Heaven. In modern times, the founder of a religion would be looked on as an impostor, and, whether surrounded by terror, like Robespierre, or by glory, like young Bonaparte, his scheme would end in ridicule.

There was no need to invent a religion in 1800. A pure, moral, ancient belief was in existence ; it was the old religion of Christ—the work of God, according to some—of man, according to others ; but, by unanimous consent, the profound work of a sublime reformer—of a reformer commented on, during eighteen centuries, by councils, which consisted of assemblies of the most eminent men of their time, who discussed, under the title of heresies, all systems of philosophy ; adopting, on each of the grand problems of human destiny, opinions the most plausible, and most suitable to society, and adopting those opinions by, what might be termed, a majority of the human race ; thus, finally, producing that body of unvarying doctrine, known by the name of CATHOLIC UNITY—a doctrine, before which the mighty genius of a Bossuet and of a Leibnitz, after having long investigated all the codes of philosophy, had humbly prostrated itself. That religion still existed, whose sway had

extended over all civilised nations, had formed their morals, had inspired their songs, had furnished subjects for their poetry, their pictures, their statues; whose impress stamped all their national recollections, and whose sign was emblazoned on their banners, whether victorious or vanquished. It had disappeared for a time, during a wild tempest of the human mind, but that tempest passed, and a want of religious faith being again felt, it was found lurking in the recesses of the heart—the natural and indispensable creed of France and of Europe.

What was more obviously necessary, in 1800, than to raise up once more the altar of St. Louis, of Charlemagne, and of Clovis, which had for a brief space been overturned. General Bonaparte, who would have been ridiculous had he set up for a prophet, or the messenger of Heaven, was in the position assigned to him by Providence, for raising up again this venerable altar with his victorious hands, and leading back to its sanctuary by his example, the people that had for a time wandered from it. And nothing less than the brilliancy of his glory would have sufficed for such a task. Men of great genius, not only among philosophers, but among kings—Frederick and Voltaire—had cast contempt on the Catholic religion, and by their example gave rise to the scoffs and raileries of half a century. General Bonaparte, who in mind was the equal of Voltaire, while he eclipsed Frederick in glory, was the only man capable, by his example and deference, of silencing the jeers of the last century.

On this subject the slightest doubt never entered his thoughts. The two-fold motive of re-establishing order in the State and in private families, and of supplying the moral want of souls, had inspired him with the firm resolution of re-establishing, on its ancient basis, the Catholic religion, shorn, however, of its former political attributes, for he looked on these as incompatible with the present phasis of French society. With such motives to guide him, is it necessary that we should stop to inquire, whether he acted through the inspiration of religious faith, or through policy or ambition? Let it suffice, that he acted through wisdom, or in other words, through a profound knowledge of human nature. The rest is a mystery, which curiosity, always natural, when the conduct of a great genius is to be scanned, may try to penetrate, but which matters but little in reality.

In this respect, however, it must be observed, that the moral constitution of general Bonaparte inclined him to religious ideas. It is in proportion to the enlargement of the understanding that intelligence of mind can comprehend the beauties of creation. Intellect may perceive a plan in the vast universe, but it requires greatness of soul to behold God through His works. General Bonaparte took pleasure in discussing philosophical and religious subjects with Monge, Lagrange, La Place, men of erudition, whom he honoured and esteemed, and often embarrassed them in their incredulity by the clearness and original

vigour of his arguments. To this must be added, that brought up in an uncultivated and religious country, under the eyes of a pious mother, the sight of an old Catholic altar awakened in him the recollections of childhood ; always so powerful in a sensitive and great imagination.

As to ambition, which some detractors have taken the liberty of saying was his sole motive in this matter, he had none other at the time than to do good in all things, and, doubtless, he is to be excused, if he foresaw that an augmentation of power, would reward the accomplishment of this good work. What more noble, more legitimate ambition can there be than that which seeks to found its dominion by satisfying the true necessities of a nation ? The path that he had traced out for himself, apparently an easy one, since it led to the relief of an evident public want, was nevertheless bestrewed with thorns. The men who surrounded him, almost without exception, were disinclined from establishing the old religion, they were men, who, whether as magistrates, soldiers, or cultivators of literature or science, had been the founders of the French Revolution, the true and steadfast defenders of that now vilified Revolution, and those with whom it was necessary to complete it, by repairing its faults, and consecrating definitively its reasonable and legitimate results. The First Consul was thus constrained to run counter to his colleagues, his supporters, and his friends. These men, taken from the ranks of the moderate revolutionary party, had not, like Robespierre and Saint Just, shed human blood, and there was no difficulty in their disavowing any participation in the violent excesses of the Revolution, but they had been involved in the errors of the Constituent Assembly, and had exhibited an indecent levity in repeating the witticisms of Voltaire, and it was not easy to make them acknowledge that they had misconceived the most exalted truths of social order. Men of learning, like La Place, Lagrange, and particularly Monge, told the First Consul that he was about to prostrate at the feet of Rome, the dignity of his government and of the age. M. Roederer, the most hot-headed royalist of the day, he who would have monarchy to be restored in its most complete form, and as speedily as possible, looked, however, with pain on the project of re-establishing the ancient form of worship. M. de Talleyrand himself, the assiduous promoter of every measure which could approximate the present to the past, and France to the rest of Europe, he, the coadjutor in chief, and a useful and zealous coadjutor he was, in bringing about the general peace, looked, nevertheless, coldly enough on what was commonly called the religious peace. He was certainly averse to further persecution of the priests, but galled by recollections which came home to himself, he was not at all desirous of the re-establishment of the ancient Catholic church, with its rules and discipline. The companions in arms of

general Bonaparte, the generals who had fought under his command, most of whom had never received the rudiments of a liberal education, who had been brought up amidst the vulgar jests of the camp, or some of them amidst the declamations of the clubs, were all repugnant to the restoration of worship. Although covered with glory, they seemed to apprehend that the shaft of ridicule might reach them at the foot of the altar. Lastly, the brothers of the First Consul, associating much with the literati of the day, who were still imbued with the principles of the last century, feared, for the sake of their brother's power, every thing that had the appearance of serious opposition; and not being able to see, that beyond the selfish, and, by no means enlightened, resistance of those that had access to the government, there existed a real want, which was already felt by the populace, dissuaded him strongly from what they considered an imprudent or premature reaction.

Thus was the First Consul beset with counsels of every sort. Some advised him not to meddle in religious matters, to limit himself to rescinding the persecution against the priests, and to leave the sworn and unsworn clergy to settle their own differences amongst themselves. Others, seeing the danger of indifference and inaction, pressed him to take opportunity by the forelock and make himself the head of a French church, and not leave, any longer, the immense influence of religion in the hands of a foreign authority. Others, in fine, proposed to him to urge France to Protestantism, saying, that if he set the example by becoming a Protestant, she would eagerly follow the example.

The First Consul resisted these vulgar counsels with all the force of his reasoning and of his eloquence. He had collected for his own reading a library of religious books, consisting of not many volumes, but well chosen, for the most part relating to the history of the Church, but above all, to the relations of the Church with the State; he had caused the Latin works of Bossuet on this subject to be translated for him; these he used to read with avidity in the brief intervals allowed him from the duties of business, and his genius supplying what he was unacquainted with, as it did in drawing up the Civil Code, he astonished every one by the justness, extent, and variety of his knowledge on the subject of forms of worship. According to his habit, when a thought took possession of his mind, he discussed it daily with his colleagues, his ministers, the Council of State, or the Legislative Body, with all men, in fact, whose opinion he thought it useful to reform. He refuted in succession the erroneous systems proposed to him, and did so in arguments distinct, clear, and decisive.

To the system of not at all interfering in religious matters, he replied, that the indifference so prosingly talked of by certain disdainful wiseacres, was of little account with a people whom



they had seen very lately, for instance, take forcible possession of a church and threaten to pillage it, because the remains of an actress, admired by the public, had been refused Christian Burial. How, he asked, could he remain indifferent in a country which, with the pretensions of being indifferent, was so little so. "Besides," asked the First Consul, "how can I avoid interfering, when the sworn and unsworn priests are contending with each other for the religious edifices, and coming incessantly to call on the government for its intervention in ejecting those in possession and putting their opponents in their places?" He asked what course they would have him to pursue, when the constitutional clergy, already but little attended to by the religious portion of the community, should be entirely abandoned by it,—and that the clergy who had refused the oath, the only section hearkened to and followed, should have, exclusively, the entire privilege of performing worship,—as they were having in a great measure already,—and should continue such performance amidst clandestine congregations? Would it not be imperative to restore the temporal part of worship to those who were able to conquer the spiritual part? And would not that be interfering? And then the priests, whose endowments in lands the Revolution had seized on, should have wherewithal to live; and for that purpose they should be placed on the list of pensioners in the State Budget, or be allowed to organise, under the head of voluntary contributions, a large system of impost, the produce of which would amount to a sum of 30,000,000 or 40,000,000 francs (between 1,200,000 and 1,600,000*l.* sterling), the distribution of which would belong to themselves alone, perhaps to a foreign power; and possibly might be employed one day or another, without the knowledge of government, for the maintenance of the old soldiers of the civil war in La Vendée. In whatever way the subject be viewed, the government would be soon compelled, in spite of itself, to take an active part, either for the maintenance of good order, or for the disposal of the houses of worship, either in pensioning the priests, or in watching their mode of exacting payment.

It would thus have all the responsibility of government, without its advantages, without being able (which it would be by a prudent arrangement with the Holy See for securing to itself the religious administration) to bring back the clergy to the government, and enlist them in the work of reparation, to re-establish repose in families, to tranquillise the dying, the possessors of national property, the married priests, &c., in fact, all parties compromised by the part they had taken in the Revolution.

Inaction, then, according to the First Consul, was only a mere dream, besides being a subterfuge resorted to by men who had no practical notion of the *rationale* of government.

As to the idea of creating a French church independent of



all foreign supremacy, like the Church of England, and having, in place of a spiritual foreign head, a temporal one located at Paris, which could be no other than the government itself, in other words, the First Consul looked on it to be as vain as it was contemptible. What! he, a warrior, wearing sword and spurs, and doing battle, to become the head of a church, a sort of Pope, regulating church discipline and dogma! But it was sought to render him as odious as Robespierre, the inventor of the worship of the Supreme Being, or as ridiculous as Larévellière-Lepeaux, the inventor of the theophilanthropia! Who, in that case, were to be his followers? Who were to constitute his flock of the faithful? He could not, assuredly, expect it would consist of the orthodox Christians, to which class the majority of Catholics belonged, and who had an aversion from following excellent priests who had no other fault than that of having taken an oath imposed on them by the laws. The only followers he could hope to have, then, would be a few bad priests, a few monks who had run away from their convents, and were frequenters of the clubs, who, having led dissolute lives before, wished to lead them still, while they waited for the head of the new church to grant permission to the priests to marry! He could not even hope to count among his flock the abbé Grégoire, who, while he demanded a return to the primitive church, held out for remaining in communion with the successor of St. Peter! He could not even hope to have Larévellière-Lepeaux, who wanted to confine religious worship to a few hymns, and to a few flowers strewed upon an altar! Was such the church of which they wanted to make him the head! Was that the part to be played by the conqueror of Marengo and Rivoli, the restorer of social order! Yet was this project proposed to him by the jealous supporters of liberty! But supposing that the project might succeed, which, by the way, was impossible, and that to his already immense temporal power the First Consul should unite the spiritual power; he would become the most formidable of tyrants, and be master of both body and soul in as great a degree as the sultan of Constantinople, who is at one and the same time head of the state, of the army, and of the religion. Moreover, the hypothesis was absurd; he would be a tyrant, open to derision, for he could succeed only in producing a schism, the most silly of all. He, whose wish was to be the pacificator of France and of the world, to terminate all political and religious divisions, was he to become the originator of a new schism, a little more absurd, and not less dangerous, than the preceding ones! "Yes! doubtless," said the First Consul, "a Pope I must have, but he must be a Pope who will approximate men's minds to each other instead of creating divisions, who will reunite them and give them to the government sprung from the Revolution, as a price for the protection that he shall have obtained from it. And for this

purpose I must have the true Pope, the Catholic Apostolic and Roman Pope, whose seat is at the Vatican. With the French armies and some deference, I shall always be sufficiently his master. When I shall raise up the altars again, when I shall protect the priests, when I shall feed them and treat them as ministers of religion deserve to be treated in every country, he will do what I shall ask of him, through the interest which he will have in the general tranquillity. He will calm men's minds, reunite them under his hand, and place them under mine. Short of this, there is only a continuation and an aggravation of the desolating schism which is preying on us, and for me an immense and indelible ridicule."

As to the idea of urging France to Protestantism, it appeared to the First Consul more than ridiculous, it was odious to him. In the first place, he thought he could not succeed any better by it. In his opinion persons were wrong in fancying that in France one could do whatever one wished. It was an error by no means creditable to those who committed it, for they were supposing France to be without conscience and without opinion. He, himself, said some, could do whatever he wished; "Yes," replied he, "but only with regard to the real and sensibly felt wants of France." She had been in deep disquiet, and he had brought her to the most perfect calm; he had found her a prey to anarchists, who no longer knew how to defend her against foreign aggression, and he had dispersed these anarchists, re-established order, and driven far from their frontiers the Austrians and the Russians; given the peace for which she was so eager; he had put an end, in a word, to the scandals of a weak and licentious government: was it so very astonishing that he should have been allowed to do such things? Again, quite recently, the opposers of the tribunal had wished to refuse him the means of clearing the high roads of the brigands who infested them! Yet, with that fact before them, persons pretended that he could do whatever he pleased! It was an error. He had power according to the wants and the opinions at the time predominant in France, but nothing more. He could use it better, more strenuously, than another, but he should be powerless against the actual movement of opinion. This movement inclined to the re-establishment of all things essential to society: religion was the first. "I am very powerful at present," exclaimed the First Consul; "what then? were I to wish to change the old religion of France, she would set herself against me, and conquer me. Do you know when the country was hostile to the Catholic religion? It was when the government, in coalition with it, used to burn books and send to the wheel the Callas and the Labarres; but, rely on it, were I to become the enemy of Religion, the whole country would join her. I should change the indifferent into believers, into sincere Catholics. I should, perhaps, be a little less jeered for wishing to urge on to Protestantism than if I set myself up as

patriarch of a Gallican Church, but I should soon become the object of public hatred. Is Protestantism the old religion of France? Is it the religion which, after long civil wars, after a thousand fights, has triumphed lastingly, as most suitable to the manners, to the genius of our nation? Is it not evident that it is violence to impose one's opinions on a people instead of their own, to create for them tastes, usages, even recollections which they have not. The principal charms of a religion are its recollections. For my part," said the First Consul, one day to one of those with whom he was in conversation, "when at Malmaison, I never hear the sound of the church bell in the neighbouring village without emotion; and what emotion could be created in France by Protestant meeting-houses, which were not frequented in childhood, and whose cold and stern aspect so badly accords with the manners of our nation! It may be thought, perhaps, that it is an advantage not to be dependent on a foreign head. It is an error. Everywhere, and for all things, there must be a head. There is no institution more to be admired than that which maintains unity in faith, and prevents, at least as much as is possible, religious dissensions. There can be nothing more odious than a crowd of sects disputing with one another, interchanging invectives, coming to open contention with arms in their hands, if they be in their first excitement, or, if they have got the habit of living together, looking at each other with a jealous eye, forming in the State coteries which stand by one another, urge on their partisans, keep aloof those of rival sects, and give the government embarrassments of every sort. The bickerings of sects are the most insupportable that I know of. Dispute is the province of science; it animates it, sustains it, and leads it to discoveries. To what does dispute in religious matters lead, if not to uncertainty and to the destruction of all faith? Moreover, when the activity of the mind is directed to theological controversies, these controversies are so absorbing that they turn the thoughts of man from all useful research. Seldom do you find combined together great theological controversy with great mental operations. Religious quarrels are either cruel and sanguinary, or dry, barren, and bitter; there are none more odious than they. Inquiry in regard to science, faith in matters of religion, that is the true, the useful course. The institution which maintains unity of faith, that is to say the Pope as guardian of Catholic unity, is an admirable institution. The reproach of being a foreign sovereign is made against this head of the Church. True, he is a foreign sovereign, and we ought to thank Heaven for it. What! in the same country can one picture to himself a like authority conjoined with the government of the State? United to the government, this authority would be the despotism of the sultans; were it separate from, perhaps hostile to the government, it would produce a frightful, an intolerable rivalry. The Pope is outside Paris, and well it is so;

he is neither at Madrid nor at Vienna, and that is why we bear with his spiritual authority. Vienna and Madrid congratulate themselves for the same reason. Do you imagine that if he were at Paris the Viennese or Spaniards would consent to receive his decisions? We are then lucky that he is not a resident amongst us, and that, while residing away from us, he does not take up his abode amongst rivals; that he dwells in that old Rome, far from the hand of the emperors of Germany, far from that of the kings of France, or the kings of Spain, holding the balance between the Catholic sovereigns, inclining always a little to the side of the strongest, but he soon recovers his attitude, if the stronger becomes an oppressor. Centuries have brought this about, and have done it well. For the government of souls, it is the most beneficent institution imaginable. I do not," added the First Consul, "maintain these opinions through the positiveness of a devotee, but from reason. Hear me!" said he one day to Monge, whom he esteemed most highly among the *savans* of the day, and whom he had constantly with him, "religion such as mine is very simple. I look at this universe, so vast, so complex, so magnificent, and I say to myself, that it cannot be the result of chance, but the work, however intended, of an unknown Omnipotent Being, as superior to man as the universe is to the finest machines of human invention. Search, Monge, obtain the assistance of your friends, the mathematicians and the philosophers, you will not find a more powerful or a more decisive argument, and whatever you may do to oppose it, you will not weaken it. But this truth is too succinct for man; he wishes to know regarding himself, regarding his future, a crowd of secrets which the universe does not disclose. Allow religion to tell him all which he feels the want of knowing, and respect her disclosures. It is true, that what one class of religionists advance is contradicted by others. For my part, I come to conclusions different from those of M. de Volney. Inasmuch as there are different religions which naturally contradict each other, he draws a conclusion against all; he puts forward that all are bad. Now I should rather find them all good, all, at bottom, say the same thing. They are wrong only when they wish to proscribe each other; but that is what must be hindered by good laws. The Catholic religion is that of our country, that in which we were born; she has a government profoundly constructed, which obviates disputes as much as it is possible to obviate the tendency of man to disputation; that government is away from Paris, and we should felicitate ourselves that it is so; it is not at Vienna, it is not at Madrid, it is at Rome, and therefore should be acceptable. If, next after the institution of the papacy, there be any thing approaching it in perfection, it is the relation to the Holy See of the Gallican church, subject to it, yet independent of it, at one and the same time. Catholic

unity and Bossuet's articles form, conjoined, the true form of religious government. It is that which we must re-establish. As to Protestantism, it has a right to the most firm protection of government: those who profess it have an absolute right to an equal share in social advantages; but it is not the religion of France. Ages have decided on it. If you propose to the government to make it prevail, you propose an act of violence and an impossibility. Besides, what is more hideous than schism? What can weaken a nation more? Of all civil wars, which penetrates the heart most deeply; which troubles families the most painfully; it is a religious war. We must put an end to that. We are at peace with Europe; let us maintain it as long as we shall be able, but religious peace is the most urgent of all. That being concluded, we have nothing more to apprehend. It is doubtful whether Europe will let us remain long in tranquillity, or that she will be satisfied to see us always as powerful as we are; but, when France shall be united as one man, when the Vendéans and the Bretons shall march in our armies with the men of Burgundy, Lorraine, and Franche Comté, we shall have nothing more to fear from Europe, were she to come against us with all her combined powers."

Such were the conversations held daily by the First Consul with his intimate advisers, with MM. Cambacérès and Lebrun, who were of his opinion, with MM. de Talleyrand, Fouché, Roederer, who were of contrary opinions to his, with a crowd of members of the Council of State and of the Legislative Body, whose ideas in general differed from his. In these discussions, he spoke with unexampled warmth and perseverance of purpose. He saw nothing more useful, more urgent, than to put an end to religious differences, and applied himself to it with that ardour which he displayed in things that he looked on as of pre-eminent importance.

He had decided on his plan, which was simple, wisely conceived, and which has been successful in terminating the religious differences of France; for the unhappy disputes, which the First Consul, when emperor, had at a later period with the court of Rome, occurred between him, the Pope, and the bishops, and never affected the religious peace re-established amongst the people. There never sprung up again into existence, even when the Pope was a prisoner at Fontainebleau, two forms of worship, two sections of clergy, or two classes of the faithful.

The First Consul formed the project of reconciling the French Republic and the Roman Church, by treating with the Holy See, on the very basis of the principles laid down by the Revolution. No longer was there to be a clergy endowed with political power; no longer a clergy having landed property; the thing would have been anomalous in 1800. A clergy solely de-



voted to the performance of worship, paid by a stipend from the government, appointed by it, and the appointment ratified by the Pope ; a new revision of the dioceses, which were to consist of sixty sees, instead of the 158 that formerly existed on the territory of old and new France ; the regulation of the forms of worship transferred to the civil authority, the jurisdiction over the clergy to the Council of State, instead of the parliaments, since abolished—such was the plan of the First Consul. It was the chief constitution decreed in 1790, with modifications that would render it acceptable to Rome ; that is to say, with bishops nominated by the government, and confirmed by the Pope, in place of bishops elected by their flocks, together with a general promise of submission to the laws, instead of the oath taken by the different religious communities—an oath which had served as a pretext for ill-disposed or timorous priests to excite scruples of conscience ; it was, in a word, the true reform of worship—the reform to which the Revolution should have confined itself, in order to render it agreeable to the Pope—a circumstance not to be despised, for every religious establishment was impossible without a good understanding with Rome.

It has been said, that a matter of the greatest importance was omitted ; namely, to require that bishops nominated by the civil power should be accepted by the Pope, whether he would or would not. In such a case, the government of Rome would have been seriously weakened—a matter not at all desirable. The civil power, in nominating a bishop, indicates the subject in whom it recognises, with the moral qualities of a pastor, the political qualities of a good citizen, who respects, and will cause to be respected, the laws of the country. It belongs to the Pope to say whether, in this subject, he recognises an orthodox priest who will teach the true doctrines of the Catholic Church. To wish to confine the period of delay to some months, after which the ratification by the Pope should be considered as granted, would have been to force the ratification itself, to deprive the Pope of his spiritual authority, and to renew no less than the memorable and terrible quarrel of investitures. In matters of religion, there are two authorities, to wit, the civil authority of the country where the religion is practised, charged to watch over the maintenance of the laws and the established powers ; and the spiritual authority of the Holy See, charged with watching over the maintenance of unity of faith. It is needful that both should concur in the selection of the clergy. The religious authority of the Holy See sometimes refuses, it is true, to ratify the appointment of the bishops selected ; it makes use of this means to force the temporal power. The like has been seen to have occurred, and it is an abuse, though fleeting, yet inevitable. The civil authority, also, may stand back, and that has been seen under Napoleon him-



self, that most enlightened and most courageous restorer of the ancient Catholic Church.

The plan of the First Consul left nothing more to be desired for the definitive establishment of worship ; but it was necessary that he should give his mind to the transition, that is to say, the passage from the present state to the approaching one about to be created. What was he to do regarding the sees as they stood ? What arrangements were to be made with ecclesiastics of every sort, bishops or simple priests, some sworn and attached to the Revolution, performing worship publicly in the churches, others unsworn, who were emigrants, or had returned from emigration, exercising by stealth the functions of their ministry, and the greater part hostile to his government ? A system occurred to the mind of general Bonaparte, the adoption of which was an immense difficulty at the court of Rome ; for, during eighteen centuries, the Church had never done what was about to be proposed to her. This new system was to abolish all existing dioceses. For that purpose, the former bishops, still living, were to be applied to, and the Pope was to demand of them their resignation. If they refused it, the Pope was to pronounce their deposition ; and, when a *tabula rasa* should thus have been made, sixty new dioceses were to be traced out on the map of France, forty-five of which were to be bishoprics, and fifteen archbishoprics. To fill them, the First Consul was to nominate sixty prelates, taken indiscriminately from among the sworn and unsworn priests ; but rather from the latter, who were the most numerous, were held in most consideration, and were most beloved by the faithful. He would choose both from among ecclesiastics worthy of the confidence of government, respectable from their morals, and reconciled to the French Revolution. These prelates, nominated by the First Consul, were to be instituted by the Pope, and at once to enter on their duties, under the surveillance of the civil authority and of the Council of State.

A salary, in proportion to their wants, was to be allotted to them from the Budget of the State. But, in return, the Pope was to recognise as valid the alienation of the Church property, to interdict the suggestions which the priests were in the habit of making at the bedside of the dying ; to reconcile to Rome the married clergy ; to assist the government ; in a word, in putting an end to all the calamities of the period.

This plan was a complete one ; and, with some exceptions, excellent for the present as well as for the future. It reorganised the Church, as much as possible, on the same model as that of the State ; it fused down all individual peculiarities, selecting from all parties wise and moderate men, who valued the public good above their revolutionary or religious stubbornness. But we shall presently see how great is the difficulty of executing a good work, even when it is necessary, even when it

is a real and pressing want; for, unfortunately, though it be a want, it does not result from it that it presents a clear, evident notion, unsusceptible of being contested.

At Paris, there was the party of scoffers—disciples still living of the philosophy of the eighteenth century; old Jansenists, who had become constitutional priests, and finally, generals, imbued with vulgar prejudices: this was the obstacle on the part of France. But at Rome, there was fidelity to antique precedents; the fear of touching dogma if discipline were altered; religious scruples, sincere or affected; above all, antipathies to our Revolution; and, in particular, a sort of complaisance with regard to the French royalist party, which was composed of emigrant priests or nobles, some residing at Rome, others in correspondence with her, all passionate enemies of France, and of the new order of things beginning to be established in it: this was the obstacle on the part of the Holy See.

The First Consul persisted in his plan with invincible firmness and patience, during one of the longest and most difficult negotiations known in the history of the Church. Never had the temporal and spiritual powers met under more important circumstances; never had they been more worthily represented.

That young man, so sensible, so profound in his views, but so impetuous in his will—that young man, who governed France, found himself, by a singular design of Providence, placed on the stage of the world, in presence of a pontiff of rare virtue, of physiognomy and character angelic, but of a tenacity capable of braving martyrdom, where he thought that the interests of the Faith, or those of the court of Rome, were compromised. His countenance, animated, yet mild, told the elevated sensibility of his soul. About sixty years old, weak in health, though he lived to an advanced age, holding down his head and stooping, gifted with a keen and penetrating look, his language graceful and affecting, he was the fit representative not more of that imperious religion which, under Gregory VII., commanded, and deserved to command, barbarous Europe, than of that persecuted religion, which, having no longer in its hands the thunderbolts of the Church, was unable to exercise on men any other power than that of mild persuasion.

A secret charm attached him to general Bonaparte; they had both met, as we have said elsewhere, during the wars of Italy, and, in place of those ferocious warriors, spawned by the French Revolution, who were depicted in Europe as profaners of the altar and assassins of emigrant priests, Pius VII., at that time bishop of Imola, had found a young man full of genius, speaking, like himself, the Italian language, displaying the most moderate sentiments, maintaining order, causing the temples to be respected, and, far from persecuting the French priests, making use of his power to oblige the Italian churches to take them

in and support them. Surprised and delighted, the bishop of Imola restrained the spirit of insubordination of the Italians of his diocese, and repaid general Bonaparte the services which his Church had received from him. The impression produced by this first acquaintance was never effaced from the heart of the pontiff, and influenced his whole conduct towards the general, when he became Consul and Emperor: a striking proof that in all things, great or little, a good turn is never lost. In fact, at a later period, when the conclave was assembled at Venice, to elect a successor to Pius VI., who died a prisoner at Valentia, the remembrance of the first acts of the general of the army of Italy had influenced, in a manner we may call providential, the selection of the new Pope.

It will be remembered that, at the very time when Pius VII. was preferred by the conclave, in the hope of finding in him a conciliator, who would reconcile Rome with France, and perhaps put an end to the misfortunes of the Church, the First Consul had gained the battle of Marengo, had become master of Italy and ruler of Europe, and had sent an emissary, the nephew of the bishop of Vercelli, to announce his intentions to the newly-elected pontiff. He sent him word, that, pending ulterior arrangements, peace should exist between France and Rome *de facto*, on the footing of the treaty of Tolentino, signed in 1797; that there should be no more mention of a Roman republic, the invention of the Directory; that the Holy See should be re-established, and recognised by the French, as in ancient times. As to the question of knowing whether the three great provinces of Bologna, Ferrara, and Romagna, were to be restored to the Church, not a word was said. But the Pope was replaced on his throne, and had peace. All the rest he left to Providence. The First Consul had, moreover, commanded the Neapolitans to evacuate the Roman States, which they had, in fact, evacuated, saving the environs of Benevento and Ponte Corvo. Still more, in all the movements of his armies around Naples and Otranto, the First Consul had given orders to respect the Roman States. He had even sent Murat, who commanded the French army in Lower Italy, to bend his knee at the foot of the papal throne. Monsignor Gonsalvi had then guessed aright, and he was amply rewarded for it; for, on his arrival at Rome, the Pope appointed him Cardinal Secretary of State, first minister of the Holy See, a post which he held during the greatest part of the pontificate of Pius VII. It was in the train of these, in some sort miraculous events, that the Pope, at the request of the First Consul, sent Monsignor Spina, a keen, devout, greedy Genoese priest, to Paris, for the purpose of treating on all matters, political as well as religious. At first, Monsignor Spina had assumed no official title, so much did the holy father, notwithstanding his liking for general Bonaparte, notwithstanding his ardent desire

for an approximation, dread to avow his relations with the French Republic. But soon, when he saw the ministers of Prussia and of Spain, who were already in Paris, closely followed by those of Austria, Russia, Bavaria, Naples, those, in fact, of all the courts, the pontiff no longer hesitated, and allowed Monsignor Spina to assume an official character, and to avow the object of his mission. The French emigrant party made a great outcry, and tried useless efforts to hinder, by its remonstrances, the approximation of the Church to France, knowing well that if it lost religion as a means of keeping up agitation, it would soon lose its best arm. But Pius VII., although chagrined, nay, sometimes intimidated by these remonstrances, showed himself decided to place the interests of religion and of the Holy See above all consideration of party. One single reason slackened a little his excellent resolutions; it was the vague, and by no means wise, hope of recovering the Legations, lost at the time of the treaty of Tolentino.\*

M. Spina, being now in Paris, had orders to gain time, in order to see if the First Consul, as master of Italy, and having the power of disposing of it as he pleased, would entertain the lucky thought of restoring the Legations to the Holy See. An expression which was frequently in the mouth of the First Consul had given rise to more hope than he intended to convey by it. "Let the holy father," said he, "put the utmost confidence in me, let him cast himself into my arms, and I will be for the Church another Charlemagne." "If he be a new Charlemagne," replied those priests, who knew but little of the affairs of the age, "let him prove himself to be so by restoring to us the patrimony of St. Peter." Unfortunately, they were out in their reckoning, for the First Consul thought he had done a great deal in re-establishing the Pope at Rome, in restoring to him, with his pontifical throne; the Roman State, in offering to treat with him for the re-establishment of Catholic worship; and, in fact, he had done a great deal, the state of opinion in France and that in Italy being considered. If the French patriots, still full of the ideas of the eighteenth century, saw with little satisfaction the approaching re-establishment of the Catholic Church,

---

\* There does not exist a more curious negotiation, or one more deserving of meditation, than that of the Concordat. There does not exist one in which the archives of France are richer in documents; for, besides the diplomatic correspondence of our agents, and above all the abbé Bernier's own correspondence, we possess that of Monsignor Spina and cardinal Caprara with the Pope and cardinal Gonsalvi. The last has remained in our hands in virtue of an article of the Concordat, by which the archives of the Roman legation, in case of a rupture, were to remain in France. The letters of Monsignor Spina and cardinal Caprara, written in Italian, form one of the most curious monuments of the time, and afford of themselves the secret of the religious negotiations of that period, a secret still very imperfectly known at the present day, even after the divers works published on this matter.

the Italian patriots saw with despair the re-erection of priestly government over them. It was then impossible for the First Consul to extend his complaisance to the length of restoring the Legations to the Holy See, which Legations could not be of any use in supporting clerical government, and which were, besides, a promised portion of the Cisalpine Republic. But the court of Rome, feeling itself distressed since it had been deprived of the revenues of Bologna, Ferrara, and Romagna, reasoned otherwise. As to the rest, the Pope, who, in the midst of the pomp of the Vatican, lived like an anchorite, thought less of this worldly interest than cardinal Gonsalvi, and cardinal Gonsalvi less than Monsignor Spina. The last walked with stealthy step in the negotiation, hearkening to all that was said to him regarding religious questions, having the air of attaching exclusive importance to those, and yet, by some random expressions, dropped from time to time on the poverty of the Holy See, trying to bring about the introduction of the question of the Legations. He had not succeeded in making his hints understood, and was protracting matters, in trying to obtain something that might answer the false hopes imprudently indulged in by his court.

To treat with Monsignor Spina, the First Consul had made choice, as we have said before, of the celebrated abbé Bernier, the pacificator of La Vendée. This priest, a simple curé in the province of Anjou, unadorned with the externals which a careful education imparts, but gifted with a profound knowledge of mankind, of superior prudence, long exercised amidst the difficulties of civil war, very well read in canonical matters, was the principal author of the re-establishment of peace in the provinces of the West. He was fond of this peace, because it was his work, and was naturally desirous of every thing that could strengthen it, and looked on the approximation of France to Rome as one of the surest means of rendering it complete and definitive. Nor did he cease from addressing to the First Consul the most earnest entreaties to hasten the negotiations with the Church. Furnished with his instructions, he conveyed to the archbishop of Corinth the proposals of the French government, already put forward: viz., resignation of their sees imposed on all former titular bishops; a new remodelling of dioceses; sixty sees instead of 158; the formation of a new body of clergy, composed of ecclesiastics of all parties; the nomination of this clergy by the First Consul and their institution by the Pope; a promise of submission to the established form of government; salaries paid from the State budget; a renunciation of Church property, and a complete recognition of the right of selling that property; superintendence of the forms of worship to be allowed to the civil authority represented by the Council of State; finally, the pardon of the Church for the married priests, and their re-admission to the Catholic communion.



Monsignor Spina was loud in his language, on hearing these conditions put forward, he characterized them as exorbitant, as contrary to the faith, and held up that the Pope would never consent to them. He, first of all, required that in the preamble of the Concordat the Catholic religion should be declared the *Religion of the State* in France, that the consuls should make a public profession of it, and that the laws and acts contrary to this declaration of a *State Religion* should be abrogated.

As to the new re-construction of the dioceses, he admitted that the number of sees was great, but he pretended that the Pope had not the right to depose a bishop, that none of his predecessors had dared to do so, in the history of the Roman Church, and that if his holiness allowed such an innovation, he would create a second schism directed this time against the holy father himself; that all he could do on this subject was to have an amicable understanding with the First Consul; that those amongst the former bishops who should display good feeling towards the French government should be merely and simply reinstalled in their dioceses, or, at least, in the diocese corresponding to that which they had formerly occupied; that those, on the other hand, who had conducted themselves, or were conducting themselves still, in a manner not meriting the confidence of this government, should be laid aside, and, till their deaths, certainly not far off, considering their great age, administrators, chosen by the Pope and the First Consul, should govern their sees.

Monsignor Spina, then, did not entertain the idea of forming a new clergy, taken from all classes of priests, and from all parties, unless to fill the vacant sees. Still more, he did not wish that the constitutional priests should participate in it, unless they should make one of those solemn recantations, which are a triumph for Rome, and an indemnification for the pardon which she grants.

In regard to the nomination of bishops by the head of the Republic, and their institution by the Pope, there was but little difficulty. The point naturally set out from was the principle that, in treating with Rome, the new government should have all the prerogatives of the old government, and that the First Consul should be considered, in every particular, as the kings of France had been. Hence the nomination of the bishops was his right. Yet, the post of First Consul, at least for the nonce, was elective; general Bonaparte, now invested with that dignity, was a Catholic, but his successors might not be so; and, at Rome, it was not allowed that a Protestant sovereign could nominate bishops. Monsignor Spina demanded that this exception should be looked to.

Every thing regarding the curés was settled. They were to



be nominated by the bishops, with the approval of the civil authority.

The promise of submission to the laws was admitted, without entering into the precise terms.

The Pope's sanction of the sales of Church property was a stumbling-block to the Roman negotiator. He acknowledged the absolute impossibility of recalling those sales; but demanded that the Holy See should be spared a declaration which might imply a moral approval of what had taken place on that head. He conceded a renunciation of all ulterior inquiry, while he refused the formal recognition of the right of alienation. "This property," said Monsignor Spina, "known by the names *Vota fidelium, patrimonium pauperum, sacrificia peccatorum*, the Church herself had not the power to alienate. However, she can renounce the prosecution of its recovery." As an indemnification, he demanded a restitution of the domains not yet alienated, and that the dying should have the power of making wills in favour of religious establishments, which implied a renewal of property in mortmain, and was a recommencement of the old order of things, namely, that of a clergy endowed with lands. Finally, the pardon of the married priests, and their reconciliation with the Church, was an affair of indulgence, easy, on the part of the court of Rome, which is always disposed to forgive, when the fault is acknowledged by him who has committed it. Still, she excepted from the pardon two classes of priests, to wit, former friars, who had made certain vows, and bishops. This was not the way to acquire for the Holy See the good wishes of the minister of foreign affairs, M. de Talleyrand.

These pretensions of the court of Rome, although they did not imply a real impossibility of coming to an understanding with the French government, showed a glimpse, nevertheless, of serious difference of opinion.

The First Consul felt this, and showed great impatience at it. He had had several interviews with Monsignor Spina, and had declared to him, in person, that he would never depart from the fundamental principle of his project, which consisted in making a *tabula rasa*, in forming new diocesan arrangements and a new clergy, in deposing the former bishops, and selecting their successors from all classes of priests. He had told him, that the amalgamation of honest and wise men of all parties was his principle of government; that he would apply that principle to the Church as well as to the State; that it was the only way left him of putting an end to the troubles of France, and that he would persist in it undeviatingly.

The abbé Bernier, who, to the very palpable ambition of being the principal instrument in the re-establishment of religion, joined a sincere love of whatever was good, addressed the most

earnest entreaties to Monsignor Spina to smooth the difficulties laid in the way by the court of Rome, against the project of the First Consul. "To declare the Catholic religion," said he, "*the Religion of the State*, was impossible, was contrary to the ideas prevalent in France, and would never be admitted by the Tribune and the Legislative Body." In place of such declaration, on his view of it, the mention of a fact might be substituted, namely, that the Catholic religion was that of the majority of Frenchmen. The mention of this fact was of as much use as the wished-for declaration. To insist on an impossibility, rather through pride than principle, was to compromise the true interest of the Church. The First Consul might assist in person at the solemn rites of worship, and the presence of a man like him at these ceremonies was a great act; but it was necessary to renounce the demand of his going through certain forms, such as confession and communion, that went beyond the bounds within which it was fit he should confine himself with regard to the French public. It was needful to win back opinion, and not to shock it, above all, not to afford it subjects for laughter. The demand of resignation of their sees, addressed to the former bishops, was quite simple; it was a consequence of the step which they had taken in regard to Pius VI., in 1790. At that period, the French prelates, in order to make their resistance seem to arise from anxiety for the faith, and not for their own private interests, had declared that they accepted the Pope as arbitrator, and that they delivered their sees into his hands; that, if he was of opinion that they should abandon them in favour of the civil constitution, they would submit. At the present day, then, it was only taking them at their word, and enacting the fulfilment of that solemn offer. If some amongst them, through personal motives, should be a bar to so great a benefit as the restoration of religion to France, they should no longer be looked on as bishops, but be considered as having resigned from 1790. The abbé Bernier added, that there was a precedent of this sort in the Church, namely, the resignation *en masse* of the 300 bishops of Africa, agreed on for the purpose of putting an end to the schism of the Donatists. It is true that they had not been deposed. As to the new selections to be made, it was necessary to concede to the First Consul the principle of amalgamation. This principle the First Consul would apply, above all, to the benefit of the unsworn clergy; he would pick out two or three constitutional priests, merely for example's sake, but his principal selection would be from the mass of the orthodox clergy. The French negotiator advanced here on his own responsibility further than he should have done. It is true, that the First Consul set little value on the constitutional bishops, who, for the most part, were narrow-minded Jansenists, or declaimers at the clubs; it is true, that in that body of clergy

he esteemed only the ordinary priests, who, in general, had taken the oath through submission to the laws, through a desire of continuing their sacred ministry, and had not taken advantage of the agitations of the time to raise themselves to the sacerdotal hierarchy. Nevertheless, if he had but little respect for the constitutional bishops, he adhered to his principle of amalgamation, and did not bargain away the rights of the sworn clergy so cheaply as the abbé Bernier seemed to announce. But the abbé Bernier expressed himself thus to further the success of the negotiation. As to the nomination of the bishops by the First Consul, it was necessary, according to the abbé Bernier, to get over a very remote and very improbable difficulty, viz., that of some day having a Protestant First Consul. It was not worth while, in his opinion, to look forward to so very unlikely an occurrence. Relatively to the property of the clergy, it was needful to lose no time in drawing up a form of selling it, since they were agreed on the principle. Relatively to the restitution of the unsold property, and to testamentary donations of houses and lands, they were irreconcilable with the political principles in vogue at the time in France, principles absolutely at variance with property in mortmain. That the Roman negotiator should be content in this respect with one concession, namely, that of donations of annuities from the public funds. "In fine," said the abbé Bernier, "the time has arrived for concluding, for the First Consul was beginning to be dissatisfied. He thought that the Pope had not the energy to break with the emigrant party, for the purpose of giving himself entirely to France. He would end by renouncing the good of which he had at first entertained the thought, and, without persecuting the priests, leaving them to themselves, he would allow the Church to become what it could in France, not taking into consideration that he would pursue in Italy a line of conduct hostile to the court of Rome. It was," continued abbé Bernier, "to have lost all discernment not to profit by the dispositions of so great a man, the only man capable of saving religion. He himself, too, had great difficulties to overcome with regard to the revolutionary party; and, so far from thwarting, one ought to assist him in surmounting these difficulties, by making to him such concessions as he needed for winning to his side opinions, little disposed in France in favour of the Catholic religion."

Monsignor Spina was beginning to be very much embarrassed. He was a believer, but his covetousness surpassed his faith. Incessantly demanding money for his court, his most ardent wish was to make her as rich and as lavish as of yore. But the little success of his insinuations regarding the lost provinces discouraged him singularly. He perceived that the First Consul, as wily as the Italian priests, did not wish to be communicative with persons who were not communicative them-

selves. He saw, moreover, all the courts at his feet; he saw the Russian negotiator, M. de Kalitscheff, who had wished, in so insolent a manner, to protect the petty Italian princes, go away disappointed, all Germany dependent on France for the partition of the territorial indemnities; Portugal submissive, and England herself brought to make peace through fatigue. Confronted by such a state of things, he was convinced that he had no longer any other resource than to submit, and to trust for what he was desirous, to the sole will of the First Consul. Disposed to yield, Monsignor Spina, was still afraid to give his adherence to the very arbitrary conditions which the French cabinet had laid down, with the evident resolution of not swerving from them, because they were established by the imperious necessities of the state of things.

The First Consul, with his accustomed cleverness, relieved the Roman negotiator from embarrassment. It was the moment, already described above, when all the negotiations were going on together, especially those with England. Thinking, with a sort of joy, on the prodigious effect that a general peace would have, which should comprise even the Church herself, he wished to have done with it by a quick and decided step. He caused a project of a Concordat to be drawn up, to offer it definitively to Monsignor Spina. This matter was managed by two ecclesiastics, who had laid aside holy orders, and belonged to the department for foreign affairs, to wit, M. de Talleyrand and M. de Hauterive. Fortunately, between them and Monsignor Spina, was interposed the clever and orthodox Bernier. The project, written by M. de Hauterive, and revised by the abbé Bernier, was simple, clear, decided. It contained, drawn up in law form, all that the French legation had proposed. This project was presented to Monsignor Spina, who was very much troubled by it, and offered to send it to his court, but declared that he could not sign it himself. "Why," he was asked, "do you refuse to sign it? Can it be that you have not powers? If so, what have you been doing in Paris for six months? Why do you take on you the part of a negotiator, which you cannot fill to its necessary term, that is to say, to a conclusion? Or perhaps you think the project inadmissible? If you do, have the boldness to say so; and the French cabinet, which can grant no other conditions, will cease to negotiate with you. It may, or may not break with the Holy See; but it will have done with Monsignor Spina."

The crafty prelate knew not what answer to make. He affirmed that he had powers. Not having the courage to avow that he considered the French proposal inadmissible, he alleged that, in matters of religion, the Pope, surrounded by his cardinals, could alone accept a treaty. And, in consequence, he renewed the offer of sending the First Consul's project to his Holiness. "Let it be so," said some to him; "but declare, at

least, in sending it, that you approve of it." Monsignor Spina still refused any approving formula, and replied, "that he would impress urgently on his Holiness, the adoption of a treaty which might work out in France the re-establishment of the Catholic faith.

A courier was despatched to Rome with the project of the Concordat, and with orders to M. de Cacault, the ambassador from France to the Holy See, to submit it to the Pope for his immediate and definitive acceptance. The courier was the bearer of a present which was destined to cause great joy in Italy, it was the famous wooden Virgin of Notre Dame of Loretto, carried away, in the time of the Directory, from Loretto itself, and afterwards deposited in the national library of Paris, as an object of curiosity. The First Consul knew that the placing of such a relic in the royal library was a source of scandal to many sincere yet irritable Christians, and made this pious restitution to precede the Concordat.

This present was welcomed in the Romagna with a gladness hard to be conceived in France. The Pope received the Concordat better than was expected. This worthy pontiff, pre-occupied with the interests of the faith more than with his temporal concerns, did not see any thing absolutely inadmissible in the project, and thought that, with some changes in the wording of it, he should succeed in satisfying the First Consul, which he looked on as a very important point; for the re-establishment of religion in France was, in his eyes, the greatest, the most essential, of the affairs of the Church.

He appointed the three cardinals, Cavandini, Antonelli, and Gerdil, to make a primary examination of the project sent from Paris. The cardinals Antonelli and Gerdil, passed for the two most learned personages of the Church. Cardinal Gerdil was even become a Frenchman, for he belonged by birth to Savoy. The Pope enjoined these three to use despatch. The first examination ended, they were to make their report to a congregation of twelve cardinals, chosen from among those who were then in Rome, and who understood best the interests of the Roman Church. They were required to promise secrecy on the Holy Gospels. The Pope, fearing the plottings and outcries of the French emigrants, sought to withhold the decision of the sacred college from all party influence. On his part, then, the efforts were in perfect sincerity. He had by him a French minister entirely to his taste: this was M. de Cacault, a man of feeling as well as wit, divided between the recollections of the eighteenth century, to which he belonged by his years and education, and the sentiments which Rome inspires in all those who live in the midst of her ruined grandeur and her religious pomp. In setting out from Paris, M. de Cacault had asked the First Consul for his instructions. He had answered him by that superb saying, "Treat the Pope as if he had



200,000 soldiers." M. de Cacault loved Pius VII. and general Bonaparte; and, by his kindly demeanour, disposed them to love one another. "Confide in the First Consul," said he, incessantly, to the Pope; "he will arrange your affairs. But do what he asks of you, for he has need of what he asks of you in order to succeed." He said to the First Consul, "Have a little patience. The Pope is the most holy, the most engaging of men. He wishes to satisfy you; but give him time for it. It is necessary to accustom his mind and that of the cardinals to the arbitrary proposals which you send hither. Rome is more trusting than you think. This court must be led with gentleness. If we ruffle her we shall bewilder her. She will fling herself into the endurance of martyrdom, as the only resource in her situation." These wise counsels moderated the impetuosity of the First Consul, and inclined him to await patiently the fastidious examination of the court of Rome.

At last, when the business was finished, the Pope and cardinal Gonsalvi had several interviews with M. de Cacault. They communicated the Roman project. M. de Cacault, finding it too distant from the French project, made reiterated efforts to obtain some modifications. It was necessary, a second time, to have recourse to the congregation of the twelve cardinals; this, again, took up much time; so that, without gaining advantages of any note, M. de Cacault contributed himself to the loss of an entire month. At length the parties came to an agreement, as nearly as possible; which ended in a plan, differing from the plan of the First Consul, in the following points.

The Catholic religion was to be declared in France, the *religion of the State*; the Consuls were to profess it publicly; there was to be a new diocesan reconstruction, and only sixty sees, as the First Consul wished. The Pope was to address the former bishops, demanding their voluntary resignation, on the grounds of their offer of resignation made to Pius VI., in 1790. It was probable that a very great number would give it, and then, the sees vacant by death or resignation would furnish the French government with room for an ample list of nominations. As for those who should refuse, the Pope would take suitable measures that the administration of the sees should not remain in their hands.

The excellent pontiff said to the First Consul, in an affecting letter which he addressed to him: "Dispense with my declaring publicly that I will depose old prelates who have suffered cruel persecutions for the cause of the Church. First, my right to do so is doubtful; secondly, it is grievous to me to treat in this manner ministers of the altar, in misfortune and in exile. What answer would you make to those who should require you to sacrifice the generals by whom you are sur-



rounded, and whose devotedness has rendered you so many times victorious? . . . . The result which you desire to obtain will be the same in the end, for the greater part of the sees will become vacant by death, or by resignation. You shall fill them up; and, as to the small number of those which will remain occupied, in consequence of some refusals of resignation, we will not nominate bishops to them, but cause them be administered by vicars worthy of your confidence and ours." On the other points, the Roman project was nearly similar to the French. It granted the nominations to the First Consul, saving in the case where a First Consul should be a Protestant; it contained the sanction of the public sales; but, while it persisted in demanding that testamentary gifts of houses and lands might be made to the clergy, it conceded to the married priests the indulgences of the Church.

Evidently, the most serious difficulty was the deposition of those old bishops who should refuse to tender their resignation. Such a sacrifice was painful to the Pope; for it was, in a manner, immolating at the feet of the First Consul the old French clergy. However, this immolation was indispensable, to enable the First Consul to suppress, in his turn, the constitutional clergy, and, out of the different classes of priests, to make but one, composed of persons esteemed by all sects. It was one of those occasions, on which, in all ages, the papacy had not hesitated to take decisive resolutions to save the Church. But, at the moment of resolving, the well-disposed though timorous mind of the pontiff was a prey to the most painful perplexities.

Whilst the time was thus employed at Rome, whether in conferences of the cardinals with each other, or in conferences of the secretary of state with M. de Cacault, the First Consul, in Paris, had lost patience. He was beginning to fear that the court of Rome might be intriguing, either with the emigrants, or with foreign courts, particularly that of Austria. To his natural distrust were joined the suggestions of the enemies of religion, who sought to persuade him that he was deceived, and that he, so penetrating, so clever, was the dupe of Italian finesse. He was but little disposed to believe that their finesse was keener than his own, but he wished, however, to try the soundings of that sea which he was told was so deep; and, the same day (May 13th) that the courier, bearing the despatches of the Holy See was leaving Rome, he made a threatening demonstration in Paris.

He sent for the abbé Bernier, Monsignor Spina, and M. de Talleyrand, to Malmaison. He informed them that he had no longer confidence in the dispositions of the court of Rome; that the desire of deferring to the emigrants was evidently of greater importance with her than the desire of becoming reconciled with France; and that party interest took precedence of the in-

terests of religion; that he did not understand that inimical courts should be consulted, and, perhaps, even the heads of the emigrant party, to know if she ought to treat with the French Republic; that, as the Church might receive from him immense benefits, she ought to accept or refuse them on the spot, and not retard the welfare of the million, by useless hesitations, or by yet more misplaced consultations; that he would do without the Holy See, since his efforts were not seconded by her; that certainly he should not expose the Church to the persecutions of by-gone days, but that he would leave the priests to themselves, confining himself to chastising the turbulent among them, and leaving the others to live as best they might; that he would hold himself, relatively to the court of Rome, as free from all engagements to her, even from the engagements contained in the treaty of Tolentino, since, *de facto*, that treaty had become null the very day of the proclamation of war between Pius VII. and the Directory. In uttering these words, the tone of the First Consul was cold, positive, withering. He gave it to be understood, in the illustrations following this declaration, that his confidence in the holy father was unchanged; but that he imputed the slow delays which gave him annoyance to cardinal Gonsalvi and to the set of advisers about the Pope.

The First Consul had gained his end, for the unfortunate Spina quitted Malmaison in real disorder of mind, and hastened to Paris, in order to write to his court despatches brimful of the fear which agitated himself. M. de Talleyrand, on his part, wrote to M. de Cacault a despatch conformable to the scene at Malmaison. He enjoined him to repair to the Pope and cardinal Gonsalvi, to declare to them that the First Consul, full of confidence in the personal character of the holy father, had not any in his cabinet; that he was resolved to break off a negotiation too insincere; and that he, M. de Cacault, had orders to quit Rome within five days, if the plan of the concordat was not immediately adopted, or was only adopted with modifications. M. de Cacault, in fact, was instructed to withdraw, pending this delay, to Florence, there to wait until the First Consul should transmit to him his determination.

This despatch reached Rome at the latter end of May. It chagrined M. de Cacault very much; he feared, by the news of which he was the bearer, to disconcert, perhaps to push to desperate resolutions, the Roman court; he feared, above all, to afflict a pontiff for whom he had not been able to avoid feeling a real attachment. However, the commands of the First Consul were so absolute, that there were no means of evading their execution. M. de Cacault went then to the Pope, and to cardinal Gonsalvi, and showed them his instructions, which caused them both poignant distress. Cardinal Gonsalvi, in particular, who saw himself clearly designated, in

the despatches of the First Consul, as the author of the interminable delays of this negotiation, felt as if dying of consternation. Nevertheless, he was not much to blame, and the superannuated forms of that oldest chancery in the world was the sole cause of the delays of which the First Consul complained, at least since the affair was transferred to Rome. M. de Cacault proposed to the Pope and to cardinal Gonsalvi an idea, which surprised and disturbed them at first, but which appeared to them, in the sequel, the only way to a safe issue. "You do not wish," said he to them, "to adopt the Concordat sent from Paris, in all its expressions. Well! let the cardinal himself go to France, invested with your powers. He will make himself known to the First Consul; he will inspire him with confidence; he will obtain from him the indispensable changes in the document. If any difficulty should arise, he will be there to obviate it. He will anticipate, by his presence on the spot, the loss of time which particularly irritates the impatient character of the head of our government. You will be thus withdrawn from great peril, and the affairs of religion will be saved." It was a great pain to the Pope to part with a minister whom he could no longer dispense with, and who alone gave him strength to bear the pains of sovereignty. He was plunged into frightful perplexities, finding the idea of M. de Cacault very wise, but the separation proposed to him cruel.

That implacable faction, composed not only of emigrants, but of all those who, in Europe, detested the French Revolution—that faction, which would have longed for an eternal war with France, which had seen with sorrow the end of the civil war in La Vendée, and which saw, with no less sorrow, the approaching termination of schism—besieged Rome with letters, filled it with its tattle, and covered its walls with placards. It said, for instance, that Pius VI., to save the faith, had lost the Holy See; and that Pius VII., to save the Holy See, would destroy the faith.\* The invectives, of which he was the object, had no effect with this pontiff (who was sensitive, but devoted to his duties), in shaking his resolution of saving the Church, in spite of all parties—in spite of the Church party itself; but he suffered severely from them. Cardinal Gonsalvi was his confidant and his friend; to part from him was a poignant grief to him. The cardinal, in his turn, dreaded the prospect of being in Paris, in that revolutionary gulf which had swallowed, as he was told, so many victims. He trembled at the sole idea of finding himself in the presence of that formidable general, the object at once of admiration and of fear, whom Monsignor Spina depicted to him as particularly irritated against the secre-

---

\* "Pio VI. per conservar la fede,  
Perde la sede.  
Pio VII. per conservar la sede,  
Perde la fede."

tary of state. These wo-begone priests formed a thousand false notions regarding France and its government; and, improved as they were told it was, they shuddered at the very thought of being a moment in its hands. The cardinal decided, then, but his decision was as that of one about to brave death. "Since they must have a victim," said he, "I devote myself, and give myself up to Providence." He had even the imprudence to write to Naples letters in conformity with these words—letters which came to the knowledge of our minister at Naples, and were communicated to the First Consul, who fortunately regarded them as a subject of laughter, rather than of irritation.

But the journey of the secretary of state to Paris was far from smoothing all difficulties and anticipating all dangers. The departure of M. de Cacault to his retreat at Florence, the head-quarters of the French army, might perhaps be a gloomy manifestation for the two governments of Rome and Naples. These two governments, in fact, were continually menaced by the repressed and always ardent passions of the Italian patriots. That of the Pope was odious to men who were unwilling to be governed any longer by priests, and the number of these men in the Roman State was large; that of Naples was abhorred for the blood it had spilt. The departure of M. de Cacault might be considered as a sort of permission, given to the mischievously inclined Italians to try their hands at some dangerous attempt. The Pope, also, feared it. It was agreed, then, to prevent any misinterpretation, to let M. de Cacault and cardinal Gonsalvi set out together. They were to be travelling companions as far as Florence. M. de Cacault, on quitting Rome, left there his secretary of legation.

MM. Gonsalvi and de Cacault quitted Rome on the 6th of June (17th Prairial) and journeyed towards Florence. They travelled in the same carriage, and, wherever they stopped, the cardinal pointed out M. de Cacault to the populace, saying to them: "This is the French minister;" so desirous was he that it should be known that no rupture had taken place. The agitation in Italy was brisk enough. However, it produced nothing vexatious for the nonce; for men awaited a clearer view of the dispositions of the French government, before essaying any change. Cardinal Gonsalvi separated from M. de Cacault at Florence, and took his road tremblingly towards Paris.\*

---

•

Florence, 19 Prairial, year IX.

François Cacault, minister plenipotentiary of the French republic, at Rome, to the citizen minister for foreign affairs.

"Citizen Minister,—

"Here I am at Florence. The cardinal secretary of state left Rome along with me. He called for me at my house. We have made the journey together in the same carriage. Our servants followed, after the same fashion,

In this interval, the First Consul, receiving from Rome the amended project, and perceiving that the differences were more formal than fundamental, had become calm. The news that cardinal Gonsalvi was coming himself to settle an agreement between the Holy See and the French cabinet satisfied him completely. He saw in it the certainty of a proximate arrangement. He prepared, then, to give the best reception to the prime minister of the Roman court.

Cardinal Gonsalvi arrived the 20th of June (1st Messidor) in Paris. The abbé Bernier and Monsignor Spina hastened to meet him and to cheer him respecting the disposition of the First

in a second carriage, and the expenses were paid by each one's respective courier.

"We were looked on everywhere with staring wonder. The cardinal was much afraid it might be imagined that I was going away in consequence of a diplomatic rupture; he was incessantly saying to every body, '*This is the minister of France.*' This country, ~~crushed~~ by the bygone evils of the war, shudders at the least idea of the movement of troops. The Roman government is more afraid of its own discontented subjects, particularly of those who have been allured to authority and to plunder by the sort of revolution that has passed. We have thus prevented, and dissipated at the same time, horrifying fears and rash hopes. I think that ~~the~~ tranquillity of Rome will not be troubled.

"The cardinal has spent here the day of the 18th in great and manifest friendship with general Murat, who has given him a residence and a guard of honour. He offered the same to me. I have not accepted any thing; I lodged at an inn.

"The cardinal set out this morning for Paris. He will arrive shortly after my despatch; he will travel extremely quick. The poor fellow feels that if he fails he will be lost without hope, and that all will be lost for Rome. He is eager to know the upshot. I have made him understand that a great means of saving every thing was despatch, because the First Consul had serious reasons for concluding quickly and executing promptly.

"I had tried at Rome to induce the Pope to give his own signature solely to the Concordat, and if he had conceded that point I should not have left Rome; but this idea has not succeeded with me.

"You are right in thinking that the cardinal is not sent to sign at Paris what the Pope has refused to sign at Rome; but he is first minister to his holiness and his favourite; it is the soul of the Pope that is about to enter into communication with you. I hope that an agreement concerning the modifications will be the result of it. It is a question of phrases, of words which may be turned in so many ways that in the end a good one will be sifted out.

"The cardinal carries to the First Consul a confidential letter from the Pope and the most ardent desire to terminate the affair. He is a man of a clear mind. His person has nothing imposing; he is not fitted for grandeur; his elocution, a little verbose, is not captivating; his character is mild, his soul will open itself to overflowing, provided he be encouraged mildly to confidence.

"I have written to Madrid, to the ambassador Lucien Bonaparte, to inform him of the meaning of cardinal Gonsalvi's brilliant journey to Paris and of my retirement to Florence. In like manner I have informed the ministers of the emperor and of the king of Spain at Rome, that there was no likelihood of war with the Pope,

"I am, yours respectfully,

"CACAULT."

**Consul.** The costume in which he was to be presented at Malmaison was agreed on, and he repaired thither, with great emotion at the idea of meeting general Bonaparte, who, being aware of it, did not care to add to the uneasiness of the cardinal. He displayed all the art of language with which nature had gifted him, to impress himself on the mind of his hearer, to show him thoroughly his intentions, so frankly benevolent towards the Church, to make him sensible of the serious difficulties attached to the re-establishment of public worship in France; and, above all, to make him understand that the interest he had in deferring to French opinion was much greater than what he could have in gratifying the resentments of priests, of emigrants, of deposed princes, despised and abandoned by Europe. He declared to cardinal Gonsalvi, that he was ready to revise certain details which were obscure to the court of Rome, provided that, at bottom, she would grant what he regarded as indispensable; namely, the creation of an ecclesiastical establishment entirely new, which might be his work, and might reunite the wise and respectable priests of all parties.

The cardinal came away encouraged from this interview with the First Consul. He seldom showed himself in Paris, observed a becoming distance, equally remote from an exaggerated severity, and from that Italian facility, so much the reproach of the Roman priests. He accepted some invitations from the ministers and the consuls, but perseveringly refused to show himself in the public places. He set to work with the abbé Bernier to resolve the last difficulties of the negotiation. Two points formed above all an obstacle to the agreement between the two governments: the one relative to the title of *Religion of the State*, which title was sought to be obtained for the Catholic religion; the other, the deposition of the former bishops. Cardinal Gonsalvi wished that, in order to justify, in the face of Christendom, the great concessions made to the First Consul, a solemn declaration should be put forward by the French Republic in favour of the Catholic Church; he wished that it should proclaim the Catholic religion *the dominant religion*, that it should promise abrogation of the laws that were opposed to it, and that the First Consul should engage to profess it publicly in person. His example would be looked on as calculated to be of omnipotent effect on the minds of the multitude.

The abbé Bernier repeated that, to proclaim a *Religion of State*, or a *dominant religion*, was to alarm the other religious persuasions, to create a fear of the return of a plundering, oppressive, intolerant religion, &c.; that it was impossible to go beyond the declaration of a fact, namely, that the majority of the French were Catholic. He added, that to a brogate anterior laws it was necessary to have the concurrence of the legislative power, which would throw the French cabinet into



inextricable embarrassments; that the government, taken as a governing body, could not profess a religion; that the consuls might profess it personally; but that this fact, quite an individual and in some sort a private one, was not of a nature to figure in a treaty. As to the personal conduct of the First Consul, the abbé Bernier said, in quite a low tone, that he would assist at a *Te Deum* or at a mass; but that, as to the other practices of religion, it was not necessary to expect them of him, and that there were things that the discernment of the cardinal ought to renounce the exaction of, for they would produce an effect more vexatious than salutary. A preamble was agreed on at length, which, in connexion with the first article, nearly satisfied the two legations.

*The government, it ran, recognising that the Catholic religion is the religion of the great majority of the French. . . .*

The Pope, on his part, recognising that this religion had derived, and still expected at this moment the greatest benefit from the re-establishment of the Catholic worship in France, and from the individual profession which the Consuls of the Republic made of it, &c.

From this double motive, the two authorities, for the good of religion, and for the maintenance of internal tranquillity, laid it down, (article first) *that the Catholic religion should be exercised in France, and that its forms of worship should be public, in conformity with the police regulations, which are judged to be necessary for the maintenance of tranquillity: (article second) that there should be a new arrangement of dioceses, &c.*

This preamble sufficiently satisfied the objects of all parties; for it proclaimed loudly the re-establishment of divine service, rendered the profession of it in France public as in former days, made the profession of this religion by the consuls an individual act, personally exercised by the three consuls, put this allegation as proceeding from the Pope's lips and not from those of the chief of the republic. These first difficulties then appeared to be happily overcome. Next came the contested points regarding the deposing of the former bishops. Fundamentally they were agreed to, but cardinal Gonsalvi demanded that the Pope should be spared the pain of pronouncing the deposition in a public act, of the ancient French bishops. He promised, that those who should refuse to tender the resignation of their sees should no longer be considered as titular, and that the Pope would consent to appoint successors to them; but he did not wish that that should be formally contained in the Concordat. The First Consul showed himself inflexible on this point, and, without specifying the precise words, required that it should be stated in positive terms, that the Pope would address himself to the former bishops, that he would demand of them the resignation of their sees, which he expected with confidence from their love of religion, and that if

they refused, "the bishoprics of new formation should be provided with new diocesans for their government." These were the exact expressions of the treaty.

The other conditions were not contested. The First Consul was to have the nomination of the bishops, and the Pope the institution of them. However, cardinal Gonsalvi craved, and the First Consul granted, one reservation, by which it was said that, in case of a Protestant First Consul, a new convention should be had, to regulate the mode of nomination. It was stipulated that the bishops should nominate the curés, and should select them from amongst subjects approved of by the government. The question of the oath was settled by the mere and simple adoption of the oath formerly pledged to the kings of France. The Holy See had reasonably claimed powers, granted to it without difficulty, of establishing seminaries for recruiting the clergy, but without obliging the State to endow them. The engagement not to disturb the holders of national property was formal. Their ownership of acquired property was expressly recognised. It was said that the government would take measures that the clergy should receive suitable salaries, that the old religious edifices, and all the parsonages not yet alienated, should be restored to them. It was agreed, that permission to make donations should be granted to the faithful, but that the Church should regulate the form of them. Secretly, the form of payment out of the funds was mutually agreed on, seeing that the First Consul would not on any account re-establish property in mortmain. This settlement was to be found in ulterior regulations of the police superintending the forms of worship, which the government alone had the power to make.

With regard to the married priests, the cardinal had given his word, that a brief of indulgence should be immediately published; but he demanded that an act of religious charity, emanating from the clemency of the holy father, should preserve its free and spontaneous character, and not pass as a condition imposed on the Holy See. This consideration was granted.

All matters were finally agreed on, and on reasonable foundations, which guaranteed, at the same time, the independence of the French Church and its perfect union with the Holy See. Never had there been made with Rome a convention more liberal and at the same time more orthodox; and, it must be acknowledged, that one serious resolution had been forced on the Pope, but it was perfectly justified by circumstances, that of deposing the former bishops who should refuse to resign. It was necessary then to remain satisfied and to conclude.

Meanwhile, agitation was at work around the First Consul to hinder his definitive consent. The men who usually had access to him, and who enjoyed the privilege of giving him their advice, combated his determination. The party of the constitutional clergy bestirred themselves a great deal for fear of being sacri-

ficed to the unsworn clergy. It had obtained the power of assembling its members and forming a sort of national council at Paris. The First Consul had granted these powers for the purpose of stimulating the zeal of the Holy See, and of making it feel the danger of delays. In this assembly many senseless matters were broached, on the customs of the primitive Church, to which the authors of the civil constitution had wished to bring back the French Church. It was professed by them that episcopal functions ought to be conferred by election, that, if that was not completely possible, the First Consul should choose subjects from a list presented by the faithful of each diocese; that the nomination of the bishops should be confirmed by the metropolitans, that is by the archbishops, and that of the latter by the Pope alone; but that the papal ratification could not be allowed to the Holy See arbitrarily; and that, after a certain delay, she should be compelled: which latter was equivalent to the complete annihilation of the rights of the court of Rome. All that was uttered in this sort of council was not, however, as destitute of practical reasoning. Some sound ideas on the limitation of bishoprics, on the emission of bulls, on the necessity of not allowing any publication emanating from pontifical authority, without the express permission of the civil authority. They intended to reunite these divers observations under the form of votes, which were to be presented to the First Consul to explain their resolutions. What was very glibly and very frequently repeated in this assembly was, that, during the reign of terror, the constitutional clergy had rendered great services to proscribed religion, that they had not fled nor abandoned the churches, and that it was not just to sacrifice them to those who, during the persecution, had assumed the pretext of orthodoxy to escape the dangers of the priesthood. All this was very accurate, particularly as regarded the ordinary priests, the greater part of whom had, in reality, the virtues attributed to them. But the constitutional bishops, some of whom, however, deserved respect, were disputants, real sectarians, whom ambition in some, and the pride of theological squabbles in others, had carried away, and who were inferior in worth to their subordinates, simple and unpretending men. He, who at their head, showed himself the most restless, the abbé Grégoire, was the head of a sect: his morals were pure, but his mind narrow, his vanity excessive, and his political conduct stained by a melancholy reminiscence. Without being exposed to the impulses or the terrors which tore from the Convention a vote of death against the unfortunate Louis XVI., the abbé Grégoire, at that time absent, and free to hold his tongue, had addressed to that assembly a letter breathing sentiments but little conformable to humanity and to religion. He was one of those whom a return to sane ideas suited least, and who were trying, though in vain, to struggle against the tendency incited in all things by the con-

sular government. He had taken care to make attachments for himself in the Bonaparte family, and by that means conveyed to the head of that family a multitude of objections against the resolution in preparation. The First Consul allowed the constitutionalists to talk and do, but was ready to stop them if their agitation proceeded to scandal; and he was not sorry to render their presence irksome to the Holy See, and to apply to her slowness this sort of stimulant. Although he had little fondness for the members of this branch of the clergy, because they were in general squabbling theologians, he wished to defend their rights, and to force on the Pope, as bishops, those who were known for pure morality and a manageable disposition. More was not required by the greater number, for they were far from being repugnant to the reunion with the Holy See. They even desired it, as the surest and most honourable means for them to abandon a life of agitation and a state of vexatious disesteem with their flocks. The greater part resisted an arrangement with Rome only through the fear of being sacrificed, *en masse*, to the former bishops.

There was a more formidable in-door opposition to the First Consul; it was that produced in the ministry itself. M. de Talleyrand, wounded by the *animus* of the court of Rome, which had shown itself less easy, less indulgent, than he had thought it at the outset, was become cold and ill-disposed to it. He was evidently baffling the negotiation, after having begun it with so much good-will, when he looked on it only as one peace more to be concluded. He had set out for the waters, as we have already stated, leaving with the First Consul a project completely drawn up—a project arbitrary in form, hurtful without usefulness, and which the court of Rome would not admit on any consideration. M. de Hauterive had taken charge of continuing his part. The latter, half plighted to holy orders, having freed himself from that bond at the time of the Revolution, was but little favourable to the desires of the Holy See. He opposed a thousand technical difficulties to the project agreed upon by the abbé Bernier and cardinal Gonsalvi. In his opinion, the deposition of the former bishops should be expressed in it in a more positive and manifest manner; they ought to have mentioned in it that pious legacies could be made only through the funds; to have specified, in short, in a formal article, the Catholic reinstatement of the married priests, &c. M. de Hauterive thus brought again into existence the technical difficulties before which the negotiation had well nigh succumbed. On the very day of signing, he sent, a most pressing memorial, on these various points, to the First Consul.

All these debates being ended, an assembly of the consuls and the ministers was held, in which the question was definitively discussed and settled. The objections, already known, were repeated there; great stress was laid on the inconvenience

of ruffling the French mind, of adding to the budget new charges, of putting in peril, it was said, even the national property, by awakening among the clergy, restored to their functions, more hopes than one was willing to satisfy. A project of simple toleration was spoken of, which should consist merely in giving up, to the sworn as well as to the unsworn priests, the religious edifices, and for the government to remain a quiet spectator of their quarrels, saving intervention if order happened to be materially disturbed by them.

The consul Cambacérès, a strong partisan of the concordat, expressed himself on this subject with warmth, and replied triumphantly to all the objections. He maintained that the danger of ruffling the French mind was not real, except as regarded some *beaux esprits* of the oppositionists, but the mass of the people would willingly welcome, with open arms, the re-establishment of worship, and felt already a real moral want of it; that the consideration of the expense was a contemptible consideration in such a matter; that the national property was, on the contrary, more solemnly guaranteed than ever, by the sanction obtained from the Holy See of the national sales. M. de Cambacérès was, in this place, interrupted by the First Consul, who, ever inflexible when there was question of the national property, declared that he was making the concordat precisely on account of the holders of national property, particularly in their behalf; that he would crush, with all his might, those priests who were foolish enough or ill disposed enough to abuse the great act about to be performed. The consul Cambacérès, resuming his discourse, showed how ridiculous, how hard of execution was this project of indifference to religious parties, who would dispute among each other for the confidence of the faithful, for the religious edifices, for the voluntary donations of public piety, who would bestow on government all the weariness of active intervention, without any of its advantages, and would end, perhaps, in the reunion of all sects in one single hostile Church, independent of the state, and depending on foreign authority.

The consul Lebrun spoke in the same strain; and, lastly, the First Consul gave his opinion in a few words, in a clear, precise, and peremptory manner. He was aware of the difficulties, even of the perils of this undertaking; the extent of his views went beyond some difficulties of the moment, and he was resolved. He showed himself so in his words. Henceforward there was no more resistance, except disapproval or grumbling at his resolution, when out of his presence. Then came submission, and the command was given to sign the Concordat, such as the abbé Bernier and cardinal Gonsalvi had definitively drawn it up.

According to his custom of reserving for his elder brother the conclusion of all important acts, the First Consul appointed,



as plenipotentiaries, Joseph Bonaparte, the councillor of state, Cretet, and lastly the abbé Bernier, to whom this honour was deservedly due for the pains he had taken, and the ability he had displayed, in this long and memorable negotiation. The Pope had for plenipotentiaries, cardinal Gonsalvi, Monsignor Spina, and father Caselli, a learned Italian, who had followed the Roman legation, in order to assist it by his theological knowledge. They met together, for form sake, at Joseph Bonaparte's house ; they read over the acts again ; they made some slight changes of detail, always reserved for the last moment ; and, on the 15th of July, 1801 (26th Messidor), this great act was signed, the most important that the court of Rome had ever concluded with France, and, perhaps, with any Christian power, for it terminated one of the most frightful storms that the Catholic religion had ever gone through. As to France, it put a stop to a deplorable schism, and put a stop to it, by placing the Church and the State in suitable relations of union and independence.

There remained much to be done after the signature of this treaty, which has since borne the title of the Concordat. It was necessary to demand the ratification of it at Rome, then to obtain the bulls which were to accompany the publication of it, as well as briefs addressed to all the former bishops, to call for their resignation ; it was next necessary to trace out the new demarcations of the dioceses, to chose the sixty new prelates, and, in all things, to proceed in accordance with Rome. It was an uninterrupted negotiation, until the day on which they could, at last, chant a *Te Deum* at Notre Dame, to celebrate the re-establishment of religion. The First Consul, always eager to arrive at the result, would have wished that all this might be finished promptly, in order to celebrate at the same time the peace with the European powers and the peace with the Church. The accomplishment of such a desire was difficult. Haste was made, nevertheless, in expediting these details, in order not to retard in the slightest degree the grand act of religious restoration.

The First Consul did not make public as yet the treaty signed with the Pope, for it was first necessary to have received the ratifications. But he imparted it to the Council of State, in the sitting of the 6th of August (18th Thermidor). He did not communicate the act in its tenour, he contented himself with giving an analysis of the substance of it, and accompanied this analysis with the enumeration of the motives which had decided this act of the government. Those who heard him that day were struck with the precision, the vigour, the loftiness of his language. It was the eloquence of the chief magistrate of a State. However, if they were impressed by that simple and nervous eloquence which Cicero called, coming from Cæsar's lips, "*vim Cæsaris*," they were little reconciled



to the proceeding of the First Consul.\* They remained sullen and dumb, as if they had seen one of the most to be regretted works of the Revolution perish along with the schism. The act not being yet submitted to the deliberations of the Council of State, there was no discussing it, nor voting on it. Nothing disturbed the silent coldness of this scene. They were silent; they separated without saying a word, without expressing a suffrage. But the First Consul had exhibited his will, henceforth irrevocable, and that went far with a vast number of persons. It was, at the least, the safe silence of those who did not wish to displease him, and of those too, who, respecting his genius, valuing the immensity of benefits that he had conferred upon France, were decided to pass over even his faults.

The First Consul, thinking that he had now sufficiently stimulated the court of Rome, judged that it was necessary to put an end to the pretended council of the constitutional clergy. In consequence, he commanded them to separate, and they obeyed. Not one of them would have dared to offend the authority which was going to distribute sixty bishoprics raised up, this time, by pontifical institution. In separating, they presented to the First Consul an act suitable in form, and which contained their views relatively to the new religious establishments. It contained the propositions which we have already made known.

The cardinal Gonsalvi had left Paris to return to Rome, and to bring back M. de Cacault to the presence of the Holy See. The Pope was sighing for this double return, for Lower Italy was dangerously agitated. The Italian patriots of Naples and the Roman State were waiting with impatience the opportunity of a new commotion; and the old Ruffo party, the cut-throats of the queen of Naples, sought nothing better than a pretext

---

\* Letter from Monsignor Spina to cardinal Gonsalvi, Secretary of State:—  
“Paris, 8th August.

“On Thursday last, the First Consul, being present at the Council of State, and having been informed that the Convention concluded by him with his Holiness was the general conversation at Paris, and that every one, though ignorant of its precise tenour, spoke of it, and commented upon it, each after his own fancy, therefore took the opportunity of communicating to the Council itself the whole details. I know for certain that he spoke for an hour and a half, demonstrating the necessity and advantage of it, and I have been told that he spoke most admirably. As he did not ask for the opinion of his Council, all the members remained silent. I have not yet been able to learn what impression was produced on the minds of the councillors in general. The good were delighted at it, but their number is very limited. I will endeavour to discover what impression was made on those who are adverse to it. It appears that the First Consul is desirous of preparing the minds of those who are hostile to this measure, with the view of disarming their opposition; but he will not succeed, unless he adopts some more energetic proceedings against the Constitutionals, or whilst he leaves the Catholic worship exposed to the lash of the minister of police.”

to fall on the French. These men, so different in intention, were ready to combine their efforts for the purpose of throwing every thing into confusion. The news of the agreement established between the two governments, French and Roman, the certainty of the intervention of general Murat, placed in the neighbourhood at the head of an army, restrained the plottings, and hindered these sinister intentions. The Pope was overjoyed on seeing cardinal Gonsalvi and the minister of France return to Rome. He immediately called together the congregation of the cardinals, in order to submit to them the new work, and he caused the bulls, the briefs, in fine, all the acts, the necessary sequel of the Concordat, to be prepared. The worthy Pontiff was joyous, but agitated. He had the certainty of doing good, and of immolating nothing but the interests of faction to the general good of the Church. But the disapprobation of the old throne and altar party broke forth with violence at Rome, and, although the holy father had put at a distance from him all the ill-disposed, he heard their bitter words ; he was disturbed by them. Cardinal Maury, with his usual acuteness, judging the cause of the emigrants to be lost, and already, perhaps, looking forward with secret satisfaction to the moment when all, now sighing in exile, would be restored to their native land, kept himself aloof in his diocese of Montefiascone, occupying himself solely with the care of a library, which was the charm of his exile. The Pope, in order not to give any umbrage to the First Consul, had, besides, made that cardinal understand that his unrestricted retreat at Montefiascone, was at the moment an expedient of the pontifical government.

The Pope, then, was satisfied, but full of emotion,\* and he

---

\* Letter of M. de Cacault, Minister Plenipotentiary of the French Republic at Rome, to the Minister of Foreign Relations :—

“ Rome, 8th August, 1801 (20th Thermidor, year X.).

“ Citizen Minister,—To inform you of the state of the affair of the Pope's ratification, expected at Paris, I can do no better than transmit you the original letter which I have this moment received from cardinal Gonsalvi.

“ This cardinal, having been unable to leave his bed, his Holiness has come to work to-day at the house of his Secretary of State.

“ The Sacred College is to concur in the ratification ; all the doctors of the first rank are employed, and in motion. The holy father is in the agitation, the inquietude, and the desire of a young wife, who dares not be merry on the festal marriage day. Never has the pontifical court been seen more self-collected, more seriously, and more secretly occupied with the novelty about to burst forth, while France, for whose interest it is, for whom they work, neither intrigues, promises, gives, nor even shines here, according to ancient usage. The First Consul will soon enjoy the accomplishment of his views with regard to an accordance with the Holy See, and that will take place in a novel, simple, and truly respectable manner.

“ This will be the work of a hero and of a saint, for the Pope is a man of real piety.

“ He has said several times to me : ‘ Rely on it, that if France, in place of

eagerly pressed the completion of the undertaking so happily begun. The congregation of the cardinals was wholly favourable to the concordat, since its new revision, and they pronounced themselves in an affirmative manner. The Pope, thinking that it was necessary henceforth to cast himself into the arms of the First Consul, and to accomplish with *éclat* a work which had so noble an object as the re-establishment of the Catholic religion in France, wished that the ceremony of the ratification should be surrounded with much solemnity. In consequence, he gave his ratification in grand consistory, and, to add to the brilliancy of that pontifical solemnity, he nominated three cardinals. He received M. de Cacault in pomp, and displayed, notwithstanding the straitness of his means, all the luxury that became the occasion. Having to make choice of a legate to send to France, he fixed on the most eminent diplomatist of the Roman court; this was cardinal Caprara, a distinguished personage by his birth (he was of the illustrious family of the Montecuculli), distinguished by his understanding, his experience, his moderation. Formerly ambassador at the court of Joseph II., he had seen the tribulations of the Church in the last century; he had, by his skill and ready wit, relieved the Holy See of many an inconvenience. The First Consul had himself expressed the desire of having near his person this prince of the Church. The Pope hastened to satisfy this desire, and made great efforts to overcome the resistance of the cardinal, aged, infirm, and little disposed to recommence the career of his early youth. However, this repugnance was overcome by the earnest intreaties of the holy father and by the pressing interest of the Church. The Pope wished to confer on cardinal Caprara the highest diplomatic dignity of the Roman court, that of legate *a latere*. This legate has the most extended powers; the cross is carried before him everywhere; he has power to do every thing that is possible away from the Pope. Pius VII. renewed on this occasion the ceremonies of old, in which the venerated sign of their mission was confided to the representatives of St. Peter. A grand consistory was convoked anew, and, in the presence of all the cardinals, of all the foreign ministers, cardinal Caprara received the silver cross, which it was his duty to have carried before him in that republican France, so long a stranger to Catholic pomp.

The First Consul, sensible of the cordial conduct of the being a dominant power, were prostrate and weak with regard to her enemies, I should not do less for her than I am granting to-day.'

"I do not think it can have often happened that so great a result, on which the tranquillity of France and the welfare of Europe, will henceforward materially depend, could have been obtained without violence, as well as without corruption.

"I have the honour to be yours, respectfully,

"CACAULT."

Pope, testified the kindest consideration for him. He enjoined Murat to spare the Roman States the passage of troops; he made the Cisalpines evacuate the little duchy of Urbino, which they had seized upon pretext of a dispute concerning boundary. He announced the approaching evacuation of Ancona, and, in the interim, sent money to pay the garrison of it, in order to relieve the pontifical treasury of this expense. The Neapolitans, persisting in holding possession of two confine territories belonging to the Holy See, to wit, Benevento and Ponte Corvo, received anew an injunction to evacuate them. The First Consul had also caused one of the fine hotels of Paris to be got ready, and furnished luxuriously, as a lodging for cardinal Caprara, at the expense of the French treasury.

The ratifications had been exchanged; the bulls approved of; the briefs were in course of being expedited throughout all Christendom, to call for the resignations of the ancient diocesans. Cardinal Caprara, notwithstanding his age, had hastened his journey to Paris. Everywhere orders had been given to the authorities to welcome him in a manner conformable to his exalted dignity. They had done so with earnest regard; and the populace of the provinces, seconding their zeal, had given to the representative of the Holy See marks of respect, which proved the dominion of the old religion over the rural population. But there was a dread of putting the jibing people of Paris to the same proof, and every thing was arranged that the cardinal should enter the capital by night. He was received there with eager attentions, and lodged in the hotel prepared for him. He was given to understand, in the most delicate manner, that a part of the expenses of his mission was at the cost of the French government, and that this was a diplomatic usage, intended to be established in reference to the Holy See. The First Consul had sent to the legate's residence two carriages drawn by his finest horses.

Cardinal Caprara was received as a foreign ambassador, but not, as yet, as a representative of the Church. That reception was adjourned to the time of the definitive re-establishment of religion. To institute the new bishops, to chant the *Te Deum*, and to tender to the cardinal-legate the oath due by him to the First Consul, were reserved for one and the same day.

The indispensable formalities by which it was necessary that the publication of the Concordat should be preceded, had taken much more time than was thought of at the commencement, and had led to the period in which the preliminaries of peace had just been signed in London. The First Consul would have been glad to be able to make the *fête* dedicated, on the 18th of Brumaire, to the general peace, coincide with the grand religious solemnity of the restoration of religion. But it was necessary that the resignations of the ancient diocesans should have arrived at Rome, before the approval there

of the new demarcations, and the choice of the new bishops. These resignations demanded by the Pope from the ancient clergy of France, were at that moment the object of general attention. There was a desire to know, from all quarters, how this great act of the Pope and the First Consul would be received. They, hand in hand, appealing to the ancient ministers of religion, whether friends or enemies to the Revolution, scattered through Germany, Russia, England, or Spain, demanded of them the sacrifice of their position, of their party affections, of the very pride of their doctrines to make Church unity triumph, and to re-establish the internal tranquillity of France. How many of them could there be found so sufficiently sensible to this double motive, as to immolate so many personal feelings and interests at once? The result proved the wisdom of the great act which the Pope and the First Consul did at that moment; it proved the dominion that can be exercised over souls by the love of good, nobly invoked by a saintlike pontiff and a hero.

The briefs addressed to the orthodox bishops and to the constitutional bishops were not similar. The brief addressed to the bishops who had refused to recognise the civil constitution of the clergy, treated them as legitimate titulars of their sees, demanded of them to resign in the name of the interest of the Church, in virtue of an offer formerly made to Pius VI., and, in case of refusal, declared them deposed. The language of them was affectionate, sad, but replete with authority.

The brief addressed to the constitutionalists was paternal likewise, was redolent of the mildest indulgence, but did not speak of resignation, seeing that the Church had never recognised the constitutionalists as legitimate bishops. It demanded of them an abjuration of former errors, a return to the bosom of the Church, and to terminate a schism which was at once a scandal and a calamity. It was a manner of inducing their resignation without calling for it, for, to call for it, would have been a recognition of their title which the Holy See could not grant.

We must render equal justice to all men who facilitated this great act of reunion. The constitutional bishops, some of whom would have wished to resist, but the majority of whom, well advised, were sincerely desirous of seconding the First Consul, resigned in a body. The brief, although full of cordiality, annoyed them, because it spoke only of their errors and not of their resignations. They imagined a form of adhesion to the wishes of the Pope, which, without implying any retraction of the past, implied, nevertheless, their submission and their resignation. They declared that they adhered to the new Concordat, and consequently stripped themselves of their episcopal dignity. They were about fifty in number. All submitted, with one exception, viz., bishop Saurine, a man of a very vivid

imagination, of a religious zeal more ardent than enlightened, a priest besides of pure morals, whom the First Consul at a later period called to the episcopacy, after having made him acceptable to the Pope.

This part of the work was not the most difficult. It was, besides, the most easy to be realized immediately, because the constitutionalists were almost all in Paris, under the grasp of the First Consul, and under the influence of the friends who had constituted themselves their defenders and their guides.

The unsworn bishops were scattered through all Europe. There was, however, a certain number of them in France. The immense majority offered a noble example of evangelical piety and submission. Seven resided in Paris, eight in the provinces—in all fifteen. Not one hesitated in the reply to be made to the pontiff and to the new head of the State. They made that reply in language worthy of the best times of the Church. The old bishop of Belloy, a venerable prelate, who had replaced M. de Belsunce at Marseilles, and who was the model of the ancient clergy, hastened to give to his brother-bishops the signal of self-denial. “Full,” said he, “of veneration and obedience for the decrees of his Holiness, and wishing always to be united to him in heart and mind, I do not hesitate to deposit in the hands of the holy father, my resignation of the bishopric of Marseilles. It is enough that he thinks it necessary for the preservation of religion in France that I should submit to it.”

One of the most learned bishops of the French clergy, the historian of Bossuet and of Fénelon, the bishop of Alais, wrote, “Happy to be able to concur by my resignation, as much as is in my power, to the views of wisdom, of peace, and of conciliation, which his Holiness has adopted, I pray God to bless his pious intentions, and to avert from him the contradictions which might afflict his paternal heart.”

The bishop of Acqs wrote to the holy father, “I have not hesitated a moment to immolate myself, as soon as I had learned that this painful sacrifice was necessary to the peace of the country and to the triumph of religion . . . . May she issue glorious from her ruins! May she rise, I will not say only, on the wreck of all my dearest interests, of all my temporal advantages, but on my very ashes, if I could serve as her expiatory victim! . . . . May my fellow-citizens return to concord, to faith, to holy morals! Never shall I form any other wishes during my life, and my death will be too happy if I see them accomplished.”

Let us confess it, beautiful is the institution which commands such sacrifices and such language. The greatest names of the ancient clergy of ancient France, the Rohans, the Latours du Pin, the Castellanes, the Polignacs, the Clermont-Tonnerres, the Latours d’Auvergne, were found in the list of the bishops who had resigned. There was a general enthusiasm which re-



called to mind the generous sacrifices of the ancient French nobility in the night of the 4th of August. It was the same eager desire to facilitate, by a great act of self-denial, the execution of that Concordat, which M. de Cacault had designated as the work of a hero and of a saint.

The bishops who had taken refuge in Germany, in Italy, in Spain, followed this example for the most part. There remained the eighteen bishops who had retired to England. These latter were waited for, to see if they could escape the hostile influences which surrounded them. The British government, actuated at the time by a friendly spirit towards France, wished to have nothing to do with their determination. But the princes of the house of Bourbon, the heads of the Chouan party, the instigators of civil war, the accomplices of the infernal machine, Georges and his associates, were in London, living on the means given to the emigrants. They surrounded the eighteen prelates, resolved to hinder them from completing, by their adherence, the union of all the French clergy about the Pope, and about general Bonaparte. Long deliberations were set on foot. Amongst the refractory were found the archbishop of Narbonne, to whom very temporal interests were attributed, for with his see, he would lose immense revenues; and the bishop of Saint-Pol-de-Léon, who had created for himself a post, said to be lucrative, that of the distributing the British subsidies among the transported priests. Those factions acted on the bishops, and seduced thirteen of them. But they met with a noble resistance from the five other prelates, at the head of whom were found two of the most illustrious, of the most imposing, of the old clergy, M. de Cicé, archbishop of Bordeaux, formerly keeper of the seals under Louis XVI., a personage in whom was recognised a superior political mind; M. de Boisgelin, a learned bishop, and of great seignieural possessions, who had in former times displayed the attitude of a worthy priest, faithful to his religion, but by no means inimical to the lights of the age he lived in. They, with their three colleagues, MM. d'Osmond, de Noé, and du Plessis d'Argentré, sent in their adherence. Almost all the ancient clergy had then submitted. The work of the Pope was accomplished with less bitterness to his feelings than, at first, he had apprehended. All those resignations inserted in succession in the *Moniteur*, side by side with the treaties signed with the courts of Europe, with Russia, England, Bavaria, Portugal, produced an immense effect, of which contemporaries have retained a deep recollection. If any thing made the overwhelming influence of the new government be felt, it was that respectful, earnest submission of two hostile churches, the one devoted to the Revolution, but corrupted by the demon of disputation; the other, haughty, proud of its orthodoxy, of the greatness of its names, infected by the spirit of emigration, animated with sincere royalism, and believing, besides, that time was sufficient

to render her victorious. This triumph was one of the finest, the most deserved, the most universally felt.

The 18th Brumaire, fixed for the grand *fête* of the general peace, was approaching. The First Consul was seized with one of those personal feelings, which often, in men, are mingled with the noblest resolutions. He wished to enjoy *the result* of his work, and to be able to celebrate the re-establishment of religious peace on the 18th Brumaire. But to do so, two things were necessary; first, that they should have sent from Rome the bull relative to the diocesan arrangements; and, secondly, that cardinal Caprara might have the faculty of installing the new bishops. Had these things been done, the sixty bishops might have been nominated and consecrated, and a solemn *Te Deum* sung in their presence in the church of Notre Dame. Unfortunately, at Rome, they had been waiting for the reply of the five French bishops, who had retired to the north of Germany, and, as to the faculty of giving canonical investiture, it had not been conferred on cardinal Caprara, because never had such a power been deputed, even to a legate *à latere*. It was already the 1st of November (10th Brumaire), there were only a few days left. The First Consul sent for cardinal Caprara, spoke to him in the bitterest manner, complained, with a vivacity which was neither becoming nor deserved, of the little assistance that he obtained from the pontifical government for the accomplishment of his projects, and produced a deep emotion in the worthy cardinal.\* But he very

---

\* Letter from cardinal Caprara to cardinal Gonsalvi.

“ Paris, 2nd of November, 1801.

“ Having just returned from Malmaison, about 11 o'clock at night, I sit down to detail to you the substance of the interview I have had with the First Consul. He did not say one word upon the subject of the five articles which I annexed to my letter of the 1st of November; but, with his characteristic vivacity, and, I must add also, with marked indications of displeasure, he launched out into the most bitter complaints against all Romans, saying that they wished to lead him a dance, and that they were trying to ensnare him, by their eternal procrastination in expediting the bull of circumscription, and that they added to the delay by not sending the Pope's letters to the bishops in proper time; and further still, by not sending them by couriers, as every other government would have done which felt an interest in a negotiation of this kind; that they were trying to ensnare him, for they sought, by making a bugabo of him, to deter the Pope from assenting to the nominations which he might make of the constitutional bishops: and, continuing to talk like a torrent, he repeated precisely every thing that councillor Portalis had told me yesterday evening in the presence of Monsignor Spina.

“ After an attack so vehement, in language so full of invective, I took upon myself to justify the accused Romans; when he, interrupting me, said, ‘ I will listen to no justification; I make but one exception, and that is the Pope, for whom I feel respect and affection.’ . . . It appearing to me that at this moment he was less excited than at the beginning of the conversation, I endeavoured to make him feel, that, entertaining an affection for his Holiness, he ought to give some proof of it, by sparing him the pain of nominating constitutional bishops. On this suggestion being made, he resumed his previous angry tone, and replied, ‘ The constitutional bishops shall be appointed by me,

speedily perceived his errors, and sought as quickly to repair them. He immediately felt that he was wrong, and, wishing to soften the effect produced by his vehemence, he kept the cardinal a whole day at Malmaison, charmed him by his grace and his kindness, and consoled him for the hastiness of the morning.

Letters were written to Rome, and a respectable priest, M. de Pancemont, curé of Saint Sulpice, afterwards bishop of Vannes, was despatched to Germany to fetch the impatiently-expected reply of the five bishops. However, the 18th Brumaire passed over before the arrival of the desired acts. The *éclat* of that day was, nevertheless, great enough to make the First Consul forget what might be additionally wanting to it. At length the answers of Rome arrived. The Pope, still inclined to do what he, whom he called his "*dear son*," desired, sent the bull for the settlement of the dioceses, and the power of instituting the new bishops, conferred on the legate in a manner unprecedented. As a compensation for so much deference, he desired one thing, which he confided to the skill of cardinal Caprara, namely, that he might be spared the vexation of instituting constitutionalists.

Thenceforward nothing any longer opposed the proclamation of the great religious act accomplished after so much labour, but the propitious moment had been allowed to pass. The session of the year X. was opened, according to custom, reckoning from the 1st Frimaire (22nd of November, 1801). The Tribune, the Legislative Body, the Senate, were assembled:

and their number shall be fifteen. I have conceded all in my power, and I will not deviate one iota from the determination at which I have arrived.' . . . .

As to the chiefs of the sectarians, councillor Portalis, who was present, assured me that I might be easy upon that point, as well as upon the subject of the subordinates; but on the subject of the submission being mooted, the First Consul exclaimed, 'It is arrogance to demand such a thing, and it would be cowardice to yield to it;' then, without waiting for an answer, he entered into a wide field of discursive argument on canonical institutions, and, completely throwing aside his military character, held forth for a very long time in a strain worthy of a canon. I will not say that he tried to convince, but only to keep me at arm's length. At last he wound up by observing, 'But the bishops do not make profession of faith, nor take the oath;' councillor Portalis having said, 'Yes they do;' 'Well,' concluded he, 'that act of obedience to the Pope is of more value than a thousand submissions.' Then turning to me, he laconically said, 'Endeavour to arrange that the bull of circumscription be soon here, and that the other, regarding which I spoke to you on a former occasion, may not, at Rome, meet with the same fate which the Pope's letters to the bishops have experienced, and which, as I am apprised, were not received by any of the several parties in Germany until the 21st of the last month.'

"This closed the interview. I ought, however, to add that, at its conclusion, about one o'clock in the day, he took an airing with madame, and was absent for about an hour, but previously insisted that I should stay to dinner, although I was already engaged to dine with his brother Joseph, to whom however, he sent word; certainly, without exaggeration, from dinner time until ten o'clock at night, he never ceased to talk to me, walking nearly all the while up and down the room, in his usual manner, and descanting upon every imaginable topic in politics and economy which concerned us."

active resistance and scandalous remarks were made against the Concordat. The First Consul did not at all like that such bursts should interfere to disturb an august ceremony, and he resolved to await the re-establishment of the forms of worship until he had brought round or crushed the Tribunate. Now the delays were to come from him, and it was the Holy See that was to show itself pressing. However, the sudden difficulties, which he was likely to meet with proved the merit and the courage of his resolution. It was not only to the Concordat, but to the Civil Code itself, and to some of the treaties which had just secured the peace of the world, that active opposition was threatened. Proud of his works, strong in the public approval, the First Consul was resolved to proceed to the greatest extremities. He spoke only of crushing the bodies that should resist him. Thus were the human passions about to mingle their impulses with the finest works of a great man and of a great epoch.



## BOOK XIII.

---

### THE TRIBUNATE.

Internal Administration—Suppression of Highway Robbery and Repair of the Roads—Revival of Commerce—Exports and Imports of the Year 1801—Material Results of the French Revolution, in Respect to Agriculture, Manufactures, and Population—Influence of the Prefects and Sub-prefects on the Administration—Order and Celerity in the Despatch of Business—Councillors of State on Circuit—Discussion of the Civil Code in the Council of State—Brilliant Winter of 1801-1802—Extraordinary Resort of Foreigners to Paris—Court of the First Consul—Organisation of his Civil and Military Establishment—The Consular Guard—Prefects of the Palace and Ladies of Honour—Sisters of the First Consul—Hortense de Beauharnais marries Louis Bonaparte—Messrs. Fox and De Calonne in Paris—Prosperity and Luxury of all Classes—Approach of the Session of the Year X.—Warm Opposition raised against some of the best Plans of the First Consul—Causes of this Opposition, shown not only by Members of the Deliberative Assemblies, but by some Distinguished Officers of the Army—Conduct of Generals Lannes, Augereau, and Moreau—Opening of the Session—Dupuis, Author of the Work on the Origin of all Religions, is elected President of the Legislative Body—Ballot for the Places vacant in the Senate—Nomination of the Abbé Gregoire, contrary to the Propositions of the First Consul—Violent Explosion in the Tribune, on Account of the Word *Subject* introduced into the Treaty with Russia—Opposition to the Civil Code—Discussion in the Council of State respecting the Course to be adopted under these Circumstances—It is resolved to await the Discussion of the first Sections of the Civil Code—The Tribune rejects those First Sections—Result of the Ballot for the Places vacant in the Senate—The First Consul proposes old Generals not selected from among his Creatures—The Tribune and the Legislative Body reject them, and agree to propose M. Daunou, known for his Opposition to the Government—Warm Speech made by the First Consul to a Meeting of Senators—Threats of an Arbitrary Measure—The Opponents, being intimidated, submit, and contrive a Subterfuge to annul the Effect of the First Ballots—Cambacérès dissuades the First Consul from any illegal Measure, and advises him to get rid of the Opposition Members by means of Article XXXVIII. of the Constitution, which prescribes that the first fifth of the Legislative Body and the Tribune shall go out in the Year X.—The First Consul adopts this Idea—Suspension of all the Legislative Labours—Advantage is taken of it to assemble at Lyons an Italian Diet, by the Title of Consulta—Before leaving Paris, the First Consul despatches a Fleet with Troops for St. Domingo—Plan for the reconquest of that Colony—Negotiations of Amiens—Object of the Consulta convoked at Lyons—Various Constitutions proposed for Italy—Plans of the First Consul relative to this Subject—Creation of the Italian Republic—General Bonaparte proclaimed President of that Republic—Enthusiasm of the Italians and French assembled at Lyons—Grand Review of the Army of Egypt—Return of the First Consul to Paris.





## BOOK XIII.

## THE TRIBUNATE.

WE have seen by means of what persevering and skilful efforts the First Consul, after conquering Europe by his victories, had reconciled it with France by his policy; we have seen by means of what efforts he had reconciled the Romish Church with the French Republic, and put an end to the evils of schism. His efforts for making the high roads safe and practicable for travellers; for giving activity to commerce and industry; for introducing order into the finances and regularity into the administration; for digesting a code of civil laws adapted to our manners; in short, for organizing French society in all its parts, had been neither less constant nor less successful.

That race of robbers, composed of deserters from the army, and soldiers disbanded after the civil war, who attacked wealthy landed proprietors in the country, and travellers on the high roads, plundered the public coffers, and struck terror throughout the land, had just been suppressed with the utmost rigour. These banditti had taken advantage of the moment, when the march of almost all the troops out of the country at once had deprived the interior of the forces requisite for its security, to spread themselves over it. But since the peace of Lunéville and the return of part of our troops to France, the situation was no longer the same. Numerous moveable columns, accompanied at first by military commissions, and subsequently by those special tribunals the institution of which we have recorded, had scoured the roads in every direction, and chastised with merciless energy those who infested them. Several hundreds of them had been shot in the space of six months, and not a voice had been raised in behalf of the villains, impure relics of the civil war. The others, completely disheartened, had given up their arms and made their submission. Safety was re-established on the high roads; and though, in the months of January and February, 1801, it was scarcely possible to travel from Paris to Rouen or from Paris to Orleans, without running the risk of being murdered, one might, at the end of that year, traverse all France, without being liable to meet with any

accident. There might at furthest be some remnants of those bands in the heart of Bretagne or in the interior of the Cévennes. It was not long before they were completely dispersed.

We have already seen that the ruinous state of the roads in France, owing to ten years' troubles, had almost put an end to communication by means of them; we have seen how a turnpike toll had been substituted in place of the ancient *corvée*; how, under the system of that toll, at once incommodious and insufficient, the roads had fallen into a state of complete decay; finally, how the First Consul had, in last Nivôse, devoted an extraordinary subsidy to the repair of twenty of the principal high roads running through the territory of the Republic. He had himself superintended the application of that subsidy, and, by incessant attention, excited the zeal of the engineers to the highest degree. Every one of his aides-de-camp, or of the high functionaries who travelled in France, was questioned by him to ascertain if his orders were executed. The funds had this year been voted rather late: the end of the year had been extremely wet, and there was, moreover, a want of hands. This was owing to the bringing suddenly into cultivation immense tracts of land, and above all, to the civil war. These various causes had retarded the operations; but the improvement was nevertheless remarkable. The First Consul had just devoted a fresh subsidy out of the estimates for the year X. (1801 and 1802) to the repair of forty-two other roads. This subsidy, borrowed from the general funds of the treasury, was to be added to the produce of the tolls. Including the sum of 2,000,000 not expended in the year IX., 10,000,000 extraordinary assigned upon the year X., and 16,000,000 produced by the tolls, the sum total devoted to the maintenance of the roads, for the current year, would be 28,000,000. This was twice or thrice as much as had been allotted to them in former periods. Thus the repairs proceeded with great rapidity, and there was every prospect that, in the course of 1802, the roads in France would be brought into a perfectly fit state for travelling.

Orders were given for the formation of new communications between the different parts of France, old and new. Four high roads between Italy and France were in progress. That of the Simplon, which has been several times mentioned, was advancing rapidly. That which was to unite Piedmont and Savoy by Mont Cenis, was already begun. A third, by Mont Genève, to unite Piedmont and the south of France, was ordered. The engineers repaired to the spot to make the plans for each. The repair of the high road of the Col de Tende, crossing the Maritime Alps, was undertaken. Thus the barrier of the Alps, between France and Italy, was about to be thrown down by means of these four roads, passable for all sorts of vehicles,

civil or military. The miracle of the passage of the St. Bernard would henceforward be needless, whenever it should be requisite to hasten to the assistance of Italy.

The canal of St. Quentin was proceeding. The First Consul had gone himself to inspect the canal of the Ourcq, and had ordered the works to be resumed. The canal from Aigues-Mortes to Beaucaire, assigned to a company, was in the course of construction. The government had encouraged the company by making vast grants of land to it. The new bridges over the Seine, contracted for with an association of capitalists, were nearly finished. These numerous and useful enterprises strongly attracted the public attention. The minds of men, always warm in France, turned with a sort of enthusiasm from the glories of war to the glories of peace.

During the year IX. (1800-1801) commerce had already made a great advance, though the naval war had continued during the whole of that year. The imports, which, in the year VIII., had been 325,000,000 only, had amounted, in the year IX., to 417,000,000. It was an increase of nearly one-fourth in the space of a single year. This increase was owing to two causes—the rapidly increased consumption of colonial produce, and the importation, in considerable quantity, of raw materials employed in manufactures, such as cotton, wool, oil—which was an evident sign of the revival of our manufactures. The exports had felt much less of this general tendency to increase, because our foreign commerce was not yet re-established in the year IX. (1800-1801), and because the fabrication of productions must necessarily precede their exportation. The total of the exports, which, in the year VIII., amounted to no more than 271,000,000, had nevertheless risen, in the year IX., to 305,000,000. This increase of 34,000,000 was owing particularly to extraordinary shipments of our wines and brandies, which had produced considerable commercial activity at Bordeaux. The reader will also remark what a difference those ten years of naval warfare had produced between our exports and our imports, since we imported to the amount of 417,000,000, and had exported to the amount of 305,000,000 only. But the restoration of our manufactures very soon made up the difference.

The silks of the South began again to flourish. Lyons, the favourite city of the First Consul, applied itself anew to the manufacture of its beautiful productions. Out of 15,000 looms, formerly engaged in weaving silks, not more than 2000 were at work during the time of our troubles. Seven thousand were already set a-going. Lille, St. Quentin, Rouen, shared in this activity; and the seaports, which were about to be relieved from blockade, were equipping numerous vessels. The First Consul, on his part, was making preparations for the re-establishment of our colonies, the object and extent of which will presently be seen.

It was desirable to ascertain the state in which the Revolution left France in regard to agriculture and population. Statistical inquiries, which were impossible while collective administrations managed the provincial affairs, had become practicable since the institution of prefectures and sub-prefectures. Orders were issued for a census, which had furnished singular results, confirmed, however, by the councils-general of departments, which met for the first time in the year IX. The returns of the population were then completed for sixty-seven departments, out of the 102 of which France was composed in 1801. The population of these sixty-seven departments, amounting, in 1789, to 21,176,243, had increased, in 1800, to 22,297,443. This was an augmentation of 1,100,000 souls, that is, about one-nineteenth. This result, scarcely credible, if it had not been confirmed by the declarations of a great number of councils-general, proved that, after all, the mischief done by great social revolutions is more apparent than real, as far as material things are concerned, at least, and that, at any rate, the evil is effaced with prodigious rapidity. Agriculture was on the advance almost everywhere. The abolition of the rangerships had been extremely beneficial in most of the provinces. If, in destroying the game, it had destroyed one of the least objectionable pleasures of the wealthy classes, it had, on the other hand, delivered agriculture from ruinous annoyances. The sale of a great number of extensive estates had caused considerable tracts to be brought into cultivation, and given a value to a part of the soil which before lay unproductive. Many church lands, which had passed out of the hands of a negligent tenant into those of an intelligent and active proprietor, increased every day the mass of agricultural produce. The revolution which has taken place among us in landed property, and which, by dividing it among a thousand hands, has prodigiously increased the number of proprietors, as well as the extent of the cultivated lands—this revolution was then accomplished, and was already producing immense results. The processes of agriculture, it is true, were not yet materially improved, but the tillage of the soil was extended in a wonderful manner.

The forests, both of the State and the communes, suffered from the administrative disorder of recent times. This was one of the objects to which it was urgently necessary to attend; for lands planted with wood were cleared, and neither the properties of the State nor those of private individuals were spared. The administration of the finances, possessing a great quantity of forests, in consequence of the confiscation of the estates of emigrants, knew not yet how to superintend and to manage them to advantage. Many proprietors, either absent or intimidated, abandoned the defence of the woods of which they were the possessors, some really, others fictitiously, on behalf of pro-

scribed families. This was the consequence of a state of things to which, fortunately, an end was about to be put. The First Consul had bestowed particular attention on the preservation of the sylvan wealth of France, and had already begun to re-establish order and respect for property. A rural code was everywhere wanted, to prevent the damage that was done by cattle.

The new institution of prefects and sub-prefects, created by the law of Pluviôse, year VIII., had produced immediate results. The disorder and the carelessness of collective administrations were succeeded by regularity, promptness of execution, anticipated and necessary consequences of the unity of power. The affairs of the State and of the communes had alike benefited by it, for they had at last found agents who attended to them with incessant assiduity. The preparation of the assessments and the collection of the tax, formerly so deplorably neglected, were not behindhand anywhere. Order began likewise to be introduced into the revenues and the expenses of the communes. Several departments of their administration, however, still required to be remedied. The hospitals, for instance, were in a wretched condition. The loss of a portion of their revenues, by the sale of their property, and by the abolition of certain rates, reduced them to extreme distress. In some towns, the *octroi* had been introduced, and the re-establishment of the indirect contributions had been tried on a small scale. But these *octrois*, badly placed as yet, were neither sufficient nor employed generally enough. The foundling department also suffered from the general perturbation. There were to be seen great numbers of deserted children, for whom public charity did not provide, or who were committed to the care of unfortunate nurses, whose wages were not paid. The re-establishment of the former Sisters of Charity, for the service of the hospitals, was almost everywhere called for.

The civil registers, taken from the clergy and given to the municipal officers, were most negligently kept. To introduce order into this department of the administration, so important to the state of families, there were required not only zeal and vigilance on the part of the administrators, but also improvements in the law, which was still insufficient or faulty. This was one of the objects which the Civil Code, now under discussion in the Council of State, was destined to regulate.

Complaints were made of the too great division of communes and of their infinite number, and the union of several of them into one was demanded. That beautiful French system of administration, which is now completed, and surpasses in regularity, in precision, in vigour, all the administrations in Europe, was thus rapidly organised under the creative and all-powerful hand of the First Consul. He devised one of the most efficacious methods for informing himself of every thing, and for introducing



into this vast machine such improvements as it was susceptible of. He commissioned some of the ablest of the councillors of State to travel through France, and to observe on the spot how the administration worked. These councillors, on their arrival in the departments, summoned thither the prefects of the neighbouring departments and the heads of the different services, and held councils, in which those officers revealed to them the difficulties which could not be foreseen, the unexpected obstacles arising from the nature of things, the deficiencies in the laws or in the regulations made during the last ten years. They examined, at the same time, if that hierarchy of prefects, sub-prefects, and mayors, performed its functions with order and facility; if the persons were well chosen; if they showed that they were thoroughly impressed with the intentions of the government; if they were, like it, firm, laborious, impartial, free from all party-spirit. These tours produced the best effect. The councillors sent on this errand stimulated the zeal of the functionaries, and brought back to the Council of State information, useful either for the decision of current matters, or for the digesting and improving of the administrative regulations. Encouraged more especially by the energy of the First Consul, they did not hesitate to denounce to him such agents as were either weak, incapable, or animated by a bad spirit.

The solicitude of the First Consul was not confined to this survey of the country by the councillors of State during their tours. The numerous aides-de-camp despatched by him, sometimes to the armies, sometimes to the seaports, to communicate to them the energy of his determinations, had orders to make observations by the way, and to report every thing to their general. Colonels Lacuée, Lauriston, Savary, sent to Antwerp, Boulogne, Brest, Rochefort, Toulon, Genoa, Otranto, were directed, on their return, to stop in every town, to see, to hear, and to take notes of every thing—the condition of the roads, the state of commercial affairs, the conduct of the public functionaries, the wishes of the inhabitants, the public opinion. None of them failed to obey; none was afraid to tell the truth to a just and all-powerful chief. That chief who then thought only of doing good, because that good, infinite in its extent and its diversity, sufficed to absorb the ardour of his soul, warmly welcomed the truth which he had provoked, and courageously turned it to account, whether he was obliged to punish a culpable functionary, to repair a defect in the new institutions, or to turn his attention to a subject which had hitherto escaped his indefatigable scrutiny.\*

---

\* Here are a few specimens of the instructions given to his aides-de-camp on mission:—

“ To Citizen Lauriston, Aide-de-camp.

“ Paris, 7th Pluviôse, year IX. (Jan 27th, 1801.)

“ You will set out, citizen, and go to Rochefort. You will inspect most

At this moment, a spectacle struck all eyes, it was the discussion of the Civil Code in the Council of State. The want of this code was certainly the most urgent of the wants of France. The old civil legislation, composed of the feudal law, the common

---

minutely the port and the arsenal, addressing yourself for this purpose to the maritime prefect.

“ You will bring back to me memorials on the following subjects :—

“ 1. The number of men, in the most exact detail, on board the two frigates which are about to sail, and the inventory of all matters belonging to artillery, or others, which those frigates have on board. You will stay at Rochefort till they have sailed.

“ 2. How many frigates are left in the road ?

“ 3. A particular report respecting each of the three ships, the *Foudroyant*, the *Duguay-Trouin*, and the *Aigle*. In what time will each of those ships be ready to sail ?

“ 4. A particular report respecting each of the frigates, *la Vertu*, *la Cybèle*, *la Volontaire*, *la Thétis*, *l'Embuscade*, and *la Franchise*.

“ 5. A return of all the muskets, pistols, swords, and cannon-balls, which have arrived in that port for maritime equipments.

“ 6. Are there in the magazines ship provisions sufficient to supply six ships of the line for six months, independently of the three above mentioned ?

“ 7. Lastly, have all measures been taken for recruiting the sailors, and for obtaining from Bordeaux and Nantes provisions, cordage, and all that is necessary for the equipment of a squadron ?

“ If you foresee that you shall have to stay at Rochefort more than six days, you will send me your first report by post. You will not fail to inform the prefect that I am of opinion that the minister of the marine has taken all necessary measures to enable nine sail to put to sea from Rochefort at the beginning of Ventôse. You perceive that this must be said to the prefect in great secrecy.

“ *You will avail yourself of all circumstances to collect, in all the places through which you pass, particulars relative to the march of the administrations and to the public spirit.*

“ If the departure of the frigates is delayed, I authorise you to go to Bordeaux and to return by Nantes. You will bring me a memorial concerning the frigates that are equipping.

“ I salute you.

“ BONAPARTE.”

To Citizen Lacuée, Aide-de-camp.

“ Paris, 9th Ventôse, year IX. (Feb. 23, 1801.)

“ You will go, citizen, with all speed to Toulon ; you will deliver the accompanying letter to rear-admiral Ganteaume. You will inspect all the ships of the squadron, as well as the arsenal : you will take care to ascertain yourself the force and the number of the English ships blockading the port of Toulon. If it is less than that of rear-admiral Ganteaume, you will urge him not to allow himself to be blockaded by an inferior force.

“ If circumstances decide general Ganteaume to continue his mission, you will prevail upon him to take on board at Toulon as many troops as he can carry. For this purpose you will see the military commandant, to remove all obstacles, so that he may be supplied with the troops.

“ You will give rear-admiral Ganteaume to understand that he has been in general rather blamed for his cruise to Mahon, because he has roused the attention of admiral Warren, whose only object was to defend Mahon.

“ If rear-admiral Ganteaume decides to complete his mission, you will stay at Toulon four days after his departure.

“ If, on the contrary, news from sea should lead you to think that he will

law, and the Roman law, was no longer adapted to a society revolutionised from top to bottom. The old laws respecting marriage, and those which had since been hastily enacted respecting divorce and successions, were not adapted either to the new state of society or to a moral and regular order of things. A commission, composed of Messrs. Portalis, Tronchet, Bigot de Préameneu, and Malleville, had drawn up a sketch of the Civil Code. This sketch had been sent to all the tribunals, that they might examine and make their observations upon it. In consequence of this examination and these observations, the sketch had been modified, and at length submitted to the

---

remain too long, you will return to Paris, *after staying fifteen days in Toulon, six at Marseilles, four at Avignon, and five or six at Lyons.*

“ You will take care to bring back to me a return of every thing that has been put on board each ship ; of the ships and frigates that have sailed from Toulon since the 1st Vendémiaire, year IX. ; of the state of the arsenal ; *and notes relative to the public functionaries of the country through which you will pass, and also to the spirit that prevails there.*

“ You will take advantage of all the couriers despatched by the maritime prefect to give me news of the squadron, of the sea, and of the English.

“ You will encourage by your observations all the captains of ships, and point out to them of what immense importance their expedition is to the general peace.

“ I salute you.

“ BONAPARTE.”

To Citizen Lauriston.

“ Paris, 30th Pluviôse, year IX. (Feb. 19th, 1802.)

“ I have received, citizen, your different letters, and your last of the 25th Pluviôse. I beg you to make, in secret, inquiries concerning the administration of the provisions, the service of which seems to excite complaints.

“ Contrive to bring me, on your return, a detailed statement of the northern commodities furnished in the course of the year X. by Lechie and Co. They pretend to have at this moment 1,700,000 francs' worth in warehouse.

“ What quantity of timber has arrived at Havre since the peace, and are they at last at work finishing the five ships that are building ?

“ In repassing to Lorient, see how many ships are building there, and the time when each of them will be ready to put to sea. Inspect all the gunners and grenadiers of the coast-guard, that you may be able to give me an account what sort of men they are, and what it will be possible to do with them at the moment of the definitive peace.

“ Lastly, see at Nantes to ascertain what northern commodities have been received in the year X., and what hemp there is left, and if the shipment of timber for Brest is going on. *Stop two days at Vannes, to make suitable observations on the public spirit.*

“ In all these observations, endeavour to see for yourself, and without the advice of the authorities.

“ Let me know what character one Charron has left at Lorient, and stop there three or four days, *to observe the conduct of the administration in that port.*

“ *In short, miss no opportunity of seeing for yourself, and fixing your opinion respecting the civil, naval, and military administration.*

“ *Inform yourself in every department what prospect there is of the next harvest.*

“ I suppose that you will bring me notes relative to the manner in which the troops are paid and clothed, and to the state of the principal military hospitals.

“ I salute you.

“ BONAPARTE.”

Council of State, which had just been discussing it, article by article, for several months. The First Consul, who attended all these meetings, had displayed, while presiding at them, a method, a clearness, frequently a depth of views, which were matter of astonishment to every one. They were not surprised to find him, who was accustomed to direct armies, to govern conquered provinces, an administrator, for that quality is indispensable to a great general ; but that he should possess the quality of legislator did appear extraordinary. His knowledge of this subject was rapidly acquired. Interesting himself in every thing, because he comprehended every thing, he asked Cambacérès, the consul, for some law books, and especially for the materials prepared in the time of the Convention for the digest of the new Civil Code. He had devoured them, like those books of religious controversy, with which he had provided himself, when engaged upon the Concordat. Classing in his head the general principles of civil law, combining with these few rapidly collected notions his profound knowledge of man, his perfect clearness of understanding, he had soon qualified himself for directing that important business, and he had even furnished the discussion with a great number of just, new, and profound ideas. Sometimes an insufficient acquaintance with these subjects caused him to support strange ideas ; but he soon suffered himself to be led back to the truth by the learned men who surrounded him, and he was the master of them all, when it was necessary to draw from the conflict of contrary opinions the most natural and the most rational conclusion. The principal service rendered by the First Consul was that of bringing to the completion of this fine monument a firm mind and persevering application, and thereby conquering the two great difficulties which had hitherto baffled preceding attempts, the infinite diversity of opinions, and the impossibility of proceeding uninterruptedly with the business amidst the agitations of the time. When the discussion had been long, diffuse, obstinate, the First Consul was able to sum up and to decide it by a word ; and, moreover, he obliged every body else to work by working himself for whole days together. The minutes of these remarkable meetings were printed and published. However, before they were sent to the *Moniteur*, Cambacérès took care to revise them, and to suppress what might not be suitable for publication, either when the First Consul had expressed opinions, sometimes singular, or treated of questions relative to manners with a familiarity of language which ought not to go beyond the circle of a privy council. There was left, therefore, in the minutes, nothing but the ideas of the First Consul, sometimes rectified, frequently discoloured, but always striking. The public was astounded, and became accustomed to consider him as the sole author of every thing good and great that was done in France. It even took a kind of pleasure in seeing as legislator him

whom it had seen as general, diplomatist, administrator, and constantly superior in these widely different characters.

The first book of the Civil Code was finished, and it was one of the numerous bills (*projets*) which were about to be submitted to the Legislative Body. The pacification of France and its internal reorganization were thus proceeding at an equal pace. Though all the evil was not repaired, though all the good was not accomplished, yet the comparison of the present with the past filled men's minds with satisfaction and hope. All the good effected was ascribed to the First Consul, and not unjustly; for, according to the testimony of his assiduous fellow-labourer, Cambacérès, he directed the whole of the proceedings, attended himself to the details, and *did more in every department than those to whom it was specially committed*.

The man who governed France from 1799 to 1815 had, no doubt, in his career, intoxicating days of glory; but, assuredly, neither he nor France, which he had seduced, ever witnessed days like these, days when greatness was accompanied by more wisdom, and particularly by that wisdom which holds out a hope of duration. He had just given, after victory, a most glorious peace, and what he never afterwards could obtain—a maritime peace; he had given, after chaos, complete order; he had still left a certain liberty, not all the liberty that was desirable, but as much, at least, as was possible on the morrow of a sanguinary revolution; to all the parties he had done good; only excepting the transportation of the hundred and odd revolutionary proscripts, condemned without trial after the affair of the infernal machine, he had respected the laws; and that act itself, culpable because it was illegal, was not thought of in that immensity of good. Finally, Europe, reconciled with the Republic, feeling without saying that she had been wrong in wishing to interfere in a revolution which did not concern her, and that the unparalleled greatness of France was the just consequence of an unjust aggression heroically repulsed, Europe eagerly came to lay her homage at the feet of the First Consul, happy in being able to say, for the sake of her own dignity, that she had made peace only with a revolutionist full of genius, the glorious restorer of social principles.

Certainly, if one could but stop at the wonders of these first times, history, in treating of this reign, would say that nothing greater, nothing more complete, was ever seen upon earth. All this was written in the eager, admiring faces of those men of all ranks and of all nations, who pressed around the First Consul. An extraordinary influx of foreigners poured into Paris, to see France, to see general Bonaparte, and most of them had the honour of being presented to him by the ministers of their respective governments. His court, for he had formed one, was at once military and civil, austere and elegant. He had made an addition to it since the preceding year; he had composed a

military household for himself and the other consuls, and given a princely establishment to Madame Bonaparte.

The consular guard was composed of four battalions of infantry, each 1200 strong, some of them grenadiers, the others chasseurs; and of two regiments of cavalry, the first of mounted grenadiers, the second of mounted chasseurs. They were both composed of the finest and bravest men in the army. A numerous and well served artillery completed this guard, and made it an absolute war division, provided with all arms, and amounting to about 6000 men. A brilliant staff commanded these superb troops. There was a colonel to each battalion, and a general of brigade to two united battalions. Four lieutenant-generals, one of infantry, one of cavalry, one of artillery, one of engineers, commanded alternately the whole corps for one decade, and did duty about the consuls. It was a corps of picked men, in which the best soldiers found a recompense for their good conduct, which surrounded the government with a splendour conformable with its warlike character, and which, on the day of battle, presented an invincible reserve. It will be recollected that the battalion of the grenadiers of the consular guard had nearly saved the army at Marengo. To this particular staff of the consular guard the First Consul had added a military governor for the palace of the Tuileries, accompanied by two officers of the staff with the title of adjutants. This governor was Duroc, the aide-de-camp, who was always employed in delicate missions. No officer was fitter for maintaining in the palace of the government that order and decorum which harmonised with the taste of the First Consul and the spirit of the time. It was necessary to temper this military display by a certain civil state. M. Benezech, a councillor of State, had been appointed in the first year to preside at receptions, and to receive with due honours either the foreign ministers or the high personages admitted to the consuls. Four civil officers, with the title of prefects of the palace, succeeded M. Benezech in this office. Four ladies of the palace were given to Madame Bonaparte, to assist in doing the honours of the First Consul's drawing-room. As soon as it was known that this organization of the palace was preparing, numerous candidates came forward, even from among the families belonging to what was called the *ancien régime*. It was not yet the high nobility, those who formerly filled the apartments of Versailles, that presented themselves to solicit; the moment for their submission had not yet arrived. Still they were families of distinction in past times, which had not figured in the emigration, and were the first to approach a powerful government, which, by its glory, rendered service about it honourable to any body. General Bonaparte selected for prefects of the palace M. Benezech, who had already performed the functions, Messrs. Didot and de Luçay, engaged under the old system in the financial department, M. de Remusat in the magistracy. The four ladies of the palace, charged to do its



honours by the side of Madame Bonaparte, were Mesdames de Luçay, de Lauriston, de Talhouet, and de Remusat. The most arrant slanderers of the emigrant drawing-rooms of Paris had nothing to allege against the fitness of these selections; and reasonable persons, who require no more of courts than what decorum renders necessary, had no fault to find with that military and civil organization. In fact, in a republic, as in a monarchy, the palace of the heads of the State must be guarded and surrounded by an imposing display of the public force; in the interior of that palace there must be men, women, chosen to do the honours of it either to illustrious foreigners or to distinguished citizens, who are admitted to the first magistrates of the republic. In this point, the court of the First Consul was imposing and worthy of him. It received a certain grace from his wife and his sisters, all remarkable either for manners, understanding, or beauty. We have elsewhere adverted to the brothers of the First Consul: this is the proper place to notice his sisters. The eldest sister of the First Consul, Madame Elisa Bacciochi, not remarkable for her person, was a woman of superior understanding, and drew around her the most distinguished literary men of the time, such as Messrs. Suard, Morellet, and Fontanes. The second, Caroline Murat, who had married the general of that name, ambitious and beautiful, intoxicated with her brother's fortune, striving to turn it to the best account for herself and her husband, was one of the women of this new court who gave it most animation and elegance. The third, Pauline Bonaparte, who had married general Leclerc, and who afterwards married a prince Borghese, was one of the greatest beauties of her time. She had not yet provoked slander so much as she afterwards did, and, if her inconsiderate conduct sometimes grieved her brother, the passionate affection which she felt for him touched him and disarmed his severity. Madame Bonaparte was above them all from her position as wife of the First Consul, and charmed by her exquisite grace both the French and the foreigners admitted into the palace of the government. Inevitable and already observable rivalries between members of that family, so near to the throne, were repressed by general Bonaparte, who, though he loved his relations, treated with military roughness those who disturbed the peace which he desired to see reigning around him.

An event of some importance had just occurred in the consular family; this was the marriage of Hortense de Beauharnais with Louis Bonaparte. The First Consul, who was fondly attached to his wife's two children, had wished to marry Hortense with Duroc, believing that a reciprocal affection subsisted between those two young hearts; but this match, being disapproved by Madame Bonaparte, was not carried into effect. Madame Bonaparte, incessantly tormented by the dread of a divorce, ever since she had lost all hope of having more children, was for marrying her own daughter to one of her husband's brothers,

flattering herself that the offspring of that union, bound by two different ties to the new chief of France, might serve him for heirs. Joseph Bonaparte was married; Lucien led a very irregular life, and behaved like an enemy to his sister-in-law; Jerome was expiating some youthful indiscretions on board a ship. Louis was the only one who suited the views of Madame Bonaparte. She selected him. He was prudent, well informed, but morose, and ill matched in disposition with the wife who was destined for him. The First Consul, who was of this opinion, resisted at first, afterwards yielded, and assented to a marriage which was not destined to make either party happy, but which for a time appeared likely to give heirs to the empire of the world.

The nuptial benediction was given by cardinal Caprara, and in a private house, as was then the practice with all the ceremonies of religion, when priests who had not taken the oath officiated. On the same occasion, that benediction was given to Murat and his wife Caroline, who had not yet received it, like many other husbands and wives of that time, whose marriage had been contracted before the civil magistrate only. General Bonaparte and Josephine were in the same predicament. The latter earnestly intreated her husband to add the religious bond to the civil bond, which already united them; but, whether from foresight, or from fear of avowing to the public the incomplete contract which bound him to Madame Bonaparte, he would not comply.

Such was then the consular family, afterwards the imperial family. These personages, all remarkable on different accounts, happy in the glory and the prosperity of the head who constituted their greatness, controlled by him, and not yet spoiled by fortune, presented an interesting sight, which did not pain the eye like that directorial court, the honours of which were done for several years by Barras, the director. If certain envious or disdainful Frenchmen, who were frequently under obligations to it, did, nevertheless, persecute it with their sarcasms, foreigners, more just, paid it a tribute of curiosity and commendation.

Once every decade, as we have elsewhere said, the First Consul received the ambassadors and the foreigners who were presented to him by the ministers of their nation. He went through the ranks of the assembly, which was always numerous, followed by his aides-de-camp. Madame Bonaparte came after him, accompanied by the ladies of the palace. It was the same ceremonial that was observed in other courts, with a smaller train of aides-de-camp and ladies of honour, but with the incomparable lustre which surrounded general Bonaparte. Twice in each decade, he invited to dinner the eminent personages of France and Europe, and once a month he gave in the gallery of Diana an entertainment, at which a hundred guests were sometimes assembled. On those days, he held a drawing-room at the Tuileries in the evening, and admitted to

his presence the high functionaries, the ambassadors, and those persons of high French society, who were friendly towards the government. Always carrying calculation into the minutest things, he enjoined his family to wear certain dresses, with a view to render the use of them general by imitation. He ordered silk to be worn, for the purpose of encouraging as much as possible the manufactures of Lyons. He recommended to his wife the stuff called *linon* (lawn), in order to favour those of St. Quentin.\* As for himself, simple among all, he wore a plain dress of *chasseur* of the consular guard. He had obliged his colleagues to put on the embroidered dress of consul, and to hold a drawing-room in their apartments, for the purpose of repeating there, though with less splendour, what was done at the Tuileries.

This winter, of 1801 and 1802 (year X.), was extremely brilliant, from the satisfaction prevailing among all classes, some happy to return to France, others to enjoy at last entire security, others to catch in the maritime peace a glimpse of unbounded prospects of commercial prosperity. The great resort of foreigners contributed to the splendour of the winter festivities. Among the persons who appeared in Paris this season, there were two who attracted general attention: one was an illustrious Englishman; the other an emigrant, whose name had formerly been very notorious.

The illustrious Englishman was Mr. Fox, the most eloquent orator in England; the famous emigrant was M. de Calonne, formerly minister of the finances, who, with a mind ready and fertile in expedients, contrived to hide for a few moments from the eyes of the court of Versailles the abyss towards which it was hurrying. Mr. Fox felt a real impatience to see the man towards whom, notwithstanding his British patriotism, he was irresistibly attracted. He came to Paris immediately after the signature of the preliminaries of peace, and was presented to the the First Consul by the English minister. He came not only to see France and its chief, but also to make researches into our diplomatic archives, for the great Whig orator was then employing his leisure in writing the history of the last two Stuarts. The First Consul ordered all the archives to be opened to Mr. Fox, and gave him such a welcome as would have sufficed to con-

---

\* Here is a letter written at St. Quentin to Cambacérès:—

“Saint-Quentin, 21st Pluviôse, year IX. (February 10th, 1801.)

“The interesting manufactures of St. Quentin and environs, which employed 70,000 hands, and brought into France more than 15,000,000 in cash, have decreased five-sixths. It were to be wished that our ladies would bring lawn into fashion, without giving such an absolute preference to muslins. The idea of reviving one of the most interesting manufactures, and which we possess exclusively, and of giving bread to such a great number of French families, is well calculated, in fact, to bring lawns into fashion: besides, have not lawns been long enough in disgrace?”

ciliate an enemy, but which charmed a friend whom he had won by his glory alone. The First Consul threw aside all etiquette with this generous foreigner; he had long and frequent conversations with him, and seemed desirous to make, in his person, a conquest of the English nation itself. Mr. Fox was endowed with that warm imagination which makes fascinating orators, but his understanding was neither positive nor practical. He was full of those noble illusions, which the First Consul, though he had as much imagination as depth of understanding, had never indulged, or at least had ceased to indulge. The young general Bonaparte was disenchanted, as one is after a revolution commenced in the name of humanity, and wrecked in blood. He had shaken off all the first enchantments of the Revolution excepting one—that of greatness, and this he carried to excess. He was not liberal enough to please the leader of the Whigs, and too ambitious to please an Englishman. Each, therefore, galled the other sometimes by contrary opinions. Mr. Fox made the First Consul smile by a simplicity, by an inexperience, which were singular in a man who was nearly sixty years old. The First Consul at times alarmed the British patriotism of Mr. Fox by the vastness of his designs, which he took too little care to dissemble. They harmonized, nevertheless, in understanding and in heart, and were enchanted with each other. The First Consul took infinite pains to make Mr. Fox thoroughly acquainted with Paris, and sometimes he was pleased to accompany him himself to the public establishments. There was just then an exhibition of the productions of French industry, which was the second since the Revolution. Every body was astonished at the progress of our manufactures, which, amidst the general commotion, participating nevertheless in the impulse given to the public mind, had invented a great number of improvements and new processes. Foreigners appeared powerfully struck, particularly the English, who are good judges of such matters. The First Consul took Mr. Fox to the halls fitted up for this exhibition in the court of the Louvre, and sometimes enjoyed the surprise of his illustrious guest. Mr. Fox, amidst the attentions which were paid him, gave vent to a sally, which does honour to the feelings and the mind of that noble statesman, and which proves that in him justice towards France was combined with the warmest patriotism. In one of the halls of the Louvre, there was a very large and very handsome terrestrial globe, destined for the First Consul, and very ingeniously constructed. One of the personages who accompanied the First Consul, turning this globe, and putting his hand upon England, made the unlucky remark, that England occupied a very small place in a map of the world. “Yes,” exclaimed Mr. Fox, warmly; “yes, it is in that little island that the English are born, and it is in that island that they all wish to die; but,”

added he, extending his arms around the two oceans and the two Indies, "but, while they live, they fill the entire globe, and embrace it with their power." The First Consul applauded this proud and well-timed reply.

The personage who, next to Mr. Fox, attracted the greatest share of public attention, was M. de Calonne. It was the prince of Wales who had solicited and obtained permission for him to appear again in Paris. M. de Calonne held, ever since his arrival, a language wholly unexpected, and which created a sensation among the royalists. He had no intention, he said, to serve the new government. He could not do it, attached as he had been to the house of Bourbon; but it was his duty to tell the truth to his friends. No man in Europe was capable of making head against the First Consul: generals, ministers, kings, were his inferiors and his dependents. The English, instead of hating, were now full of enthusiasm for him. This feeling was shared by all classes of the British population, and it was carried to an extreme, as all sentiments are by the English. They must, therefore, not reckon upon Europe for overthrowing general Bonaparte. Neither ought they to dishonour the royalist cause by odious plots, which filled all honest men throughout the whole world with horror. They must submit, hope every thing from time and from the double difficulty of governing France without royalty, and of founding a royalty without the family of Bourbon. The infinite vicissitudes of revolutions could alone bring about chances which did not now exist in favour of the exiled princes. But, happen what would, they must expect every thing from France alone, from enlightened France, from France animated by better sentiments, but nothing from foreigners or from conspiracies—this language, singular on account of its wisdom, especially in the mouth of M. de Calonne, caused real astonishment, and induced a belief that M. de Calonne would not be long before he connected himself with the consular government. He had seen the consul Lebrun, who received the royalists with the consent of the First Consul, and had conversed with him on the affairs of France. It was even asserted that he was about to become for the finances what M. de Talleyrand was for diplomacy, the reclaimed noble, lending his experience and the influence of his name to the First Consul. The surmise was unfounded. The First Consul had less need of brilliant understanding than of application, which M. de Calonne had never shown, and he had found all that he wanted in M. Gaudin, who had introduced perfect order into our finances. Nevertheless, on this mere rumour, a crowd of applicants, who had recently returned to France, and were desirous of bettering their fortunes by taking office, had beset M. de Calonne, thinking that they could not choose a fitter person to introduce them to the new government, or one who



would better justify by his example their adhesion to the First Consul.\*

Who would believe that, notwithstanding so much good, either already done, or on the point of being done, an opposition, and a warm one too, could be raised? An opposition, and one

---

\* There were, in Paris, agents of the exiled princes, some of whom were men of talent, and very well informed into the bargain. These agents made almost daily reports, to which I have already adverted. I subjoin an extract from one of these reports relative to M. de Calonne.

“ M. de Calonne returned to Paris about a month ago. Before he left England, he had a conference with the ministers, and was cordially received by them. He was asked if, in returning to France, it was not his intention also to enter into the administration? He replied that his principles, his conduct during the Revolution, and his attachment to the royal family, absolutely forbade him to accept any place at the hands of the new government; but that, attached to France by taste and by instinct, he should not refuse to give his advice, if it were asked, and if he believed that it would be advantageous to his country.

“ His arrival in Paris has produced a great sensation. He is every day beset by visitors, and surrounded by creatures, as at the most brilliant period of his fortune and influence. The notion that he is about to be raised to the ministry brings swarms of applicants to him; and, to escape from them, he is obliged to betake himself to the country. It does not appear, however, that this opinion is well founded; and, if it ever is realized, it will not be at present. All that is known is, that he was to be presented a few days since to Bonaparte, and to have a private conference with him.

“ He sees all his old friends, and expresses his sentiments to them with entire freedom. Having witnessed the weakness and the nullity of foreign powers, he does not think that there is to be found in them the slightest guarantee against revolutionary invasion, and, still less, any efficient protection for the cause of the king. He repeats what we have long known, that the men who govern in Europe are men without means and without character, who are unacquainted with the time in which they live, who can neither judge of the present nor foresee the future, and who are alike destitute of the courage which incites to undertake, and of the firmness which enables to persevere. He considers them all as delivered up to Bonaparte, trembling before him, and ready humbly to execute all his commands. In consequence, he is persuaded that it is in France only that there is any possibility of labouring for the restoration of the monarchy; not by putting one's self forward, and by fomenting stupid and ridiculous plots, more calculated to dishonour one's cause, than to pave the way to its real success; but by striving, without noise and without show, to re-establish public opinion, to destroy prejudice, to diminish fears, to unite all the servants of the king, and to keep them in readiness to profit in his favour by all the events which the natural course of things must bring about.

“ M. de Calonne asserts, that in England the enthusiasm for Bonaparte is not only general, but carried to an excess, of which it is difficult to form an idea. The court and the city, the capital and the country, all classes of the citizens, from the minister to the artisan, are eager to proclaim his praises, and vie with each other in chanting his victories and the splendour of his power. Besides, this enthusiasm is not peculiar to England; all Europe is, as it were, infected with it. From all parts people are hastening to Paris to see the great man at least once in their lives; and the police has been obliged to threaten to apprehend some Danes, who had publicly bent the knee before him whenever they saw him.

“ This is one of the principal causes of his strength and of his immense power. How could the French dare to oppose him, so long as they see the European powers prostrate at his feet!”



of the most vehement, was, nevertheless, preparing against the best measures of the First Consul. It was not in the violent parties radically opposed to the government of the First Consul, royalist or revolutionary, that this opposition was preparing, but in the same party which had desired and seconded the overthrow of the Directory as insufficient, and called for a new government that should be at once able and firm. The subaltern revolutionists, men of commotion and of blood, were repressed, submissive, or transported, and were daily sinking deeper and deeper into their obscurity, never more to emerge from it. The villains of rovalism had need to take breath since the infernal machine, and kept quiet. Besides, part of those who infested the high roads had been put to death. The royalists of high quality, while holding impertinent language in the saloons of Paris, nevertheless began already to show the disposition which led them subsequently to act, the men the part of chamberlains, the women that of ladies of honour, in the palace of the Tuileries, which the Bourbons no longer inhabited.

But the moderate revolutionary party, called to compose the new government, was divided, as it is almost always the case with every victorious party which sets about founding a government, and disagrees about the manner of constituting it. From the very first days of the Consulate, this party, which had concurred, in various ways, in the 18th Brumaire, had appeared divided between two contrary tendencies; the one, consisting in making the Revolution terminate in a democratic and moderate republic, such as Washington had recently established in America; the other, in making it end in a monarchy, resembling, more or less, the English monarchy, and, if need were, the old French monarchy, without its former prejudices, without the feudal system, but retaining its grandeur. The consular government had entered its third year, and, as usual, these two tendencies kept gaining strength by the very contradiction. Some, again, became almost violent revolutionists, on seeing how things were proceeding, on seeing the authority of the First Consul increasing, monarchical ideas spreading, a court forming at the Tuileries, the Catholic worship restored, or on the point of being restored, and the emigrants returning in shoals. The others became almost the royalists of former times, so eager were they to re-act and to refound a monarchy, so strongly were they disposed to put up with even an enlightened despotism, as the total result of the Revolution. As to enlightened despotism, that which was arising in France at this moment had so much genius, insured such a sweet repose, that the seduction was great. Meanwhile, the contradiction was carried to such a length on both sides, that a crisis might soon be expected to ensue.

The Tribune, agitated during the preceding sessions, at one

time on account of the laws relative to finances, at another on account of the special tribunals, was much more so this year, at the aspect of all that was passing, and at the sight of this government proceeding so rapidly towards its goal. The Concordat excited particular indignation, as the most counter-revolutionary act that could be imagined. The Civil Code was not, according to this assembly, sufficiently conformable with equality. Those treaties of peace themselves, which comprehended the greatness of France, displeased it in their wording, as we shall see presently.

M. Sieyès, while striving to prevent all agitation by means of his constitutional precautions, had not, as we have seen, prevented any, for constitutions do not create human passions, neither can they destroy them; they are only the stage upon which the passions come forward. In placing all the seriousness, all the activity, of affairs in the Council of State; the noise, declamation, empty animadversion in the Tribune; in confining the latter to pleading for or against the acts of the government, before a Legislative Body, confined to answering yes or no; in placing above an idle Senate, which, at long intervals, elected the men charged to perform those two almost useless parts in the two legislative assemblies; in choosing the *personnel* of the government in the same spirit; in placing the men fit for business in the Council of State, the men fit for speech-making, inclined to clamour, in the Tribune, the obscure superannuated in the Legislative Body, the superannuated of a higher order in the Senate—M. Sieyès had scarcely prevented the passions of the time from breaking forth; he had even added, it must be confessed, a certain jealousy of these bodies one towards another. The Tribune was sensible of the declamatory vanity of its part; the Legislative Body was sensible of the ridiculousness of its silence, and contained, moreover, many priests who had quitted orders, organized by the abbé Grégoire into a silent but annoying opposition. The Senate itself, which M. Sieyès had designed to mould into a wealthy and quiet old man, was not so quiet as he had expected. That body was somewhat fired of its idle dignity, for the senators were debarred from public functions, and their electoral power, so rarely exercised, was far from filling up their time. All of them were jealous of the Council of State, which shared with the First Consul the glory of the great things that were daily accomplished. Thus this body, which M. Sieyès had designed to lull into a sort of aristocratic stupor, after the example of Venice and Genoa, still tossed, like one who has some remains of fever, and might be checked, controlled by a master, but not composed into a tranquil sleep, as its maker had hoped.

And, strange to tell, M. Sieyès, the inventor of all these constitutional arrangements, by virtue of which there reigned so much activity on the one hand, so little on the other, M. Sieyès

came to weary himself with his own inaction. Moderate, and even monarchical in his opinions, he ought to have approved the acts of the First Consul; but causes, some of them inevitable, others accidental, began to embroil them. That great speculative genius, limited to seeing every thing, and doing nothing, could not but feel jealous of that active and mighty genius, which was daily acquiring the mastery of France and of the world. In the magnificent works of general Bonaparte, M. Sieyès already perceived the germ of his future faults; and, if he did not yet say so aloud, he sometimes indicated it by his silence, or by a phrase in language profound as his thoughts. It is possible that, if attentions had been at all times paid to him, they might have soothed and attached him to the First Consul; but the latter had rather too early considered himself quit with M. Sieyès by the gift of the estate of Crosne; and, besides, absorbed by his immense labours, he had too much neglected the superior man, who had so nobly ceded to him the first place on the 18th Brumaire. M. Sieyès, indolent, jealous, piqued, had faults to find, even in the immensity of the present good, and showed himself a morose and cold censor. The First Consul was not sufficiently master of his temper to leave all the wrong to his adversaries. He talked cavalierly of the metaphysics of M. Sieyès, of his impotent ambition, and made a thousand remarks on that subject, which were immediately repeated and aggravated by malevolent persons. M. Sieyès had at his side some friends, such as M. de Tracy, a man of superior mind, but not religious, an original philosopher in a school that had but little originality, and a very respectable character; M. Garat, a specious philosopher, more pretending than profound; M. Cabanis, devoted to the study of the material man, and seeing nothing beyond the limits of matter; M. Lanjuinais, a sincerely pious, honest, vehement man, who had nobly defended the Girondins, and who now warmed at the idea of resisting the new Cæsar. They surrounded M. Sieyès, and already formed a perceptible opposition in the Senate. The Concordat appeared to them, as to many others, the most striking proof of a speedy counter-revolution.

The First Consul, seeing France and Europe enchanted with his proceedings, could not comprehend how it was that the only declaimers against those proceedings should be found precisely around him. Piqued at this opposition, he called the members of the Senate from whom it proceeded *ideologues*, led on by a pouter, who regretted the exercise of the supreme power, of which he was incapable; he called the members of the Tribune busy-bodies, with whom he should know how to break a lance, and to prove that he was not to be frightened with noise; he called the more or less numerous malecontents of the Legislative Body unfrocked priests, Jansenists, whom the abbé Grégoire, in concert with the abbé Sieyès, was striving to organize into an

opposition against the government; but he declared that he would break all those resistances, and that they should not easily stop him and prevent the good which he purposed to accomplish. Never having lived in the assemblies, he was ignorant of that art of coaxing men, which Cæsar himself, powerful as he was, did not neglect, and which he had learned in the Senate of Rome. The First Consul expressed his displeasure publicly, boldly, with the feeling of his strength and of his glory, and scarcely listened to the wise Cambacérès, who, possessing great experience in the management of the assemblies, exhorted him to no purpose to use moderation and soothing. "You must prove to those people," replied the First Consul, "that you are not afraid of them; and they will be frightened, on condition that you are not frightened yourself." Here were already, as we see, the manners, the ideas, of pure royalty, in proportion as the moment approached when monarchy would become inevitable.

It was not only in the bodies of the State that opposition manifested itself, but also in the army. The mass of the army, like the mass of the nation, sensible of the important results obtained during the last two years, was entirely devoted to the First Consul. Still, among the chiefs there were malecontents, some of them sincere, others merely jealous. The sincere malecontents were the stanch Revolutionists, who beheld with chagrin the return of the emigrants and the speedy obligation to go and exhibit their uniforms in the churches. The malecontents from jealousy were those who saw with mortification an equal, who, having first surpassed them in glory, was now on the point of becoming their master. The former belonged mostly to the army of Italy, which had always been downright revolutionary; the latter to the army of the Rhine, calm, moderate, but rather envious.

The chiefs of the army of Italy, in general devoted to the First Consul, but ardent in their sentiments, disliked both priests and emigrants, complained that they were to be made churchmen of, and said all this in the original and not most decent language of soldiers. Augereau, Lannes, bad politicians, but heroic warriors, especially the second, who was an accomplished captain, used the most extraordinary expressions. Lannes, having become commander-in-chief of the consular guard, administered its chest with a prodigality known to the First Consul and authorized by him. A mansion was furnished in a sumptuous style for the accommodation of the staff of that guard. Lannes there kept open table for all his comrades, and there, at their soldierly banquets, he launched forth invectives against the proceedings of the government. The First Consul had no reason to fear that the attachment of these unoccupied soldiers to himself was diminished. At the first signal, he was sure to find them all about him, and Lannes above all the rest.

Still, it was dangerous to allow those heads and tongues to go any further, and he sent for Lannes. The latter, accustomed to great familiarity with his general-in-chief, gave way to some outbursts of passion, which were soon repressed by the calm superiority of the First Consul. He retired, grieved at his fault, and grieved at the displeasure which he had incurred. From a feeling of honourable susceptibility, he determined to pay the sums drawn from the chest of the guard with the consent of the First Consul. But this general, after all his campaigns in Italy, possessed scarcely any property. Augereau, just as inconsiderate as himself, but who had an excellent heart, lent him a sum, being all that he had, saying, "Here, take this money; go to that ungrateful fellow for whom we have spilt our blood; give him back what is due to the chest, and let neither of us be any longer under obligations to him." The First Consul would not suffer his old companions in arms, at once heroes and boys, to throw off their affection for him. He dispersed them. Lannes was destined for a profitable embassy, that of Portugal. It was Cambacérès, the consul, who was charged with this arrangement. Augereau had orders to be more circumspect for the future, and to return to his army.

These scenes, however, greatly exaggerated by malevolence, which distorted while propagating them, produced a mischievous effect on public opinion, especially in the provinces. Not a single voice, indeed, was raised against the First Consul, whom people were disposed to think in the right against all opposition; but they excited uneasiness and apprehension of serious difficulties for the supreme authority, the re-establishment of which was earnestly desired.\*

These scenes with the officers of the army of Italy were scenes between friends, falling out one day and embracing on the next. They were rather more serious with the generals of

---

\* Here is a passage from a letter of M. de Talleyrand's, who had gone some time afterwards to Lyons for the organization of the Italian Consulta:—

"Lyons, 7th Nivôse, year X. (December 28th, 1801.)

"General,—I have the honour to inform you of my arrival at Lyons, at half-past one o'clock, this morning. The road through Burgundy, with the exception of six or eight leagues, is not very bad, and the prefects on that line of communication have taken advantage of the movement of enthusiasm, produced by the hope of your passage, to cause the repair of the roads to be prosecuted with activity. Wherever I came to communes, to habitations, I heard cries of '*Vive Bonaparte!*' For the last ten leagues, which I travelled in the middle of the night, every one came as I passed, with light in hand, to repeat those words. It is an expression which you are destined to hear continually.

"The story about general Lannes has spread, and appeared to excite great attention: the sub-prefect of Autun and a citizen of Avallon talked to me about it, but mentioned various circumstances, which letters from Paris had reported to them as anecdotes. I have again had occasion to remark to what a degree every thing that relates to your person engages the public attention, and is instantly talked of throughout France."



the Rhine, who were colder and more malicious. Unfortunately, a fatal division began to manifest itself between the general-in-chief of the army of Italy and the general-in-chief of the army of the Rhine—between general Bonaparte and general Moreau.

Moreau, ever since the campaign against Austria, the success of which he owed, at least in part, to the First Consul, who had given him the command of the finest army of France, Moreau was reputed the second general of the Republic. In reality, nobody was mistaken in regard to his value; he was well known to possess a mind of moderate powers, incapable of great combinations, and totally destitute of political genius. But people laid stress on his real qualities of a prudent, discreet, and vigorous general, to make of him a superior commander, capable of coping with the conqueror of Italy and Egypt. Parties have a wonderful instinct for discovering the weaknesses of eminent men. They flatter or abuse them by turns, till they have found an avenue by which they can penetrate to their hearts, and infuse their poisons into them. They had very soon discovered the weak side of Moreau; this was vanity. While flattering him, they had inspired him with a fatal jealousy against the First Consul, which was destined before long to prove his ruin. The females of the two families of Bonaparte and Moreau had quarrelled, about some of those trifles for which women do quarrel with one another. The members of Moreau's family strove to persuade him that he ought to be the first and not the second; that general Bonaparte was ill-disposed towards him; that he sought to depreciate him, and to make him play a secondary part. Moreau, who was destitute of character, had listened but too willingly to these dangerous suggestions. The First Consul, on his part, had never wronged him in any way whatever; on the contrary, he had loaded him with distinctions; he had affected to speak of him more highly than he thought, especially in reference to the battle of Hohenlinden, which he proclaimed in public a master-piece of military art, whereas in private he considered it rather as a piece of good luck than as a scientific and deliberate combination. But, when Moreau had once taken it into his head that he was wronged, he would not be left far behind, and, with the usual promptness of his character, he soon began to resent those wrongs. One day he invited Moreau to accompany him to a review; Moreau drily refused, that he might not be lost amidst the staff of the First Consul, and alleged as an excuse that he had no saddle-horse. The First Consul, nettled at this refusal, soon returned it in kind. On one of the great festive occasions which were frequently occurring, all the high functionaries were invited to dine at the Tuileries. Moreau was in the country, but, returning the day before on some business or other, he called upon Cambacérès, to speak to him on the subject. The consul, who made it his incessant business to conciliate, received Moreau with the utmost cordiality. Surprised to see him



in Paris, he hastened to the First Consul, and warmly urged him to invite the commander-in-chief of the army of the Rhine to the grand dinner that was to take place on the following day. "He has given me one public refusal," replied the First Consul, "I will not run the risk of receiving a second from him." Nothing could change his determination, and, on the morrow, while all the generals and the high functionaries of the Republic were seated in the Tuileries, at the table of the First Consul, Moreau revenged himself for having been neglected by going publicly, and in plain clothes, to dine at one of the most frequented restaurants of the capital, with a party of discontented officers. This circumstance was much noticed, and produced a most mischievous effect.

From that day, that is to say from the autumn of 1801, generals Bonaparte and Moreau manifested extreme coldness towards each other. The public was soon aware of it, and the hostile parties hastened to avail themselves of this disposition. They began to extol Moreau at the expense of general Bonaparte, and strove to fill the hearts of both with the poison of hatred. These details will perhaps appear far beneath the dignity of history; but whatever serves to make known the characters of men, and the deplorable littlenesses even of the greatest, is worthy of history; for every thing that is capable of instructing belongs to it. One cannot too strongly warn high personages against the frivolousness of the motives which frequently embroil them, especially when their divisions become those of the country.

The opening of the session of the year X. took place on the 1st Frimaire (November 22nd, 1801), agreeably to the injunction of the Constitution itself, which fixed that day for the purpose. Assuredly, if ever man had a right to feel proud in presenting himself before a legislative assembly, it was with that which the consular government then brought along with it. Peace concluded with Russia, England, the German and Italian powers, Portugal, the Porte, and concluded with all those powers on glorious conditions; a plan of conciliation with the Church, which put an end to the religious troubles, and which, while reforming the French Church upon the principles of the Revolution, nevertheless obtained the adhesion of the orthodox to the consequences of that revolution; a Civil Code, a monument since admired by the whole world; laws of high utility respecting public instruction, the Legion of Honour, and an infinity of other important matters; financial measures, which placed the expenditure and the revenues of the State in perfect equilibrium—what more complete, more extraordinary, than such a mass of results to submit to a nation! Nevertheless, all these things were, as we shall presently see, very unfavourably received.

The session of the Legislative Body was this time opened with a certain solemnity. The minister of the interior was commissioned to preside on this occasion. Set speeches were made on

either side, and there seemed to be an intention to imitate the forms customary in England, when Parliament is opened by commission. This new ceremonial, borrowed from a constitutional monarchy, drew forth malicious remarks from the opposition. The Tribune and the Legislative Body constituted themselves, and proceeded to that kind of manifestations by which assemblies take pleasure in revealing their secret sentiments—the election of persons. The Legislative Body chose for its president M. Dupuis, author of the celebrated work, *Sur l'Origine de tous les Cultes*. M. Dupuis was not so strong an oppositionist as might be supposed from his book; for he had acknowledged to the First Consul, in conversation with him, that the reconciliation with Rome was necessary; but his name carried great weight at a moment when the Concordat was one of the principal grievances alleged against the consular policy. The intention was easy to be inferred, and it was comprehended by the public, especially by the First Consul, who even exaggerated the importance of it to himself.

The two assemblies exercising the legislative power, that is to say, the Tribune and the Legislative Body, being constituted, three councillors of State presented the exposition of the situation of the Republic. This exposition, dictated by the First Consul, was simple and noble in regard to language, magnificent in regard to subject. It made a deep impression upon the public mind. On the following day, a numerous train of councillors of State brought such a series of bills (*projets de lois*) as a government rarely has occasion to present to assembled chambers. They were the bills destined to convert into laws the treaties with Russia, Bavaria, Naples, Portugal, America, and the Ottoman Porte.

The treaty with England, previously concluded in London, under the form of preliminaries of peace, was on the point of receiving, at this moment, in the congress of Amiens, the form of a definitive treaty, and could not yet be submitted to the deliberations of the Legislative Body. As for the Concordat, it was thought right not to expose it immediately to the ill-will of the opposition. Portalis, the councillor of State, next read an address, which has ever since enjoyed a just celebrity, on the subject of the Civil Code. The first three heads of that code were brought up at the same time by three councillors of State: the first related to *the publication of the laws*; the second to *the enjoyment and the privation of civil rights*; the third to *the acts of the civil state*.

One would think that such a prospectus of legislative labours ought to have silenced all opposition: it did no such thing. When, according to custom, those bills (*projets*) were communicated to the Tribune, the communication of the treaty with Russia produced a most violent scene. The third article of that treaty contained an important stipulation, that the two govern-

ments had agreed upon, in order to secure themselves against the underhand dealings, in which one of them might have engaged against the other, in case they had been inimically disposed. They had promised, said that Article III., "not to suffer any of their *subjects* to maintain any correspondence whatever, either direct or indirect, with the internal enemies of the present government of the two States; to propagate there principles contrary to their respective constitutions; or, to foment disturbances." The French government had had in view the emigrants; the Russian government had had in view the Poles. Nothing was more natural than such a precaution, especially for the French government, which had the Bourbons to fear and to watch. But, in adverting to the persons who might attempt to disturb the mutual repose of the two countries, the negotiators had employed the word which naturally occurred, as the one most frequently employed in diplomatic language, namely, the word *subjects*. It had been employed without any intention, because it was the word usually employed in all treaties; because it was common to say the *subjects* of a republic, as well as the *subjects* of a monarchy. No sooner was the reading of the treaty finished than Thibaut, the tribune, one of the members of the opposition, demanded leave to speak. "Into the text of this treaty," said he, "there has crept an expression inadmissible in our language, and which is not to be endured. I mean the word *subjects*, applied to the citizens of one of the two States. A republic has no subjects, but citizens. It is no doubt an error of the writer, but it ought to be rectified." These words produced a vehement agitation, as is sure to be the case in an assembly previously excited, which expects an event, and which is thrilled by every circumstance, however slight, if connected with the subjects that preoccupy the minds of the members. The president cut short the explanation that was about to be entered upon, by remarking that the deliberation was not then opened; and that these observations ought to be reserved for the day when, upon the report of a commission, the treaty presented would be submitted for discussion. This appeal to the regulations prevented the tumult from breaking out at the moment, and a commission was immediately appointed.

This manifestation increased the ferment prevailing in the great bodies of the State, and irritated the First Consul still more. The manifestations by means of the election of new members continued. There were several places to fill in the Senate. One was vacant by the death of the senator Crassous; two others were to be filled in virtue of the Constitution. That Constitution, as the reader will recollect, had at first supplied only sixty out of the eighty senators, who were to compose the total number of the Senate. To reach that number, two were to be appointed every year for ten years. At this moment, then, there were three places to be given away, including that

which had become vacant by the death of Crassous. According to the Constitution, the First Consul, the Legislative Body, and the Tribune, were each to present a candidate, and the Senate then chose from among the candidates presented.

The ballots for this purpose commenced both in the Legislative Body and in the Tribune. In the Tribune, the opposition supported M. Daunou, who had publicly fallen out with the First Consul, on occasion of the special tribunals, so warmly discussed during the last session. From that time, he would not attend the meetings of the Tribune, saying that he would have nothing to do with any legislative proceedings *while the tyranny lasted*. He had actually kept his word, and not shown himself afterwards. The opposition members had, therefore, selected M. Daunou as the candidate most disagreeable to the First Consul. The decided partisans of the government in the same body proposed one of the authors of the Civil Code, M. Bigot de Préameneu. Neither of these was elected. The majority of votes was given to a candidate of no importance, the tribune Desmeuniers, a moderate man, and who, through his friends, was not a stranger to the First Consul. But the Legislative Body spoke out more decidedly, and chose the abbé Grégoire for its candidate to the Senate. This choice, after the gift of the presidency to M. Dupuis, was a double manifestation against the Concordat. In that body, M. Bigot de Préameneu had had a certain number of votes, nearly two-fifths.

The First Consul resolved to make, on his part, a significant proposal. He might have waited till the two bodies, authorised to present candidates concurrently with the executive power, had chosen those candidates for the two places which remained to be filled. It was probable that the Legislative Body and the Tribune, unwilling to break definitively with so popular a government as that of the First Consul, subject, moreover, to that oscillating movement of assemblies, which, when they have advanced too far one day, always fall back on the next, would make less obnoxious selections, and even fill up the two remaining vacancies with persons acceptable to the government. Thus, M. Desmeuniers, for instance, was a person whom the First Consul could perfectly approve; for he had promised to reward his services by a senator's place. It was probable that the name of M. Bigot de Préameneu would turn up from one of the ballots either of the Legislative Body or of the Tribune. The First Consul would then have it in his power to present, on his own account, such of the candidates adopted by those assemblies as should suit him best, and, in this case, a name presented by two authorities out of three was almost certain to be favoured by the majority of the Senate. Cambacérès recommended this course; but it was a kind of compromise, frequently resorted to in a representative government, but to which the First Consul had a supreme aversion. The

general-magistrate, a stranger to that form of government, would not place himself in this manner behind the Legislative Body or the Tribune, and await their preferences before he manifested his own. In consequence, he immediately presented not one candidate, but three at once; and he chose three generals. Notwithstanding the hopes previously given to M. Desmeuniers, the First Consul, displeased with him because he had not spoken out with sufficient energy in the discussions which had already taken place on the Civil Code, set him aside, and presented generals Jourdan, Lamartillière, and Berruyer. It is true, that these selections were perfectly suited to the occasion. General Jourdan had appeared hostile to the 18th Brumaire, but he enjoyed universal respect; he conducted himself prudently, and had since been invested with the government of Piedmont. In presenting him to the Senate, the First Consul gave a proof of that genuine impartiality which befits the head of a government. As for general Lamartillière, he was the oldest officer of the artillery, and had served in all the campaigns of the Revolution. General Berruyer was a very aged officer of infantry, who, after participating in the Seven Years' War, had been wounded in the armies of the Republic. These, then, were not creatures of his own, whom general Bonaparte purposed to reward, but old servants of France under all the governments. This bold and decisive conduct once adopted, it was impossible to make a more worthy selection. A circumstance still more singular is, that it was justified in a preamble. The spirit of this preamble was as follows: "You are at peace," said the government to the Senate; "you are indebted for it to the blood which your generals have shed in a hundred battles. Prove to them, by calling them into your bosom, that the country is not ungrateful to them."

The Senate assembled, and was agitated by many intrigues. M. Sieyès, who resided habitually in the country, left it on this occasion, and came to join in these intrigues. Many well-disposed persons, such as old Kellermann, for example, were led away by being told that the Legislative Body, in case its candidate, that is to say, the abbé Grégoire, were preferred, would repay that preference by proposing for the second vacant place general Lamartillière, one of the three candidates of the First Consul, and that then, by choosing that general a little afterwards, it would satisfy two authorities at once, the Legislative Body and the government. These manœuvres succeeded, and the abbé Grégoire was elected senator by a great majority.

While these elections were agitating people's minds and giving great joy to the oppositionists, the discussions in the Legislative Body and the Tribune were assuming a most mischievous character. The treaty with Russia had become, on account of the word *subjects*, the occasion of the most violent discussions in the commission of the Tribune. M. Costaz, the



reporter of that commission, who was not of the opposition party, had applied to the government for some explanations. The First Consul had received him, and explained to him the meaning of the article so vehemently attacked, and the motive of its insertion in the treaty; and, as for the word *subjects*, he proved to him, by referring to the Dictionary of the Academy, that this word, used diplomatically, applied to the citizens of a republic as well as to those of a monarchy. In order to his entire edification, he had even entered into various details concerning the relations of France with Russia touching emigrants. M. Costaz, convinced by the evidence of these explanations, made his report in a spirit favourable to the article in question; but, intimidated by the violence of the Tribunate, he found fault with the use of the word *subjects*, and related things in a very awkward manner, which was liable to give Russia the appearance of a weak government, delivering up the emigrants to the First Consul, and to the First Consul the appearance of a persecuting government, pursuing the emigrants even into their most distant asylum. M. Costaz, as it frequently happens to circumspect men, who wish to conciliate all parties, equally displeased the opposition and the First Consul, whom he compromised with Russia.

The day for the discussion having arrived—it was the 7th of December, 1801 (16th Frimaire)—the tribune Jard-Panvilliers moved, that the debate should take place in secret committee. This very wise proposal was adopted. No sooner were the tribunes relieved from the presence of the public, which, by the by, was far from favourable to them, than they gave way to the most inconceivable transports of passion. They declared their determination to reject the treaty, and to propose its rejection to the Legislative Body. If ever there was culpable folly, it was this; for, on account of a word, correct, moreover, and perfectly innocent, to reject such a treaty, so long and so difficult to conclude, and which procured peace with the first power of the Continent, was to act like idiots, like lunatics. Messrs. Chénier and Benjamin Constant launched out into the most violent declamations. M. Chénier went so far as to pretend that he had important things to say upon this question, but that he should not say them till the sitting was public, for he wished all France to hear them. He was told that it would be better to begin by communicating them to his own colleagues. He drew back, however; and an unknown tribune, a simple and sensible man, restored the minds of his colleagues to reason by a short speech. “I know nothing of diplomacy,” said he; “I am a stranger both to the art and to its language. But I see in the proposed treaty a treaty of peace. A treaty of peace is a precious thing, which must be adopted entire, with all the words that it contains. Depend upon it that France will not forgive you for its rejection, and that the responsibility which would



rest upon you would be terrible. I move, therefore, that an end be put to the discussion, that the sitting be rendered public, and that the treaty be immediately put to the vote." After this short address, delivered with calmness and simplicity, the assembly was about to vote, when the opposition members moved an adjournment till the next day, on account of the lateness of the hour. The adjournment was carried. On the following day, the tumult was quite as great as it had been the day before. M. Benjamin Constant delivered a written speech, very perspicuous and very subtle. M. Chénier declaimed anew with vehemence, saying that five million Frenchmen had died that they might cease to be *subjects*, and that this word ought to remain buried among the ruins of the Bastile. The majority, weary of all this violence, was about to put an end to it, when a letter from Fleurieu, councillor of State, addressed to Costaz, the reporter, arrived. M. Costaz had treated as official the explanations which he had presented in his report, and had given the assembly to understand that they came from the First Consul. Furnish positive proof of that, was the answer made to him. He had then provoked a declaration from M. Fleurieu, who was the councillor of State appointed to support the bill (*projet*). The latter, after taking the orders of the First Consul, sent the desired declaration, accompanied by numerous corrections, which the report of M. Costaz rendered indispensable, and which revived the debate. M. Ginguené put an end to it by an epigrammatic and not very becoming motion. Acknowledging that it was difficult to reject a treaty of peace, on account of one displeasing word, he proposed the passing of a vote couched in these terms, "For the love of peace, the Tribunate adopts the treaty concluded with the court of Russia."

M. de Girardin, who was one of the most reasonable and intelligent members of the Tribunate, induced the assembly to reject all these propositions, and to pass immediately to the vote. After all, the majority of the Tribunate meant, by its choice of persons, to give the First Consul signs of dissatisfaction; it had no wish to enter upon a struggle, especially on account of a treaty, the rejection of which would have drawn upon it the public animadversion. It was adopted by seventy-seven votes against fourteen. The adoption in the Legislative Body took place without tumult, thanks to the form of the institution.

This scene produced a painful effect in Paris. People did not consider the First Consul as a minister liable to lose the majority, and no fears were entertained for his political existence. He was considered as a hundred times more necessary than a king appeared to be in a well-established monarchy. But they beheld with grief the slightest appearance of fresh troubles; and the friends of a wise liberty asked themselves how, with such a character as that of general Bonaparte, how,

with a constitution, into which the framer had neglected to admit the power of dissolution, such a contest would terminate if it were prolonged?

In fact, if a dissolution had been possible, the difficulty would soon have been solved, for France, when convoked, would not have re-elected one of the adversaries of the government. But, obliged to live together till renewal by one-fifth, the powers were liable, as under the Directory, to some violence the one from the other; and, if such a thing occurred, it was evidently neither the Tribune nor the Legislative Body that could triumph. It needed but an arbitrary act of the First Consul's to reduce to nothing both the Constitution and those who made such a use of it. All wise men, therefore, trembled on seeing this state of things.

The discussion of the Civil Code served only to strengthen these apprehensions. Now that time has obtained universal esteem for that Code, one would scarcely conceive all the objections urged against it at that period. The opposition at first expressed great astonishment on finding that Code so simple, and that it had so little novelty. What, said they, is that all?—in that bill (*projet*) there is no new conception, no great legislative creation which is peculiar to French society, which can stamp it with a particular and durable character; it is but a translation of the Roman or common law. Its authors have taken Domat, Pothier, the Institutes of Justinian, they have digested into French all that they contain; they have divided this into articles, and connected these articles by numbers rather than by a logical deduction; and then they present this compilation to France, as a monument which has a claim to its admiration and its respect! Messrs. Benjamin Constant, Chénier, Ginguené, Andrieux, all of them men who might have employed their understandings to better purpose, jeered the councillors of State, saying, that it was lawyers under the guidance of a soldier who had made this paltry compilation, pompously called the Civil Code of France.

M. Portalis, and the men of sense who were his fellow-labourers, replied that, on the subject of legislation, the point was not to be original, but clear, just, and judicious; that they had not a new society to constitute, like Lycurgus or Moses, but an old society to reform in some points, and to restore in many others; that the French law had subsisted for ten centuries; that it was the produce at once of Roman science, of feudalism, of monarchy, and of the modern spirit, acting together for a long period of time on French manners; that the Civil Law of France, resulting from these different causes, had now to be adapted to a society which had ceased to be aristocratic and become democratic; that it was necessary, for example, to revise the laws relative to marriage, to the paternal authority, to successions, to divest them of every thing that was repugnant

to the spirit of the present time ; that it was necessary to purge the laws relative to property of all feudal servitude ; to draw up this mass of prescriptions in clear, precise language, which should afford no occasion for ambiguities, for endless disputes ; and to put the whole into excellent order ; that this was the only monument to be erected ; and that if, contrary to the intention of its authors, it should happen to surprise by its structure, if it should please a few scholars by new and original views, instead of obtaining the cold and silent esteem of lawyers, it would miss its real aim, though it were to please certain minds, more eccentric than judicious.

All this was perfectly reasonable and true. In this respect, the Code was a masterpiece of legislation. Grave lawyers, full of learning and experience, thoroughly acquainted with the language of the law, under the guidance of a chief—a soldier, it is true, but of a superior mind, capable of deciding their doubts and keeping them to work—had composed this beautiful digest of French Law, completely purified from feudal law. It was impossible to do otherwise or to do better.

It is true that, in this vast Code, one might here and there substitute one word to another word, transpose an article from one place to another place ; one might do it without much danger, but likewise without much utility ; and that is precisely what even well-intentioned assemblies are fond of doing, solely that they may have some hand in the work which is submitted to them. Sometimes, in fact, after the presentation of an important bill (*projet de loi*), we see men of subordinate and ignorant minds lay hold of a legislative work, the fruit of profound experience and long labour, alter this and that, make out of a perfectly connected whole a shapeless incoherent mass, without relation to the existing laws and to real facts. Frequently they act thus, not out of a spirit of opposition, but merely from a fondness for retouching the work of another. Only figure to yourself vehement tribunes, men of little information, exercising themselves in this manner on a code of some thousand articles ! it was enough to make its authors throw up the work in disgust.

The preliminary portion had to sustain the first attack of the critics of the Tribunate. It had been referred to a commission, of which Andrieux was the reporter. This part contained, with the exception of a few unimportant differences in the wording, the same dispositions as were definitively adopted, and which now form the preface, as it were, to that admirable monument of legislation. The first article related to the promulgation of the laws. The ancient system, by virtue of which the law could not be enforced, till the parliaments and the tribunals had assented to its registration, was abandoned. That system had formerly produced the struggle between the parliaments and royalty, a struggle which, in its time, had been a useful correc-

tive of absolute monarchy, but which would have been an egregious blunder, at a period when there existed representative assemblies charged to grant or to refuse taxes. To this system had been substituted the very simple idea of causing the law to be promulgated by the executive power, to render it executable at the seat of the government twenty-four hours after its promulgation, and in the departments after a delay proportioned to the distances. The second article forbade any retro-active effect to the laws. Some great errors of the Convention on this point, rendered that article useful and even necessary. It was requisite to lay it down as a principle, that the law could never disturb the past, and regulate only the future. After limiting the action of the laws as to time, it was necessary to limit their action as to places; to declare what laws should follow Frenchmen out of the territories of France, and be obligatory on them in all places, as those, for instance, which regulated marriages and successions; and what laws should be obligatory on them in the territory of France only, but which within that territory should be obligatory on foreigners as well as on natives of France. The laws relative to the police and to property were to come under this latter head; it was the subject of Article III. The fourth article obliged the judge to try, even when the law appeared to him insufficient. This case had occurred more than once in the transition from one legislation to another. Frequently, in fact, the tribunals had been, for want of laws, really embarrassed to pronounce sentence; frequently, too, they had fraudfully withdrawn themselves from the obligation to render justice. The Court of Cassation and the Legislative Body were beset with addresses for interpretations of laws. It was requisite to prevent this abuse, by obliging the judge to give a decision in all cases; but it was requisite, at the same time, to prevent him from constituting himself legislator. This was the object of Article V., which forbade tribunals to decide any thing but the special case which was submitted to them, and to pronounce by way of general disposition. Lastly, the sixth article limited the natural faculty which all the citizens have to renounce the benefit of certain laws by particular agreements. It rendered the laws relative to public order, to the constitution of families, to good manners, absolute and impossible to be evaded. It decided that no person could withdraw himself from them by any particular agreement.

These preliminary dispositions were indispensable, for it was necessary to declare, somewhere in our legislation, how the laws were to be promulgated, at what moment they became executable, how far their effects extended in regard to time and in regard to place. It was necessary to prescribe to the judges the general mode of the application of the laws, to oblige them to try, but to forbid them to constitute themselves legislators; lastly, it was necessary to render immutable the laws which

constitute social order and morality, and to withdraw them from the variations of particular agreements. If it was indispensable that these things should be written, where was it more proper to be done than at the head of the Civil Code, the first, the most general, the most important of all Codes? Would they have been better placed, for example, at the head of a commercial Code, or a Code of civil proceedings? These general maxims were evidently necessary, well written, and well placed.

It would be difficult to form an idea, at the present day, of the animadversions directed by M. Andrieux against the preliminary part of the Civil Code, in the name of the commission of the Tribunate. In the first place, these dispositions, according to him, might be put anywhere; they belonged no more to the Civil Code than to any other. They might, for instance, be placed at the head of the Constitution, as well as at the head of the Civil Code. That was true; but, since the framer of the Constitution had omitted to place them at the head of it, which was natural, for they had no political character, where could they be better placed than in that Code which might be called the Social Code?

Secondly, the order of these six articles was arbitrary, according to M. Andrieux. The first might be put last, and the last first. This was not quite correct, for, on close examination, it was easy to discover a real logical deduction in the manner in which they were arranged. But, at any rate, what signified the order of these articles, if one was as good as the other? Was not that the best order which eminent lawyers, after the most conscientious labour, had preferred? Were there not natural difficulties enough in this great work, without adding to them puerile difficulties?

Lastly, according to M. Andrieux, it contained general, theoretical maxims, belonging rather to jurisprudence than to the positive law, which disposes and commands. This was false; for the form of the promulgation of the laws, the limit given to their effects, the obligation imposed upon the judges to give judgment and not make regulations, the prohibition of certain particular agreements, contrary to the laws—all this was imperative.

These animadversions, then, were as frivolous as they were ridiculous. They, nevertheless, made an impression on the Tribunate, which deemed them worthy of the greatest attention. Thiessé, the tribune, considered the disposition which denied all retro-active effect to the laws as extremely dangerous and counter-revolutionary. It was annulling, he said, to a certain point, the consequences of the night of the 4th of August; for persons born under the system of the law of primogeniture and of substitutions might allege that the new law relative to the equal division of property was retro-active, in regard to them, and, consequently null, as far as they were concerned.

Such absurdities were supported, and this preliminary part was rejected by sixty-three votes against fifteen. The opposition, delighted with this commencement, resolved to follow up this first success. Agreeably to the Constitution, the Tribunal nominated three orators, to undertake, against three councillors of State, the discussion of the laws before the Legislative Body. Messrs. Thiessé, Andrieux, and Favard were directed to demand the rejection of this preliminary portion. They obtained it by 142 votes against 139.

This result, together with the different votes at the elections, and with the scene occasioned by the word *subjects*, was serious. It was rumoured that the two other parts already presented, *on the enjoyment of civil rights*, and *on the form of the acts of the civil state*, were nearly certain to be rejected also. The report of M. Siméon, on *the enjoyment and privation of civil rights*, was, in fact, in favour of rejection. M. Siméon, so discreet in general, had, among other animadversions, alleged that the proposed law neglected to say that the children born of French parents, in the French colonies, were French by right. We cite this singular objection, because it excited in the First Consul an astonishment mingled with anger. He summoned the Council of State, to consult what was to be done on this occasion. Was the government to persist in the course adopted, or not? Ought the mode of presentation to the Legislative Body to be changed? or would it be better to defer this great work, so impatiently expected, and to put it off till another time? The First Consul was exasperated. "What would you do," he exclaimed, "with people who, before the discussion, said that the councillors of State and the consuls *were downright asses*, and that their work ought to be flung at their heads? What will you do when such a man as Siméon alleges a law to be incomplete, because it does not declare the children of French parents, born in the colonies, to be French? Indeed, one is astounded at such strange aberrations. Even with all the sincerity brought to this discussion in the bosom of the Council of State, we have had the greatest difficulty to agree; how, then, is it possible to succeed in an assembly five or six times as numerous, and which discusses without sincerity? How is an entire code to be drawn up on such conditions? I have read the speech of Portalis to the Legislative Body, in reply to the orators of the Tribunal; he has left them nothing to say; *he has drawn their teeth*. But, let a man be ever so eloquent; let him speak twenty-four hours successively, he will make no impression on a prejudiced assembly, which is determined not to listen to him."

After these complaints, expressed in warm and bitter language, the First Consul asked the opinion of the Council of State as to the best course to be pursued to insure the adoption of the Civil Code by the Tribunal and the Legislative Body.



The subject was not new in the Council of State. The difficulty had been there foreseen, and various means proposed for getting over it. Some proposed the presentation of general principles only, on which the Legislative Body should vote, with the understanding that the developments should afterwards be given, by way of regulations. This was scarcely admissible, for it is difficult to comprehend the general principles of laws, if the developments are drawn up separately. Others proposed a more simple plan—to present the entire Code at once. “You would have no more trouble,” said they, “about the three books of the Code than you have about one. The tribunes would fall foul of the first heads; they would then tire, and let the rest pass. The discussion would thus be abridged by its very immensity.” This course was the most plausible, and the wisest. Unfortunately, several conditions were wanting, in order to its success. The assemblies had not then the faculty of amending the propositions of the government, that permits those little sacrifices, by means of which the vanity of some is gratified and the scruples of others are disarmed, in ameliorating the laws. The opposition members, too, were deficient in that sincerity without which all grave discussion is impossible; and, lastly, the First Consul was deficient in that constitutional patience which the habit of contradiction imparts to men accustomed to representative government. He did not admit that good, sincerely intended and laboriously prepared, ought to be delayed or spoiled, to please what he called babblers.

Some resolute spirits went so far as to propose to present the Civil Code as the treaties were presented, with a law of acceptance beside it, and thus get it voted in the lump by yes or no. This method of proceeding was too dictatorial, and it was not seriously contemplated.

On the recommendation of the most enlightened members, particularly Tronchet, it was resolved to await the fate of the two other heads presented to the Tribunate—“Yes,” said the First Consul, “we can risk two more battles. If we gain them, we shall continue the march that is begun. If we lose them, we must go into winter-quarters, and consider what course to pursue.”

This plan of proceeding was adopted, and the issue of the two discussions was awaited. The public opinion began to be strongly expressed against the Tribunate. The leaders, therefore, bethought them of an expedient to temper the effect of their successive rejections, and that was to intermingle them with an adoption. The head relative to the keeping of *the acts of the civil state* pleased them much in itself, because it sanctioned still more strictly the principles of the Revolution in regard to the clergy, by absolutely forbidding them the registration of births, deaths, and marriages, and attributing it exclusively to the municipal officers. This head, presented by Thibaudeau,

councillor of State, was excellent, but that would not have saved it, if it had not contained dispositions against the clergy. It was, therefore, agreed to adopt it. But, in the order of presentation it should have come third. It was introduced second, and voted without difficulty, to make the more sure of the rejection of the head relative to the *enjoyment and the privation of civil rights*. The latter, brought under discussion in its turn, was rejected in the Tribunate by an immense majority. Its rejection by the Legislative Body was not doubtful. Thus the whole series of difficulties which had been foreseen started forth at once. Those difficulties could not fail to be aggravated, when the laws on marriage, on divorce, and on the paternal authority, should be under Consideration. As for the Concordat and the bill (*projet*) relative to public instruction, there was evidently no chance of succeeding in obtaining their adoption.

But what served to push matters to extremity was a new ballot for members, which assumed the character of direct hostility against the First Consul. The election of the abbé Grégoire as senator had already been carried, in opposition to the wishes of the government, and to give a sign of disapprobation of its religious policy. There were, as we have just seen, two places to fill, and not only were the assemblies desirous to fill them in a manner contrary to the already known intentions of the First Consul in favour of three generals, but they were bent on making such a choice as would be most disagreeable to him. This choice was, therefore, that of M. Daunou. Pains were therefore taken to obtain the presentation of M. Daunou by the two legislative authorities at once, that is to say by the Tribunate and the Legislative Body, which would render his nomination by the Senate almost inevitable.

The most active steps were taken, and votes were solicited, with a boldness which justly excited astonishment, in opposition to so formidable an authority as that of the First Consul.

M. Daunou was balloted for in the Legislative Body against general Lamartillière, the government candidate. Repeated ballots took place. At last, M. Daunou obtained 135 votes, and general Lamartillière 122. He was declared the candidate of the Legislative Body for one of the vacant places in the Senate. In the Tribunate, also, M. Daunou had general Lamartillière for a competitor. He obtained forty-eight votes, general Lamartillière thirty-nine: he was declared candidate. He had, therefore, two presentations for one. This ballot took place on the 1st of January, 1802 (11th Nivôse), the very day on which the head of the Civil Code relative to *the enjoyment and privation of civil rights* was rejected.

According to the ordinary rules of the representative system, one would have been obliged to say, that the majority was lost. But, in this case, the person who must have retired was the First Consul, since he was the grand object of the admiration of France

as well as of the hatred of his enemies. No one, however, set up any pretension to exclude him, because no one possessed the means to do so. It was, therefore, a mere shuffling trick, unworthy of serious men. It was spite the most puerile and, at the same time, the most dangerous; for they were pushing to extremity a violent character, full of the feeling of its strength, and capable of any thing. Cambacérès himself, usually so moderate, regarding the proceedings as absolutely disorderly, said that hostilities so direct could not be suffered, and that, for his part, he could not answer for it that it would be possible to appease the First Consul. The indignation of the latter was, indeed, extreme, and he loudly declared his resolution to rid himself of the obstacles which persons were striving to throw in the way of all the good that he purposed to do.

The following day, the 2nd of January (12th Nivôse), was the day of the decade on which he gave audience to the senators. A great number, even of those who had acted against him, attended. They came, some from curiosity, others from weakness, and to disavow by their presence their participation in what was passing. M. Sieyès was one of the visitors. The First Consul was, as usual, in uniform; his countenance appeared animated, and some violent scene was expected. A circle was formed around him. "You are determined, then, to nominate no more generals," said he; "yet to them you are indebted for peace; this would be the right time for showing your gratitude to them." After these few words, the senators, Kellermann, François de Neufchâteau, and others, were roughly taken to task. They made a very lame defence. The conversation then became general again, and the First Consul, casting his eyes towards M. Sieyès, thus resumed: "There are people," said he, in a very loud voice, "who want to give us a Grand Elector, and who are thinking of a prince of the house of Orleans. This system has its partisans, I know, even in the Senate." These words alluded to a scheme, truly or falsely attributed to M. Sieyès, and reported by his enemies to the First Consul. M. Sieyès, on hearing these offensive words, withdrew blushing. The First Consul, then addressing the assembled senators, added: "I declare to you that, if you nominate M. Daunou senator, I will take it as a personal affront, and you know that I have never yet put up with one."

This scene frightened the mass of the senators present, and grieved the most discreet. These saw with pain, a man so great, so necessary, but so little master of himself when he was offended, urged into such irritation. The malevolent went away, crying that never had members of the bodies of the State been treated in a manner more indecent and more insupportable. Fear had penetrated into those rancorous but timid minds; and that noisy opposition was destined soon to humble itself before the man whom it had attempted to brave.

The consuls discussed among themselves the course to be

pursued. General Bonaparte was bent upon some signal act of violence. If he had possessed legal authority to dissolve the Tribune and the Legislative Body, the solution would have been easy by regular means, and it would have produced, by a general election, a majority entirely favourable to the views of the First Consul. It is true that a general election would have excluded *en masse* the men of the Revolution, and brought forward totally new men, animated, more or less, by royalist sentiments, like those against whom it had been necessary to act on the 18th Fructidor, which would have been a misfortune of another kind. So true it is that, on the morrow of a sanguinary revolution, which had deeply exasperated minds against one another, the free action of constitutional institutions was impossible. To get out of the hands of hot-headed revolutionists, one would have fallen into the hands of evil-disposed royalists. But, at any rate, the law was silent on the subject of dissolution; it was, therefore, requisite to devise some other expedient.

The First Consul proposed to withdraw the Civil Code, to let the Legislative Body and the Tribune keep holiday, to submit nothing to them but the laws of finance; and then, when he should have made all France thoroughly sensible that these bodies were the sole cause of the interruption given to the beneficent operations of the government, to seize an occasion for breaking the inconvenient instruments which the Constitution imposed upon him. But Cambacérès, a man skilful in expedients, found gentler means, the legality of which was defensible enough, and which, moreover, were alone practicable at the moment. He dissuaded his colleague, the general, from any illegal and violent measure. "You can do any thing," said he; "people would put up with it from you. They even permitted the Directory to do what it pleased—the Directory, which had not the advantage either of your glory, or of your moral ascendancy, or of your immense military and political successes. But the arbitrary proceeding of the 18th Fructidor, necessary as it was, ruined the Directory. It rendered the directorial Constitution so despicable, that nobody could afterwards take it in earnest. Ours is much better. With skill to use it, one may do good with it. Let us not then consign it to the public contempt by violating it, on account of the first obstacle that we meet with." Cambacérès admitted that it would be necessary to withdraw the Civil Code, to break off the session, to give a vacation to the deliberative bodies, and to throw upon them, as a subject of serious reproach, the compulsory inaction to which the government would be reduced. But this inaction would be a blind alley, which they must get out of. M. Cambacérès found the means of doing so in Article XXXVIII. of the Constitution, which runs thus: "The first renewal of the

Legislative Body and the Tribune shall not take place before the year X."

It was then the year X. (1801—1802.) Government had a right to choose any period of the year that it pleased for effecting this renewal. It might, for example, proceed to it in the course of the winter, in Pluviôse or Ventôse; then dismiss one-fifth of the Tribune and of the Legislative Body, which would be twenty members for the Tribune, sixty for the Legislative Body; remove in this manner the most hostile, fill their places with discreet, peaceable men, and open an extraordinary session in spring, to obtain the adoption of the laws which were now stopped in their passage by the malevolence of the opposition. This method was evidently the best. By excluding twenty members of the Tribune and sixty of the Legislative Body, the government would remove those restless men who swayed the inert mass, and intimidate such as might be again tempted to resist. But, if it wished to succeed, it must first gain the concurrence of the Senate in two things; firstly, an interpretation of Article XXXVIII., in accordance with the proposed plan; secondly, the exclusion of the opposition members, and the nomination of men devoted to the government to fill their places. M. Cambacérès, thoroughly acquainted with that body, knowing that the mass was timid, and the opposition far from courageous, answered for it that the Senate, when it saw how far it was likely to be hurried beyond the bounds of prudence and reason, would readily comply with all the wishes of the government. Article XXXVIII., the interpretation of which now became an important point, did not specify the mode to be employed for the designation of the fifth that was to go out. In the silence of that article, the Senate, charged to choose, might, if it pleased, prefer the ballot to the lot. Against such an interpretation it might be urged that the constant practice, when an assembly is to be partially renewed, is to have recourse to the lot, in order to designate the portion which is to be first excluded. To this it might be answered that recourse is had to the lot when one cannot do otherwise. One cannot, in fact, apply to several hundred electoral colleges to designate the fifth that is to go out, for to address any part of them is to designate that fifth one's self; to address all is to have recourse to a general election, and, in a general election, one cannot fix beforehand the number of the excluded, for that again would be to designate one's self the fifth to be removed. The lot is, therefore, the only resource, in the ordinary system of elections by electoral colleges. But, having here the Senate, charged to elect, and which could easily be induced to designate by ballot the fifth to be excluded; it was more natural to have recourse to the clear-sighted authority of its votes, than to the blind authority of the lot. The Senate, it is true, was thus made the arbiter

of the question ; but this was acting in conformity with the real spirit of the Constitution ; for, in conferring on the Senate all the prerogatives of the electoral body, it had been made judge of the conflicts which might arise between the legislative majorities and the government. In short, the faculty of dissolution, indispensable in every regular government, was re-established by a subterfuge.

The most important reason was, that the government extricated itself from embarrassment, without ostensibly violating the Constitution. The First Consul declared that he would admit this plan or any other, provided that he were rid of the men who prevented him from pursuing measures conducive to the welfare of France. M. Cambacérès took upon himself the task of preparing a memorial on the subject. A message, was also prepared, to announce to the Legislative Body that the Civil Code was withdrawn. General Bonaparte undertook to draw it up himself in a noble and austere style.

The explosion of his anger began already to be dreaded ; it was said that a manifestation of it would speedily be exhibited. On the day after the scene with the senators, the 3rd of January (13th Nivôse), a message was sent to the president of the Legislative Body. It was read amidst profound silence, which expressed a sort of terror. The message was as follows :

“ Legislators—The government has resolved to withdraw the bills (*projets de loi*) of the Civil Code.

“ It is with pain that it finds itself obliged to defer till a future period the laws so anxiously awaited by the nation ; but it is convinced that the time is not yet come, when these important discussions can be carried on with the calmness and unity of purpose which they require.”

This deserved severity produced the strongest effect. All governments cannot and ought not to use such language ; they must, however, be permitted to do so when they are in the right, and when they have conferred on a country immense glory and immense benefits, repaid by an inconsiderate opposition.

The Legislative Body, intimidated by this blow, fell at the feet of the government in not the most honourable manner. A motion was made that, before it broke up, the assembly should ballot for the presentation of a candidate for the third and last vacant place in the Senate. The same men—will it be believed?—who had so spitefully persisted in presenting Messrs. Grégoire and Daunou, instantly voted for general Lamartillière. He obtained 233 out of 252 votes. It was impossible to comply more promptly with the wishes of the First Consul. In consequence, general Lamartillière was declared the candidate of the Legislative Body.

This presentation furnished the Senate with an expedient for satisfying the First Consul, without humbling itself too deeply.



After the threat held out to the senators at the audience on the 2nd of January, all idea of taking M. Daunou was relinquished. M. Daunou had, nevertheless, been presented by two bodies at once, the Legislative Body and the Tribune. To prefer the government candidate to one, who had in his favour the double presentation of the two legislative assemblies, would be throwing themselves too openly at the knees of the First Consul. A paltry subterfuge was therefore devised, but it did not save the dignity of the Senate, and served only to exhibit its embarrassment in a clearer light. It met on the following day, the 4th of January (14th Nivôse). The presentation of M. Daunou by the Legislative Body had been determined on the 30th of December, that of general Lamartillière on the 3rd of January. The Senate pretended that the resolution of the 30th of December was not communicated, while that of the 3rd of January only had been, and that general Lamartillière was consequently the only known candidate of the Legislative Body. To this subterfuge it added another trick still more paltry. It filled up the second of the three vacant places. Now general Lamartillière was the first, general Jourdan the second, on the list of the First Consul. It affected, therefore, to consider general Jourdan as the government candidate for the place still vacant. The Senate then drew up its decision in these terms:

“Considering the message of the First Consul of the 25th Frimaire, by which he presents general Jourdan; considering the message of the Tribune of the 11th Nivôse, by which it presents citizen Daunou; considering, lastly, the message of the Legislative Body of the 13th Nivôse, by which it presents general Lamartillière, the Senate adopts general Lamartillière, and declares him a member of the Conservative Senate.”

By this device the Senate feigned that it had adopted, not the candidate of the First Consul, but the candidate of the Legislative Body. This was adding to the shame of submission the disgrace of a lie which deceived nobody. Assuredly, it was acting judiciously to give way to an indispensable man, without whom France would have been plunged into chaos, without whom not one of the opposition members would have been sure of keeping his head on his shoulders; but people should have taken care not to affront him, when they knew that they were unable to carry through the affront.

The opposition members in the Tribune loudly inveighed against the weakness of the Senate, a weakness which they were themselves destined soon to imitate, and even to surpass.

The plan adopted by the government was immediately put into execution. The legislative labours were suspended, and it was publicly announced that the First Consul was about to quit Paris for Lyons, and that he would be absent nearly a month.

The object of this journey had the accustomed greatness of the acts of general Bonaparte. It was undertaken for the purpose of constituting the Cisalpine Republic; and 500 deputies, of all ages, and of all conditions, were at this moment crossing the Alps, in a severe winter, to form at Lyons a great diet, by the name of *Consulta*, and to receive, from the hand of general Bonaparte, laws, magistrates, an entire government. It had been agreed that they should meet him half way; and Lyons had been considered, next to Paris, as the most suitable point for such a meeting. Prodigious preparations had been made in that city for this imposing political spectacle. He was also to be surrounded by a great military display; for the 22,000 men left of the army of Egypt, having been landed by the English fleet at Marseilles and Toulon, were on march for Lyons, to be reviewed by their former general.

Nobody bestowed further thought either on the Legislative Body or on the Tribunate. They were left in total inactivity, without any sort of explanation of the plans which the government might have conceived. The Constitution no more conferred the faculty of prorogation than that of dissolution. The two assemblies, therefore, were not dismissed, but they were not furnished with any employment. The government had withdrawn not only the laws of the Civil Code, but also a law relative to the re-establishment of branding for the crime of forgery. This crime, owing to the circumstances of the Revolution, had increased in a frightful manner. So many papers required by the new regulations for the accountable officers of government; so many certificates of civism, formerly indispensable for every one who would not be considered as suspected; so many certificates of presence required of returned emigrants to clear themselves of the offence of emigration; so many verifications of all kinds, demanded and furnished in writing, had given rise to a detestable class of criminals—that of forgers. They infested the sphere of business, as robbers had formerly infested the high roads. The First Consul designed to have a special punishment for them, as he had wished to have a special jurisdiction for the banditti of the highways, and he had proposed branding. “The crime of forgery enriched,” he said; “a forger, who has undergone his punishment, returns into society, and his wealth causes his crime to be forgotten. There ought to be an indelible mark set upon him by the hand of the executioner, which would forbid those complaisant persons, whom opulence always draws around it, to sit at table with the enriched forger.” This proposal had to encounter the same difficulties as the Civil Code. It was withdrawn, and nothing whatever was left under deliberation; for the laws relative to public instruction and to the re-establishment of religious worship had not even been presented. As to the laws of finance, they were reserved to

furnish a pretext for an extraordinary session in the spring. This species of parliament was thus left, not dissolved, not prorogued, idle, useless, weary of its inaction, and bearing, in the eyes of France, the responsibility of the complete interruption of all the excellent and useful operations of the government.

It was agreed that, during the absence of the First Consul, M. Cambacérès, who had peculiar skill in managing the Senate, should take care to get such an interpretation as was desired put upon Article XXXVIII. of the Constitution, and that he should superintend himself the exclusion of the twenty and of the sixty members, whom it was intended to remove from the Tribune and the Legislative Body.

Before he set out, the First Consul had to attend to two important subjects; the expedition of St. Domingo, and the Congress of Amiens. The second detained him beyond the term fixed for his departure.

The desire to possess distant possessions was an old deep-seated feeling of ambition, which the reign of Louis XVI., the palmy days of our navy, had roused, and which subsequent maritime reverses had not yet completely extinguished. The possession of colonies was, at that time, eagerly coveted by all commercial nations. The expedition of Egypt, which had been undertaken with a view of disputing the dominion of the East Indies with the English, was the natural consequence of this universally prevailing inclination, and its unfortunate issue had excited a very earnest desire to compensate for this loss in some other way. The First Consul proposed to indemnify us in two modes, by Louisiana and St. Domingo. He had granted Tuscany, that fertile and valuable portion of Italy, to the court of Spain, in order to obtain Louisiana in exchange: and at this moment he was pressing for the due performance of the engagement entered into by that cabinet. He was determined, at the same time, to repossess himself of the island of St. Domingo. This island, previously to the Revolution, was the first and most important of the West India islands, and the most coveted amongst all the colonies which produced sugar and coffee. It furnished materials to our ports and our navy for the most extensive trade. The imprudent policy of the Constituent Assembly had caused an insurrection of the slaves, and had led to those ever-to-be-lamented horrors, by which the liberty of the blacks was first proclaimed to the world. A negro, endowed with true genius, Toussaint l'Ouverture, had achieved at St. Domingo an humble imitation of that which the First Consul had accomplished in France. He had subdued and established a government over this revolted people, and had succeeded in restoring some degree of order. Thanks to him, the negroes no longer slaughtered each other in St. Domingo, but were beginning to work. He had drawn up a constitution,

which he had submitted to the First Consul for his approbation, and exhibited a sort of national attachment for the mother country. This negro had a profound aversion for British connexion; he only required to be free, but still to continue French. The First Consul had at first acquiesced in this state of things; but, shortly afterwards, conceiving doubts of Toussaint l'Ouverture's fidelity, and, without wishing to bring back the negroes to a state of slavery, he meditated taking advantage of the maritime armistice which succeeded the preliminaries of peace in London, to despatch an expedition to St. Domingo, consisting of a squadron and an army. With regard to the blacks, the First Consul contemplated the continuance of that condition which events had brought about. He intended, in all the colonies which the spirit of revolt had not pervaded, still to uphold slavery, relaxing, however, its rigour; but in St. Domingo to tolerate freedom, which had now become impossible of restraint. But he meant fully to establish the authority of the parent country in this latter island, and, for that purpose, to keep an army stationed there. In the event of the blacks, after their emancipation, becoming disloyal subjects, or of the English renewing the war, his intention was, without interfering with the freedom of the blacks, to reinstate the proprietors in the possession of their colonial estates, as they filled all Paris with their complaints of their lamentable poverty, and with their imprecations against Toussaint l'Ouverture's government. A considerable portion of the French nobility, already deprived of their property in France by the Revolution, were also proprietors of estates in St. Domingo, and had been plundered of the rich possessions which they had formerly held in that island. They were refused the restoration of their estates in France, as they had become national domains; but it was in our power to restore to them their sugar and coffee plantations in St. Domingo, and this compensation seemed in some measure to satisfy them. These were the various motives which influenced the proceedings of the First Consul. To recover the greater part of our colonies, to hold it, not by the tenure of the doubtful fidelity of a black raised to dictatorial power, but by force of arms; to keep firm possession of it against the blacks and the English; to restore to the old colonists their estates, which were to be cultivated by free labour; finally, to connect this queen of the West Indies with the mouth of the Mississippi by the acquisition of Louisiana—such were the combined objects which the First Consul had in view; a combination of objects certainly much to be regretted, as will soon be seen, but imperatively required, so to speak, by the general opinion prevalent in France at that period.

It was very important to use the utmost expedition, as, although the definitive peace negotiated at this moment at the Congress of Amiens was almost certain, yet it was necessary, at all

events, in case the English should raise new and inadmissible pretensions, to take advantage of the interval during which the seas would be open to despatch the fleet. The First Consul caused an immense armament to be prepared at Flushing, Brest, Nantes, Rochefort, and Cadiz, consisting of twenty-six ships of the line, and twenty frigates, capable of transporting 20,000 men. He appointed admiral Villaret-Joyeuse to the command of the squadron, and general Leclerc, one of the best officers of the army of the Rhine, to the command of the troops; the latter had recently married his sister Pauline. He insisted upon his sister accompanying her husband to St. Domingo. He loved her with tender affection; he, therefore, sent thither one of the objects most dear to him, and he had no intention at the time, as party rancour subsequently ascribed to him, to transport to an unhealthy climate, subject to dangerous fevers, those soldiers and generals of the army of the Rhine who had given him umbrage. Another circumstance fully proves the feeling which actuated him in the selection of the corps sent to St. Domingo. As peace appeared, at that time, likely to become general, military men were under the apprehension that their vocation would cease. Great numbers solicited permission to join the expedition, and this favour was distributed amongst them with a due regard to justice and equality in the various appointments. The brave Richepanse, the hero of the army of Germany, was appointed lieutenant under general Leclerc.

The First Consul applied his accustomed energy to the speedy completion of these preparations, and as much as possible urged the departure of the several naval divisions, distributed in the various ports situated between Holland and the southern extremity of the Peninsula. However, before they set sail, he was under the necessity of coming to an explanation with the English ministry, to whom this vast armament occasioned considerable misgivings. He had some difficulty in satisfying them upon this subject, although, in fact, they were rather desirous that the expedition should proceed. They were not, at that time, so eager for the emancipation of the negroes as the English ministers have since that time appeared to be. The freedom of the blacks of St. Domingo, inspired them with great alarm for their own colonies, and above all for Jamaica. They were anxious, therefore, for the success of our enterprise; but the extent of the means employed disturbed them, and they would have preferred the troops being sent over in transports. We succeeded, however, in inducing them to listen to reason; and they reluctantly acquiesced in allowing this immense armament to put to sea, at the same time despatching a squadron to watch its movements. They even promised to place all the provisions and ammunition which the resources of Jamaica could command at the disposal of the French army, subject, of course, to payment for whatever might be supplied. The chief

naval division, equipped at Brest, set sail on the 14th of December. The others followed shortly afterwards. By the end of December, the whole expedition had put to sea, and would consequently reach St. Domingo, whatever might be the final result of the negotiations of Amiens.

These negotiations, conducted by lord Cornwallis and Joseph Bonaparte, proceeded slowly, without, however, giving apprehension of a rupture. The first cause of delay had arisen from the actual composition of the Congress, which was to embrace not only the French and English plenipotentiaries, but also the Dutch and Spanish plenipotentiaries; as, after the preliminaries, peace was to be concluded between the two great belligerent nations and all their allies. Spain, which, from a state of close amity, had gone almost to the other extreme of hostility, thwarted the views of the First Consul by not sending her plenipotentiaries to the Congress. As, in point of fact, she knew that peace was inevitable, and that she should only appear in the protocol for the purpose of surrendering Trinidad, she did not hurry herself in sending her negotiator to the meeting. The English, on their part, were anxious to have a Spanish ambassador at the Congress of Amiens, in order to obtain a formal cession of the island of Trinidad. They even intimated that they would not enter into negotiation if the Spanish ambassador were not present. The First Consul was under the necessity of assuming a tone with the court of Spain, which should rouse her from her apathy, and he ordered general St. Cyr, who had been appointed ambassador in the room of Lucien, to lay before the king and queen the extravagant conduct of the prince of the Peace, and to declare to them that, if such a course of conduct were persevered in, it would end in some thunder-clap.\*

---

\* The following important letter will enable us to form a correct opinion of the relations between France and Spain at this juncture :—

“To citizen Saint Cyr, ambassador at Madrid.

“10th Frimaire, year X., 1st of December, 1801.

“The conduct of the cabinet of Madrid becomes a riddle to me. I enjoin you, especially, citizen ambassador, to take every means to open the eyes of this cabinet, to induce it to adopt some consistent and becoming course of proceeding. It has appeared so important to me, that I have thought it my duty to write to you myself on the subject.

“The most intimate union subsisted between France and Spain when his Majesty thought proper to ratify the treaty of Badajoz.

“M. the Prince of the Peace transmitted at that time a note to our ambassador, a copy of which I have ordered to be transmitted to you. This note was couched in such offensive terms as rendered it quite impossible for me to pay any attention to it. A few days afterwards, he forwarded to the French ambassador at Madrid a note, in which he declared that his Catholic Majesty was about to make his peace separately with England. I also order a copy of this letter to be sent to you. I felt at that time what little reliance I could have upon the support of a power, whose minister expressed himself so unbecomingly, and manifested such inconsistency in his conduct. Being fully conscious of the good intentions of the king, I should have made him ac-



The Spanish minister destined to figure so conspicuously at the Congress of Amiens, M. Campo-Arlange, was ill in Italy. Spain at length determined to give orders to M. d'Azara, ambassador at Paris, to repair to the Congress. This difficulty got over with the Spaniards, there was still another to overcome with the Dutch. The Dutch plenipotentiary, M. Schimmelpenninck, would not admit the basis of the preliminaries, that is to say, the cession of Ceylon, before he was aware how Holland would be treated with respect to the restitution of her fleets put into the possession of England; with respect to the indemnities laid claim to on behalf of the dispossessed stadtholder; and finally, with respect to certain questions of limits on the French side. Joseph Bonaparte received orders to notify to M. Schimmelpenninck, that he would only be received at Congress, on the condition of his first admitting the preliminaries of London as the basis of the negotiation. Lord Cornwallis having expressed himself satisfied with this formality, the Congress thus became constituted.

Nevertheless, the English were anxious to introduce Portugal as a party, under the pretence that she was an ally of England. The real secret motive was, to procure the exemption of the court of Lisbon from the payment of the contribution of 20,000,000 frs.

---

acquainted directly with the improper conduct of his minister, if the illness of his Majesty had not supervened.

"I have several times intimated to the court of Spain that its refusal to execute the convention of Madrid, that is to say to occupy a fourth part of the Portuguese territories, would lead to the loss of Trinidad; no attention has been paid to these observations.

"In the negotiations which have taken place in London, France has contended for the interests of Spain, just as she would have done for herself; but, as, after all, his Britannic Majesty would not give up Trinidad, I could no longer insist upon it, especially as Spain, in an official note, threatened France with a private negotiation; we could no longer rely upon her assistance in continuing the war.

"The Congress of Amiens has met, and a definitive treaty of peace will be signed; nevertheless, his Catholic Majesty has not yet published the preliminaries, nor intimated in what manner he wishes to treat with England. It, however, becomes very essential to his position among European powers, and to the interests of his crown, that he should make up his mind without delay, without which a definitive peace will be shortly signed without his being a party to it.

"It has been reported to me, that at Madrid they want to retract their bargain respecting the cession of Louisiana; France has never swerved from the strict fulfilment of any treaty made with her, and she will not permit any power to be wanting to her in this respect. The king of Tuscany is seated upon his throne, and in possession of his States, and his Catholic Majesty is too well aware of the faith due to his engagements to refuse any longer to put us in possession of Louisiana.

"I desire you will express to their Majesties my extreme displeasure at the unjust and inconsistent conduct of the prince of the Peace.

"During the last month, this minister has spared neither insulting notes nor hazardous measures; every thing he had in his power to do against France he has done. If this system of conduct be persevered in, tell the Queen, and the prince of the Peace, boldly, that it will end by some unexpected thunder-clap."

which had been imposed upon it by one of the conditions of the treaty of Madrid. The First Consul refused his consent to this, declaring that peace between France and Portugal was already made, and nothing more had to be done. This pretension being set aside, the Congress set to work, and the basis was soon agreed upon.

In order to avoid incalculable difficulties, it was agreed that every demand should be rejected if it did not fall within the scope of the preliminaries. *Nothing more, nothing less than the articles of London*, was the rule thus reciprocally laid down. The English had, in fact, again brought under discussion the subject of the abandonment of the island of Tobago by France. The First Consul, on the part of France, had demanded an extension of territory in the region of Newfoundland, for the improvement of the French fisheries. These several pretensions were mutually rejected, and, to put an end to similar claims, it was agreed not to entertain any subject of further concessions, but what was contained in the preliminary treaty. Otherwise, by reviving the difficulties which had been so happily overcome, peace itself might be placed in jeopardy. This principle being laid down, it only remained to draw up the formal *precis* of the preliminaries stipulated in London.

Two important points remained to be resolved: the payment of the cost of supporting the prisoners, and the administrative government proper to be established in Malta.

The number of French prisoners supported by England far exceeded the number of English prisoners maintained by France, and the English accordingly claimed reimbursement of the difference. France rejoined, that the principle generally admitted was, that each nation should maintain the prisoners which she had made; that, if a different principle were acted upon, France would have to require repayment for the Russian, Bavarian, and other soldiers, in the pay of England, whom she had taken prisoners and supported; that all soldiers paid by England should be included in the number of prisoners whom she was bound to maintain. "Besides," added the French plenipotentiary, "it is purely a question of amount, which can be settled by means of commissioners specially appointed for the liquidation of such claims."

With respect to Malta, the question was of a more serious nature. The English and the French greatly distrusted each other on this subject. They seemed to have a foresight into futurity, each fearing that, at some subsequent period, the island would again fall into the hands of one power or the other. The First Consul, by a singular instinct, proposed utterly to destroy all the military works, to leave only the dismantled city, to establish a great neutral lazaretto, open to all nations, and to convert the Order into an hospitable foundation, wholly divested of any military attributes.

This proposition did not satisfy the English. They alleged that the rock was naturally so strong a defence that, even stripped of the fortifications, raised at successive periods by the knights, it would still remain a formidable place of strength. They urged, also, that the Maltese people would offer great resistance to the destruction of these fine fortresses, and proposed the reconstitution of the Order upon a new and more solid basis. They had no objection to allow the French language still to be used there, stipulating only that a college should be instituted for teaching the English and also the Maltese language; the latter for the advantage of the Maltese people, who should have a share in its management; they were desirous of placing this new settlement under the guarantee of some great power, Russia for example. The English were in hopes that, with the English and Maltese languages spoken by the people, who would be devoted to them, they should still have an influence in the island, which would prevent the French from again obtaining possession of it.

The First Consul insisted upon the destruction of the fortifications, stating that at present it would be very difficult to reconstitute the Order; that already Bavaria had seized upon their property in Germany; that Spain, since the establishment of Russian protection over Malta, meditated the same thing, and to appropriate the lands situated in her territory; that the institution of Protestant knights would be a conclusive reason with her; that the Pope, already very adverse to every thing which was done with regard to the Order, would not, under any consideration, give his assent to these new arrangements, and that France had not the requisite means of affording instruction so as to secure the introduction of the French language, inasmuch as her present laws did not permit, under any modification, the re-establishment of an order of nobility. He was ready, if it were insisted upon, to assent to the re-establishment of Malta upon its ancient basis, with the preservation of the existing fortifications, but without either the French or English languages, and that the island should be placed under the guarantee of the court situated nearest to it, namely, that of Naples. He rejected the guarantee of Russia.

None of the continental arrangements were touched upon. The First Consul had expressly forbidden the French legation to allude to them. Nevertheless, as the king of England took a deep interest in the house of Orange, now deprived of the stadtholdership, the First Consul was willing to take upon himself to procure for it a territorial compensation in Germany, when the great question of the German indemnities should be determined. In return, he demanded the restitution, either in ships or in money, of the Dutch fleet carried off by the English.

In the main, there was nothing in all this absolutely irreconcilable; inasmuch as the question of the prisoners was one

purely of money, which could be arranged by means of a joint commission. The question of Malta was of more difficult solution, as it involved a feeling of mutual distrust. It was important to discover, and it was within the scope of possibility, some specific scheme which should remove the fears of all parties of an eventual contingency which might happen; namely, the sudden occupation of the island by one of the two great maritime nations. As regarded the stadtholder, nothing was more easy, since both parties were agreed upon that subject.

The First Consul was anxious to bring things to a conclusion as soon as possible. He wished to have the treaty ready on his return from Lyons, as he intended to present this state document (which rendered the general peace complete), together with the Concordat, and the laws relating to finance, to the new Legislative Body. He therefore gave orders to his brother Joseph not to make unnecessary difficulties in the adjustment of the remaining details, but to get the treaty signed with as little delay as possible.

The First Consul left Paris on the 8th of January (18th Nivôse), accompanied by his wife and a numerous military escort, to proceed to Lyons. M. de Talleyrand had preceded him, in order to arrange all the business, so that, upon the First Consul's arrival, it would only be necessary to give his sanction, by his presence, to the plans submitted to him. The winter was very severe; nevertheless all the Italian deputies were already assembled, and impatient to see general Bonaparte, the great object of their journey.

The time had now arrived for the regulation of the affairs of Italy, by constituting the Cisalpine Republic a second time. M. de Talleyrand was greatly opposed to this step. This minister dwelt upon the great difficulty of carrying on business in a republic; he cited the examples of the Dutch, Helvetic, Ligurian, Roman, and Parthenopean republics, and pointed out the difficulties, under which they had formerly laboured, or were at present labouring. He said, that there were quite enough of these offsets of the French Republic, that not one more was necessary; and he suggested in lieu either a principality or a monarchy, similar to that of Etruria, which could be conferred upon some prince, a friend and dependent upon France. He would not have objected to grant this State to a prince of the house of Austria, to the grand-duke of Tuscany for instance, who must be indemnified in Germany, if he were not indemnified in Italy. This arrangement, which would have been highly agreeable to Austria, would have strongly influenced her to remain at peace. It would have equally satisfied the German powers, who, by this plan, would have had one co-participator the less to indemnify with the lands of the ecclesiastical princes. Above all, it would have highly pleased the Pope, who cherished the hope that the Legations would be restored to him, when we should be

released from the promises made respecting the Cisalpine. This arrangement, in one word, was in accordance with the general opinions of all Europe; as it extinguished one republic, and left one territory more to be appropriated, and made a corresponding diminution of one State the less under the direct dominion of the French Republic.

Undoubtedly, to render, in any way, the greatness of France less insupportable to the nations of Europe, was a reason of very great weight, as thereby the probability of the longer duration of peace would be considerably increased. Now that France had the Rhine and the Alps for her frontiers; now that she had Switzerland, Holland, Spain, and Italy, under her immediate control; now that she held Piedmont directly, with the general though tacit consent of all the powers; now that she had reached to this height of greatness, the most moderate line of policy was, from this moment, the most rational and prudent. In this view of the case, M. de Talleyrand was certainly in the right. Nevertheless, after all that had been already done, we were compulsorily under the obligation of reconstituting Italy; and, as Austria had been now deprived of it, it was necessary to devise a plan of making the loss irrevocable, which could only be accomplished by constituting it upon a firm and independent footing. By this act, we only endangered a collision with Austria, and one only of the hundred battles since fought, for the purpose of creating French kingdoms throughout the continent, would have sufficed to consolidate for ever in Europe any state of things we might have chosen to establish in Italy.

Upon this plan, we must have renounced the possession of Piedmont, as, if the Italians prefer the French to the Germans, at the bottom they are not attached to either, inasmuch as both are regarded by them as foreigners. This is a natural and legitimate feeling which ought to be respected. The French, by keeping Italy under their protection, without having actual possession of it, would have secured the permanent attachment of the people, and would not have superinduced those sudden revulsions of feeling, which they have so often exhibited, since, bandied between the French and the Germans, they have incessantly changed masters. Under this arrangement, Etruria ought not to have been granted to a Spanish prince. Then, by uniting Lombardy, Piedmont, the duchies of Parma and Modena, Mantua, the Legations, and Tuscany, a magnificent country would have been formed, extending from the Maritime Alps to the Adige, from Switzerland to the Roman State. It would have been easy to detach, either in Tuscany or in Romagna, a portion of territory to indemnify the Pope, whose devotion could not last long, unless, sooner or later, we administered to his poverty. It would have been necessary to unite these different provinces under one federative government,

in which the executive power should be strongly constituted, so as to enable it to concentrate its forces promptly, and afford time to our armies to repair to its assistance. The alliance between this State and France should be, in fact, most intimate, as it could not exist but through her; and France, on her side, must at all times have a deep interest in her permanent stability.

An Italian state, containing 10,000,000 or 12,000,000 of inhabitants, possessing admirable frontiers, with the sea on both sides, with a certain chance, at the first favourable war, of augmenting its territory by the addition of the Venetian States, and of extending its line along the natural boundaries of Italy, that is to say, the Julian Alps; embracing, within its limits at a later period, the newly-constituted Genoese Republic, by means of a simple federative tie, which might leave each principality its respective independence, retaining the Pope, with the necessary conditions for his political and religious authority, including, also, the state of Naples, delivered from an incapable and sanguinary court; such a State, thus constituted, and with the additions which futurity might bring, would be the foundation of Italian regeneration, and would create a third federation, which, added to the two already existing, the German and the Swiss, would contribute immensely to the adjustment of the general balance of Europe.

With regard to the difficulty of governing Italy, that could be solved by its being placed under the protectorate of France, which, if only prolonged for one entire reign, would thus, in the infancy of the State, direct it in the path of liberty and independence.

Now, the plan actually followed at this moment did not exclude the possibility of this bright futurity, inasmuch as Piedmont might be, some day, restored to the new Italian State, the duchy of Parma, at the decease of the present duke—an event which, according to all probability, could not be far distant; Etruria itself might be restored, if it were found expedient. It was, therefore, easy to recur to this plan at a future period, and a firm and ample foundation was now being laid, by constituting the Cisalpine into an independent republic. Moreover, perhaps, it was better, at the moment, not to avow unreservedly the project of Italian regeneration, in order to avoid frightening Europe. But, to parcel out the five provinces we had already, into inconsiderable fragments, as M. de Talleyrand proposed, for the purpose of constructing one more diminutive kingdom for the benefit of an Austrian prince, was, in point of fact, handing over Italy to Austria; as this prince, whatever might be done, would always be essentially an Austrian, and the people themselves, whose hopes would have been unworthily betrayed, conceiving a well-founded hatred against France, would fly back to the Germans, out of a feeling of resentment and despair.



General Bonaparte, who had acquired his first and perhaps his greatest glory by delivering Italy from the hands of the Austrians, was not capable of committing such an error. He adopted a middle course, which did not stand in the way of an extensive scheme of Italian independence at a future period, and which, indeed, might be the commencement of it at the present time.

He accordingly bestowed upon the Cisalpine Republic the whole of Lombardy, as far as the Adige, together with the Legations and the duchy of Modena; every thing, in short, which it possessed at the peace of Campo-Formio. The duchy of Parma remained in abeyance; Piedmont, for the present, appertained to France. The Cisalpine thus constituted, contained a population of nearly 5,000,000 of people. It could easily be made to produce 70,000,000 or 80,000,000 frs., and to maintain an army of 40,000 men, which would not absorb more than one-half of its revenue, leaving sufficient resources to pay conveniently the charges of the civil government. It was protected on the north by the Alps and the Adige; on the left, it had Piedmont, now a French dependency; on the right, the Adriatic; and, on the south, Tuscany, placed under the protection of France. It was thus supported on all sides by our protective power. Immense fortified works, ordered by general Bonaparte, who was guided in their construction by that consummate quicksightedness and experience of the country, which no one in the world possessed in the same degree, must render it impregnable to the Austrians, and always capable of being timely relieved by the French. The Adige was fortified from Rivoli to Legnago, in such a manner that it could not be crossed. The environs of the Lago di Garda, and especially the position of the Rocca d'Anfo, were sufficiently well closed, so as to prevent the possibility of the line of the Adige being turned. The Mincio formed a second line in the rear. Peschiera and Mantua, with a great augmentation of territory, added considerable strength to this second line of defence. Mantua, especially, improved both in respect to the strength and healthiness of the place, might still hold out by itself, even if the Adige were forced. The object of other works was to insure at all times the arrival of the French armies. They could debouch, first by the Valais, into the Milanese, over the road of the Simplon; secondly, by Savoy, or by Provence into Piedmont, over Mont Cenis, Mont Genève, or the Col de Tende. It has been stated, that works were ordered to be executed, which would shortly render these four roads passable for any purpose of conveyance. It was requisite to erect solid *points d'appui*, with vast military establishments, adapted both to receive any French army, which might be suddenly compelled to evacuate the country, or if necessary, to serve the same army to debouch, when again in a state to resume the offensive. For these purposes, two sta-

tions had been pitched upon, and a vast expense had been incurred to render them effective; one at the debouché of the Simplon road, the other at the debouché of the three roads of Mont Cenis, Mont Genèvre, and the Col de Tende. The first, and the smaller of the two, was to be situated at the extremity of the Lago Maggiore. According to the plan upon which it was to be constructed, it would be capable of containing the sick, the wounded, the stores of the troops when retreating, as also the flotilla of the lake, and would be able to hold out, if invested, for three or four weeks, until an army, crossing the Simplon, could advance to its assistance. The second, and the larger fortress destined to keep Piedmont in check, and for the reception of the whole resources of the French armies, to serve also as a *point d'appui*, and as a means of descending at all times into Italy, as strong, as extensive as that of Mayence, Metz, or Lille, capable of sustaining a long siege, was to be erected at Alexandria. This point, contiguous to the field of battle of Marengo, was most favourably adapted for any great military movements, of which Italy might become the theatre. Turin was too much under the influence of a numerous, and, in some cases, hostile population. Pavia was beyond the Po. Alexandria, between the Po and the Tanaro, at the real debouché of all the roads, united great advantages, and on this account was preferred. Vast works were ordered to be executed. These latter being situated in Piedmont, the expenses were to be defrayed by the French treasury; all the others were to be paid out of the funds of the Cisalpine, as they more particularly concerned her interests.

Owing to these arrangements, France was, at all times, in a position to throw succours into the Cisalpine; she held Upper and Middle Italy under her control, and ruled over Southern Italy by her influence. She might transmit to Rome and to Naples her less ostensible commands, but they would be as much obeyed, as in Turin or in Milan.

It was necessary to confer some form of government upon this Cisalpine Republic. A beginning had been made, by the appointment of provisional authorities, consisting of an executive committee of three members, Messrs. de Somma-Riva, Visconti, and Ruga, and of a *Consultum*, a sort of legislative assembly, of limited number, chosen from amongst the wisest men, most devoted to our interests. But such a state of things could not be of long duration.

The First Consul had with him in Paris, the minister of the Cisalpine, M. de Marescalchi, besides Messrs. Aldini, Serbelloni, and Melzi, sent to France respecting the affairs of Italy. They were the most important personages of their own country. The First Consul consulted them upon the organisation best adapted for the new republic, and in concurrence with

them, digested a Constitution, resembling both the French, and the ancient Italian constitutions.

In lieu of the list of notables of M. Sieyès, which began to be decried in France, the First Consul and his fellow-labourers devised three electoral colleges, permanent and for life, with power to fill up vacancies occasioned by death. The first was to consist of great landed proprietors, to the number of 300 ; the second of the chief merchants, to the number of 200 ; the third, of literary and learned men, and the most distinguished clergy of Italy, to the number of 200. These three colleges, were to select from their own body a committee consisting of twenty-one members, called the *Commission de Censure*, whose province was to elect all the bodies of the State, and to perform the same electoral duty which the Senate fulfilled in France.

This creative authority was afterwards to nominate, under the designation of the *Consultum* of State, a Senate of eight members empowered, like that of France, to watch over the Constitution ; to decide upon extraordinary emergencies ; to order under arrest any dangerous individual ; to exclude from the pale of the Constitution any department which might have deserved it ; to deliberate upon treaties, and to nominate the President of the Republic. One of these eight members was *ex officio* minister of foreign affairs.

There was to be a Council of State under the title of Legislative Council, composed of six members, to digest the laws and regulations, and to support them before the Legislative Body ; finally, a Legislative Body of seventy-five members, which was to select from this number fifteen orators, whose duty would be to discuss before it, the laws upon which it might be afterwards required to vote.

Finally, at the head of this Republic were to be a president and a vice-president, appointed for ten years. These were, as we have just said, to be nominated by the *Consultum* of State or Senate ; but all the other authorities could only be formed by the choice of the *Commission de Censure*.

These functionaries of every grade were to derive considerable emoluments from their respective offices.

It may be perceived that it was an imitation of the French Constitution, with corrections, or in other words an improved edition of the work of M. Sieyès. For the list of notables were substituted three electoral colleges constituted for life. The Senate, or the *Consultum* of State, had not the power of election ; it only nominated the chief of the executive power, but it deliberated on treaties, which by this arrangement were withdrawn from the tumultuous discussions of the assemblies. The Tribunate was merged into the Legislative Body. In lieu of three consuls, there was to be one president.

When the First Consul had determined, in conjunction with Messrs. Marescalchi, Aldini, Melzi, and Serbelloni, upon the adoption of this scheme of government, it became necessary to think of the persons who were to compose this government. The selection of these was of the more consequence, as the permanence of the principal bodies was of greater importance, and the good or evil resulting from their composition, would endure for a longer period. Now Italy was split, like France, into parties difficult to conciliate. On the one hand, there were the partisans of the past order of things, devoted to the Austrian government; and, on the other extreme, the *ultra* patriots, ready, as in all places, for the perpetration of all kinds of excesses, but who as yet had not shed blood, kept under restraint as they had been by the French army. Besides these, between the two, were the moderate liberals, bearing the weight of the government, with all the unpopularity incident thereto, especially in time of war, when very heavy burdens must unavoidably be imposed upon the country. With these different parties the elections could not, as in France, produce satisfactory results. The First Consul, in order to supersede the necessity for these elections, fixed upon a plan, which was not on his part the inspiration of ambition, but rather of great good sense; this was to nominate himself the persons who should compose this government, in the same way as he had just decided upon its structure, and thus, for the first time, to make the whole of the appointments, by virtue of his own absolute authority. In taking this step he was only actuated by a desire to do good, and at all events he had an undoubted right to act as he deemed fit; as this new State was created by a simple act of his will, and in constituting it in this spontaneous manner, he had a right to model it agreeably to his own views, which, on this occasion, were unquestionably both pure and exalted.

But, amongst all these appointments, the most difficult to be decided upon was that of President. Italy, always governed by priests and foreigners, had not been able to produce statesmen; nor was there amongst them one single illustrious name, before which the others could consent to waive their own pretensions. The First Consul, accordingly, conceived the idea of conferring upon himself the dignity of President, and of nominating a Vice-President, selected from amongst the most distinguished Italian personages, to whom he could delegate the details of affairs, reserving to himself the supreme direction. For the infancy of the Republic, this was the only practicable system of government. Had it been given up to its own choice, and to an Italian president, it would soon have been like a ship left without compass, exposed to the mercy of the waves; but, the government being administered, on the contrary, by Italians, and directed at a distance by the man to whom it owed its origin, and who would remain, for a long time to come, its

protector, the great probability was that, under such a system, it would be at once both independent and well governed.

For this purpose, a solemn, imposing inauguration, was necessary, when the Constitution should be granted to the new State in due form, and all the authorities publicly proclaimed. This act of inauguration could not be celebrated with too much splendour. It should simultaneously address itself to Italy and to all Europe. The First Consul conceived the idea of a vast meeting of all the Italians at Lyons, as it was too far for them to repair to Paris, and too far for him to go to Milan. The city of Lyons, which is situated on this side of the Alps, and in which Italy, in former days, had assembled in council, was the spot naturally pointed out by circumstances. The First Consul, moreover, took an earnest and sincere interest in bringing Italians and Frenchmen to mingle in each others' society. He even aimed, by this means, at re-establishing the trade between the two countries, as it was at Lyons that the produce of Lombardy was formerly exchanged for the products of our Eastern provinces.

Some intimation of these views was given by M. de Talleyrand to the Italians sent to Paris, that is to say, Messrs. Marescalchi, Aldini, Serbelloni, and Melzi. He was only silent upon that part of the scheme which had reference to the conferring the presidency upon the First Consul. This he wished to elicit from the *Consultum*, by a burst of enthusiasm, at the period when it should assemble. The views of the First Consul were too much in conformity with the real interests of the whole country of Italy, not to meet with unanimous concurrence. Accordingly, these personages set out, and, accompanied by M. Petiet, the French minister at Milan, a wise and influential man, repaired to Lyons to perfect the plan of organisation, which had been concerted at Paris.

The scheme of the new Constitution encountered no opposition. It was received with great satisfaction, as the people were eager to emerge from the precarious state in which they lived, and to acquire a political existence well secured to them. The executive committee, and the *Consultum*, who were invested with the provisional authority, accepted the project with alacrity, with the exception of some slight modifications in the details, which were transmitted to Paris for approval, and there sanctioned. But they were very much perplexed as to the mode of first giving vitality to the new Constitution, and as to the choice of the persons who were to set it in motion. M. Petiet secretly communicated to several influential personages the idea of giving up to the First Consul the nomination of all the members of the government, from the president down to the three electoral colleges. No sooner was this idea of a supreme arbiter, so admirably situated with regard to them, as to be perfectly exempt from all the passions and prejudices which divided the

Italians, and who could only be actuated by a desire for their happiness, no sooner was this idea broached than it instantly succeeded, and the provisional government forthwith yielded up to the First Consul the power of choosing all the authorities.

A message was addressed to him, to announce to him the formal acceptance of the Constitution, and to express to him the wish of the Cisalpine people, to see the first magistrate of the French Republic exercise himself the power of choosing the magistrates of the Italian Republic.

They went no further than this, and not a word was said respecting the presidency. But it was expedient to induce the Italians to come to Lyons, and this formed the subject of a fresh communication to the members of the provisional government. They were made sensible of the extreme difficulty of constituting the Cisalpine Republic, with the First Consul residing at Paris, and who would have to select individuals to fill 700 or 800 offices, when he was necessarily at a distance both from them and their respective localities; the difficulty was also dwelt upon, of the First Consul making a journey from Paris to Milan; on the contrary, the great advantage of dividing the distance; of assembling all the Italians in a body at Lyons; of the First Consul repairing thither; of forming there a sort of great Italian diet, where the new Republic would be constituted, with a pomp and splendour which would give more solemnity to the engagement made by the First Consul on its creation, to maintain and to defend it. This idea carried something noble in it, which was calculated to please the imagination of the Italians. It succeeded just like the arrangements concerted beforehand, and was immediately adopted. A scheme was already prepared, and it was converted into a decree by the provisional government. Deputations were appointed, the members of which were chosen from the clergy, the nobility, the great landed proprietors, the mercantile body, the universities, the tribunals, and the national guards. Four hundred and fifty-two persons were selected, amongst whom were to be found venerable prelates, greatly advanced in years, some of whom would probably sink under the fatigues of the journey. They set out in the month of December, and crossed the Alps during one of the most rigorous winters that had been experienced for a long time. They were all anxious to be present at this proclamation of the independence of their country, by the hero who had achieved it. The roads of the Milanese, of Switzerland, and of the Jura were completely obstructed by the travellers. The First Consul, whose foresight extended to every thing, had given orders that these representatives of Italian nationality should want for nothing either on their journey or at Lyons, as, by their presence, they revived the recollection of his earliest and brightest triumphs. The prefect of the Rhône had made immense pre-



parations for their reception, and fitted up spacious and magnificent halls for the solemnities which were to take place. A portion of the consular guard had been sent to Lyons. The army of Egypt, formerly the army of Italy, had recently landed on its return. It was magnificently clothed in a short time, and in a manner suitable to the French climate, which seemed quite new to the soldiers, who were tanned by an Egyptian sun, so much so as to be transformed in appearance into complete Africans. The Lyonese youth had been collected, and formed into a body of cavalry, with the arms and colours of the ancient city of Lyons. M. de Talleyrand, and M. Chaptal, the minister of the interior, had preceded the First Consul on his journey, for the purpose of receiving the members of the *Consultum*. General Murat and M. Petiet had hastened from Milan, and M. Marescalchi from Paris to the general place of rendezvous. The prefects and authorities of the twenty departments were collected at Lyons. The First Consul kept them waiting, on account of the Congress of Amiens, the negotiations of which required his presence for some days longer. The Italian deputies began to grow impatient. With a view of occupying their attention, they were divided into five sections, one for each province of the new State, and the scheme of the new Constitution was presented to them. They suggested a variety of useful observations which M. de Talleyrand was instructed to listen to, to deliberate upon, and to admit, without prejudice, however, to the fundamental principles of the project. With the exception of some minute details which were modified, the new Constitution met with general approval. It was suggested also, with a view of pacifying the impatience of the Cisalpine deputies, to draw up a list of candidates, in order to assist the First Consul in the numerous selections which he had to make. This ransacking of names satisfactorily filled up their time.

The First Consul arrived on the 11th of January, 1802 (21st Nivôse). The whole population of the country, collected on the roads, waited anxiously for him day and night. They assembled round immense fires, and ran before all the carriages coming from Paris, crying out—“*Vive Bonaparte!*” The First Consul at length made his appearance, and on his road to Lyons was received throughout with the most tumultuous transports of enthusiasm. He arrived there in the evening, accompanied by his wife and his adopted children, with his aide-de-camp, and was received by his ministers, the civil and military authorities, an Italian deputation, the staff of Egypt, and the youth of Lyons mounted on horseback. The city, illuminated in every part, appeared as brilliant as at noon-day. He passed under a triumphal arch, which was surmounted by a noble emblem of consular France—a sleeping lion. He alighted at the Hôtel de Ville, which had been suitably fitted up for his residence.

The following day, the First Consul was wholly occupied in receiving the departmental deputations, and, after these, the Italian *Consultum*, which amounted to 450 members, actually present, out of 452—an instance of punctuality almost unprecedented, if the number of persons, the season, and the distance are taken into consideration; and, moreover, that one of the absentees was the respectable archbishop of Milan, who had just died of apoplexy at the house of M. de Talleyrand. The Italians, with whom the First Consul conversed in their own language, were delighted to see him again, and to find united in him all the characteristics of both the French and the Italians. The succeeding days were devoted to the last labours of the *Consultum*. The modifications proposed to be made to the Constitution had been acceded to by the First Consul; the lists of candidates were drawn up. The plan was conceived of forming a committee of thirty members, selected from the entire *Consultum*, which was to discuss with the First Consul the long series of nominations to be made. This business occupied several days, during which the First Consul, after having employed a portion of the day in seeing and entertaining the Italians, also occupied himself in the affairs of France, received the prefects and the departmental deputations, listened to a statement of their wants and wishes, and thus personally became acquainted with the true state of the Republic. The enthusiasm increased every day, and it was at the height of this general excitement, whilst the French and the Italians were in intimate communication with each other, that the idea was suggested of nominating the First Consul President of the Cisalpine Republic. Messrs. Marescalchi, Petiet, Murat, and de Talleyrand had interviews every day with the members of the Committee of Thirty, and conferred with them upon the choice of a president. When they conceived them perfectly at a loss, and divided amongst themselves about the selection, a mode of relieving them from their embarrassment was cautiously insinuated into their minds, by the suggestion of conferring upon the Italian personage, who might be most preferred, the simple dignity of vice-president, and of covering his insufficiency by the glory of the First Consul, who might be appointed president. This simple thought, still more essential to the existence of the Cisalpine, and to the administration of its affairs, than to the greatness of the First Consul, was generally approved, nevertheless, with the condition of having an Italian vice-president. Citizen Melzi was induced to accept the vice-presidency, under the First Consul. Every thing being arranged, one of the members of the Thirty made this proposition to the committee. It was received with delight, and instantly assumed the official form of a *projet* of a decree. No time was lost, and, on the following day, the *projet* was presented to the *Consultum*. They received it with accla-

mations, and proclaimed **NAPOLEON BONAPARTE** President of the Italian Republic. This was the first occasion on which the two names of **NAPOLEON** and **BONAPARTE** were used together. The general was to add to the title of First Consul of the French Republic that of President of the Italian Republic. A deputation was sent to him to express their wishes.

Whilst these deliberations were going on, the general of the armies of Italy and Egypt inspected his old soldiers at a public review. The demi-brigades of the army of Egypt, which there had been time to collect, had been assembled with the consular guard, with numerous detachments of troops, and the Lyonese militia. On that day the fogs of winter were dispersed, and, under a brilliant sun, but with the weather intensely cold, general Bonaparte passed along the lines of these veterans, who received him with inconceivable transports of joy. The soldiers of Egypt and of Italy, delighted to find this child of their own making grown so great, greeted him with their shouts, and tried to make him understand that they had not ceased to be worthy of him, although, for a moment, they had been commanded by chiefs unworthy of themselves. He called some of the old grenadiers out of the ranks, talked with them about the battles in which they had been engaged, and the wounds they had received; he recognised, here and there, officers whom he had seen, in more than one encounter, shook hands with them all, and filled them with a sort of intoxication, from which even he himself could not escape, at the sight of so many brave fellows, who had contributed, by their devotion, to produce the wondrous fortune which he enjoyed, and which France enjoyed with him. This scene took place upon the ruins of the Place Bellecour, and obliterated the sad recollection connected with the spot, in the same way that glory makes us forget the troubles we have endured.

At the entrance of the Hôtel de Ville, on his return from this review, the First Consul found the deputation of the *Consultum*, received their address, intimated his acceptance of their proposal, and that, on the following day, he would give his reply to this new mark of confidence of the Italian nation.

On the next day, 26th of January (6th Pluviôse), he repaired to the spot where the general sittings of the *Consultum* had been held. It was at a great church fitted up and decorated for this purpose. All the arrangements were similar to those observed, both in France and in England, when royalty is present at the sittings. The First Consul, surrounded by his family, by the French ministers, by a great number of generals and prefects, was seated upon a dais. He delivered in the Italian language, which he spoke perfectly, a simple and concise speech, in which he announced his acceptance of the dignity, explained his views respecting the government and prosperity of the new Republic, and proclaimed the chief selections which he had made in con-

formity with the wishes of the *Consultum*. His words were drowned in cries of "*Vive Bonaparte! Vive le Premier Consul de la République Française! Vive le Président de la République Italienne!*" The Constitution was afterwards read, together with the list of all the citizens who were to aid in carrying it into effect. A long continued shout of applause expressed the concord which prevailed between the Italians and the hero who had enfranchised them. This sitting was most solemn and imposing; it opened in a suitably dignified manner the proceedings of the new Republic, which, henceforward, was to be designated the ITALIAN REPUBLIC. Upon this occasion, as upon so many others, only one wish could be expressed respecting general Bonaparte; that the creative genius which inspired this favourite of fortune might ever go hand in hand with the conservative genius, by which alone his works could be perpetuated.

The First Consul had now been twenty days at Lyons. The government of France required his presence at Paris, as he had to give his final orders for the signature of the definitive treaty of peace, which was in course of negotiation at the Congress of Amiens. During this time, the consul Cambacérès and the Senate were labouring to get rid of the unruly members, who had opposed him so violently at a moment of his career when he had least of all deserved it. He was about to be in a position to resume that long series of labours which constituted the happiness and greatness of France. He was accordingly urgent to return to Paris, to resume his accustomed occupations, to acquire there, probably, as a reward for his labours, a new glory, which would be only a just recompense for the most noble, comprehensive ambition ever embraced by the conception of man.

He set out on the 28th of January (8th Pluviôse), leaving the Italians filled with enthusiasm and hope, and also the Lyonese delighted with having had a visit of some days from the extraordinary man, whose fame was spread throughout the whole world, and who had shown so marked a predilection for their city. He had received from the emperor Alexander an answer to a letter, in which he solicited some advantages for the trade of Lyons. The substance of this answer, which intimated the most friendly dispositions on the part of Russia, was published, and produced the greatest satisfaction. On his departure, the First Consul presented the three mayors of the city of Lyons with three scarfs in commemoration of this glorious visit. The inhabitants of Bordeaux had sent a deputation to request him to come within their walls. He made them a promise to this effect, as soon as the definitive peace should afford him a little leisure. He came back by way of St. Etienne and Nevers, and reached Paris on the 31st of January\* (11th Pluviôse).

---

\* We subjoin some extracts from the correspondence of the First Consul during his stay at Lyons.

To the Consuls Cambacérès and Lebrun.

“ Lyons, 24th Nivôse, year X. (14th of January, 1802.)

“ I have received, Citizens Consuls, your letter of the 21st. The weather is excessively cold here, and I pass the mornings, from noon till six o'clock, in receiving the prefects and the notables of the neighbouring departments. You know perfectly well that at this sort of conferences, one must talk a great deal.

“ This evening the city of Lyons gives a concert and ball. I am going there in about an hour.

“ The labours of the *Consultum* are in progress.

“ The troops of the army of the East are now arriving in great strength at Lyons; I am taking steps to have them clothed, I hope to review them on the 28th.

“ I continue to be extremely pleased with every thing I see, both with the people of Lyons, and with those of the south of France.

“ The negotiations at Amiens appear to be getting on.

“ I congratulate you on the manner in which every thing proceeds under your direction.

“ Joseph writes to me from Amiens, that lord Cornwallis told him that the British cabinet has received favourable news about the French army at St. Domingo, and that a spirit of dissension had manifested itself in Toussaint's army.”

From the Same.

“ Lyons, 26th Nivôse, year X. (16th of January, 1802.)

“ I have received, Citizens Consuls, your despatches of the 22nd and 23rd Nivôse.....The Lyonese have given us a most magnificent *fête*. Annexed you will find the details, with the songs sung on the occasion.

“ I am proceeding very slowly in my operations, as I pass the whole of my mornings in giving audience to the deputations of the neighbouring departments.

“ It is very fine to-day, but very cold.

“ The improvement in the happiness of the Republic, during the last two years is obvious. The population of Lyons has increased during the years VIII. and IX. more than 20,000 souls; and all the manufacturers that I have seen from St. Etienne, Annonay, &c., tell me that their works are in a high state of activity.

“ All minds seem to be full of energy, not that which overturns empires, but that which re-establishes them, and conduces to their prosperity and riches.

“ I shall, in a few days, review nearly six demi-brigades of the army of the East.”

To the Consul Cambacérès.

“ Lyons, 28th Nivôse, year X. (18th of January, 1802.)

“ I have just received, Citizen Consul, a deputation from Bordeaux. It has presented a petition to me, soliciting me to visit their city, which I have promised to do, as soon as their relations with the West Indies and the Isle of France shall be in full activity.

“ Your letter of the 25th communicates to me the deliberations of the Senate. I beg you particularly to see that the twenty and the sixty unruly members whom we have in the constituted authorities, are every one got rid of. The wish of the nation is, that the government shall not be obstructed in its endeavours to act for the public good, and that the head of Medusa shall no longer show itself, either in our tribunes, or in our assemblies.

“ Sieyès' conduct on the present occasion completely proves that, having contributed to the destruction of all the several constitutions since '91, he wants now to try his hand against the present. It is very extraordinary that he cannot perceive the folly of it. He ought to burn a wax-candle to Our Lady, for having got out of the scrape so fortunately, and in so unexpected a

manner ; but, the older I grow, the more I perceive that each man must fulfil his destiny.

" I take it for granted that you have taken the proper measures for demolishing the Châtelet.

" If the minister of marine should stand in need of the frigates of the king of Naples, he may make use of them. Indeed, it will be as well to despatch them to America as soon as possible. Every thing can be arranged afterwards with the king of Naples.

" The cold is not so great to-day.

" General Jourdan, who has arrived to-day from Piedmont, gives me a very satisfactory account of the state of that province.

" The proceedings of the *Consultum* are in an advanced state, all their organic laws are being digested.

" I have been occupied part of the morning in a conference with the prefects.

" I recommend you to see the minister of marine, to ascertain whether the provisions for St. Domingo, have been actually sent off."

#### To the Consuls Cambacères and Lebrun.

" Lyons, 30th Nivôse, year X. (20th of January, 1802.)

" I should wish, Citizens Consuls, the minister of the public treasury to send citizen Roger to the 16th military division, to examine into the accounts of the paymaster, and those of the principal receivers of the departments composing that division.

" I also wish the minister of the public treasury to send to Rennes some individual like citizen Roger, to perform the same duty in the 13th military division.

" Despatch also the councillors of State, Thibaudeau and Fourcroy, one to the 13th military division, and the other to the 16th, to inspect these divisions in the same way as they did on their former mission. One subject of complaint is, that the minister of war has not caused the compensation money, in lieu of forage and lodging, for the first three months of the year X. to be paid over to the officers, that the receivers keep the money a long time, and that the paymasters put off the payment to as late a period as they can. The paymasters and the receivers are the greatest nuisances in the State."

#### To the Same.

" Lyons, 30th Nivôse, year X. (20th of January, 1802.)

" I have received, Citizens Consuls, your letter of the 26th and 27th. At Lyons, as at Paris, the weather has become considerably milder.

" Yesterday, I visited several factories. I was pleased with the industry, and with the severe economy, which, I thought I perceived practised throughout, by the manufacturers in the employment of their workmen.

" I ought to-day to have held my grand review, but I have postponed it till the 5th Pluviôse; the troops of the army of the East had not yet got their new clothes ; I am in hopes that by the 5th, they will be all ready, so that they will present a fine appearance.

" I perceive, with much pleasure, the decision you have come to about the Châtelet. If the weather should become severe, I do not think the steps you have taken, of allowing 4000 frs. per month for the extraordinary factories, will be sufficient.

" Besides the 100,000 frs. which the minister of the interior grants monthly to the Committees of *Bienfaisance*, it will be necessary for you to add a further sum of 25,000 frs., extraordinary, for the distribution of wood, and if the cold weather returns, it will be necessary, as in '89, to light fires in the churches and other great buildings, to give warmth to a great number of people.

" I calculate on being back in Paris in the course of the Decade. I beg you to consider whether it will not be expedient to insert in the *Moniteur*, the last message to the Senate, and to add two lines at the bottom, to state that



the Senate having appointed a commission, which made its report in the sitting of the . . . ., it is decided upon to proceed to a renewal of the chamber, in conformity with the XXXVIIth Article of the Constitution, &c. &c.

“ Reports from various quarters lead me to believe, that Caprara requires the priests to sign some formula or profession of faith, couched nearly in these words :—

“ ‘ We rejoice, moreover, in hereby making a solemn profession of filial respect, of complete submission, and perfect obedience to,’ &c. &c.

“ This information has reached me, amongst the rest, from Maëstricht. I beg you to confer upon the subject with Portalis. This formula appears to me quite inconceivable.”

To the Same.

“ Lyons, 2nd Pluviôse, year X. (22nd January, 1802.)

“ I only received to-day, Citizens Consuls, your letter of the 29th Nivôse, which reached me about three o'clock in the afternoon. The thaw and the inundations have retarded your courier some hours.

“ The forage department is entirely disorganised in the department of the Drôme ; an amount of 10,000 francs must be set apart out of the ordonnance of Pluviôse, until this branch of the service is placed upon a proper footing.

“ The civil hospitals, which are allowed only fourteen sous per day for the sick military, complain that they have not yet received any thing for the year X. That of Valence even, besides the whole year X., claims an arrear for the month of Fructidor, IX.

“ The order issued for the organisation of the Piedmontese troops, which I signed more than a month ago, has not yet reached Turin, which occasions some degree of perplexity amongst those troops. Generally speaking, there is a good deal of backwardness, and any thing but activity, in the war department : this is the general opinion amongst all who have any thing to do with that department.

“ It is indispensably requisite that the minister of war should send a good and experienced commissary to Turin. . . .

“ All the most important arrangements of the *Consultum* are decided upon. I still depend upon reaching Paris in the course of the Decade.

“ It would be desirable, for the Senate to name a dozen prefects either to the Tribune or to the Legislative Body. The prefect of Mont Blanc should be amongst them.

“ I should wish you to insert in the journals some articles respecting the roguery of Fouilloux, to turn into ridicule the foreign gulls, who spread absurd reports, which had no other foundation than the written bulletin of a rogue in a small way, who was in want of a dinner, and duped them. It would be as well to recur to this subject several times.”

To the Same.

“ Lyons, 6th Pluviôse, year X. (26th January, 1802.)

“ I have received, Citizens Consuls, your letter of the 2nd Pluviôse.

“ I had to-day a grand review on the Place Bellecour. The weather was magnificent. The sun shone as if it were the month of Floréal.

“ The *Consultum* has appointed a committee of thirty individuals, which has made a report to the effect that, considering the interior and exterior circumstances of the Cisalpine Republic, it was indispensable to leave me to perform the duty of the chief magistracy, until circumstances should permit, or I should deem it expedient to appoint a successor. To-morrow I calculate upon presenting myself to the assembled *Consultum*. The constitution will be read, with the list of the appointments, and every thing will be brought to a conclusion. I shall be in Paris on Decadi.”

To the Same.

“ Lyons, 6th Pluviôse, year X. (26th January, 1802.)

“ I have received, Citizens Consuls, your letter of the 3rd Pluviôse. I

think it will be well to wait till the peace of Amiens is signed, before we raise the state of siege of the city of Brest.

"At two o'clock I went to the hall of the sittings of the extraordinary *Consultum*; I delivered a short speech in Italian, of which you will find enclosed a French translation. The Constitution was read, the first organic law, and one relating to the clergy. The different nominations were published.

"I will send you to-morrow a minute of the whole proceedings of the *Consultum*, in which will be found a copy of the Constitution. The two ministers, four councillors of State, twenty prefects, with the general and superior officers accompanied me. This sitting exhibited both majesty and unanimity, and I hope that the Congress of Lyons will produce all the results which I anticipated from it.

"I think it is useless, unless false reports are circulated about the Congress of Lyons, to publish any thing before the arrival of the courier whom I shall send you to-morrow. Only in case of its being rumoured that the *Consultum* has nominated me president, you can print the two papers enclosed, which will make known the exact turn that matters have taken.

"I shall be occupied all day to-morrow in bringing the whole business to a close, and I shall start at night. On Decadi, I shall be in Paris...."



## BOOK XIV.

---

### CONSULATE FOR LIFE.

Arrival of the First Consul in Paris—Scrutiny of the Senate, which excludes sixty Members of the Legislative Body and twenty Members of the Tribunal—The excluded Members succeeded by Men devoted to the Government—End of the Congress of Amiens—Some Difficulties arise at the last Moment of the Negotiation, in consequence of Jealousies excited in England—The First Consul surmounts these Difficulties by his Moderation and his Firmness—The Definitive Peace signed 25th of March, 1802—Although the first Enthusiasm for Peace has subsided in France and in England, they welcome, with renewed Joy, the Hope of a sincere and durable Reconciliation—Extraordinary Session of the Year X., destined to convert into Law, the Concordat, the Treaty of Amiens, and different Projects of high importance—The Law for regulating Religious Matters added to the Concordat, under the Title of *Organic Articles*—Presentation of this Law and of the Concordat to the new Legislative Body and Tribunal—Coldness with which these two Projects are received, even after the Exclusion of the Oppositionists—They are adopted—The First Consul fixes on Easter Sunday for the Publication of the Concordat, and for the first Ceremony of the Re-established Religion—Organisation of the New Clergy—Part assigned to the Constitutionals in the Nomination of Bishops—Cardinal Caprara refuses, in the name of the Holy See, to institute the Constitutionals—Firmness of the First Consul, and submission of Cardinal Caprara—Official Reception of the Cardinal as Legate *à latere*—Consecration of the four principal Bishops at Notre Dame on Palm Sunday—Curiosity and Emotion of the Public—The very Eve of Easter Day, and of the solemn *Te Deum* which was to be chanted at Notre Dame, Cardinal Caprara wishes to impose on the Constitutionals a humiliating Recantation of their Past Conduct—New Resistance on the part of the First Consul—Cardinal Caprara does not yield until the Night before Easter Day—Repugnance of the Generals to repair to Notre Dame—The First Consul obliges them to it—Solemn *Te Deum* and Official Restoration of Religion—Adherence of the Public, and Joy of the First Consul on seeing the Success of his Efforts—Publication of the *Génie du Christianisme*—Project of a General Amnesty with regard to the Emigrants—This Measure, having been discussed in the Council of State, becomes the Object of a *Senatus Consultum*—Views of the First Consul on the Organisation of Society in France—His Opinions on Social Distinctions, and on the Education of Youth—Two Projects of Law of High Importance, on the Institution of the Legion of Honour, and on Public Instruction—Discussion of these two Projects in a full Council of State—Character of the Discussions of that Great Body—Language of the First Consul—Presentation of the two Projects to the Legislative Body and to the Tribunal—Adoption, by a great Majority, of the Project of Law relative to Public Instruction—A large Minority pronounces against the Project relative to the Legion of Honour—The Treaty of Amiens presented last, as the Crowning Work of the First Consul—Reception given to this Treaty—It affords occasion for saying that a National Recompense ought to be conferred on the Author of all the Benefits enjoyed by France

—The Partisans and Brothers of Bonaparte contemplate the Re-establishment of Monarchy—This Idea appears premature—The Idea of conferring the Consulate for Life prevails generally—The Consul Cambacérès offers his Intervention with the Senate—Dissimulation of the First Consul, who will not avow what he is desirous of—Embarrassment of Consul Cambacérès—His Efforts to induce the Senate to confer the Consulate on General Bonaparte for the rest of his Life—The Secret Enemies of the General profit by his Silence to persuade the Senate that a Prolongation of the Consulate for Ten Years should suffice—Vote of the Senate on this Construction—Displeasure of the First Consul—He thinks of refusing—His Colleague, Cambacérès, hinders him from doing so, and proposes, as an Expedient, to appeal to the National Sovereignty, and to put the question to France, to know if General Bonaparte shall be Consul for Life—The Council of State charged to draw up the Question—Opening of Registries to secure Votes in the Mayoralty Offices, the Tribunals, and the Offices of Notaries Public—Eagerness of all the Citizens to tender their Affirmative Votes—Change wrought in the Constitution of M. Sieyès—The First Consul receives the Consulate for Life, with the power of appointing a Successor—The Senate is invested with the Constituent Power—The Lists of Notability abolished, and replaced by electoral Colleges for Life—The Tribunate reduced to be only a Section of the Council of State—The new Constitution becomes completely Monarchical—Civil List of the First Consul—He is proclaimed solemnly by the Senate—General Satisfaction at having founded, at last, a strong and durable Power—The First Consul takes the Name of Napoleon Bonaparte—His Moral Power is at its Culminating Point—*Resumé* of this Period of Three Years.

## BOOK XIV.

## THE CONSULATE FOR LIFE.

THE journey of the First Consul to Lyons had had for its object the constitution of the Italian Republic, and to secure to himself the government of it, for the advantage of Italy and of France. His object was, also, to embarrass the opposition, and to bring it into discredit by leaving it idle, by proving that good was impossible to be expected while hampered by it; in fine, to give time to the consul Cambacérès to exclude from the Legislative Body and from the Tribune the most restless and most troublesome members.

Every wish was realised. The Italian Republic, constituted with *éclat*, found itself bound to the policy of France without losing its own integrity. The oppositionists in the Tribune, and in the Legislative Body, struck by the message which withdrew the Civil Code, being left in Paris without a single project of law to discuss, knew not how to extricate themselves from the dilemma. Everywhere it was laid to their charge that they interrupted the best efforts of government: everywhere they were blamed for a petty and unreasonable imitation of the agitators of former days. So situated, M. Cambacérès dealt them the last blow by the ingenious plan that he had conceived. He sent for the able lawyer, Tronchet, who had been introduced into the Senate by his influence, and in which body he enjoyed the twofold influence of learning and character. He communicated his plan, and obtained his approval of it. We have seen in the preceding book what that plan was; we have seen that it consisted in the interpretation of Article XXXVIII. of the Constitution, which fixed for the year X. the going out of a first fifth of the Tribune and of the Legislative Body, and the giving to the Senate the power of designating that fifth. There were many reasons for and against this mode of interpretation of Article XXXVIII.: the best of all was the necessity of affording to the executive power the faculty of dissolution, which had not been made one of its attributes by the Constitution. M. Tronchet, a wise man, a good citizen, admiring, and at the same time fearing the First Consul, but judging him indispensable, and foreseeing with M. Cambacérès that if he were not delivered



from the importunate opposition of the Tribune, he would have recourse to violent measures, even from solicitude to effect the good which they prevented him from doing, M. Tronchet entered into the views of the government, and undertook to prepare the Senate for the adoption of the projected measures. He succeeded in it without difficulty, for the Senate felt that it had been rendered an accomplice and a dupe of the ill humour of the oppositionists. That body had already receded with great haste and little dignity in the affair of the elections. Swayed by that love of repose and of power which had taken possession of every body, it consented to remove the oppositionists whose projects it had at first seconded. The plan having been favourably received by the principal personages of the body, Lacépède, La Place, Jacqueminot, and others, they proceeded without delay to its execution by a message dated January 7, 1802 (17th Nivôse, year X.).

"Senators," said the message, "Article XXXVIII. of the Constitution ordains that the renewal of the first fifth of the Legislative Body and of the Tribune should take place within the year X., and we are close on the fourth month of that year. The Consuls have thought it their duty to call your attention to this circumstance. Your wisdom will find in it the necessity of taking into consideration without delay the operations which must precede this renewal."

This message, the intention of which it was easy to guess, struck with surprise the oppositionists of both legislative assemblies, and naturally excited in them the most vehement irritation. From thoughtlessness, from impulse, they had run headlong in that career of opposition, without foreseeing the issue of it, and they were strangely surprised by the blow which threatened them, a blow, which would have been more severe, but for the intervention of M. Cambacérès. They assembled to draw up a memorial and present it to the Senate. M. Cambacérès, who was personally acquainted with almost all of them, addressed himself to the least compromised. He represented to them that, in further signalling themselves by their resistance, they would draw upon them, individually, the attention of the Senate, and the exercise of the power of exclusion with which that body was about to be invested. This observation quieted the greater number of them, and they awaited in silence the decision of that supreme authority. In the sittings of the 15th and 18th of January (25th and 28th Nivôse), the Senate resolved the question arising out of the message of the Consuls. By a very great majority, it decided that the renewal of the first fifth, in the two legislative assemblies, should take place immediately, and that the designation of that fifth should be made by ballot and not by lot. But a modification of form was adopted, and instead of balloting for those who were to go out, it was decided that the ballot should

designate those who were to stay in. Hence the measure had the appearance of a preference, in place of having that of an exclusion. By means of this slight softening down of form, they proceeded, without delay, to the designation of the 240 members of the Legislative Body, and of the eighty members of the Tribunal, destined to continue in the legislature. The senators, most immediately under the influence of the government were entrusted with the secret of the members to be saved from exclusion, and at the close of January (the end of Nivôse and commencement of Pluviôse), the ballots of the Senate, followed up without intermission, effected the separation of the partisans from the opposers of government. Sixty members of the Legislative Body, who had shown most resistance to the projects of the First Consul, particularly to the project of the re-establishment of religion, and twenty of the most active members of the Tribunal, were struck off by exclusion, or, in the language of the day, by elimination. The leading men amongst the twenty, were Messrs. Chénier, Ginguené, Chazal, Bailleul, Courtois, Ganilh, Daunou, and Benjamin Constant. The remainder, less known, men of letters or of business, former conventionalists, former priests, had no other claim to admission into the Tribunal than the friendship of M. Sieyès and his party; the same claim was the cause of their exclusion.

Such was the end, not of the Tribunal, which continued in existence some time longer, but of the momentary importance which this body had acquired. It might have been desirable that the First Consul, so full of glory, so indemnified by the universal adherence of France for an unseemly opposition, could have made up his mind to bear with a few impotent detractors. This resignation would have been more worthy, and also less hurtful to the species of liberty which he would have been able to leave us at the time, in order to prepare for us at a later period a genuine liberty. But in this world wisdom is more rare than ability, more rare even than genius; for, wisdom implies a victory over one's own passions, a victory of which great men are not more capable than little men. The First Consul, it must be acknowledged, wanted wisdom on this occasion, and one single excuse can alone be made in his favour; it is, that such an opposition, emboldened by his patience, would have become, perhaps, more than inconvenient, ay, dangerous, and even insurmountable, if the majority of the Legislative Body and of the Senate had at last taken part in it, which was possible. This excuse has some foundation, and it proves that there are times in which dictatorship is necessary, even in countries which are free, or are destined to be free.

As to this opposition of the Tribunal, it has not merited the eulogies which have so often been awarded to it. Inconsistent and shuffling, it resisted the Civil Code, the re-establishment of religion, in fine, the best acts of the First Consul, and looked on,

in silence, at the proscription of the unfortunate revolutionists, who had been unjustly transported on account of that infernal machine, of which they were not the originators. The tribunes had held their tongues at that time, because the terrible explosion of the 3rd Nivôse had stunned them with terror, and they dared not defend the principles of justice, in the persons of men the greater number of whom were stained with blood. The courage which they lacked for blaming a flagrant illegality, they sadly found for impeding excellent measures! If, however, a sincere sentiment of liberty inspired many among them, in others there could be seen that vexatious spirit of envy, which animated the Tribune against the Council of State, the men reduced to do-nothings against those who had the power to do every thing. They committed, then, serious faults, and unhappily provoked not less serious ones on the part of the First Consul: deplorable concatenation, which history so often observes in our agitated world, the passions of which are invariably the moving principle.

It was necessary to find successors for the excluded fifth in the Legislative Body and the Tribune. The majority, who had pronounced the exclusion, pronounced the new admissions, and did it in the most satisfactory manner for the consular government. They made use, for the new elections, of the lists of notability invented by M. Sieyès as a principal basis of the Constitution. Notwithstanding the efforts of the Council of State to find out a suitable manner of forming these lists, not one of the systems devised had remedied the inconvenience of the principle. The lists were slow and difficult of formation, because the citizens were not zealous about them, for they saw in this vast presentation of candidates, no direct and immediate means of influencing the composition of the chief authorities. They were in reality only a method of saving appearances, and of dissembling the necessity, at the time inevitable, of the composition of the great bodies of the State by themselves; for every election turned out badly, that is to say, went to extremes. There had been the greatest difficulty in completing these lists, and, out of 102 departments then existing, two of which, those of Corsica, were out of the pale of the law, four, those of the left bank of the Rhine, not organised, and eighty-three only had sent in their lists. It was agreed that the selections should be made from the lists sent in, with a reservation of indemnity, by after-selections, to the departments which had not yet executed the law.

There were called to the Legislative Body a large number of those great proprietors, whom the new security which they were enabled to enjoy induced to abandon the retirement in which they had hitherto sought to live. There were also called to it some prefects, some magistrates, who, for three years past, had been in training to the practice of business affairs under the

direction of the consular government. Amongst the personages introduced to the Tribune was Lucien Bonaparte, who had returned from Spain, after an embassy more agitated than useful; and who affected to desire nothing more than a quiet life employed in serving his brother in one of the great bodies of the State. Along with him had been introduced Carnot, who had lately been in the ministry of war, where he had not succeeded in pleasing the First Consul. Carnot was not more favourable to the consular government than the recently excluded tribunes; but he was a grave personage, universally respected, whose opposition would not be very active, and whom the Revolution could not have laid aside without hateful ingratitude. This nomination was, in other words, a last homage to liberty. Next to these two names, the most notable was that of M. Daru, an able and upright administrator, a man of a discreet and cultivated understanding.

Whilst these operations were in progress, the First Consul had returned to Paris, after an absence of twenty-four days. He arrived on the evening of the 31st of January (11th Pluviôse). In every quarter there was submission, and that singular movement of resistance, which was seen not long before in both legislative assemblies, was now completely appeased. The new authority with which the First Consul had been invested, had itself acted on the public mind. Assuredly it was not much for the power of the First Consul to have the Italian Republic added to that French Republic which had conquered and disarmed the world; but that example of deference given to the genius of general Bonaparte by an allied people had produced a great effect. The bodies of the State all came eagerly to offer him their congratulations, and to address to him speeches in which, along with the loftiness of language that he ordinarily inspired, was to be found a marked tone of respect. It seemed as if one saw already, on that domineering brow, the double crown of France and of Italy.

He had all power now, both for the organisation of France, which was his first object, and for his personal aggrandizement, which was his second. He had no longer to apprehend that the Codes which he had caused to be drawn up, and which he caused to be again revised, nor that the arrangements concluded with the Pope for the restoration of the altars, would be thwarted by the ill will or the prejudices of the great bodies of the State. These were not the only projects that he contemplated. For some months, he had been preparing a vast system of public instruction, to mould the youth of France to the system which had sprung from the Revolution. He was projecting a plan of national rewards, which, under a military form, suitable to the time and to the warlike imagination of the French, might also serve to remunerate great civil actions as well as great military actions; this was the Legion of Honour, a noble institution,

long meditated in private, and certainly not the least difficult of the works which the First Consul wished to render agreeable to Republican France. He wished also to close one of the deepest wounds of the Revolution—emigration. Many Frenchmen were still living in foreign countries, nursing the bad feelings which exile imparts, deprived of their families, their fortune, and their country. With the project of effacing the traces of our deep discords, and of preserving all the good that attended the Revolution, of separating from it all the evil mixed up with it, emigration was one of its results which could not be allowed to subsist. But, on account of those who had acquired national property, persons ever susceptible and distrustful, it was one of the most difficult acts, and one which required most courage. Yet the time was at hand when such an act was likely to become possible. In fine, if, as it was said on all sides at that period, it was requisite to consolidate power in the hands of the man who had exercised it in a manner so admirable: if it were requisite to give his authority a new, a more elevated, a more lasting character than that of a temporary magistracy of ten years, three of which had already passed away, the moment had already arrived; for public prosperity, the fruit of order, victory, and peace, was at its height; it was felt at that instant, with a fervency which time might damp, but could not increase.

Meanwhile, these projects for the public weal and for personal aggrandizement, which he fostered together, needed, for their accomplishment, one last act, namely, the definitive conclusion of the maritime peace, which was negotiating at the Congress of Amiens. The preliminaries of London had laid down the basis of this peace; but, as long as these preliminaries were not converted into a definitive treaty, the alarmists, interested in disturbing public repose, did not fail to say every week that the negotiation was broken off, and that the country would soon be replunged into a maritime war, and by a maritime war into a continental war. Wherefore, immediately on his return to Paris, the First Consul imparted new activity to the negotiations at Amiens. “Sign,” he wrote day after day to Joseph, “for, after the preliminaries, there is no other serious question to discuss.” This was true. The preliminaries of London had resolved the only important questions, in stipulating the restitution of all the maritime conquests of the English, excepting Ceylon and Trinidad, which the Dutch and Spaniards were to sacrifice. The English had, to be sure, demanded of the Congress of Amiens the little island of Tobago; but the First Consul had firmly resisted this, and they had renounced it. Hence, there was no other controversy, but relative to points altogether accessory, such as the support of prisoners, and the form of government to be given to Malta.

We have, in a preceding chapter, explained the difficulty with regard to prisoners. It was a mere question of money,



always easy to be resolved. The form of government to be given to Malta presented a more real difficulty, for a reciprocal distrust complicated the views of the two powers. The First Consul, by a singular presentiment, wished to demolish the fortifications of the island, to reduce it to a rock, and to make of it a neutral lazaretto, open to all nations. The English, who looked on Malta as a stepping-stone by which to reach Egypt, said that the rock of itself was too important to leave it always accessible to the French, who, from Italy might pass into Sicily, from Sicily into Malta. They proposed the re-establishment of the Order on its ancient basis, with the creation of an English tongue and a Maltese tongue, the latter composed of the inhabitants of the island, who were devoted to them. The First Consul had not admitted these conditions; for, in the state of manners in France, there could be no hope of creating a French tongue numerous enough to counterbalance the creation of an English tongue. Finally, this point was settled. The Order was to be re-established without there being any new tongue. A different Grand Master was to be named, for M. de Hompesch, who, in 1798, had delivered up Malta to general Bonaparte, was not to be thought of. Awaiting the re-organisation of the Order, it was decided that the king of Naples should be asked to furnish a Neapolitan garrison of 2000 men, who were to be stationed in the island on its evacuation by the English. By way of additional precaution, it was desired that some great power should guarantee this arrangement, to preserve Malta from any attacks like those which, for the last five years, had made it fall at one time under the power of the French, at another under that of the English. There were thoughts of making application to Russia to furnish that guarantee, grounding it on the kindness which that power had shown for the Order under Paul I. All these points were settled at the time of the departure of the First Consul for Lyons. The fisheries, re-established on their former footing; the territorial indemnity promised in Germany to the house of Orange, for the loss of the stadtholdership; the peace and integrity of territory secured, whether to Portugal or Turkey, presented only resolved questions. However, since the return of the First Consul to Paris, the negotiation appeared languid, and lord Cornwallis seemed to retreat in disquietude, as the French negotiator advanced with new steps towards him. Lord Cornwallis could not be suspected, good and estimable soldier as he was, who wished only for an amicable termination of the difficulties of the negotiation, and to add to his military services the performance of a great civil service, that of giving peace to his native land. But his instructions had suddenly become more rigorous, and the pain that he felt on this account was plainly depicted in his face. His cabinet had enjoined him, in fact, to be more particular, more vigilant in the



wording of the treaty, and had imposed on him conditions of detail, which it was difficult for him to reconcile with the haughty and distrustful humour of the First Consul. This brave officer, who had hoped to crown his career by a memorable act, had reason to fear that he should see his old renown tarnished by the part he was about to be compelled to play, in a negotiation shamefully broken off. In his vexation he unbosomed himself freely to Joseph Bonaparte, and joined with him in making sincere efforts to overcome the obstacles opposed to the conclusion of peace.

It will be asked, what motive could have destroyed all at once, or, at least, cooled, the pacific dispositions of the cabinet over which Mr. Addington presided? That motive is easy to be understood. The administration had taken a different tack, no uncommon thing in free countries. The preliminaries had been signed six months, and, in this intermediate state, which, excepting the absence of cannonading, was very like war, few benefits had been conferred by the peace. The leading merchants, who, in England, were the class most interested in the resumption of hostilities, because war afforded them a universal monopoly, had hoped to indemnify themselves for what they were losing, by making numerous shipments to the ports of France. There, they found prohibitory regulations which had originated during a violent contest, and which there had not been time to soften down. The people, who were hoping for a fall in the price of provisions, had not hitherto seen their hopes realised; for a definitive treaty was necessary to overcome the speculators, who kept the prices of corn still very high. Finally, the great landed proprietors, who wished for a reduction of all imposts, and the middle classes, who were demanding the repeal of the income-tax, had not yet reaped any of the fruits promised by the pacification of the world. A little disenchantment had then succeeded that unparalleled infatuation for peace, which, six months previously, had suddenly seized on the English people — a people just as subject to infatuation as the French. But, more than all the rest, the scenes at Lyons had acted on its jealous fancy. That taking possession of Italy, made so manifest, had appeared for France and for her chief something so great, that British jealousy had been warmly excited by it. It was an additional argument for the war party, who already were not backward in saying that France was growing greater and greater, and England less and less in proportion. A recent and far-spread piece of news likewise acted on their minds; it was that of a considerable acquisition made by the French in America. Tuscany had been seen given away, under the title of kingdom

of Etruria, to an infante, without the price of that gift, paid by Spain, having been made known. Now that the First Consul claimed, at Madrid, the cession of Louisiana, which was the stipulated equivalent for Tuscany, this condition of the treaty became divulged; and that fact, joined to the St. Domingo expedition, revealed new and vast projects in America. To all this was added that a considerable port was acquired by France in the Mediterranean, namely, that of the isle of Elba, in exchange for the duchy of Piombino.

These different reports, spread at once, whilst the *Consultum* assembled at Lyons was decreeing to general Bonaparte the government of Italy, gave some strength to the war party in London, which had been previously obliged to shroud itself in extreme reserve, and to hail, at least with hypocritical homage, the re-establishment of peace.

Mr. Pitt, who had retired from the cabinet the year before, but who was still more powerful in his retirement than were his upright and weak successors in their plenitude of power, was silent on the preliminaries. He had said nothing about the conditions, but he had approved of the fact of the peace itself. His former colleagues, very inferior to him and consequently less moderate, Messrs. Wyndham, Dundas, Grenville, had blamed the weakness of the Addington cabinet, and found the conditions of the preliminaries disadvantageous to Great Britain. On learning the departure of a fleet conveying 20,000 men to St. Domingo, they had exclaimed against the stupidity of Mr. Addington, who had allowed a squadron to pass which was destined to re-establish the French power in the Antilles, without having first secured a definitive peace. They predicted that he would be the victim of his imprudent confidence. With the news of the events at Lyons, of the cession of Louisiana, of the acquisition of the Isle of Elba, they exclaimed still more loudly, and lord Carlisle had made a violent attack upon the gigantic ambition of France, and upon the weakness of the new British cabinet.

Mr. Pitt continued silent, thinking that it was necessary to allow this fondness for peace, with which the London multitude seemed to be smitten, to exhaust itself, and that it was becoming to protect, for some time longer, the cabinet destined to satisfy a taste probably transient. The English cabinet itself appeared moved by the effect produced on public opinion; but it feared much more what would be said, if the peace were broken off as soon as entered on, and if a treaty in form were not to take the place of the preliminaries. It confined itself then to dispatching some armed vessels, which had been prematurely called into harbour, and sending them to the Antilles to watch the French fleet which had sailed for St. Domingo. It sent instructions to lord Cornwallis which, without changing the groundwork of things, aggravated certain condi-

tions, and overloaded the definitive treaty with precautions either useless, or disagreeable to the dignity of the French government. Lord Hawkesbury wished for the precise stipulation of a sum of money to be paid to England for the number of prisoners which she had had to support; he wished that Holland should pay the house of Orange an indemnity in money, independently of the indemnity of territory promised in Germany; he wished it to be formally stipulated, that the former Grand Master should not be reinstated as the head of the order of Malta. He would above all have desired to make a Turkish plenipotentiary figure at the Congress of Amiens; for, ever filled with the remembrance of Egypt, the British cabinet clung to their intention of curbing the daring of the First Consul in the East. In fine, he wished for an instrument which might give Portugal the means of escaping the stipulations of the treaty of Badajoz, stipulations, in virtue of which the court of Lisbon had lost Olivenza in Europe and a certain tract of territory in America.

Such were the instructions sent to lord Cornwallis. However, there was one proposition which was reserved to be directly made by lord Hawkesbury to M. Otto. That proposition was relative to Italy. "We see," said lord Hawkesbury to M. Otto, "that there is nothing to be got from the First Consul, so far as Piedmont is concerned. To ask any thing on that score would be desiring impossibilities. But let the First Consul concede to the king of Sardinia the smallest territorial indemnity, in whatever corner of Italy it may be, and, in exchange for that concession, we will instantly recognise all that France has done in that country. We will recognise the kingdom of Etruria, the Italian Republic, and the Ligurian Republic."

The changes demanded, whether by lord Cornwallis or by lord Hawkesbury, consisting rather in the form than in the groundwork were not much at variance either with the power or the pride of France. Peace was too fine a thing in itself not to accept it in the way proposed. But the First Consul unable to discover whether these new demands were merely a precaution of the English cabinet, with the intention of rendering the treaty more presentable to Parliament, or, whether in fact this backing out from points already conceded, accompanied with maritime armaments, concealed a secret intention of breaking off, acted, as he always did, by proceeding direct for the mark. He conceded what, as it seemed to him, ought to be conceded, and decidedly refused the remainder. Relative to the prisoners, he repelled the precise stipulation of a sum of money to be paid to England, but agreed to the formation of a commission which was to regulate the account of expenses, still considering German or other soldiers who had been in the English service as English pri-

soners. He insisted that Holland should not give a single florin to the stadtholder. He agreed to the nomination of a new Grand Master of Malta, but without any expression applicable to M. de Hompesch, or from which it might be inferred that France allowed the abandonment of those who had done her service to be imposed on her. He wished that the guarantee of Malta, proposed to Russia, should be asked also of Austria, Prussia, and Spain. In fine, without admitting a Turkish or Portuguese plenipotentiary, he consented to the insertion of an article in which the integrity of the Turkish territory, and that of the Portuguese territory, should be formally guaranteed.

As to the recognition of the Italian Republic, of the Ligurian Republic, and of the kingdom of Etruria, he declared that he would do without it, and that he would not purchase it by making any concession to the king of Piedmont, whose dominions he was resolved henceforth to keep definitively.

After having sent these answers to his brother Joseph, with a sufficient liberty of settling their form, he recommended him to act with great prudence, in order to have a proof that the refusal of signing the peace came not from him but from England. He caused it to be intimated, moreover, both in London and at Amiens, that if the English ministers were not willing to accept what he proposed, they ought to put an end to the matter, and that he would instantly re-arm the former flotilla at Boulogne, and form a camp opposite to the coast of England.

The rupture was not more desired in London than in Paris, or at Amiens. The English cabinet was sensible that it would be exposed to ridicule if the truce of six months, the consequence of the preliminaries, had served only to open the seas to the French fleets. Lord Cornwallis, who knew that the English legation would be unjustifiable, for it was that alone which had raised the last difficulties, was very conciliating in the terms of the treaty. Joseph Bonaparte was not less so, and in the evening of the 25th of March, 1802, (4th Germinal, year X.), the peace with Great Britain was signed, on an instrument overloaded with corrections of every sort.

Thirty-six hours were taken up in translating the treaty into as many languages as there were powers interested. On the 26th of March (6th Germinal), the plenipotentiaries assembled at the hôtel de ville. The First Consul had wished that every thing should be transacted with the greatest parade. Long before, he had sent off for Amiens a detachment of his finest troops, newly clothed; he had had the roads from Amiens to Calais, and from Amiens to Paris, repaired; and had sent relief to the labourers of the country out of work, that nothing might excite in the English negotiator an

unfavorable idea of France. He had given orders for preparations in the town of Amiens itself, in order that the signature should be given with a sort of solemnity. On the 27th, at eleven o'clock in the morning, detachments of cavalry went to the abodes of the plenipotentiaries, and escorted them to the hôtel de ville, where a hall had been prepared to receive them. It took them some time to look over the copies of the treaty, and, at length, about two o'clock, admittance was given to the authorities and the crowd, eager to be present at the imposing ceremony of the two first nations of the universe becoming reconciled, before the face of the world, becoming reconciled, alas ! for how short a time ! The two plenipotentiaries signed the peace, and then cordially embraced each other, amidst the acclamations of the bystanders, who, full of emotion, were transported with joy. Lord Cornwallis and Joseph Bonaparte were reconducted to their residences, amidst the most boisterous acclamations of the multitude. Lord Cornwallis heard blessings pronounced on his name by the French people, and Joseph went home, hearing on all sides the cry which was to be for a long time, and which might, by possibility, have been still, the cry of France, "*Vive Bonaparte !*"

Lord Cornwallis set out immediately for London, notwithstanding the invitation he had received to go to Paris. He feared that the facilities in the drawing up of the treaty to which he had lent himself might not be approved by his government, and he wished to secure the ratification of the treaty by his presence.

The successful issue of the congress at Amiens, if it did not excite among the English people the same transports of enthusiasm as the signing of the preliminaries, yet found them joyous and cheery. This time they were told that they were going to enjoy the reality of peace, provisions at a low price, and the abolition of the income-tax. They believed it, and showed themselves truly satisfied.

The effect was nearly the same on our side. Fewer external demonstrations, but not less internal satisfaction—such was the spectacle presented by the people of France. In fine, it was felt that the real peace, that of the seas, was obtained, as a certain and necessary condition of the continental peace. After ten years of the most violent, the most terrible, struggle that had ever been seen among men, they laid down arms : the temple of Janus was shut.

By whom had all this been accomplished ? Who had rendered France so great and so prosperous—Europe so calm ? One single man, by the might of his sword, and by the depth of his policy, France proclaimed this, and entire Europe re-echoed her proclamation. He has since conquered at Austerlitz, at Jena, at Friedland, at Wagram ; he has conquered in a hun-

dred battles; has dazzled, startled, subdued the world; but never was he so great, for never was he so wise!

All the bodies of the State, too, came anew to tell him, in harangues full of sincere enthusiasm, that he had been the conqueror, that now he was the benefactor, of Europe. The young author of so much good, the possessor of so much glory, was far from thinking himself at the end of his task; he hardly enjoyed what he had done, so impatient was he to do more. Devoted at the time to the labours of peace, without being very sure that peace would be of long duration, he was anxious to complete what he called the organisation of France, and to reconcile what was true and good in the Revolution with what was useful and necessary to all times in the old monarchy. The matters he now had most at heart were the restoration of the Catholic religion, the organisation of public education, the recall of the emigrants, and the institution of the Legion of Honour. These were not the only things that he contemplated; but they were, according to him, the most urgent. Master, henceforth, of the opinions in the bodies of the State, he made use of the prerogatives of the Constitution to command an extraordinary session. He had returned on the 31st of January, 1802 (11th Pluviôse), from the *Consultum* held at Lyons; the treaty of Amiens had been signed on the 25th of March (4th Germinal); the promotions to the Legislative Body and to the Tribune were finished several weeks before, and the newly-elected members had repaired to their posts: he convoked, therefore, an extraordinary session for the 5th of April (15th Germinal). It was to last to the 20th of May (30th Floreal), that is to say, one month and a half. This was sufficient for his plans, however great they might be; for the contradiction which he was henceforth liable to meet with, could not cause him the loss of much time.

The first of the projects submitted to the Legislative Body, was the Concordat. It was still the most difficult of the new projects to get adopted, if not by the popular masses, at least by the men, civil and military, who surrounded the government. The Holy See, which had been so slow in conceding, at one time, the very principle of the Concordat, at another time, the bull regarding the new bishoprics, at another, the faculty of instituting the new bishops, had long ago sent all to cardinal Caprara, that he might be prepared to exhibit the powers of the Holy See, whenever the First Consul should think it opportune. The First Consul had thought, and justly too, that the proclamation of the definitive peace was the moment, when, under favour of the public joy, the spectacle of the republican government prostrated at the foot of the altars, and thanking God for the benefits



that it had received from Him, might be exhibited for the first time.

He prepared every thing, therefore, for dedicating Easter Sunday to the performance of this great solemnity. But the fifteen days preceding this grand ceremony were neither the least critical nor the least laborious. It was necessary, in the first place, besides the treaty called the Concordat, and which, by the name of treaty, was to be voted by the Legislative Body, it was necessary to draw up and present a law, which should regulate the police of worship, agreeably to the principles of the Concordat and of the Gallican church. It was necessary to appoint the new clergy destined to replace the former bishops, whose resignation had been demanded by the Pope, and almost universally obtained. There were sixty sees to be filled up at once, by selecting, from priests of all parties, respectable subjects; taking care not to give offence to religious sentiments by those selections, or to rekindle schism through excess of the same zeal that was used for its extinction.

These were difficulties which the tenacity, enveloped in mildness, of cardinal Caprara, and which the passions of the clergy, as great as those of other men, rendered very serious and even disquieting, up to the last instant, up to the very eve of the day on which the grand act of the re-establishment of the altars was consummated.

The First Consul began with the law destined to regulate the police of worship. It is that which in our Codes bears the title of Organic Articles. It was very voluminous, and regulated the relations of government with all religions, whether Catholic, Protestant, or Hebrew. It rested on the principle of religious liberty, granting to all religions security and protection, imposing on them mutual respect and toleration towards each other, with submission to the government. As to the Catholic religion, that which embraces almost the whole of the population of our country, it was regulated after the principles of the Roman church, consecrated in the Concordat, and the principles of the Gallican church, proclaimed by Bossuet. First of all, it was established that no bull, brief, or writing whatsoever of the Holy See, could be published in France without the authority of government; that no delegate from Rome, excepting him whom she sent publicly as her official representative, should be admitted, recognised, or tolerated; which cleared the country of those secret mandatories whom the Holy See employed to govern the French church clandestinely during the Revolution. Every infraction whatsoever of the rules resulting, whether from treaties with the Holy See, or from the French laws, committed by a member of the clergy, was styled an *abuse*, and referred to the jurisdiction of the Council of State, a poli-

tical and administrative body, animated by the true spirit of government, and which could not feel for the clergy the old hatred which the magistracy had vowed against it under the ancient monarchy. No council, general or particular, could be held in France without a formal permission from the government. There was to be one catechism alone, approved by public authority. Every ecclesiastic devoted to the instruction of the clergy, was to profess the declaration of 1682, known by the title of *Propositions de Bossuet*. These propositions, as every body knows, contain those beautiful principles of submission and independence which particularly characterise the Gallican church: she, ever submissive to Catholic unity, has made it triumphant in France, and has defended it in Europe; but, independent in her internal government, and faithful to her sovereign, she has never ended in Protestantism, like the churches of England or of Germany, or in the Inquisition, like the church of Spain. Submission to the head of the universal Church in spirituals, submission to the head of the State in temporals, such is the double principle on which the First Consul wished that the French Church should remain established. Wherefore, he exacted formally that the clergy should be instructed in the propositions of Bossuet. It was settled, of course, in the organic articles, that the bishops nominated by the First Consul, and instituted by the Pope, should select the curés, but, before they installed them, they should be obliged to submit them to the approval of government. Permission was granted to the bishops to form chapters of canons in the cathedrals and seminaries of the dioceses. All the appointments of professors in these seminaries were to be approved of by the public authorities. No pupil of these seminaries could be ordained priest before the age of twenty-five, unless he brought forward proof of his having property to the amount of 300 francs annual income (12*l.*), unless he were approved of by the administration of worship. This condition of property it was found impossible to carry out;\* but it would have been desirable had it been practicable, for the spirit of the clergy would have sunk less than we have seen it do since. The archbishops were to receive a salary of 15,000 francs (600*l.*), the bishops 10,000 francs (400*l.*) First class curés were to receive 1500 francs (60*l.*) those of the second 1000 francs (40*l.*), but without the addition of ecclesiastical pensions, which many priests enjoyed in compensation for alienated ecclesiastical property. The fees, that is to say the voluntary contributions of the faithful for the administration of certain sacraments, were reserved, on condition of a regulation to be made by the bishops. For the rest, it was stipulated that all the consolations of religion should be

---

\* It was not abolished till February, 1810.

administered gratuitously. The churches were restored to the new clergy. The presbyteries and the gardens belonging to them, or what is called among the rural population the *curés' houses*, were to be the only portions of former church property restored to the priests; on the understanding that this did not form a precedent in regard to the church property which had been sold. The use of bells was re-established for calling the faithful to church; but with a prohibition of their being used for any civil use, unless by permission from the proper authority. The sinister remembrance of the tocsin had caused the adoption of this precaution. No holiday, except Sunday, could be established, unless authorised by government. Worship was not to be performed externally, that is, outside the temples, in towns where temples existed belonging to different religions. Finally, the Gregorian calendar was made partly to correspond with the calendar of the Republic. This was certainly the most serious of the difficulties. The calendar which recalled more than any other institution the memory of the Revolution, and which had been adapted to the new system of weights and measures, could not be abolished. But neither was it possible to re-establish the Catholic religion without re-establishing the Sunday, and with the Sunday the week. In other respects morals had already done what the law had not yet dared to do, and the Sunday was become again a religious holiday, more or less observed, but universally admitted as an interruption of the labour of the week. The First Consul adopted a middle term. He decided that the year and the month should be named as in the Republican calendar, and the day and the week as in the Gregorian calendar; one should say for instance, for Easter day, Sunday 28th, Germinal, year X., which corresponded with the 18th of April, 1802. Lastly, he required, that no person should be married in church without the previous production of the act of civil marriage; and, as to the registries of births, deaths, and marriages, which the priests had continued to keep from habit, he caused it to be declared, that these registries should never be of any value in courts of justice. Finally, every testamentary, or other donation made to the clergy was to be constituted into a general fund.

Such is in substance the wise and profound law which bears the name of *Organic articles*. It was for the French government quite an internal act, which regarded itself alone, and which by that title was not to be submitted to the Holy See. It sufficed that it contained nothing contrary to the Concordat, so that the court of Rome might have no reasonable ground of complaint. To submit it to her was to prepare interminable difficulties, difficulties greater, more numerous than those which the Concordat itself had met with. The First Consul took care not to expose himself to this. He knew that when once religion was publicly established, the Holy See would not

break the new peace entered into between France and Rome, for articles which concerned the internal police of the Republic. It is true that, at a later period, these articles became one of the causes of complaint against Napoleon, but they were a pretext rather than a real grievance. They had been, besides, communicated to cardinal Caprara, who did not appear at all shocked at reading them,\* if we are to judge of him by what he wrote to his court. He made some reservations, and advised the holy father not to be grieved at them, hoping, he said, that these articles would not be executed rigorously.

The law of the Organic Articles having been drawn up and discussed in the Council of State, it became necessary to direct attention to the clerical appointments. This was a considerable labour, for there was a multitude of selections to be examined closely before deciding on them definitively. M. Portalis, whom the First Consul had charged with the administration of religion, and who was eminently fit either to treat with the clergy, or to represent them in the bodies of the State, and to defend them with an eloquence which was mild, brilliant, and tempered with a certain religious unction; M. Portalis usually resisted the Holy See with respectful firmness. On this occasion he had become in some measure the ally of cardinal Caprara, in a pretension of the court of Rome; namely, that of completely excluding the constitutional clergy from the new sees. The Pope, still affected by an act so exorbitant in his eyes as the deposition of the former bishops, wished, at least, to indemnify himself for it by keeping out of the episcopacy the ministers of religion who had formed a compact with the French Revolution, and taken an oath to the civil Constitution. Since the signing of the Concordat, that is to say, about eight or nine months, cardinal Caprara, who was filling, incognito, the office of legate *à latere*, and who saw the First Consul every day, insinuated to him mildly, but with firmness, the desires of the Romish Church, advancing more boldly when the Consul was in a humour to let him speak, retiring precipitately and with humility when he was of a contrary humour. These desires of the Romish Church did not consist solely in excluding from the composition of the new order of French clergy the priests whom she called *intruders*, but to recover the lost provinces, Bologna, Ferrara, and Romagna. "The holy father," said the cardinal, "is very poor since he has been stripped of these his most fertile provinces; he is so poor that he is unable to pay troops to guard him, or to pay the administration of his States or the Sacred College. He has lost even part of his foreign revenues. In the midst of his grievances, the re-establishment

---

\* These assertions are founded on the correspondence itself of cardinal Caprara.

of religion in France is the greatest of his consolations; but do not mingle bitterness with this balm, by obliging him to institute priests who have apostatised—by depriving the faithful clergy of the places already so much reduced by the new limitation.” “Yes,” replied the First Consul, “the holy father is poor; I will assist him. All the boundaries of the States in Italy are not irrevocably fixed; those of Europe itself are not definitively agreed on. But I cannot now take away provinces from the Italian Republic, which has just chosen me for its chief. Meanwhile, the holy father is in want of more money than he has. He requires some millions, and I am ready to give them to him. As to the intruders,” added he, “that is another affair. The Pope has promised, when once the resignations were sent in, to reconcile with the Church, without any distinction, all those who should submit to the Concordat. This he has promised, and he must keep his word; I shall remind him of it, and he is neither a man nor a pontiff if he fail in it. Besides, my mission is not to make one party or another triumph; my mission is to reconcile them one to the other by holding the balance equally between them. For some time past, you have compelled me to read the history of the Church. I have there seen that religious quarrels occur in no wise differently from political ones; for you priests, and we soldiers, or magistrates, we are all of us men. They end only by the intervention of an authority strong enough to oblige the parties to be reconciled to each other and to amalgamate. I will, therefore, mix some constitutional bishops with the bishops that you call faithful; I will choose them well; I will choose few, but there shall be some of them. You will reconcile them with the Roman Church; I will compel them to be obedient to the Concordat, and all will go well. However, it is a thing resolved on—don’t return to it again.”

The GREAT CONSUL, as the cardinal used to call him, if pressed, took fire immediately; and the cardinal desisted, for he equally admired, loved, and feared him, and said to the holy father, “Let us not irritate this man! He alone sustains us in this country, where every one is against us; for if, unfortunately, he were to die, there would be no longer a religion in France.” The cardinal, though he had not succeeded, tried, nevertheless, to appear satisfied; for general Bonaparte loved to see people content, and was vexed when any one appeared before him with a doleful look. The cardinal then showed himself always mild and serene, and by this means had found out the art of pleasing him. He saw, besides, the troubles that annoyed general Bonaparte, and he did not wish to add to them. The general, in his turn, tried to explain to the cardinal the susceptibilities, the jealousies of the French mind; and, notwithstanding his power, he made as many efforts to convince him as the cardinal could make on his side to bring

him to his views. One day, impatient at the entreaties of the legate, he imposed silence on him by these words, at once gracious and profound. "Hold!" said he, "cardinal Caprara, do you still possess the power of working miracles? Do you possess it? If you do, employ it, for you will render me a great service. If you have it not, leave me to myself; and, since I am reduced to human means, permit me to make use of them as I know how, to save the Church."

A curious and striking picture, preserved entire in the correspondence of cardinal Caprara, is that of this powerful warrior displaying by turns, a finesse, a grace, an extraordinary vehemence, to persuade the old cardinal, theologian, and diplomatist. Both were thus arrived at the moment of the publication of the Concordat, without either having been able to convince the other. M. de Portalis, who on this point only, was of the opinion of the Holy See, dared not, as he wished to do at first, completely exclude the constitutionalists from his propositions for the filling of the sixty sees, but he presented only two of them. Having had an understanding with the abbé Bernier for the selections to be made among the orthodox clergy, he had proposed the most eminent and wisest members of the old episcopacy, and estimable curés, in sufficient number, distinguished by their piety, their moderation, and the continuance of their services during the Reign of Terror. He said, with abbé Bernier, that, to call no member of the ancient episcopacy, and to point out none but curés, would be creating a clergy too new, too unprovided with authority; that, on the contrary, to nominate former bishops alone to all the sees, would be too great a forgetfulness of the inferior clergy, who had rendered real services during the Revolution, and whose just ambition would thus be grievously offended. These views were reasonable and were admitted by the First Consul. But, as to the two constitutional prelates, he was not at all content with them.

"Of sixty sees," said he, "I mean to give one-fifth to the clergy of the Revolution, that is to say, twelve. There shall be two constitutional archbishops to ten, and ten constitutional bishops to fifty, which is not too much." After having concerted with Messrs. Portalis and Bernier, he made, with them, the best conceived selections, excepting one or two. M. de Belloy, bishop of Marseilles, the most respectable, the most aged of the members of the ancient church of France, the worthy minister of a religion of charity, who joined a venerable countenance to the sagest piety, was nominated archbishop of Paris. M. de Cicé, formerly keeper of the seals under Louis XVI., and archbishop of Bordeaux, a man of firm political mind, was promoted to the archbishopric of Aix. M. de Boisgelin, a man of high birth, an enlightened



priest, well informed and mild, formerly archbishop of Aix, became archbishop of Tours. M. de la Tour du Pin, formerly archbishop of Auch, received the bishopric of Troyes. This worthy prelate, illustrious by his knowledge as much as by his birth, had the modesty to accept that post, so inferior to the one which he resigned. The First Consul rewarded him for it, at a later period, with the cardinal's hat. M. de Roquelaure, formerly bishop of Senlis, one of the most distinguished prelates of the ancient church, by the union of amenity of manners and good morals, obtained the archbishopric of Malines. M. Cambacérès, brother of the second consul, was called to the archbishopric of Rouen. L'abbé Fesch, uncle of the First Consul, a proud priest, who made it his glory to resist his nephew, was created archbishop of Lyons, that is to say, primate of the Gauls. M. Lecoq, constitutional bishop of Rennes, a priest of good morals, but an ardent and unaccommodating Jansenist, was nominated archbishop of Besançon. M. Primat, constitutional bishop of Lyons, formerly an Oratorian, a well-informed and mild priest, having occasioned sad scandal with regard to the schism, but none with regard to morals, was promoted to the archbishopric of Toulouse. A distinguished curé, M. de Pancemont, who had been much employed in the affair of the resignations, was taken from the parish of St. Sulpice, to be sent to Vannes as bishop. Lastly, the abbé Bernier, the celebrated curé of Saint-Laud d'Angers, formerly the concealed plotter in La Vendée, afterwards its pacificator, and under the First Consul, the negotiator of the Concordat, received the bishopric of Orleans. This see was not commensurate with the high influence which the First Consul had allowed him over the affairs of the church of France; but the abbé Bernier felt that the recollections of a civil war attached to his name, did not permit too marked or too sudden an elevation; that the real power which he enjoyed was of more value than external honours. Besides, the First Consul had in view for him a cardinal's hat.

When these nominations, which were decided on, but which were not to be published until after the conversion of the Concordat into the law of the State, were communicated to cardinal Caprara, the latter opposed a strong resistance to them; he even shed tears, saying that he was unprovided with powers, although he had received from Rome an arbitrary latitude, extending to the extraordinary faculty of instituting prelates, without recourse to the Holy See. Messrs. Portalis and Bernier declared to him that the will of the First Consul was irrevocable; that he should submit, or renounce the solemn restoration of the altars, which was to take place within a few days. He did submit, writing to the Pope, that the salvation of souls who would be deprived of religion, if he

had persisted, had gained the victory, in his mind, over the interest of the faithful clergy. "I shall be blamed," said he, to the holy father, "but I have obeyed what I believed to be the voice of Heaven."

He consented, therefore, reserving to himself the right to exact from the newly-elected constitutionalists, a recantation, which might cover this last condescension of the Holy See.

Every thing being ready, the First Consul caused the Concordat to be carried up to the Legislative Body, there to be voted into a law, as prescribed by the Constitution. To the Concordat were joined the Organic Articles. It was on the first day of the extraordinary session, 5th of April, 1802 (15th Germinal), that the Concordat was presented to the Legislative Body by the councillors of State, Portalis, Régnier, and Regnault de Saint Jean d'Angely. The Legislative Body was not sitting when the treaty of Amiens, signed the 25th of March, became known in Paris. It had not, therefore, been among the authorities, which had come forward to congratulate the First Consul. On this first sitting, it was proposed to send a deputation of twenty-five members, to compliment the First Consul on the occasion of the general peace. In this proposition there was not a word said of the Concordat, which shows the spirit of the time, even in the heart of the renewed Legislative Body. The deputation was presented the 6th of April, 1802 (16th Germinal).

"Citizen Consul," said the president of the Legislative Body, "the first craving of the French people, when attacked by Europe, was for victory, and you have conquered. Its dearest aspiration, after victory, was for peace, and peace you have given to it. What glory for the past! what hope for the future! And all this is your work! Enjoy the lustre and the happiness which the Republic owes you!" The president concluded this address with the most lively expression of the national gratitude; but he was absolutely dumb on the subject of the Concordat. The First Consul took the opportunity to give him, on this subject, a sort of lesson, and to speak of nothing but the Concordat, to people who spoke only of the peace of Amiens. "I thank you," said he, to the messengers of the Legislative Body, "for the sentiments that you express to me. Your session begins with the most important operation of all, that which has for its object the appeasing of religious quarrels. All France solicits an end to these deplorable quarrels, and the re-establishment of the altars. I hope that, in your vote, like her, you will be of one mind. France will see, with a lively joy, that her legislators have voted the peace of consciences, the peace of families, a hundred times more important for the happiness of a people than that peace on occasion of which you come to congratulate the government."

These noble expressions produced the effect which the First Consul expected from them. The project, carried immediately from the Legislative Body to the Tribunate, was examined there gravely, even favourably, and discussed without vehemence. On the report of M. Siméon, it was carried by seventy-eight votes against seven. In the Legislative Body 228 voices pronounced for and twenty-eight against it.

On the 8th of April (18th Germinal) the two projects were converted into laws. There was no further obstacle. It was the Thursday preceding Palm Sunday; the following Sunday would be Easter Day. The First Consul wished to consecrate these solemn days of the Catholic religion to the great festival of the re-establishment of public worship. He had not yet received cardinal Caprara officially, as legate from the Holy See. He appointed the following day, Friday, for this official reception. The usage with legates *à latere*, is to have the gold cross carried before them. It is a sign of the extraordinary powers which the Holy See delegates to its representatives of this rank. Cardinal Caprara wishing, conformably with the views of his court, that the exercise of religion might be as public and as pompous as possible in France, desired that, according to custom, on the day on which he was to go to the Tuileries, the gold cross should be carried before him, by an officer dressed in red, and on horseback. Some hesitation was felt to exhibit such a spectacle to the populace of Paris. Negotiations took place, and it was settled that this cross should be borne in one of the carriages which were to precede that of the legate.

On Friday, the 9th of April (19th Germinal), the cardinal legate repaired in pomp to the Tuileries, in the equipages of the First Consul, escorted by the consular guard, and preceded by the cross borne in one of the carriages. The First Consul received him at the head of a numerous train, composed of his colleagues, of several councillors of State, and of a brilliant staff. Cardinal Caprara, whose exterior was mild and grave, addressed to the First Consul a discourse, in which dignity was blended with the expression of gratitude. He took the oath agreed upon, to do nothing against the laws of the State, and to vacate his functions as soon as he should be required to do so. The First Consul replied to him in elevated terms—terms destined, above all, to resound elsewhere than in the palace of the Tuileries.

This external manifestation was the first of all those which were in preparation, and was not much remarked, because the people of Paris, not having notice of it, had not the opportunity of yielding to their ordinary curiosity. The next day but one, was to be Palm Sunday. The First Consul had already reconciled the cardinal to some of the

principal prelates whose nomination was decided on. He wished that their consecration should take place on this Palm Sunday, in order that they might be able to officiate the following Sunday, Easter Day, in the grand solemnity which he had projected. They were Messrs. de Belloy, nominated archbishop of Paris; de Cambacérès, archbishop of Rouen; Bernier, bishop of Orleans; de Pancemont, bishop of Vannes. The church of Notre Dame was still occupied by the constitutionalists, who kept the keys of it. A formal order was necessary to oblige them to give them up. That beautiful temple was found in a state of sad ruin; nothing there was in readiness for the consecration of the four prelates. This defect was provided for by means of a sum of money furnished by the First Consul; and so great was the precipitation, that, when the day of the ceremony came, no place had been fitted up for a sacristy. An adjoining house was employed for that purpose. The new prelates there invested themselves in their pontifical ornaments, and in that dress crossed the open space in front of the cathedral. The people, having notice that a grand ceremony was in preparation, had hurried thither, and behaved calmly and respectfully. The face of the venerable archbishop de Belloy was so noble and so handsome, that it affected the simple hearts of which that crowd was composed; and all, men and women, bowed respectfully. The church was full of that numerous class of Christians, who had mourned for the misfortunes of religion, and who, belonging to no faction, received with gratitude the boon which the First Consul was conferring on them that day. The ceremony was affecting, even in default of pomp, through the sentiment which was brought to it. The four prelates were consecrated after the usual form.

From that moment, it must be said, the satisfaction was general amongst the many; there was a certainty of public approbation for the great manifestation fixed for the following Sunday. Excepting party men, revolutionists, obstinate in their systems, or factious royalists, who saw with chagrin the lever of revolt slipping from their clutch, every one approved of what was going on, and the First Consul was able to recognise already that his views had been more just than those of his advisers.

On the following Sunday, Easter Day, a solemn *Te Deum* was to be sung for the celebration, at the same time, of the general peace and the reconciliation with the Church. This ceremony was announced by public authority as a genuine national festival. The preparations and the programme of it were published. The First Consul wished to proceed thither in grand *cortège*, accompanied by all that was most elevated in the State. Through the ladies of the palace

he had a conference with the heads of the high officials, that they would satisfy one of his most ardent desires if they attended the metropolitan church on the day of the *Te Deum*. The greater number did not refuse pressing. It is known what fervent wishes are joined to motives the most pure, to increase the concordance in these ceremonies of religion. The most brave and women in Paris obeyed the First Consul. The principal leaders amongst them were in assembly at the Tuileries, to accompany Madame Bonaparte in the equipages of the new court.

The First Consul had given a formal order to his generals to accompany him. These were the most difficult to be gained over; for, it was said everywhere, that they held unbecoming and almost factious language. We have already seen the waywardness of Lannes. Augereau, tolerated at Paris, was actually one of those who spoke loudest. He was commissioned by his comrades to present himself to the First Consul, and to express to him their desire not to appear at Notre Dame. In consular sitting, in the presence of the three consuls, and of the ministers, was the audience to be given, in which general Bonaparte was pleased to receive Augereau. The latter delivered his message; but the First Consul recalled him to his duty with that *hauteur* that he knew how to assume in command, particularly with regard to military men. He made him sensible of the impropriety of his conduct, reminded him that the Concordat was now the law of the State; that the laws were obligatory for all classes of citizens, as well for the army as for the humblest and weakest of the people; that, moreover, he would take care, in his double capacity of general and chief magistrate of the Republic, to see them executed; that it was not for the officers of the army, but for the government, to judge of the suitableness of the ceremonies ordered for Easter Day; that all the authorities had orders to attend at them, the military as well as the civil authorities, and all should obey; that, as to the dignity of the army, he was as jealous of it, and as good a judge of it, as any of the generals his companions in arms; and that he was sure of not compromising it by assisting in person at the ceremonies of religion; that, to put an end to the matter, they had not to deliberate on, but to execute, an order, and that he expected to see them all on Sunday at his side, in the metropolitan church. Augereau made no reply, and brought back to his comrades only the embarrassment of having committed an indiscretion, and the resolution to obey.

Every thing was ready, but, at the last moment, the second thoughts of cardinal Caprara were nigh frustrating the noble plans of the First Consul. The bishops selected from the constitutional clergy had gone to cardinal Caprara's for the *proces informatif*, which is drawn up in regard to every bishop

presented to the Holy See. The cardinal had required of them a recantation, by which they were to abjure their former errors, and which characterised in the most condemnatory manner their adherence to the civil constitution of the clergy. It was a humiliating step not only for them, but for the Revolution itself. When the First Consul was informed of it he would not allow it, and enjoined them not to yield, promising to support them, and to force the representative of the Holy See to renounce his unchristianlike intentions. Cardinal Caprara had seen no other excuse for his condescension, if he instituted what were called *intruders*, than in a formal recantation of their past conduct. But the First Consul did not understand it in that shape. "When I accept for bishop," said he, "the abbé Bernier, the apostle of La Vendée, the Pope may well be satisfied with Jansenists or Oratorians, who have had no other fault than that of adhering to the Revolution." He directed them to confine themselves to a simple declaration, which consisted in saying, that they adhered to the Concordat, and the wishes of the Holy See, written in that treaty. He insisted, with reason, that, as the Concordat contained the principles on which the French Church and the Roman Church had agreed, more could not be exacted, without an avowed intention of humiliating one party for the benefit of another, and he declared that he would not permit it.

Saturday evening, Easter eve, this contest was not over. M. de Portalis was charged to go and announce to the cardinal that the ceremony of the next day should not take place, that the Concordat should not be published, and should remain without effect if he insisted any longer on the recantation demanded. This resolution was over and above serious, and the First Consul, in showing himself full of condescension for the Church, would not, however, yield on the points which seemed to him to compromise the object itself, that is to say, the amalgamation of parties. He knew that to be a conciliator it is necessary to be energetic, for it costs nearly as much trouble to bring parties to a compromise as it does to conquer them.

The cardinal at length yielded, but at a very advanced hour of the night. It was agreed that the newly-elected prelates, taken from among the constitutional clergy, should go through at his house the *proces informatif*, and that they should profess, *viva voce*, their sincere union to the Church, and that, as a consequence, a declaration should be made that they and the Church were reconciled, without saying how, or in what terms. Still, it is a fact, that the recantation demanded was not made.

The day afterwards, Easter day, 18th of April 1802 (28th Germinal, year X.), the Concordat was published in all quarters of Paris with great show, and by the principal authorities. Whilst this publication was taking place in the streets of the capital, the First Consul, who wished to solemnise on the same day every thing that was for the good of France, was exchanging the



ratifications of the peace of Amiens. This important formality having been accomplished, he set out for Notre Dame, followed by the chief bodies of the State, and by a great number of functionaries of every class, by a brilliant staff, and by a crowd of ladies of the highest rank, who accompanied Madame Bonaparte. A long suite of carriages composed this magnificent *cortège*. The troops of the first military division, assembled at Paris, formed a line from the Tuileries to the cathedral. The archbishop of Paris advanced in procession to receive the First Consul at the porch of the church, and to present the holy water to him. The new head of the State was conducted under the canopy to the place reserved for him. The Senate, the Legislative Body, the Tribunate, were ranged on each side of the altar. Behind the First Consul were found standing the generals in full uniform, rather obedient than converted, some affecting a demeanour by no means becoming. As to himself, habited in the red dress of the consuls, motionless, with a stern countenance, he displayed neither the distraction of some nor the devoutness of others. He was calm, grave, in the attitude of a chief of empire, who is performing a grand act of will, and who commands by his look submission from all the world.

The ceremony was long and dignified, in spite of the bad disposition of most of those whom it had been necessary to bring thither. For the rest, the effect of it was destined to be decisive, for, the example once given by the most imposing of men, all the ancient religious habits were about to revive and all resistance to subside.

There were two motives for this *fête*, to wit, the re-establishment of worship and the general peace. Naturally the satisfaction was general, and whosoever had not in his heart the bad passions of party was happy in the public welfare. On that day there were grand dinners at the ministers, attended by the principal members of the administrations. The representatives of the powers were guests of the minister for foreign affairs. There was a brilliant banquet at the First Consul's, to which were invited the cardinal Caprara, the archbishop of Paris, the principal bishops elect of the new clergy, the highest personages of the State. The First Consul discoursed long with the cardinal; he testified to him his joy at having achieved so great a work. He was proud of his courage and his success. One light shade crossed his noble brow, and that scarcely for an instant, it was when he cast a glance at certain of his generals, whose attitude and language had not been becoming in this conjuncture. He expressed to them his discontent with a firmness of tone which admitted of no reply, and which left no fear of a relapse.

To complete the effect which the First Consul had wished to produce on that same day, M. de Fontanes gave an account

in the *Moniteur* of a new book which was making a great noise at the time; it was the *Genie du Christianisme*. This book, written by a young Breton gentleman, M. de Chateaubriand, related to the Malesherbes, and long absent from his country, described with infinite brilliancy the beauties of Christianity, and extolled the moral and poetical influence of religious practices, which had been exposed twenty years before to the most bitter railleries. Severely criticised by Messrs. Chénier and Ginguené, who reproached it with false and overcharged colours, passionately supported by the partisans of religious restoration, the *Genie du Christianisme*, like all remarkable books, very much praised, very much attacked, produced a profound impression, because it expressed a true sentiment, very generally felt at the time in French society; it was that peculiar indefinable regret for what exists no longer, for what one has disdained or destroyed when possessed of it, for what one sadly desires when it is lost. Such is the human heart! What exists fatigues or oppresses it; what has ceased to exist acquires, all at once, a potent charm. The social and religious customs of a former period, odious and ridiculous in 1789, because they were then in all their force, and, moreover, were often oppressive; now that the eighteenth century, changed towards its close into an impetuous torrent, had swept them away in its devastating course, now, these customs returned to the recollection of an agitated generation, and touched its heart, disposed to emotions by the tragic spectacle of fifteen years. The work of the young writer, impressed with this profound sentiment, stirred up men's minds strongly, and had been welcomed with marked favour by the man who was then dispensing all glories. If it did not exhibit the pure taste, the simple and solid faith of the writers of the age of Louis XIV., it painted in charming colours the old religious manners which were no more. Without doubt, one might censure in it the misuse of a fine imagination, but after Virgil, after Horace, there has remained in the memory of mankind, a place for the ingenious Ovid, for the brilliant Lucan, and alone, perhaps, among the books of its day, the *Genie du Christianisme* will live, strongly linked as it is to a memorable epoch; it will live, as those friezes sculptured on the marble of a building live with the monument which bears them.

In recalling the priests to the altar, in withdrawing them from the dark retreats, where they practised their religion, and often conspired against the government, the First Consul had repaired one of the most vexatious disorders of the time, and had satisfied one of the greatest moral wants of every society. But there remained another extremely sad disorder, one which left to France the aspect of a country torn by factions; it

was the exile of a considerable number of Frenchmen, living in foreign lands in indigence, sometimes in hatred of their country, and receiving from hostile governments a mouthful of bread, which many of them paid for by unworthy acts towards France. A frightful invention of discord is exile; it renders the banished man wretched, it denaturalises his heart, leaves him to the alms doled out by a stranger; it parades afar the afflicting exhibition of the troubles of the land. Of all the traces of a revolution it is that which should be the first effaced. General Bonaparte considered the recall of the emigrants as the indispensable completion of the general pacification. It was a reparatory act of which he was impatient to brave the difficulties, and to have the glory. Already there existed for emigrants a system of recall very incomplete, very partial, very irregular, which had all the inconveniences of a general measure, and which had not its high and beneficent character; it was the system of erasures, which were granted to the best recommended emigrants, under pretext that they had been unduly placed on the lists. Such amnesty was not always given to the most excusable or the most deserving.

The First Consul then formed the resolution of permitting the return of the emigrants *en masse*, with certain exceptions. Grave objections were made against this measure. At first, all the constitutions, particularly the Consular Constitution, said expressly, that the emigrants were never to be recalled. They said so, particularly on account of those who had acquired national domains, who were very suspicious, and who looked on the exile of the former possessors of their property as necessary for their safety. The First Consul, considering himself as the firmest support of those holders, having always expressed the firm will to defend them, the only mortal having the power to do so, believed himself sufficiently strong in the confidence he had inspired in them all, to be able to open the gates of France to the emigrants. He then caused a resolution to be prepared, the first clause of which was, the new and irrevocable consecration of the sales made by the State to the holders of national property. He next had inserted in it a provision by which all emigrants were recalled *en masse*, placing them under the surveillance of the high police, and submitting to this surveillance, for the whole of their lives, those who should have, at any time, provoked the application of it. There were yet some exceptions to this general recall. The benefit of it was refused to the chiefs of the troops raised against the Republic; to those who had held rank in the armies of the enemy; to individuals who had continued to hold places or titles in the house of the princes of Bourbon; to the generals or representatives of the

people, who had made compacts with the enemy (this concerned Pichegru, and some members of the legislative assemblies); finally, to the bishops and archbishops who had refused their resignation demanded by the Pope. The number of these excluded persons was very inconsiderable.

The most difficult question to be solved was that which arose on the subject of the property of the emigrants not yet sold. If, with all reason, the sales made by the State should be declared inviolable, still it might appear hard not to make restitution of their property to the emigrants, when it remained untouched in the hands of government. "I do nothing," said the First Consul, "if I restore these emigrants to their country, without restoring to them their patrimony. I wish to efface the traces of our civil wars; and, by filling France with returned emigrants, who will remain in indigence, whilst their properties shall be thus under the sequestration of the State, I create a class of malecontents who will give no rest. And, these properties kept under the sequestration of the State, who, think you, will purchase them, in the presence of their ancient owners now returned?" The First Consul then resolved to restore all the unsold domains, excepting houses or buildings appropriated to the public service.

This resolution thus drawn up was submitted to a privy council, composed of the Consuls, of the ministers, of a certain number of councillors of State, and of senators. It was warmly discussed in this assembly, and appeared to excite sharp jealousies. However, the general impulse towards all reparatory measures which tended to efface the traces of our troubles, the *prestige* of the general peace, the positive will of the First Consul, all these causes combined led to the adoption of the principle of the measure. But care was taken to insert in the resolution the word amnesty, to fix upon emigration the character of a criminal act which the victorious and happy nation was willing enough to forget. The First Consul, desiring to do things in a complete manner, repelled the employment of the word amnesty. He said that it was not right to humble persons whose reconciliation with France they were endeavouring to bring about, and that to treat them as pardoned criminals was to humble them deeply. He was told in reply, that emigration had originally been a crime, for it had for its principal object to make war on France, and that it was necessary that it should remain condemned by the laws. A warm dispute took place relative to the property of the emigrants. The councillors called to the deliberation, obstinately refused the restitution of woods and forests, which the law of the 2nd Nivôse, year IV., had declared inalienable. It was, in their opinion, replacing

immense riches in the hands of the great emigration, depriving the State of prodigious resources, and, above all, of forests of indispensable utility for the service of the army and navy. Notwithstanding all his efforts, the First Consul was obliged to yield, and he thus preserved, without dreaming of it, one of the most powerful means of influence over the ancient French nobility, that which afterwards served to bring them back to him almost entirely: this means was the individual restitution which he made at a later period of their properties, to those of the emigrants who submitted to his government.

The resolution being thus modified, it remained to be settled how a legal character was to be given to it. It was not the intention to make it into a law; it was designed to give it a more elevated character, if it were possible. The idea was conceived of making an organic *Senatus-Consultum* of it. The resolution touched the Constitution itself, and, in that way, seemed to belong more particularly to the Senate. Already the Senate, by two important acts, that which had proscribed the Jacobins, falsely accused on account of the infernal machine, and that which had interpreted the thirty-eighth article of the Constitution, and excluded the oppositionists of the two legislative assemblies, had acquired a sort of power superior to the Constitution itself; for it had legitimatised either extraordinary measures, or new constitutional arrangements, which the government had thought needful. After having performed rigorous acts, it could not but be agreeable to the Senate to be intrusted with an act of national clemency. It was then decreed that the resolution pronouncing the recall of the emigrants should be first discussed in the Council of State, as were the standing orders, laws, *Senatus-consulta*, and next be submitted to the Senate, there to be deliberated on, as a measure touching the Constitution itself.

The thing was thus executed. The project of amnesty discussed in the Council of State, on the 16th of April (26th Germinal), two days before the publication of the Concordat, was carried ten days afterwards to the Senate, on the 26th of April, 1802 (6th Floréal). It was there adopted without controversy, and with remarkable motives.

“Considering,” said the Senate, “that the proposed measure is called for by the actual state of things, by justice, by the national interest, and that it is in conformity with the spirit of the Constitution;

“Considering that, at different epochs, when the laws relative to emigration were enacted, France, torn by intestine divisions, sustained against almost all Europe a war, for which history presents no parallel, and which necessitated rigorous and extraordinary arrangements;

“That at the present day, peace being made abroad, it is

important to cement it at home, by every thing which can rally Frenchmen, tranquillise families, and cause evils inseparable from a long revolution to be forgotten ;

“That nothing can better consolidate peace at home, than a measure which tempers the severity of the laws, and puts an end to the uncertainties and delays resulting from the forms established for the erasures ;

“Considering that this measure can only be an amnesty, which may extend pardon to the greater number, always more misled than criminal, and that may extend punishment to the principal culprits by permanently keeping them on the list of emigrants ;

“That this amnesty, devised by clemency, is, however, granted only on conditions just in themselves, tranquillising for the public safety, and wisely combined with the national welfare ;

“That particular provisions of the amnesty, by defending from all attack the acts done with the Republic, consecrate anew the guarantee of the sales of national property, the upholding of which will always be a particular object of the solicitude of the Conservative Senate, as it is of the Consuls : the Senate adopts the proposed resolution.”

This courageous act of clemency could not but obtain the approbation of all wise men who sincerely wished for an end to our civil broils. Thanks to the new guarantees given to the holders of national property, thanks to the confidence which the First Consul inspired them with, this last measure of government did not cause them too great disquietude, and it satisfied that honest, and luckily the most numerous, mass, of the royalist party, which received without murmur the good that was conferred on it. It met with ingratitude only among the highest class of emigrants, who were living in the saloons of Paris, repaying there, in bad language, the benefits of the government. According to them, the act was insignificant, incomplete, unjust, because it made some distinctions between persons, because it did not restore the property of the emigrants, sold or unsold. The approbation of these vain talkers could well be dispensed with. However, the First Consul was so greedy of glory, that these wretched critics sometimes disturbed the pleasure which he received from the universal assent of France and of Europe.

But his ardour for well doing did not depend on praise and censure, and scarcely had he consummated the great act which we have just related, before he already had in preparation others of the highest political and social importance. Relieved from the impediments which the resistance of the Tribune presented to his fruitful activity, he was resolved during that extraordinary session of Germinal and Floréal, to conclude,



or at least to advance considerably, the re-organisation of France. It is proper to exhibit his ideas on this subject.

By the acts of the First Consul, already known, particularly by the re-establishment of religious worship, it was easy to guess what was the ordinary tendency of his mind, and his particular manner of thinking on questions of social organisation. In general he was disposed to contradict the narrow or exaggerated systems of the Revolution, or, to speak more correctly, of some revolutionists ; for, in its first movements the Revolution had been always generous and true. It had wished to abolish the irregularities, the caprices, the unjust distinctions arising from the feudal system, and in virtue of which, for instance, a Jew, a Catholic, a Protestant, a noble, a priest, a shopkeeper, a Burgundian, a Provençal, a Breton, had not the same rights, the same duties, did not support the same burdens, did not enjoy the same advantages ; in a word, did not live under the same laws. To make of all these Frenchmen, whatever might be their religion, their birth, their native province, citizens equal in rights and in duties, eligible to every thing according to their merit, this is what the Revolution wished to do in its first enthusiasm, before contradiction had irritated it even to delirium ; this is what the First Consul wished to accomplish after that delirium had given place to reason. But that chimerical equality which demagogues had been dreaming about for a moment, which was to put all men on the same level, which hardly admitted the natural inequalities proceeding from a difference of minds and talents, that equality he despised, either as a chimera of the spirit of system, or as a revolt of envy.

He wished, then, in society for a hierarchy, on the steps of which all men, without distinction of birth, should come and place themselves according to their merit, and on the steps of which should remain fixed those whose ancestors had borne them thither, still without offering any obstacle to the new comers who might try to raise themselves in their turn.

To this sort of social vegetation, resulting from nature herself, observed in all countries and at all times, he intended to give a free course, in the institutions he was occupied in founding. Like all powerful minds, who apply themselves to discover in the sentiments of the masses the true interests of humanity, and love to oppose that sentiment to the narrow views of the spirit of system, he sought in the dispositions manifested before his eyes by the people itself, arguments for his opinions.

To those who, in matters of religion, had recommended indifference, he had opposed that popular movement, which had been recently produced at the door of a church, to force the

priests to give burial to an actress. "See," said he, to these partisans of indifference, "see, how indifferent is that multitude! And yourselves," said he also to them, "why have you, in the midst of the greatest revolutionary paroxysm, proclaimed the Supreme Being?—Because, in the bottom of the heart of a people there is something which inclines them to have a God—no matter what."

"As to the manner of classing men in society," said he to those who wished for no distinction: "why then have you created fusils and sabres of honour? Is not that a distinction? And ridiculously enough invented, for men do not carry a fusil or a sabre of honour at their breast, and, for things of this sort, men like what is seen at a distance." The First Consul had observed a singular fact, and he was fond of mentioning it to those with whom he was in the habit of conversing. Since France, the object of the respect and of the attentions of Europe, became filled with the ministers of all the powers, or with foreigners of distinction who came to visit it, he was struck with the curiosity with which the populace, and even persons above the populace, followed these foreigners, and were eager to see their rich uniforms and their brilliant decorations. There was often a crowd in the courtyard of the Tuileries to be present at their arrival and departure. "See," said he, "these futile vanities, which geniuses disdain so much. The populace is not of their opinion. It loves those many-coloured cordons as it loves religious pomp. The democrat philosophers call that vanity, idolatry. Idolatry, vanity, let it be. But that idolatry, that vanity, are weaknesses common to the whole human race, and from both great virtues may be made to spring. With these, so much despised baubles, heroes are made! To the one, as to the other of these alleged weaknesses external signs are necessary; there must be a worship for religious sentiment, there must be visible distinctions for the noble sentiment of glory."

The First Consul resolved to create an order which should replace arms of honour, which would have the advantage of being given to the soldier as well as to the general, to the peaceful *savant* as well as to the military man, which should consist in decorations similar in form to those worn throughout Europe, and moreover in useful endowments, useful particularly to the private soldier, when he should have returned to his fields. It was, in his eyes, an additional means of putting new France in relation with other countries. Since it was thus that, throughout all Europe, services rendered were marked out for public esteem, why not admit the same system in France? "Nations," said he, "should not strive to be singular any more than individuals. The affectation of acting differently from the rest of the world is an affectation reproved by persons of sense, and above all by persons of modesty."

Cordons are in use in all countries, let them be," added the First Consul, "in use in France! It will be one relation the more established with Europe. In France alone they were not given; among our neighbours they were given only to the man of gentle birth; I will give them to the man who shall have served best in the army and in the State, or who shall have produced the finest works."

One remark more particularly struck the First Consul, and had become a subject which largely engaged his thoughts; it was, to what a degree the men of the Revolution were dis-united, without a bond between them, without strength against their common enemies. Whilst the ancient nobles gave each other the hand; whilst the Vendéans were, although exhausted and subdued, secretly coalesced still; whilst the clergy, although reconstituted, formed, nevertheless, a powerful corporation, very equivocal in its friendship to the government, the men who had made that revolution were divided, and even dis-avowed, it must be said, by ungrateful and mistaken opinion. No sooner had the elections been allowed to go on alone, than there were seen starting up new personages to whom one could not impute either good or evil; or, *vice versâ*, hot-brained revolutionists, the remembrance of whom inspired terror. In the eyes of a new generation, which gave no thanks for their efforts, to those who from '89 to 1800, had suffered so much to enfranchise France, their best claim was to have done nothing. The First Consul was convinced, and with reason, that if this movement had assistance, there would soon not be one of the authors of the Revolution left on the stage; that a new class, easily inclined to royalism, would be produced; that at the very utmost there would be, when opportunity offered, a revolutionary reaction, which would cause the reappearance of some men of blood; that the elections conducted under the Directory, alternately royalist, after the fashion of the club of Clichy, or revolutionary, after the fashion of Babœuf, were a proof of it, and that, from convulsions to convulsions, they would end with the triumph of the Bourbons, and of foreigners, that is to say, with a pure counter-revolution.

He looked on it, then, as indispensable to slacken the movement of free institutions, by so doing, to maintain in power the generation which had effected the Revolution, to maintain them in it, with the exception only of some few blood-stained individuals, and even to those, to secure oblivion for their past errors, and a subsistence for their future years; to found with this generation a society, tranquil, regular, and brilliant, of which he should be the head, of which his companions in arms, and his civil colleagues should form the upper class, the aristocracy, if one chose to call it so, but an aristocracy always open to rising merit, in which should be placed, they and their children, the men who had rendered great services, and in which men capable of

rendering new services might always come and take their station. This society, thus formed after the eternal laws of nature, he wished to surround with all sorts of glories, to embellish by all the arts, for the purpose of opposing with advantage that *ancien régime*, existing like a living recollection in the memory of the emigrants, existing as a reality in all Europe; and he hoped to re-attach to it the emigrants themselves, when time should have corrected them, when the charm of high employments should have attracted them, yet, on condition that they would come, not as disdainful protectors, but as useful and submissive servants. What degree of political liberty would he grant to that society thus constituted? He knew not. He thought that the present moment was not particularly adapted to it, for, all liberty granted changed into cruel reactions; and he believed, moreover, that liberty would arrest his creative genius. Besides, he thought but little at the time on this question; and the country, eager for order only, did not allow him to think of it much. He wished then to found this society upon the principles of the French Revolution, to give it good civil laws, a powerful administration, rich finances, and external grandeur; that is to say, all benefits, save one alone, leaving for others, at a later period the care of conferring on it, or of letting it take, as much public liberty as was consistent.

It was from ideas, such as these, that he had conceived his system of civil and military rewards, and his plan of education.

The arms of honour, devised by the Convention, had not excited much interest, because they were not adapted to manners. They had, besides, involved administrative complications, which were very vexatious, on account of the double pay granted to some, and refused to others. The First Consul conceived the idea of instituting an order, in military form, but not destined for military men alone. He called it the Legion of Honour, wishing to impress the idea of an assemblage of men pledged to the cultivation of honour, and the defence of certain principles. It was to be composed of fifteen cohorts, each cohort of seven grand officers, twenty commanders, thirty officers, and 350 private legionaries, in all 6000 individuals of every rank. The oath indicated to what cause they were to dedicate themselves, when enrolled in the Legion of Honour. Each member promised to devote himself to the defence of the Republic, of the integrity of its territory, of the principle of equality, and of the inviolability of properties called national. It was, consequently, a legion which would pledge its honour to make the principles and the interests of the Revolution triumphant. Decorations and endowments were attached to each rank. To the grand officers was allotted a salary of 5000 francs (200*l.* sterling), to commanders 2000 francs (80*l.* sterling), to officers 1000 francs (40*l.* sterling), to the private legionaries 250 francs

(10*l.* sterling). An endowment in national property was to provide for these expenses. Each cohort was to have its station in the district where its particular possessions were situated. All the combined cohorts were to be administered by a superior council formed of seven members; the three Consuls first, then four grand officers; the first of the latter was to be named by the Senate, the second by the Legislative Body, the third by the Tribunate, the fourth by the Council of State. The council of the Legion of Honour, composed in this manner, was charged with the duty of managing the possessions of the Legion, and of deliberating on the nomination of its members. What served to complete the institution and to indicate its spirit was, that civil services in every line, such as the administration, the government, sciences, letters, arts, were as much titles of admission as military services. Setting out from the present state of things, it was decided that officers and soldiers who had Arms of Honour, should be, by right, members of the Legion, and classed in its ranks according to their grade in the army.

This institution numbers not much more than forty years, and it is already consecrated as if it had passed through centuries, to such a degree has it become in those forty years, the recompense of heroism, of knowledge, of merit of every sort! so much has it been sought after by the grandees and princes of Europe, the most proud of their origin. Time, the judge of institutions, has then pronounced its decision on the utility and dignity of this particular one. Let us set aside the abuse which may have been made sometimes of such a recompense, through the different governments that have succeeded each other, an abuse inherent in every recompense given to man by his fellow-man, and let us recognise what was beautiful, profound, novel to the world, in an institution whose intent was to place on the breast of the private soldier, and of the modest *savant*, the same decoration that was to figure on the breasts of leaders of armies, of princes, and of kings! let us recognise that this creation of an honour-conferring distinction was the most dazzling triumph of equality itself, not of that equality which puts men on a level by debasing them, but which equalises while it elevates them; in a word, let us recognise, that if for the great men of the civil or military order, it might possibly be only a gratification of vanity, it was for the private soldier, when returning to his rural home, an addition to the comforts of the peasant, at the same time that it was a visible proof of heroism.

Next after this admirable system of rewards, the First Consul had employed himself with no less assiduity on a system of education for the French youth. Education in fact, was at this time null, or abandoned to the enemies of the Revolution.

The religious communities formerly engaged in the education of youth, had disappeared with the ancient order of things. There was a tendency towards their revival; but the First Consul had no intention of giving up the guidance of the new generation to them; looking on them as the secret agents of his enemies. The institutions by which the Convention had sought to supply their place had been only a chimera, which had already almost disappeared. The Convention had meant to give gratuitously primary instruction to the common people, and secondary instruction to the middle classes, so as to render both accessible to all families. It ended in nothing. The communes had given habitations to the primary instructors, in general the parsonage houses of the ancient country curés, but had not paid them salaries, or, at least, had done so in assignats. Indigence very soon dispersed these unfortunate masters. The central schools, in which secondary instruction was dispensed, being placed in each chief town of a department, were establishments in some sort academical, where public courses were held, at which youths might attend some hours a day, but returned from them afterwards to their homes, or to boarding-houses established by private speculation. The nature of the studies was conformable to the spirit of the times. Classical studies, considered as an antiquated routine, had been almost abandoned in them. The natural and exact sciences, and the living languages, had taken the place of the ancient ones. A museum of natural history was attached to each of these schools. Such a mode of instruction had little influence on youth; for a course of study which lasts one or two hours a day is not the way to make an impression upon it. Youth was left to be moulded by the heads of the boarding-schools, at that time, for the most part, hostile to the new order of things, or greedy speculators, treating youth as an object of traffic, not as a sacred trust of the State and of families. The central schools, besides, placed in the hundred and two departments, one in each chief town, were too numerous. There were not pupils enough for these hundred and two schools. Thirty-two only had drawn attendance, and become nurseries of instruction. Some distinguished professors, who still preserved the spirit of sound erudition, had made their appearance there. But political vicissitudes, there as elsewhere, had exercised their melancholy influence. The professors, chosen by the juries of instruction, had succeeded one another, as the parties did, to power, had appeared and disappeared by turns, and the pupils along with them. In short, these schools, without bond, without unity, without a common direction, presented scattered fragments, and not a grand edifice of public instruction. The First Consul formed his project at the first cast, with his usual resolution of mind.



In the first place, the finances of France did not allow primary instruction to be given everywhere and gratuitously to the people, who, besides, would not have leisure enough to avail themselves of it, if the State had had money enough to afford it to them. The most that could be done was to provide for the expenses of the new clergy, and this it was possible to do, owing to a particular circumstance of the time, namely the mass of ecclesiastical pensions, which served instead of salaries to most of the curés. It was therefore impossible to pay a primary instructor in each commune. They were consequently established only among populations in sufficiently easy circumstances to bear the expenses themselves. The commune gave a residence and a school-room, the scholars paid a remuneration, calculated by the wants of the master. It was all that could be done at the time.

For the moment, the most important was the secondary instruction. The First Consul suppressed, in his project, the central schools, which were only public courses, without uniformity, without effect on youth. There were found to be thirty-two central schools, which had more or less succeeded. This was an indication of the want of instruction in the different parts of France. The First Consul projected thirty-two establishments, which he named **LYCÉUMS**, a name borrowed from antiquity, and which were boarding-houses where youth retained during the principal years of adolescence, should be subjected to the double influence of a sound literary instruction, and an education masculine, severe, and sufficiently religious, altogether military, modelled on the régime of civil equality. He wished to re-establish in them the old classic system, which assigned the first place to the ancient languages, and gave the second only to the mathematical and physical sciences, leaving to the special schools the care of completing the teaching of the latter. He was right in that as in the remainder. The study of the dead languages is not only a study of words, but a study of things; it is the study of antiquity, with its laws, its manners, its arts, its history; so moral, so deeply instructive. There is only one age at which to learn these things: it is boyhood. When youth has once arrived, with its passions, its tendency to exaggeration and to false taste, or riper age with its positive interests, life passes away without a moment having been bestowed on the study of a world, dead as the tongues that open the entrance of it to us. If a late curiosity leads us to it again, it is through the medium of faint and insufficient translations that we penetrate into this beauteous antiquity. And in a time when religious ideas are weakened, if the acquaintance with antiquity cease too, we should form nothing more than a society without moral tie to the past, informed only concerning the present, and occupied with it; a society ignorant, debased, and fitted exclusively for the mechanical arts.

The First Consul wished then that, in his project, the classical studies should resume their rank. The sciences were to come next. So much of them was to be taught as is useful in all the professions of life, and as was necessary to pass from the secondary to the special schools. Religious instruction was to be given by chaplains, military instruction by old officers who had left the army. All movements were to be executed there at a military pace, and with beat of drum. This system was suitable to a nation destined universally to bear arms, either in the army or in the national guard. Eight professors of ancient languages or of *belles-lettres*, a censor of studies, a steward, having charge of the chattels, one head-master, under the name of *proviseur*, composed the establishments of these institutions.

Such were the schools in which the First Consul wished to form the French youth. But how was it to be attracted thither? There was the difficulty. The First Consul provided for it by bold and sure means, such as must be employed when one earnestly wishes to attain one's ends. He thought of creating 6400 gratuitous exhibitions, of which the State should bear the expenses, and which, at a medium rate of 700 to 800 francs (28*l.* to 32*l.* sterling), would represent a total expense of 5,000,000 to 6,000,000 francs (200,000*l.* to 240,000*l.* sterling) per annum, a considerable sum at the time. These 6000 and some hundred pupils were sufficient to furnish the nucleus of the population of the Lyceums. The confidence of families, which it was hoped to acquire in the sequel, would some day relieve the State from the continuance of such a sacrifice. The produce of these 6000 exhibitions formed at the same time a sufficient resource for covering the greater part of the expense of the new establishments.

The First Consul intended to distribute in the following manner the exhibitions of which the government was to have the disposal: 2400 were to be given to the children of retired soldiers whose circumstances were narrow; of civil functionaries who had done useful service; of the inhabitants of the provinces lately united to France. The 4000 remaining were destined to the boarding-schools already established. A great number of these boarding-schools were, in fact, private speculations. The First Consul thought it right to let them remain; but he connected them with his plan by means the most simple and efficacious. These boarding-schools could not henceforward subsist without the authority of government; they were to be inspected annually by the agents of the State; they were obliged to send their pupils to the lectures at the Lyceums, paying a trifling remuneration; finally, the 4000 exhibitions were, after an annual examination, to be distributed among the pupils of the various boarding-schools, in proportion to the recognised merit and good order of each house.

Thus connected with the general plan, the boarding-schools absolutely formed a part of it.

Passing next to the special instruction, the First Consul occupied himself with completing its organisation. The study of jurisprudence had perished with the ancient judiciary establishment; he created ten schools of law. The schools of medicine, less neglected, subsisted to the number of three; he proposed to create six of them. The Polytechnic School existed; it was connected with this organisation. To these were added a school of public services, since known by the title of "School of Bridges and Roads;" a school for the mechanical arts, at that time fixed at Compiègne, since at Châlons-sur-Marne, the first model of the schools of arts and trades which are at this day judged to be so useful; finally, a school for the grand art which then constituted the power of the First Consul and of France, a school of military art, destined to occupy the palace of Fontainebleau.

One thing was yet wanting to the perfection of this work, namely, a body of learned men, which might supply these colleges with instructors, which might embrace them in its surveillance; in a word, what has since been called the University. But the moment had not yet arrived for that. It was already a great deal to save from wreck the establishments of public instruction, and to create, all at once, with the actual professors, colleges dependent on the State, where the youth of all classes, attracted by gratuitous education, should be formed on one common model, regular and conformable to the principles of the French Revolution, and to sound literary education. The First Consul said to Fourcroy: "This is only a commencement; by and by we shall do more and better."

These two important projects were carried to the Council of State, and warmly debated in that enlightened body. The First Consul, who did not like public discussion, because, at the time, it agitated minds which had been too long ruffled, sought it, nay provoked it, in the sittings of the Council of State. It was his representative government. There he was familiar and eloquent, there he allowed himself every latitude, and permitted the same to others, and by the collision of his mind with that of his opponents, produced more flashes than can be obtained in a great assembly, where the solemnity of the tribune, and the inconveniences of publicity, incessantly impede and repress true liberty of thought. This form of discussion would be even the best for the elucidation of affairs, so it were not dependent on a determined master to confine it to limits fixed by his will. But for enlightened despotism, when it wishes to be enlightened, such a body is the best of institutions.

The Council of State, composed of all the men of the Revolution, and of some of those who had more recently sprung up,

presented in its *ensemble* the different shades of public opinion, and those very little softened; for if, on the one hand, Messrs. Portalis, Roederer, Regnaud de Saint Jean d'Angely, Devaines, efficiently represented in it the party inclined to monarchical reaction; Messrs. Thibaudeau, Berlier, Truguet, Emmery, Berenger, represented the party faithful to the Revolution, even sometimes to a defence of its prejudices. But there, within the closed doors of the Council of State, the discussions were sincere and pre-eminently useful.

The project of the Legion of Honour was strongly attacked. Here, as in the affair of the Concordat, the First Consul was, perhaps, in advance of the intelligence of the day. That generation, which very soon afterwards prostrated itself before the altars, which very soon afterwards covered itself with decorations with boyish eagerness, still resisted, for the moment, the re-establishment of public worship and the institution of the Legion of Honour.

It was even found in the Council of State, that the institution of the Legion of Honour was a blow to equality, that it was the recommencement of an abolished aristocracy, that it was too avowed a return to the *ancien régime*. The object so elevated, so positive, indicated by the oath, that is to say, the maintenance of the principles of the Revolution, affected its opponents but slightly. They asked if the obligations contained in that oath were not common to all the citizens, if all were not to concur in defending the territory, the principles of equality, the national property, &c.; and if to particularise this obligation for some was not to render it less binding on others. It was asked if this Legion had not too exceptionable an object, as, for instance, that of defending a power to which it should be attached by the link of benefits. Others, citing the Constitution, objected that it had spoken of a system of military rewards only. They added, that the institution would be better understood, would raise fewer objections, if it had for its end the rewarding of warlike actions exclusively; that actions of this kind were so much matters of fact, so easily appreciable, so generally recompensed in all countries, that nobody could find fault if it were confined to this clear and limited object.

The First Consul replied to all these objections with the strongest arguments. "What is there aristocratic," said he, "in a distinction purely personal, and merely for life, bestowed on the man who has displayed merit, whether civil or military; bestowed on himself alone, bestowed for his life only, and not passing to his children? Such a distinction is the reverse of aristocratic, for the essential of aristocratic titles is, that they are transmissible from the man who has earned them to his son who has done nothing to acquire them. An order is the most personal, the least aristocratic, of institutions. But, it may be said, after this will come something else. That is possible," added the First Consul, "but let us first see what is given to us, we

will judge of the remainder afterwards. It is asked what this legion of 6000 individuals signifies, and what are to be its duties? It is asked, if it has other duties than those imposed on the whole mass of the citizens, who are all equally bound to defend territory, constitution, equality. In the first place, to this question one may reply, that all citizens must defend their common country, and that, nevertheless, there is an army on which that duty is more particularly imposed. Would it then be astonishing if in the army there should be a *corps d'élite*, from which would be expected more devotion to its duties, and more disposition to the grand sacrifice of life? But, do you want to know what this legion is to be?" exclaimed the First Consul, returning to his favourite idea, "here is an explanation. It is an essay at organisation for the men, originators or partisans of the Revolution; who are neither emigrants nor Vendéans, nor priests. The *ancien régime*, so battered by the ram of the Revolution, is more entire than is believed. All the emigrants hold one another by the hand; the Vendéans are still secretly enrolled; and with the words legitimate king, religion, there might in an instant be assembled thousands of arms, which would be raised, depend upon it, if their fatigue and the strength of the government did not restrain them. The priests form a body, not very friendly, at bottom, to us all. It is needful that, on their side, the men who have taken part in the Revolution should be united, bonded together, should form, too, a solid combination, and cease to depend on the first accident which might strike one single head. You had an exceedingly narrow escape from being hurled back into chaos by the explosion of the 3rd Nivôse, and given up defenceless to your enemies. For ten years we have been only making ruins; we must now found an edifice, wherein to establish ourselves, and to dwell. These 6000 legionaries, composed of all the men who have effected the Revolution, who have defended it after having made it, who wish to continue it in all that it has reasonable and just, these 6000 legionaries, officers and soldiers, civil functionaries, magistrates, endowed with the national possessions, that is to say, with the patrimony of the Revolution, are one of the strongest guarantees that you can give to the new order of things. And then, depend upon it, the struggle is not over with Europe; be assured, that that struggle will begin again. Is it not a happiness to have in our hands, so easy a means of keeping up, of exciting, the bravery of our soldiers? In place of that chimerical 1,000,000,000 francs which you would not even dare to promise again, you may, with only 3,000,000 francs of revenue in national property, raise up as many heroes to uphold the Revolution as were found for undertaking it."

Such were the arguments of the First Consul. There were others besides, destined for those who insisted that the new



order was purely military, and decreed exclusively to the army. "It is not my intention," said he, "to found a government of Prætorians; it is not my intention to reward soldiers only. My notion is that all sorts of merit are brothers; that the courage of the president of the Convention, resisting the populace, ought to be ranked with the courage of Kléber, mounting to the assault of St. Jean d'Acre. People talk of the terms of the Constitution. They ought not to suffer themselves to be so fettered by words. The Constitution was desirous of embracing every thing, and has not always succeeded in doing so: it is our province to supply what is deficient. It is right that civil virtues should have their share of reward, as well as the military virtues. Those who oppose this course reason like barbarians. It is the religion of brute force that they recommend to us. But intelligence has its rights before those of force: force itself is nothing without intelligence. In the heroic ages, the general was the strongest and the most dexterous man in person; in civilised times, the general is the most intelligent of the brave. When we were at Cairo, the Egyptians could not comprehend how it could be that Kléber, with his advantages of person, was not commander-in-chief. When Murad Bey had closely observed our tactics, he could comprehend that I, and no other, ought to be the general of an army so conducted. You reason like the Egyptians, when you pretend to confine rewards to military valour. The soldiers," added the First Consul, "the soldiers reason better than you. Go to their bivouacs; listen to them. Do you imagine that it is the tallest of their officers, and the most imposing by his stature, for whom they feel the highest regard? No, it is the bravest. Do you imagine even that the bravest stands first in their esteem? No doubt, they would despise the man whose courage they suspected; but they rank above the merely brave man him whom they consider as the most intelligent. As for myself, do you suppose that it is solely because I am reputed a great general that I rule France? No; it is because the qualities of a statesman and a magistrate are attributed to me. France will never tolerate the government of the sword; those who think so are strangely mistaken. It would require an abject servitude of fifty years before that could be the case. France is too noble, too intelligent a country, to submit to material power, and to inaugurate within her limits that worship of force. Let us honour intelligence, virtue, the civil qualities; in short, let us bestow upon them in all professions the like reward."

These reasons, assigned with warmth and energy, and issuing from the lips of the greatest captain of modern times, at once persuaded and charmed the whole Council of State. They were, it must be confessed, both sincere and interested. The First Consul was desirous that it should be thoroughly understood, especially by the military, that it was not as general



alone, but as the man of genius, that he was the ruler of France.

As he was not to be prevailed upon to forego his plan, he was earnestly exhorted to withhold it, upon the plea that it was yet too early; that, having, perhaps, outstripped the march of intelligence in regard to the Concordat, it would be right to pause a moment, and to give public opinion a short respite. He would not listen to any of these counsels. It was his nature to be, in all things, impatient for the result.

The plan relative to the system of public education likewise excited grave discussions in the Council of State. The party in favour of monarchical reaction was not far from wishing for the re-establishment of the religious corporations. The contrary party supported the central schools, and insisted rather on the improvement than the abolition of that system. The latter likewise showed some distrust on account of the 6400 exhibitions left in the gift of the government.

“The ancient corporations are not suited to the present time,” said the First Consul; “besides, they are hostile. The clergy accommodates itself to the present government, and prefers it to the Convention and the Directory; but the Bourbons would be much better liked by it. As for the central schools, they no longer exist. They are a cipher. We must create a vast system and organise public education in France. People imagine, perhaps, that it was for the sake of influence that those 6400 exhibitions were proposed. That is looking at the question in a very petty point of view. Of influence, the present government has more than it wants. There is nothing, in fact, that it could not do at this moment, especially if it purposed to react against the Revolution, to destroy what it created, to re-establish what it destroyed. From all quarters this is called for. It is assailed by confidential papers of all kinds, in which each of the writers proposes the restoration of some part or other of the ancient system. We must beware of giving way to such an impulsion. Those 6000 exhibitions are necessary for organising a new society, and filling it with the spirit of the age. In the first place, it is necessary to provide for the military and their children. We owe every thing to them. They have received no part of the promised 1,000,000,000. The least we can do is to insure to them a subsistence. Those exhibitions are an indispensable supplement to their slender pay. The civil functionaries, on their part, deserve to be rewarded and encouraged, when they have served faithfully. Besides, they are as poor as the military. Both will give us their children to educate, to fashion according to the new system. The 4000 exhibitions which we take in the boarding-schools will also be a nursery of subjects, which we shall secure for the same purpose. It behoves us to found a new society upon the principles of civil equality, in which every one finds his

place, which presents neither the injustices of feudalism nor the confusion of anarchy. It is urgently necessary to found this society, for it does not exist. In order to found it, we must have materials; the only good materials are the youth of the country. We must, therefore, make up our minds to take them; and if we do not draw them to us by the bait of gratuitous education, the parents will not give them to us of their own motion. We are all suspected, we authors, accomplices, or defenders of the Revolution; so changeable are nations! so weaned are people from the illusions of '89! We shall not readily have the children of good families given to us, unless we take measures to attract them. If we were to found lyceums without exhibitions, they would be a hundred times more deserted than the central schools; for parents can send their children, without fear, to public courses, in which Latin and mathematics are taught; but they would not easily send them to boarding-schools, completely under the control of the supreme authority. There is but one way of drawing them, that is by exhibitions. And then, the inhabitants of the recently incorporated departments must be made Frenchmen too. To accomplish this, there is again but one way, that is, to take their children, even somewhat against their will, and to place them with the sons of your military officers, of your functionaries, and of your families in narrow circumstances, whom the advantages of a gratuitous education shall have disposed to a confidence which they would not naturally have. Those children will then learn our language; they will imbibe our spirit; we shall thus blend together the French of past times and the French of the present day; the French of the centre, and the French of the banks of the Rhine, the Scheldt, and the Po."

These profound reasons, repeated in more than one meeting, and in a thousand different forms, and merely the substance of which we record here, gained acceptance for the *projet de loi*. M. Fourcroy was charged to carry it to the Legislative Body, and to support it in the discussion.

This bill (*projet*) and that of the Legion of Honour were submitted to the Legislative Body nearly at the same time; for the First Consul would not suffer this short session to pass without laying the principal foundations of his new edifice. The law relative to public instruction met with no great obstacles; and, supported by M. Fourcroy, who, with the First Consul, was half its author, it was adopted by a considerable majority. In the Tribune, it obtained eighty white balls against nine black ones; in the Legislative Body 251 against twenty-seven. But the law relative to the Legion of Honour was not so favourably received. In both assemblies it met with an equally violent resistance. Lucien Bonaparte was nominated reporter, and, from the warmth with which he took up its

defence, it was but too evident that he was defending a family idea. The institution was vehemently attacked in the Tribunate by Messrs. Savoie-Rollin and de Chauvelin, the latter making a point, in a manner, of defending the principle of equality, notwithstanding the name which he bore. Lucien, who had a talent for public speaking, but who had not exercised it sufficiently, replied with little temper and moderation, and contributed much to indispose the Tribunate. In spite of the sifting which that body had undergone, the *projet*, when presented, obtained only fifty-six white balls against thirty-eight black ones. In the Legislative Body, the discussion, though turning entirely one way, since the Tribunate, having adopted the proposition of the government, had sent only orators to support it, the discussion failed to gain many minds. There were only 166 favourable votes against 110 contrary. The *projet de loi* was, therefore, adopted, but rarely had the minority been so strong and the majority so weak, even before the exclusion of the opposition members. The reason was because the First Consul had shocked the sentiment of equality, the only one which survived in men's hearts. This sentiment took alarm, unjustly, no doubt, for there was nothing less aristocratic than an institution which had for its object to decree to soldiers and men of science a distinction merely for life, and the same that was to be worn by generals and princes. But every sentiment, when violent, is susceptible and jealous. The First Consul had proceeded too hastily; and this he admitted—"We ought to have waited," said he, "that is true. But we were right; and when one is in the right one ought to be able to risk something. Besides, this *projet* was not well supported; proper stress was not laid on the best arguments. Had they been urged with truth and energy, the opposition would have given way."

The conclusion of this prolific session approached; and yet the treaty of Amiens had not been carried to the Legislative Body, to be converted by it into a law. This important act was reserved for the last. It was intended to serve, in some measure, as a crown to the works of the First Consul, and to the deliberations of that extraordinary session. It was considered, moreover, as an occasion for the display of the public gratitude to the author of all the blessings which the nation enjoyed.

For some time past, in fact, people had been asking themselves if some signal testimony of national gratitude was not to be given to the man who, in two years and a half, had drawn France out of chaos, and reconciled her with Europe, with the Church, with herself, and who had already almost completely organised her. This feeling of gratitude was universal and deserved. It was easy to make this subservient to the secret wishes of the First Consul—wishes which consisted in obtain-

ing, in perpetuity, the power that had been conferred on him for ten years. The minds of people in general were, moreover, made up on this point; and, with the exception of a small number of royalists or Jacobins, nobody would have wished that the supreme power should fall into other hands than those of general Bonaparte. The indefinite continuance of his authority was considered as the simplest and most inevitable matter. It was easy, therefore, to convert this disposition of minds into a legal act; and if, eighteen months before, when the famous "Parallel between Cæsar, Cromwell, and general Bonaparte," provoked too early a discussion on this point, some repulsion was met with, that was no longer the case. There needed but a word to be said, to cause a real sovereignty to be offered to the First Consul, under whatever title and whatever form he pleased. It would have been sufficient to choose any suitable occasion, and to put forward the proposition, to induce its immediate adoption.

The moment when so many memorable acts succeeded close upon the heels of each other, was, in reality, that which the First Consul in his calculations, his friends in their interested impatience, and considerate minds in their foresight, had designated, and which the public, simple and sincere in its sentiments, was ready to accept, for a great manifestation. General Bonaparte wished for the supreme power; that was natural and excusable. In doing good, he had followed the impulse of his genius; and, in doing it, he had hoped for its reward. There was nothing culpable in that, more especially as, in his conviction and in reality, an omnipotent chief would be required for a long time to come, in order to complete that good. In a country which could not do without a strong and creative authority, it was legitimate to aspire to the supreme power, when a man was the greatest of his age, and one of the greatest men of all ages. Washington, amidst a democratic, republican, exclusively commercial, and, for a long period, pacific society—Washington was right to show but little ambition. In a society, republican by accident, monarchical by nature, surrounded by enemies, thenceforth military, unable to govern and to defend itself without unity of action, general Bonaparte was right in aspiring to the supreme power, no matter under what title. He was wrong, not in assuming the dictatorship, at that time necessary, but in not having always employed it as he did in the first years of his career. General Bonaparte carefully concealed in his heart desires which were plainly perceived by all, even by the simplest of the people. If he communicated them to his brothers, that was as much as he did. He never said that the title of First Consul for ten years had ceased to satisfy him. It is true that, when the question presented itself in a theoretic form, when the necessity for a strong authority was spoken of in a

general manner, he launched out, and expressed his ideas on that subject. But never did he conclude to demand a prolongation of power for himself. At once dissembling and trustful, he communicated certain things to some, certain things to others, and concealed something from all. To his colleagues, especially to M. Cambacérès, whose extraordinary prudence he appreciated, and to Messrs. Fouché and de Talleyrand, to whom he granted a great share of influence, he spoke explicitly on all that concerned the public affairs, much more than to his brothers, to whom he was far from intrusting the secrets of the State. On points that touched him personally, on the contrary, he said little, either to his colleagues or to his ministers, and much to his brothers. Still, he had not disclosed even to them the secret ambition of his heart; but it was so easy to be guessed, and the members of his family were so anxious to contribute towards its accomplishment, that they spared him the trouble of being the first to open his mind on the subject. They talked to him incessantly about it, and they left him the more convenient position of having to moderate, rather than to excite, zeal for his aggrandisement. Accordingly, they assured him that the time was come for constituting, in his favour, something better than an ephemeral, a transient, power; that he ought to think of attributing to himself one that was perfectly solid and durable. Joseph, with the peaceable mildness of his character; Lucien, with the petulance of his nature, tended openly to the same end. They had, for confidants and co-operators, the men with whom they were intimate, and who, either in the Council of State or in the Senate, shared their sentiments from conviction, or from a desire to please. Messrs. Regnault, Laplace, Talleyrand, and Rœderer, the latter always the most ardent in that vote, were frankly of opinion that monarchy ought to be restored, the sooner and the more completely the better. M. de Talleyrand, the calmest, but not the least active of them, was very partial to monarchy, elegant and brilliant, as in the palace of Versailles; but yet without the Bourbons, with whom he, at that time, deemed himself incompatible. He was incessantly repeating, with an authority which could belong to none but himself, that, for negotiating with Europe, it would be much easier to treat in the name of a monarchy than of a republic; that the Bourbons were troublesome and disesteemed guests for the sovereigns; that general Bonaparte, with his glory, his power, his courage in repressing anarchy, was for them the most desirable, the most expected, of all sovereigns; that, as for himself, the minister for foreign affairs, he affirmed that, to add, no matter how, to the present authority of the First Consul was conciliating, so far from offending Europe. These intimate confidants of the Bonaparte family had largely discussed among themselves the question of the moment. Still,



to vault at one leap into a sovereignty, whether it were to be called empire or royalty, appeared very great temerity. Perhaps it would be better to attain it by passing through several intermediate stages. Now, without changing the title of First Consul, which was more convenient, an equivalent to royal power, and an equivalent even to hereditary succession, might be given to him—this was the consulship for life, with the authority to appoint his successor. By making a few modifications in the Constitution, modifications easy to be obtained from the Senate, which had become a sort of constituent power, it was possible to create a real sovereignty, under a republican title. There would even be secured, by the faculty of appointing a successor, the only actually desirable advantages of hereditary succession; for, the First Consul having no children, having only brothers and nephews, it would be better to invest him with the right of choosing from among them the one whom he should judge most worthy to succeed to his power.

This idea, appearing the wisest and the most prudent, seemed to be adopted in preference by the Bonaparte family. That family was, at the moment, extremely agitated. The brothers of the First Consul, who had on their brows a ray of his glory, but who were not satisfied with that, and desired to see him a real monarch, that they might become princes by the right of blood, were very restless, complaining that they were nothing, that they had contributed to the elevation of their brother, but had not a rank in the State proportionate to their merit and their services. Joseph, of a more quiet disposition, satisfied with the part of ordinary negotiator of peace, wealthy, and held in consideration, was less impatient. Lucien, who gave himself out for republican, was, nevertheless, the one who showed most anxiety to see the sovereign power of his brother erected on the ruins of the Republic. Quite recently, he had refused to dine at Madame Bonaparte's, saying that he would go when a place should be marked out there for the brothers of the First Consul. In the bosom of that family, Madame Bonaparte, more worthy of interest, because she felt none of those ambitious aspirations, but dreaded them, on the contrary, Madame Bonaparte was, as usual, more alarmed than pleased at the changes which were preparing. She was afraid, as we have already observed, that her husband would be urged to ascend too hastily the steps of that throne on which she had beheld the Bourbons seated, and on which it appeared incredible to her that any other persons could sit. She was apprehensive lest inconsiderate brothers, solicitous to share the greatness of their brother, might imprudently accelerate his elevation, and, in making him ascend too quickly, might precipitate her, him, themselves, all together, into an abyss. Relieved, to a certain degree, by the affection of her husband, from the dread of a speedy divorce, she was haunted at the moment by



but one image—that of the new Cæsar, stabbed at the moment when he should attempt to place the diadem upon his head.

Madame Bonaparte frankly avowed her fears to her husband, who made her hold her tongue, by sharply enjoining silence. Repulsed by him, she had recourse to those who had any influence over him, beseeching them to oppose the counsels of ambitious and ill-advised brothers; and thus gave to her dislikes and her terrors a mischievous notoriety, which displeased the First Consul.

Among the personages admitted into the circle of this family, Fouché, the minister, entered more than any other into the views of Madame Bonaparte. Not that he had more pride of sentiment than the men by whom the First Consul was surrounded, and that he was the only one of them all who sought not to please the inevitable master—nothing of the sort. But he possessed great shrewdness: he saw with apprehension the impatience of the Bonaparte family; he heard more closely than any one else the subdued murmurs of the vanquished republicans, who were not numerous, but indignant at so speedy a usurpation; and he himself, amidst this agitation, felt some emotion on account of what was about to be undertaken. Though he had no wish to forfeit the confidence of the First Consul, which, on the contrary, he was more desirous than ever to retain, since the First Consul was soon likely to be the arbiter of the fate of all, still he allowed part of what he thought to be guessed at. Being on friendly terms with Madame Bonaparte, he had listened to the expression of the alarms with which she was beset, and, fearing the resentment of her husband, had endeavoured to soothe her—"Madam," said he, "keep yourself quiet. You cross your husband to no purpose. He will be consul for life, king, or emperor, all that it is possible to be. Your fears annoy, my advice would irritate him. Let us, then, keep in our places, and leave events, which neither you nor I can prevent, to take their own course."

The *denouement* of this agitated scene approached in proportion as the extraordinary session of the year X. drew towards a close; and the leaders were heard repeating more frequently and more loudly, that it was necessary to give stability to the supreme power, and a testimony of gratitude to the benefactor of France and of the world. This *denouement*, however, could not be brought about in a safe and natural manner without the aid of one man, and that man was the Consul Cambacérès. We have already adverted to his secret, but real and skilfully managed, influence over the mind of the First Consul. His ascendancy over the Senate was equally great. That body paid a real deference to the old lawyer, who had become the confidant of the new Cæsar. M. Sieyès, the creator, in some measure, of

the Senate, had at first possessed a certain influence in it. His intention of gaining over that body to the opposition having been very soon discovered and thwarted, M. Sieyès was now nothing more than he had always been; that is to say, a man of a superior mind, but soured, impotent, henceforward confined to the part of finding fault with every thing at his seat at Crosne—the vulgar recompense of his great services. M. Cambacérès, on the contrary, had become the secret director of the Senate. As, at the present juncture, general Bonaparte could not proclaim himself consul for life or emperor, because it was necessary that some one body should take the initiative, it was evidently the Senate, and in the Senate the man who directed it, to whom the greatest importance belonged.

M. Cambacérès, though devoted to the First Consul, beheld not without some mortification the change which tended to place him at a still greater distance from his illustrious colleague. Knowing, however, that things would not remain as they were, that it would be lost labour to oppose the desires of general Bonaparte, and that, moreover, in their present limits, those desires were legitimate, M. Cambacérès resolved to interpose spontaneously, for the purpose of causing all this internal agitation to terminate in a reasonable result, and of giving to the government a stable form, which should satisfy the ambition of the First Consul, without too completely effacing those republican forms which were still dear to the hearts of many.

While those around the First Consul were engaged in animated conversation on this subject, he himself listening, and even affecting to keep silence, M. Cambacérès put an end to this state of constraint, by speaking first to his colleague of what was passing. He did not disguise from him the danger of precipitation in an affair of this nature, and the advantage which there would be in retaining a modest and wholly republican form for a power so real and so great as his. Nevertheless, offering him, in his own name, and in the name of the third Consul, Lebrun, an unreserved devotedness, he declared to him, that they were both ready to do whatever he pleased, and to spare him the embarrassment of interfering personally, in a circumstance, in which he ought to appear to receive and not to take the title, which it was in contemplation to give him. The First Consul expressed his gratitude for such an overture, admitted the danger that there would be in doing too much or too hastily, declared that he had formed no desire; that he was content with his present position; that he was not anxious to change it, and should not take any step towards quitting it; that, nevertheless, the constitution of the supreme power was, he thought, precarious, and did not exhibit a sufficient character of solidity and durability; that, in his opinion, some changes ought to be made in the form of the government, but

that he was too directly interested in this question to interfere in it; that he should, therefore, wait, and not take any initiative.

M. Cambacérès, in reply to the First Consul, observed that his personal dignity certainly required great reserve and forbade him ostensibly to take the initiative; but that, if he would thoroughly explain himself to his two colleagues and make them both acquainted with his inmost thoughts, they, when once aware of his intentions, would spare him the trouble of manifesting them, and fall to work without further delay. Whether because he felt a certain embarrassment to avow what he wished, or because he desired more than was destined for him—the sovereignty perhaps—the First Consul covered himself with fresh veils, and merely repeated that he had no fixed idea, but that it would give him pleasure to see his two colleagues watch over the movement of minds and even direct it, to prevent those imprudences which unskilful friends might commit.

Never would the First Consul avow his idea to his colleague Cambacérès. To the natural restraint which he felt was added an illusion. He conceived that, without his having any occasion to interfere, people would come and lay a crown at his feet. This was a mistake. The public, quiet, happy, grateful, was disposed to sanction all that might be done; but, having abdicated, as it were, all participation in public affairs, it was not ready to mix itself up in them, even to express the gratitude with which it was filled. The Bodies of the State, with the exception of the interested leaders, were seized with a fit of modesty, at the idea of coming before the face of Heaven, to abjure those republican forms which they had but recently sworn to uphold. Many persons, not versed in the secrets of politics, went so far as to imagine that the First Consul, content with the omnipotence which he enjoyed, especially since he had got rid of the opposition of the Tribunate, would be satisfied with the power to do whatever he pleased, and assume to himself the easy glory of being a new Washington, with far more genius and glory than the American Washington. Thus, when the leaders asserted that nothing had been done for the First Consul, who had done so much for France, certain simple-minded men innocently replied, “What would you have us do for him? what would you have us offer him? What recompense would be adequate to the services which he has rendered? His true recompense is his glory.” M. Cambacérès was too discreet to revenge himself for the dissimulation of the First Consul, by leaving things in this stagnation. It was necessary to settle the matter; and he resolved to set about it immediately. In his opinion, and in that of many other enlightened men, a prolongation of power for ten years conferred on the First Consul, which, with the seven years remaining of the first period, would make the total duration of his consulship

amount to seventeen, would be quite sufficient. This would, in fact, be thwarting those enemies, whether in France or in Europe, who should have calculated on the legal term of his power. But M. Cambacérès was well aware that the First Consul would not be satisfied with this, that something more must be offered him, and that, with the consulship for life, accompanied by the faculty of nominating his successor, all the advantages of hereditary monarchy would be obtained, without the inconveniences of a change of title, without the displeasure which this change might excite in many honest men. He stopped short, therefore, at this idea, which he strove to propagate in the Senate, in the Legislative Body, and in the Tribune. But, if there were many members ready to vote any thing, there were others who hesitated, and who were for granting no more than a prolongation of ten years.

The First Consul had deferred till this day, and intentionally, the presentation of the treaty of Amiens to the Legislative Body, to be converted into law. M. Cambacérès, comprehending that this was the circumstance which was to be used to draw forth a general acclamation of the proposed changes, made arrangements for producing such a result. The 6th of May (Floréal 16th), had been fixed for carrying to the Legislative Body the treaty which completed the general peace. M. Chabot de l'Allier, president of the Tribune, was one of the friends of the Consul Cambacérès. The latter sent for him, and concerted with him the course to be pursued. It was agreed between them that, when the treaty should be carried from the Legislative Body to the Tribune, M. Siméon should propose a deputation to the First Consul, to testify the satisfaction of that assembly; that the president, Chabot de l'Allier, should then quit the chair, and propose the following vote: "The Senate is invited to give the Consuls a testimony of the national gratitude."

Things being thus arranged, on the 6th of May (16th Floréal), the *projet de loi* was carried by three councillors of State to the Legislative Body; these were Messrs. Rœderer, Bruix (admiral), and Berlier. In general, bills (*projets*) were communicated purely and simply by the Legislative Body to the Tribune; this time, in consequence of the importance of the object, the government resolved to communicate directly to the Tribune the treaty submitted to the legislative deliberations. Three councillors of State, Regnier, Thibaudeau, and Bigot Prémeneu, were charged with this commission. No sooner had they finished making this communication, than Siméon, the tribune, applied for leave to speak. "Since the government," said he, "has communicated to us in so solemn a manner the treaty of peace concluded with Great Britain, we ought to respond to this procedure by one of a similar nature. I propose that a deputation be sent to the government, to con-

gratulate it on the re-establishment of the general peace." This proposition was immediately adopted. The president, Chabot de l'Allier, having given up the chair to M. Stanislas de Girardin, proceeded to the Tribune, and spoke as follows :—

" Among all nations, public honours have been decreed to men who, by splendid actions, have honoured their country, and saved it from great dangers.

" What man ever had stronger claims to the national gratitude than general Bonaparte ?

" What man, whether at the head of armies, or at the head of the government, reflected greater honour upon the country and rendered it more signal services ?

" His valour and his genius have saved the French people from the excesses of anarchy and the miseries of war, and the French people is too great, too magnanimous, to leave such benefits without a great reward.

" Tribunes, be its organs. To us it belongs more especially to take the initiative, when the point is to express, in so memorable a circumstance, the sentiments and the will of the French people?"

M. Chabot de l'Allier concluded this speech by proposing to the Tribunate the vote of some great manifestation of gratitude towards the First Consul.

He proposed, moreover, to communicate this wish to the Senate, to the Legislative Body, and to the government. The proposition was adopted unanimously.

This deliberation was soon known to the Senate, and that body immediately decided that a special commission should be formed, in order to present its ideas concerning the testimony of national gratitude suitable to be given to the First Consul.

The deputation which Siméon, the tribune, had proposed to send to the government was received on the following day, the 7th of May (17th Floréal), at the Tuileries. The First Consul was surrounded by his colleagues, a great number of high functionaries, and generals. His attitude was grave and modest. M. Siméon was the spokesman. He celebrated the exploits of general Bonaparte, and the prodigies of his government, greater than those of his sword ; he attributed to him the victories of the Republic, the peace which had followed them, the re-establishment of order, the return of prosperity, and, at length concluding his address, " I must break off," he said, " I am afraid that I shall appear to praise, when all I aim at is to be just, and to express in a few words a profound sentiment, which ingratitude alone could have stifled. We expect the first body of the nation to stand forward as the interpreter of the general sentiment, the expression of which only the Tribunate is permitted to wish and to vote for."

The First Consul, having thanked Siméon, the tribune, for the sentiments which he had just expressed towards him, and

said, that he regarded this as a result of the more cordial communications established between the government and the Tribune, thus making a direct allusion to the changes effected in that body, the First Consul finished with these noble words: "As for me, I receive with deep gratitude the wish expressed by the Tribune. I desire no other glory than that of having completely performed the task imposed upon me. I aspire to no other reward than the affection of my fellow-citizens: happy, if they are thoroughly convinced that the evils which they may experience will always be to me the severest of misfortunes; that life is dear to me solely for the services which I am able to render to my country; that death itself will have no bitterness for me, if my last looks can see the happiness of the Republic as firmly secured as its glory."

The only point now left was to decide upon the testimony of gratitude that was to be given to general Bonaparte. About the nature of it there could be no doubt: every body was fully aware that it was by an extension of power that the nation would have to pay the illustrious general for the immense benefits which it had received from him. Some simple minds, however, both in the Tribune and in the Senate, imagined, when voting, that the public testimony in contemplation was a statue or a monument. But these simple minds were very few in number. The mass of the tribunes and of the senators knew perfectly well what sort of an expression of gratitude was expected. During that and the following day, the Tuileries and the hotel of M. Cambacérès, who resided out of the palace, were thronged. The senators came, eagerly inquiring how they were to act. Their zeal was warm; it was only necessary to speak, and they were ready to decree whatever was desired. One of them even went to Cambacérès, and said, "What does the general want? Does he wish to be king? Only let him say so: I and my colleagues of the Constituent are quite ready to vote the re-establishment of royalty, and more willingly for him than for others, because he is the most worthy." Curious to learn the real sentiments of the First Consul, the senators approached as near to him as they could, and tried in a hundred ways to obtain a single word from his lips, however slightly significant. But he took good care not to reveal his wishes even to Laplace, the senator, who was one of his particular friends, and who, on that account, had been desired to sound his secret intentions. He always replied, that any thing they did, whatever it might be, would be received with gratitude, and that he had not fixed his mind upon any thing. Some wished to know if a prolongation of ten years would be agreeable to him. He replied, with affected humility, that any testimony of the public confidence, whether that or any other, would be sufficient for him, and fill him with satisfaction. The senators, having learned nothing from such communications,



returned to the Consuls Cambacérès and Lebrun, to inquire what course they were to pursue. "Appoint him consul for life," replied they; "that is the best thing you can do." "But it is said that he does not wish for it," replied the most simple, "and that a prolongation for ten years will satisfy him. Why go further than he wishes?"

Lebrun and Cambacérès had difficulty to persuade them. The latter apprised the First Consul of it. "You are wrong," said he, "not to explain yourself. Your enemies, for you have some left, in spite of your services, even in the Senate, will abuse our reserve." The First Consul appeared neither surprised, nor even flattered, by the eager officiousness of the senators. "Let them alone," he replied to M. Cambacérès; "the majority of the Senate is always ready to do more than it is asked. They will go farther than you imagine."

M. Cambacérès answered that he was mistaken. But it was impossible to overcome that stubborn dissimulation, and, as we shall see, the consequences were singular. Notwithstanding the intimations of Messrs. Cambacérès and Lebrun, many good men, who thought it more convenient to give less than more, imagined that the First Consul considered a prolongation of ten years as an ample testimony of the public confidence, and as a sufficient consolidation of his power. The Sieyès party, always extremely spiteful, had roused on this occasion, and was clandestinely exerting itself. The senators who were secretly connected with this party circumvented their wavering colleagues, and affirmed that the sentiments of the First Consul were known; that he would be content with a prolongation for ten years; that he preferred it to any thing else; that every body knew, moreover, that it was rather by himself than by this combination that the public power was consolidated, the Republic upheld, and the dignity of the nation saved. As in the affair of the elections to the Senate, the gallant Lefebvre was one of those who listened to these persuasions, and who imagined that, in voting for a prolongation of ten years, they were doing what general Bonaparte wished. They had been forty-eight hours deliberating. It was necessary to bring the affair to a conclusion. Lanjuinais, the senator, with the courage of which he had exhibited so many proofs, attacked what he called the flagrant usurpation with which the Republic was threatened. His speech was listened to with pain and as something supererogatory. Skilful enemies had prepared a better manœuvre. They had gained a majority in favour of the plan for prolonging the powers of the First Consul for ten years. This resolution was accordingly adopted on the 8th of May (18th Floréal), in the evening. Lefebvre hurried among the first to the Tuileries, to report what had been done, conceiving that he should bring most agreeable intelligence. It arrived from all quarters and produced a surprise equally unforeseen and painful.

The First Consul, surrounded by his brothers, Joseph and Lucien, learned this result with the warmest displeasure. At the first moment, he thought of nothing less than refusing the offer of the Senate. He sent immediately for his colleague Cambacérès, who hastened to him forthwith. Too wise and too prudent to exult over his own foresight and the fault of the First Consul, he said that what had happened was, no doubt, disagreeable, but might be easily repaired; that, above all things, it was necessary not to show any ill-humour; that in twice twenty-fours every thing might be changed; but for this it was requisite to give the affair a new face, and this he undertook to do.—“The Senate offers you a prolongation of power,” said M. Cambacérès; “answer that you are very thankful for such an offer, but that it is not from it, but from the suffrage of the nation, that you should hold your authority; that it is from the nation, alone that you can receive the prolongation of it; and that you will consult it by the same means that were employed for the adoption of the consular Constitution, that is to say, by registers opened throughout all France. We will then have drawn up by the Council of State the form that is to be submitted to the national sanction. By this act of deference to the sovereignty of the people, we shall obtain the substitution of one plan instead of another. We will put the question, not whether general Bonaparte is to receive a prolongation of the consular power for ten years, but whether he is to be invested with the consulship for life. If the First Consul were to do such a thing himself,” added M. Cambacérès, “too great a shock would be given to decorum. But I, who am second Consul, and wholly disinterested in this affair, can give the impulsion. Let the general set out publicly for Malmaison; I will remain alone in Paris; I will convoke the Council of State, and I will instigate the Council of State to draw up the new proposition which is to be submitted to the acceptance of the nation.”

This clever expedient was adopted with great satisfaction by general Bonaparte and by his brothers. M. Cambacérès was warmly thanked for his ingenious combination, and charged with the entire management of the affair. It was agreed that the First Consul should leave Paris next day, after drawing up himself, with M. Cambacérès, the answer to the message.

That answer was composed on the following morning, the 9th of May (19th Floréal), by M. Cambacérès and the First Consul, and addressed immediately to the Senate in reply to its message.

“Senators,” said the First Consul, “the honourable proof of esteem given in your deliberation of the 18th will remain for ever engraven on my heart.

“In the three years that have just elapsed, Fortune has smiled upon the Republic; but Fortune is fickle: and how

many men whom she has loaded with her favours have lived a few years too long !

“ The interest of my glory and that of my happiness would seem to have marked the term of my public life at the moment when the peace of the world is proclaimed.

“ But the glory and the happiness of the citizen ought to be silent, when the interest of the State and the public partiality call him.

“ You judge that I owe a new sacrifice to the people ; I will make it, if the wish of the people commands what your suffrage authorises.”

The First Consul, without explaining himself, indicated pretty plainly that he did not accept the resolution of the Senate precisely as it stood. He set out immediately for Malmaison, leaving to his colleague Cambacérès the task of terminating that important affair agreeably to his wishes. The latter summoned to him the councillors of State who were most accustomed to second the views of the government, and concerted with them what was to be done at the meeting of the council. On the following day, May 10th (20th Floréal), an extraordinary meeting of the Council of State was held. The two Consuls, Cambacérès and Lebrun, and all the ministers, excepting M. Fouché, attended this meeting. M. Cambacérès presided. He explained the object of the meeting, and appealed to the wisdom of that great body in the important circumstance in which the government was placed. Messrs. Bigot de Préameu, Roederer, Regnault, Portalis, spoke immediately afterwards, maintained that the stability of the government was at that moment the most urgent want of the State ; that foreign powers, for the purpose of treating with France, that public credit, commerce, manufactures, to recover their prosperity, had need of confidence ; that the perpetuity of the power of the First Consul was the surest medium of inspiring them with it ; that that authority, conferred for ten years, was an ephemeral authority, without solidity, without greatness, because it was without duration ; that the Senate, cramped by the Constitution, had not deemed it possible to add a prolongation of more than ten years to the power of the First Consul ; but that, in addressing themselves to the national sovereignty, as had been done in regard to all anterior constitutions, they should no longer be cramped by the existing law, because they should go back to the source of all laws ; and that it was necessary to put purely and simply this question : SHALL THE FIRST CONSUL BE CONSUL FOR LIFE ?

Dubois, prefect of police, member of the Council of State, a man of a generally decided and independent character, acquainted the assembly with the opinion prevailing in Paris. In all quarters the proposition of the Senate was deemed ridiculous ; people said that France needed a government ; that one had

been at last found, strong, able, fortunate, and that this ought to be preserved; that one ought not to have been able to meddle with the Constitution, but if it was to be meddled with, one had better do so once for all, and organise that government in such a manner as to retain it for ever. What Dubois, the prefect, reported was true. Public opinion was so favourable to the First Consul, that people were universally for settling the question at once, and giving to his power the duration of his life. After these various speeches, M. Cambacérès asked if any member had objections to make; and, as the oppositionists, to the number of five or six, such as Messrs. Berlier, Thibaudau, Emmery, Dessoles, Berenger, were silent, he put the resolution to the vote, and it was adopted by an immense majority. It was, therefore, resolved that a public vote should be called for on the question, **SHALL NAPOLEON BONAPARTE BE CONSUL FOR LIFE?**

This resolution being taken, M. Roederer, who was the boldest of all the members of the monarchical party, proposed to add a second question to the first: it was this—**SHALL THE FIRST CONSUL HAVE THE FACULTY OF APPOINTING HIS SUCCESSOR?** M. Roederer was extremely tenacious in regard to this question, and very justly. If they acted with sincerity, if they harboured no after-thought of recurring by and by to what they were doing that day, if, in short, they wished to constitute the new power definitively, the faculty of appointing a successor was the best equivalent to hereditary succession, sometimes superior in its effects to hereditary succession itself; for, it is the expedient which gave to the world the reign of the Antonines. A Consul for life, with the faculty of appointing his successor, was a real monarchy under a republican appearance. It was a fine and a powerful government, which, at least, saved the dignity of the present generation, which had sworn to live republican or to die. M. Roederer, who was obstinate in his ideas, insisted on the second question being put. It was adopted, like the preceding. The next point was to decide on the form to be given to both. It was thought that this appeal made to the French people, by means of the registers opened in the communes, was an act which ought to belong to the government, for it was, in some measure, a mere convocation; that it was, therefore, natural that it should be discussed in the Council of State; that the publication of this deliberation, which had taken place in the presence of the second and third Consuls, and in the absence of the first, saved all *convenances*; that nothing more was now wanting but to put it into proper form. A commission composed of several councillors of State was directed, before the assembly separated, to draw up the result of the deliberation. This commission fell to work immediately, and returned in an hour with the act destined for publication on the following day.

That act was as follows:—

“The Consuls of the Republic, considering that the resolution of the First Consul is a striking homage paid to the sovereignty of the people; *that the people, consulted on its dearest interests, ought to know no other limit than its interests themselves*, decree as follows, &c. The French people shall be consulted on these two questions,—

“1. SHALL NAPOLEON BONAPARTE BE CONSUL FOR LIFE?

“2. SHALL HE HAVE THE FACULTY OF APPOINTING HIS SUCCESSOR?

“Registers shall be opened for this purpose at all the *mairies*, at the offices of the clerks of all the tribunals, at the houses of the notaries, and those of all public officers.”

The period allowed for giving votes was three weeks.

M. Cambacérès then repaired to the First Consul, to submit to him the resolution of the Council of State. The First Consul, from a disposition of mind difficult to be accounted for, obstinately rejected the second question. “Whom,” said he “would you have me appoint my successor? My brothers? But will France, which has consented to be governed by me, consent to be governed by Joseph or Lucien? Shall I nominate you, Consul Cambacérès, you? Durst you undertake such a task? And then, the will of Louis XIV. was not respected; is it likely that mine would be? A dead man, let him be who he will, is nobody.” On this point the First Consul was not to be overcome. He was even angry with M. Rœderer, who, without consulting any one, following only the impulse of his own mind, had put forward this idea. He therefore ordered the second question relative to the choice of a successor to be erased from the resolution of the Council of State. The motive of the First Consul on this occasion is very obscure. Was it his intention, in leaving a chasm in the organisation of the government, to reserve to himself a fresh pretext for again asserting, at a somewhat later period, that the government was without future, without greatness, and that it was necessary to convert it into an hereditary monarchy? or did he dread family rivalries and the tribulations that would be brought upon him by the faculty of choosing a successor from among his brothers and his nephews? Judging from his language at this period, the latter conjecture appears to be nearest the truth. Be this as it may, he retrenched the second question of the act emanating from the Council of State, and, to avoid the loss of time which must have arisen from a new convocation, the deliberation, thus mutilated, was sent to the official journal.

It appeared on the morning of the 11th (21st Floréal), two days after that of the Senate. To announce that such a question had been put to France was to announce that it was resolved upon. If public opinion, which had become passive, did not take the initiative of great resolutions, it might, never-

theless, be relied upon that it would cordially sanction whatever might be proposed to it in favour of the First Consul. It felt from him confidence, admiration, gratitude, all the sentiments which a susceptible and enthusiastic people is capable of feeling for a great man, from whom it has received so many benefits at once. Assuredly, if questions of form had retained any importance at a time in which constitutions had been seen made and re-made so often, it would have been thought singular that, after the Senate had proposed a mere prolongation for ten years, that proposition, emanating from the only authority which had power to make it, should be converted into a proposition of consulship for life, made by a body, which was neither the Senate, nor the Legislative Body, nor the Tribunate, which was but a council dependent on the government. It is true that the Council of State had then a high importance, which rendered it nearly the equal of the legislative assemblies: that the appeal to the national sovereignty was a corrective, which covered all the irregularities of that mode of proceeding, and gave to the Council of State the apparent part of a mere digester of the question to be submitted to France. Besides, at that time, people did not look so closely into things. The result, that is, the consolidation and the perpetuation of the government of the First Consul, was universally agreeable, and the most direct way possible to that result appeared the most natural and the best. The Senate was exposed to some raillery; in fact, it was rather ashamed of not having better understood the wishes of general Bonaparte, and it kept silence, having nothing to the purpose either to say or to do; for it could neither recall its determination nor appropriate to itself that of the Council of State. As for resisting, it had not the means, and never conceived such an idea. Of course, the torrent was not so general but that censure was to be heard in certain places, for instance, in the obscure retreats in which the stanch republicans hid their despair; in the brilliant hotels of the Faubourg St. Germain, where the royalists detested this new power, which they had not yet begun to serve. But this censure, scarcely distinguishable amidst the chorus of praise which was raised everywhere around the First Consul, and ascended to his ear, was of little effect. Only, considerate men, and these are always few in number, could make singular reflections on the vicissitudes of revolutions, on the inconsistency of this generation, overthrowing a royalty of twelve centuries, striving even in its delirium to overthrow all the monarchies in Europe, and now, having got over its worst paroxysms, rebuilding, piece by piece, a demolished throne, and eagerly seeking one to whom to give it. Luckily, it had found for this purpose an extraordinary man. It is not always that nations, in such an emergency, meet with a master who ennobles their inconsistencies to such a degree. The embarrassment of modesty, however, had for a moment



seized all minds, that master himself not daring at first to avow his desires, the Senate next not daring to guess and hesitating to gratify them, till the Council of State, throwing off all that false shame, had the courage, for all, to avow what it was necessary to say and to do.

These momentary difficulties soon gave place to a real ovation. The Legislative Body and the Tribune resolved to go to the First Consul's, to give the signal for adhesions, by proceeding in a body to vote in his hands for the perpetuity of his power. The motive devised for colouring this step was that the members of the Legislative Body and of the Tribune, being detained during this extraordinary session in their places as legislators, could not be in their communes to vote there. The reason was deemed good, and they repaired in a body to the Tuileries. M. de Vaublanc spoke in behalf of the Legislative Body, and M. Chabot de l'Allier in the name of the Tribune. It would be tedious to introduce the speeches delivered on this occasion. They invariably expressed the same gratitude and the same confidence in the government of the First Consul. Such an example could not have failed to induce the citizens to vote, if they had needed it; but so high an impulsion was not necessary. They went most cheerfully to the *mairies*, to the notaries, to the offices of the clerks of the tribunals, to inscribe their approving votes in the registers opened to receive them.

The end of Floréal had arrived. The government hastened to close this short and memorable session by the presentation of the financial laws. The proposed budget was most satisfactory. All the revenues had increased, thanks to the peace, while the expenses of the army and navy were considerably diminished. This budget of the year X. amounted to 500,000,000 frs., 26,000,000 frs. less than that of the year IX.;\* it was raised to 526,000,000 frs. by the most recent estimates, and if there were added the additional centimes for the service of the departments, which were at that time reckoned separately and amounted to about 60,000,000 frs.; if there were added the expenses of collection, which were not carried to the general budget, because each department of the taxes paid its own expenses, which amounted to 70,000,000 frs., the total might be estimated at 625,000,000 frs. or 630,000,000 frs. the definitive budget of France at this period.

Peace brought with it a saving in certain services, augmentations in some others, but, by manifestly increasing the produce of all the taxes, paved the way to the re-establishment of the balance between the expenditure and the revenue, a balance so desired and so far from being foreseen two years before. The war department, divided into two ministries, that of the *materiel*

---

\* The amount for the year IX. was at first fixed at 415,000,000 frs., then at 526,000,000 frs., and finally at 545,000,000 frs.

and that of the *personnel*, was to cost 210,000,000 frs. instead of 250,000,000 frs. It will, no doubt, appear astonishing that there should be a difference of only 40,000,000 frs. between a state of war and a state of peace ; but it should be recollected that our victorious armies had lived upon a foreign soil, and that, having returned to our own territory, with the exception of about 100,000 men, they were now subsisted by the French treasury. The navy, which at first it had been thought right to fix at 80,000,000 frs. since the conclusion of hostilities, had been raised to 105,000,000 frs. by the First Consul, who was of opinion that a time of peace ought to be employed in organising the marine of a great State. Other expenses, materially reduced, proved by their reduction the prosperous progress of credit. The obligations of the receivers-general, the origin, utility, and success of which have been explained elsewhere, had at first been discounted at only one per cent. per month, and afterwards at three quarters. They were now discounted at one-half per cent. per month, that is at six per cent. per annum. Hence the government had been enabled to reduce, without injustice, the interest of the securities from seven to six per cent. All these savings had reduced the costs of negotiation of the Treasury from 32,000,000 frs. to 15,000,000 frs. No reduction did so much honour to the government, or afforded stronger proof of the credit which it enjoyed. The five per cent. *rente*, which had at first risen from twelve to forty and fifty francs, was at the moment at sixty.

Along with these diminutions of expense there occurred some augmentations, which were the consequence of the wise financial arrangements proposed in the year IX., and so unjustly censured by the Tribune. Government had proposed, as we have said in the proper place, to complete the inscription of the *consolidated* third, that is the third of the old debt, the only one excepted from the bankruptcy of the Directory. As for the *mobilised* two-thirds, that is to say the unliquidated portion of that debt, it had designed to give them a sort of value by taking them in payment for certain national domains, or by permitting their conversion into five per cent. *consolidated*, at the rate of one-twentieth of the capital, which corresponded with the actual currency. The First Consul, desirous of completing these arrangements as soon as possible, caused it to be decided, by the law of finance of the year X., that the *mobilised* two-thirds should be compulsorily converted into five per cent. *rentes*, at the rate fixed in the law of Ventôse, year IX. The definitive inscription of the *consolidated* third, the conversion of the *mobilised* two-thirds into five per cent., other liquidations yet left to be made for the ancient credits of the emigrants, and for the transfer of the debts of the conquered countries to the Great Book, would make the total of the public debt amount to 59,000,000 or 60,000,000 of five per cent. annuities. Mean-

while, it was of importance to satisfy people's minds respecting the sum to which these various liquidations were likely to raise the public debt. It was therefore decided, by an article of this same budget of the year X., that it should not be raised, either by loan, or in consequence of the liquidations remaining to be completed, to more than 50,000,000 of annuities. It was hoped that the redemptions of the Sinking Fund, largely endowed with national domains, would absorb this foreseen excess of 9,000,000 or 10,000,000 before it had time to be produced. But, at any rate, an article of the budget added that, as soon as the inscriptions should exceed 50,000,000 frs., a redeeming portion should be immediately created for absorbing in fifteen years the sum exceeding the amount henceforward fixed for the national debt.

The title of that debt was also to be regulated. The various denominations of *consolidated third, mobilised two-thirds, Belgian debt*, and others, were abolished, and in their stead was adopted the single title of five per cent. consolidated. It was settled that the debt should be the first thing inscribed in the budget; that the interest of it should be paid before any other expense, and always in the month following the expiration of each half-year. It was estimated that the life debt, amounting at the moment to 20,000,000 frs., might rise to 24,000,000 frs.; but it was supposed that, the extinctions proceeding as rapidly as the new liquidations, it would always be kept down to the sum of 20,000,000 frs. The civil pensions also were fixed at the amount of 20,000,000 frs. The expenses likely to be further increased were those of the interior for roads and public works, those of the clergy for the successive establishment of new incumbents—expenses rather welcome than to be regretted. As for those of public instruction and the Legion of Honour, they were provided for, as we have already seen, by an endowment in national domains.

In regard to these increasing expenses, the progress of the revenue afforded a prospect of a still more rapidly increasing income. The customs, the post, the registration, the domains of the State, furnished considerable surpluses. Besides, there was yet left the resource of the indirect taxes, which had been re-established till this moment solely for the profit of the towns and for the service of the hospitals. Grievous complaints had this year been made in the Legislative Body and the Tribunal of the burden of the direct contributions, and had suggested new arguments for the re-establishment of the taxes on articles of consumption. Very accurate calculations had shown in a stronger light than ever the excessive proportions of the direct contributions. The tax on immoveable property amounted to 210,000,000 frs., the tax on personal and moveable property to 32,000,000 frs., the tax on doors and windows to 16,000,000 frs., on patents to 21,000,000 frs.; total, 279,000,000 frs., consequently more than

half in a budget of receipts of 502,000,000 frs. People compared these sums with those which had been paid during the administration of Messrs. Turgot and Necker, and demanded the re-establishment of a more just proportion between the different contributions. Before 1789, in fact, the tax on immovable and personal property produced 221,000,000 frs., the indirect taxes 294,000,000 frs. ; total, 515,000,000 frs. The natural conclusion from these complaints was the re-establishment of the old duties levied on liquors, tobacco, salt, &c. The First Consul was pleased to hear these remonstrances; they furnished him with a powerful reason for a financial creation, long resolved upon in his mind, but not yet mature enough to be proposed.

The state of our finances then was excellent, and it was becoming better regulated every day. The 90,000,000 frs. assigned, by means of a creation of *rentes* for clearing off arrears of V., VI., and VII., anterior to the Consulate, were found to be sufficient; the 21,000,000 frs. devoted to the liquidation of the year VIII., the first year of the Consulate, likewise sufficed for discharging all outstanding demands upon it. Lastly, the expenditure of the year IX., the first that had been regularly fixed, though amounting to 526,000,000 frs., instead of 415,000,000 frs., was totally liquidated by means of the extraordinary increase of the revenue. We have already observed that the estimates of the current expenditure and income, those of the year X., exactly balanced.

To sum up—a debt in perpetual *rentes* of 50,000,000 frs., perfectly regulated, reduced to one denomination, provided for by a sufficient endowment in national domains ; a debt in life annuities of 20,000,000 frs., in civil pensions to the amount of 20,000,000 frs.; 210,000,000 frs. assigned to the war department, 105,000,000 frs. to the navy, composed, with other less considerable expenses, a budget of 500,000,000 frs., exclusive of the additional centimes and cost of collection, and of 625,000,000 frs. including those centimes and costs: a budget covered by the revenue, which was manifestly increasing, without taking into account the re-establishment of the indirect contributions left as a resource for new necessities that might afterwards arise. Thus, after ten years of war and of splendid conquests, the estimates reverted to 500,000,000 frs., the budget of 1789, with this difference, that the debt formed a small portion in comparison with the revenue, and that this amount of 500,000,000 frs. raised to 625,000,000 frs. by the additional centimes and the costs of collection, represented all the charges of the country; whereas the 500,000,000 frs. of the budget of Louis XVI. omitted not only the costs of collection, but the revenues of the clergy, the feudal dues, the *corvées*, that is to say charges to the amount of several hundred millions. If, in 1802, France paid

625,000,000 frs. equally assessed, in 1789, it paid 1,100,000,000 frs. or 1,200,000,000 frs. unequally assessed, with a territory smaller by one-fourth. The Revolution had therefore produced, at least in a material point of view, something besides calamities, to say nothing of the benefit of a complete social reform. In all this financial prosperity there was but one subject for regret; this was the bankruptcy resulting from the paper-money, but in no way imputable to the consular government.

These propositions were not now received, as those of the year IX. had been, by a violent opposition. They satisfied the two legislative assemblies, and were voted with mere observations on the direct and indirect contributions—observations which the government would have dictated itself, if they had not been made spontaneously.

This was the last act of that session of forty-five days devoted to such important objects.

The Tribune and the Legislative Body broke up on the 20th of May (30th Floréal) leaving France in a state in which she had never yet been, and perhaps never will be again.

At this moment the population was thronging to the *mairies*, to the offices of the clerks of the tribunals, to the notaries, to give an affirmative answer to the question put by the Council of State. The number of the votes that were or were about to be given, was estimated at between 3,000,000 and 4,000,000. This is apparently a small proportion out of a population of 36,000,000 souls, but it is a large one, larger than is expected, and such as is not obtained, in the greater part of the known constitutions, in which three, four, five hundred thousand votes, at most, express the national will. In fact, out of 36,000,000 individuals, half must be deducted as belonging to a sex which has no political rights. Among the remaining 18,000,000, there are aged men and children, who reduce the male and valid population of a country to 12,000,000 at most. It is, therefore, an extraordinary number, if we consider the men labouring with their hands, most of them illiterate, scarcely knowing under what government they live; it is an extraordinary number, 4,000,000 out of 12,000,000, brought to form an opinion, and, above all, to express it.

There were, it is true, some republican and royalist dissentients, who came to give their negative vote, and who, by their presence, attested the liberty left to every body. But it was an imperceptible minority. For the rest, whether voting affirmatively or negatively, they were perfectly calm, and produced by their concurrence a movement that was scarcely perceptible, so quiet and content was the whole population.

Around the government, however, there was a sort of fermentation, on account of the changes which could not but be made in the Constitution, in consequence of the prolongation



of the consulship for life. On this occasion, a thousand different reports, originating in the wishes of each party, were circulated.

The brothers of general Bonaparte, Lucien in particular, had not entirely renounced the hereditary monarchy, which would at once give them the rank of princes, and place them on a level with the other great functionaries of the State. Of all the persons who took it upon themselves to give an opinion, M. Rœderer was the warmest advocate of monarchical sentiments, much more, however, from natural inclination than from any interested suggestion. He was councillor of State, charged with the public instruction, under the orders of Chaptal, minister of the interior, and he availed himself of this position to transmit to the prefects circulars which, totally foreign to the nature of his office, had a direct relation to the questions which then engaged the government and the public. These circulars, in which certain questions were addressed to the prefects, and the answers indicated, and indicated in an absolutely monarchical spirit, these circulars, not emanating from the minister himself, but yet proceeding from a very high authority, seemed to reveal some secret plan, perhaps originating in a very lofty source. They agitated the minds of the people of the provinces, and gave rise to a thousand rumours.

M. Rœderer, and those who coincided in his ideas, would fain have drawn from the departments a sort of spontaneous wish, that should authorise more boldness than had recently been shown. They did not fail to address to the First Consul urgent solicitations to settle in a bolder manner the questions that were raised. But the First Consul was decided. He thought, with all the discreet friends of the government, that it was sufficient, at least for this time, to establish the consulship for life; that it was monarchy itself, especially if the faculty of designating his successor were added to it. A sufficiently expressive movement of opinion among the men surrounding the supreme power, and among even the most devoted, had warned the First Consul that no more ought to be attempted. He had resolved, therefore, to pause, and he characterised as indiscreet all that was done and said by the injudicious friends about him, whose zeal was far from displeasing him, but was not shared generally enough to be approved.

He fell to work himself to make some changes in the Constitution, which seemed to him indispensable. Though disposed to find fault with the work of M. Sieyès, he was for retaining the ground-work of it, and merely adding to it certain new conveniences for the government.

In some men a strange disposition of mind was produced. They insisted on the re-establishment of monarchy, since the force of circumstances required it, but that in return there should be granted to France liberties which, in monarchy, are



compatible with royalty—that is to say, that there should be given to it purely and simply the English monarchy, with an hereditary royalty and two independent Chambers. On this subject, M. Camille Jordan had published a work, much noticed by the small number of persons who still intermeddled with political questions; for the mass had no other opinion but to let the First Consul do what he pleased. Hence this idea of representative monarchy, which, at the very outset of the Revolution, had presented itself to Messrs. Lally Tollendal and Mounier, as the form necessary for our government, and which, fifty years later, was destined to become the last form, this idea once more appeared to some minds like one of those lofty and distant mountains, which in a long route are seen more than once before they are reached.

The sincere royalists, who wished for monarchy, even without the Bourbons, if the Bourbons were found impracticable, and with general Bonaparte, if it were not practicable unless with him, were strongly of this opinion; so were, also, those of the Royalist party, but the latter from different motives. They hoped that, with the elections and a free press, every thing would soon be thrown into confusion, as had been the case under the Directory, and that from this renewal of chaos would at length emerge the legitimate monarchy of the Bourbons, as the necessary term of the calamities of France.

The First Consul had no notion of adopting such a scheme, even though that scheme were to bring with it royalty for himself. It was not merely out of aversion for the resistances that would have opposed such a form of government; it was from sincere conviction of the impossibility of such an establishment in the actual state of things.

Those who are determined to consider him in no other character than a warrior, at most as an administrator, but not as a statesman, imagine that he had no idea of the English Constitution. In his frequent conversations on matters of government, he reasoned with extraordinary sagacity. In the British Constitution there was one thing that displeased him much, and he expressed his sentiments upon it in that energetic language which was peculiar to him: it was to see important affairs of State, such as require, in order to succeed, long meditation, a great consequence in the views, profound secrecy in the execution, given up to publicity, and to the hazards of intrigue or of eloquence.

“Let Messrs. Fox, Pitt, or Addington,” said he, “be more clever one than the other in the management of parliamentary intrigue, or more eloquent in one sitting of Parliament, and we shall have war instead of peace; the world will be on fire again; France will destroy England, or be destroyed by her. Give up,” he exclaimed, with indignation, “give up the fate of the world to such influences!”—That great mind, exclusively occupied *with the conditions of the due execution of the affairs of State,*

forgot that, if we will not submit those affairs to parliamentary influences, which, after all, are only the national influences, represented, it is true, by passionate and fallible men, as they all are, they fall under mischievous influences of another kind, under those of a Madame de Maintenon in a devout age, of Madame de Pompadour in a dissolute age; and, even if we have the very transient good fortune to possess a great man, like Frederic or Napoleon, under the influence of ambition, which drains the chance of battles to the very dregs.

The First Consul insisted that such a Constitution required, in the first place, a strong dose of hereditary right, that a king and hereditary peers were necessary, that in France public opinion ran counter to this system, that the people were ready to accept him, general Bonaparte, as a dictator, but that they would not accept him as an hereditary monarch (which was certainly true at this moment), that the same sentiments prevailed with regard to the Senate, which no party in the country would consent to make hereditary, although it would grant it extraordinary constitutive power; that the want of stability was felt to such a degree by the nation, that it would readily consent to grant every branch of authority, the most extensive powers, but that these must be for life only; that such was the prevailing opinion amongst reflecting men, that they had not at command all the elements of English royalty, as there existed neither king nor peers; that the senators for life of M. Sieyès, aristocrats of yesterday, most of them without fortune, living upon public salaries, would become ridiculous if it were attempted to transform them into lords as in England; that if, in the absence of these latter, they wished to take the great landed proprietors, they would bring down upon them their most formidable enemies, for at the bottom of their hearts, these were all royalists, more friendly to the English and to the Austrians than to the French; that there was not wherewith to create a second upper Chamber; that by taking the best speakers of the Tribune and the silent members of the Legislative Body, there would certainly be, strictly considered, materials for making a lower Chamber, but that to make this branch effective, in imitation of England, a free tribune, a free press, and free elections were necessary, and all these would inevitably revive the scenes of the four years of the Directory, of which he had been a witness, and which would never be effaced from his memory; that, at that period, a majority was created in the electoral colleges, which, under pretext of dispersing the men sullied with blood, would only elect men more or less avowed royalists; that, at the same period, there were a hundred journals breathing a spirit of rabid royalism, all with the same tendency, and that but for the 18th Fructidor, but for the strength imparted to the Directory by the army of Italy, they would have contributed to the triumph of this disguised counter-revolution; that soon afterwards, by an inevitable reaction, these royalist elections

were succeeded by terrorist elections, which had alarmed all honest men, who demanded that they should be annulled; that, if the door were again opened to these demagogues, one convulsion would succeed another, till the Bourbons and the foreigner triumphed; that a stop must be put to all this, that the torrent must be arrested, and the Revolution brought to an end, by maintaining in power the men who had accomplished it, and by consolidating its just and necessary principles on the firm foundation of the laws.

On this occasion, the First Consul repeated his favourite theme, which consisted in saying that, in order to maintain the Revolution, it was indispensably requisite first to protect its authors, by keeping them at the head of affairs; and that without him they would all have been by this time removed from the scene by the ingratitude of the present generation. "Ask yourselves what has become of Rewbell, Barras, Larévellière! where are they? who thinks of them? no one has been saved but those whom I have taken by the hand, placed in power, supported in spite of the movement which carries us away. Look at M. Fouché, what trouble I had to defend him; M. de Talleyrand inveighs against M. Fouché; but the Malouets, the Talons, the Calonnes, who tendered me their plans, and their assistance, would have soon got rid of M. de Talleyrand, if I had chosen to lend myself to it. They tolerate military men because they fear them, and because it is not easy to step into the place of a Lannes and a Masséna at the head of an army. But if they tolerate them at present, will they continue to do so long? I myself, do I not know what they would do with me. Have they not proposed to me to appoint me Grand Constable to Louis XVIII? Doubtless the spirit of the Revolution is immortal, and would survive the present generation. The Revolution will finally triumph, but will it be by the hands of the society of the Manége!—no! there would be perpetually reactions, revulsions, which would end finally in counter-revolution!

"At present," added the First Consul, "a government must first be formed with the men of the Revolution; with men who have had experience, who have performed services, who have no blood upon their hands, unless it be the blood of the Russians and the Austrians; then we must add to these a small number of men newly raised, duly qualified for employment, or men of the old times, taken from Versailles, if you will, provided that they are also men of capacity, and that they take office as submissive adherents, and not as disdainful protectors. The Constitution of M. Sieyès is well adapted, with some modifications, for the attainment of this end. We must, above all, consecrate the great principle of the French Revolution, which is civil liberty, that is to say, equal justice in every branch, in legislation, in the tribunals, in the administration, the taxes, military service, and distribution of offices, &c. At present each depart-

ment is equal to any other department; all Frenchmen are equal alike; every citizen obeys the same law, appears before the same judge, suffers the same punishment, receives the same reward, pays the same taxes, is subject to the same military service, is eligible to and attains the same rank, whatever may be his birth, his religion, or his place of origin: These are the great social results of the Revolution, which are well worth the troubles we have suffered in achieving them, and which we must unalterably maintain. After these results, there is still one thing more, which must be maintained with equal vigour, and that is the greatness of France. The efforts of the press, the speeches from the tribune, no longer side with us, but in other times, they may both be turned in our favour. At present, we stand in need of repose, of order, of prosperity, of well-managed affairs, and the preservation of our external greatness. For the maintenance of this greatness the struggle is not over, it will be renewed; and, to maintain our rank amongst nations, vast strength and perfect unity in the government will be wanting!"

Such was the substance of the successive conversations which the First Consul held with those whom he had permitted to give him their ideas, and with whom he meditated a remodelling of the Consular Constitution.

We can easily recognise in these arguments his habitual mode of thinking. Without shutting his understanding to the future, yet only troubling himself about the present, he saw that the present welfare of France depended upon the union of all parties, upon the maintenance and perfection of social reform accomplished by the Revolution; and, finally, upon the development of the power acquired by our arms. With regard to unrestrained liberty, he rejected it as involving an inevitable recurrence to all our troubles, as an obstacle to all his schemes of improvements, and it left on his mind the impression of a difficult, obscure problem, the solution of which did not concern him, as twelve years' agitation had for a long time to come deprived the nation of any want or wish to renew it. M. Sieyès, with his aristocratic Constitution, borrowed from the republics of the middle ages when on their decline, with his Senate invested with the electoral power, with its list of notables, a sort of unalterable golden book, had hit upon the Constitution best adapted to the situation.

The First Consul took care not to meddle with the Senate: on the contrary, he was anxious to render it more powerful; but he had in view one primary alteration, which, in appearance, was a concession to the popular influence.

The lists of notables, which contained the 500,000 individuals, from whom the councils of the arrondissements and the departments were chosen, and also the Legislative Bodies, the Tribunate, and the Senate itself, which lists were never altered, except for the purpose of filling up the vacancies caused by

death, and those occasioned by the names of parties being struck out as unworthy to remain on them, such as bankrupts, for example ; these lists of notables appeared too delusive, and left the government, as would be said at the present day, with no tie in common with the country. They were, moreover, very difficult to frame, as the citizens took no interest in so insignificant a matter.

The First Consul thought that the increase of authority which was about to be granted to him, with some other modifications strengthening the power of the Constitution, ought to be requited by some popular concession, at any rate in appearance. He resolved, therefore, to establish electoral colleges.

Consequently, several different kinds of colleges were suggested. First, meetings of the district were to be convened, consisting of the inhabitants of the district, of the age and quality of citizens, who were to elect two electoral colleges, one of the arrondissement and another of the department. The college of the arrondissement was to be formed in proportion to the population, and was to consist of one individual out of five hundred. The college of the department was to be formed in the same manner, in the ratio of one to every thousand. But the number of electors were not to exceed six hundred, taken from those highest rated to the public taxes.

The two electoral colleges, of the arrondissement and of the department, were to be elected for life, by the assemblies of the districts, which, having once performed this duty, had nothing more to do than to fill up the vacancies caused by death, bankruptcy, &c.

The government was to appoint the presidents of all these assemblies, whether district assemblies or electoral colleges. It was to have the power of dissolving an electoral college. In that case the district assemblies were to be convened, in order to re-elect the college which had been dissolved.

The district assemblies, and the two electoral colleges of arrondissement and department were to present candidates to the Consuls, for the offices of *Justices de paix*, and the municipal and departmental authorities. The colleges of the arrondissements were to present two candidates for the vacancies in the Tribune; the colleges of the departments two candidates for the vacancies in the Senate. Each of these two colleges was also to present two candidates for the vacancies in the Legislative Body, which made together four candidates. So that the Tribune originated from the council of arrondissement; the Senate originated from the council of department; the Legislative Body from both.

The Senate still exercised the right of choosing the members of the Tribune, of the Legislative Body, and also of the Senate itself, from the candidates presented.

The nature of the change thus made in the Constitution is



obvious, In lieu of the lists of notables, completed or modified from time to time by the whole body of the citizens, electoral colleges for life, appointed by the same entire body, were now to elect the candidates, from which the Senate was to make the selection, as the body which generated all the others. The alteration was not very great, as these electoral colleges for life, sometimes modified, when vacancies occurred through death or bankruptcy, were almost as immutable as the lists of notables, but they occasionally assembled to elect candidates. In this way the citizens recovered some portion of the right of electing the deliberative assemblies. Tumults at elections were, moreover, little to be apprehended by this arrangement.

The Legislative Body and the Tribune were to be divided into five series, each series going out in rotation every year. The Senate was to fill up the vacancies occasioned by the retiring series, by selecting the new members from among the candidates presented. The colleges for life were afterwards to replace the candidates whom the election of the fifth had absorbed.

After this concession, which at that time appeared so excessive, that the colleagues of the First Consul said broadly, that he must feel very conscious of his own power, very sure of his position, to concede so much to the popular influence; they set about completing the powers of the Senate, in conformity with the inferences which they had deduced from recent events.

The Senate was to retain at first the privilege of electing all the bodies of the State. It was wished, also, to confer upon it a more complete constitutive power. The government had already made it exercise this power, by requiring it to interpret the thirty-eighth Article of the Constitution, by calling upon it to pronounce the repeal of the emigrants, and by demanding of it a prolongation of the authority of the First Consul. It was convenient to have at hand a constitutive power always ready to create whatever might be necessary.

It was accordingly settled, that the Senate, by means of *senatus-consultes*, called *organic*, should have the power of interpreting the Constitution, in order to perfect it, to perform in short, every thing which might be necessary to make it work.

It was arranged, also, that, by means of simple *senatus-consultes*, the Senate could declare the suspension of the Constitution, or the trial by jury, in certain departments, and determine in what cases an individual confined extraordinarily should be sent to trial in the ordinary mode, or kept in prison. Finally, two extraordinary privileges were delegated to this body, one incidental to royalty in a monarchy, the other not possessed by any branch of power in a regular state: the first was the power of dissolving the Legislative Body and the Tribune; the second was that of annulling the decisions of the tribunals whenever they might be dangerous to the safety of the State.



This last privilege would be unintelligible, if the circumstances of the time did not explain it. Certain tribunals had, in fact, recently pronounced decisions in cases relating to the national domains, which might drive the numerous and powerful class of persons who had become their possessors to despair.

It was next settled, that the Senate, which, in the course of ten years, was to be increased from sixty members to eighty, by means of two nominations annually, should be at once increased to the number of eighty. Thus there were fourteen nominations to be made immediately. The First Consul, in addition to these, had the privilege of appointing directly senators to the number of forty, which raised the total number of that body to 120. By these means, the government was relieved from the danger of new annoyances, such as those which took place at the commencement of the session of the year X.

The Tribune and the Council of State were equally modified in their respective organisation. . Whilst the Council of State might be raised to fifty members, the Tribune was to be reduced to fifty, by the successive extinction of members, and was to be divided into sections, corresponding with the sections of the Council of State. It was to make a first examination, in sections, with closed doors, of the *projets de lois* (bills), which might be afterwards submitted to them in the general meeting of the whole body. These bills were still to be discussed, by three orators, who were to argue before the silent Legislative Body, in opposition to three councillors of State, or on the same side with them, according as the bill might have been rejected or adopted.

Henceforth, in short, it was to be nothing more than a second Council of State, whose province it would be to canvass with closed doors, and, consequently, without energy, the measures prepared by the first.

Finally, the prerogative of voting treaties was taken from the Legislative Body and the Tribune. The First Consul recollected what had occurred in respect to the treaty with Russia, and he would not expose himself to a repetition of a similar scene. He projected a Privy Council, consisting of the Consuls, of the ministers, two senators, two councillors of State, two members of the Legion of Honour, having the rank of great officers, each severally summoned by the First Consul, upon every important occasion. This Privy Council was to be consulted upon the ratification of treaties. It was also empowered to digest the organic *senatus-consultes*.

The creation of a Privy Council was an encroachment on the power of the Council of State, and the latter seemed to view it seriously in this light. The First Consul, by the erection of the Privy Council, withdrew from the consideration of the Council of State the treaties, of which, hitherto, it had taken

cognizance, as he began to feel that thirty or forty individuals were too numerous a body for communications of this nature.

The executive power had still to be adjusted upon the new basis of the Consulate for life. The First Consul wished that the power which was tendered to him for life should be also extended, for the same duration, to his colleagues. "You have done so much for me," said he to the Consul Cambacérès, "that I ought now to secure your position." The principle of a continuance for life was, accordingly, fixed, with respect to the three Consuls, both as well for the present as for the time to come. The great question of the nomination of a successor to the First Consul remained still to be determined, by which the right of hereditary succession was, in the present case, to be disposed of. General Bonaparte at first wished to decline the power which it was wished to confer upon him—that of himself naming his successor. He yielded at length, and it was settled that he should have the power of appointing him during his lifetime. In this case, the successor appointed was to be presented to the Senate in great state; he was to take an oath to the Republic, before the Senate, in presence of the Consuls, the ministers, the Legislative Body, the Tribunal, the Council of State, the Tribunal of *Cassation*, the archbishops, and bishops, the presidents of the electoral colleges, the grand officers of the Legion of Honour, and the mayors of the twenty-four great cities of the Republic. After this solemnity, he was to be adopted by the living Consul, and by the nation. He was to take rank in the Senate with the Consuls, immediately after the third.

However, if, with a view of sparing the feelings of his family, the First Consul should not nominate a successor during his lifetime, but only resolve to fix upon him in his will, in that case, he was, prior to his death, to deliver this will, duly sealed with his own seal, into the custody of the three Consuls, in presence of the ministers and presidents of the Council of State. This will was to remain deposited in the archives of the Republic. But, in this case, it was necessary for the Senate to ratify the testamentary will, which had not been produced during the lifetime of the testator.

In the event of the First Consul not making his adoption during his lifetime, or of not leaving a will, or of the will not being ratified, then the second and third Consuls were empowered to appoint a successor. They were to propose him to the Senate, whose duty it was to elect him.

Such were the forms employed to guarantee the due transmission of power. It was a principle of adoption in lieu of hereditary succession, but nothing prevented it from being hereditary, as the chief of the State was free to choose his own son,

if he had one. Only, he was empowered to prefer amongst his heirs, the one who appeared most worthy.

The Consuls were *ex officio* members of the Senate; they were to preside at the sittings.

One great prerogative was added to the power of the First Consul. He was invested with the right of granting pardon for offences. This was assimilating his authority, as much as possible, to that of royalty.

On the accession of a First Consul, a law was to fix his allowance, or, to speak more properly, his civil list. On the present occasion a sum of 6,000,000 frs. (250,000*l.* sterling), for the First Consul, and 1,200,000 frs. (50,000*l.* sterling), for his two colleagues, were to be provided for in the budget.

To all these arrangements, some others were added, relating to the regulation of the tribunals. The ministerial duties of the government were better conducted than the administration of justice, because the ministers, guided by an impartial and firm master, holding their offices during pleasure, pursued exactly the course dictated by his directing mind. But the judges used their independence, as all unfettered liberty at that time was used, for the purpose of becoming subservient to the predominating feelings of the time. In some places, they persecuted the parties who had acquired the national domains; in others, they favoured them unjustly. But in no part of the country did they exhibit that regularity of proceeding which has prevailed since, and which confers upon a great body of magistrates, a dignified, but still deferential authority. To the powers just conferred in certain cases upon the Senate, of reviewing the judgments of the tribunals, an extra-judicial authority, and happily not permanent, a further power to regulate the tribunals was annexed. The tribunals of first instance were placed under the regulation of the tribunals of appeal, and the tribunals of appeal under that of the Court of *Cassation*. A judge who failed in the discharge of his duties, might be summoned before the superior tribunal, reprimanded or suspended. At the head of the whole magistracy, a GRAND JUDGE was to be placed, with power to preside at the tribunals if he chose, whose duty it was to watch over them, and to manage them. He was thus minister of justice, as well as a public magistrate.

Such were the modifications introduced into the Consular Constitution, some of them conceived by the First Consul, others proposed by his advisers. They were all collected in the form of an organic *senatus-consulte*, which was to be presented to the Senate and adopted by that body.

They consisted, as we have just seen, in getting rid of the list of notables, an extensive, inert, and illusory constituency, and in substituting in lieu electoral colleges for life, which

were to assemble occasionally for the purpose of presenting candidates for the choice of the Senate ; they conferred upon the Senate, already invested with the electoral functions and with the duty of watching over the Constitution, the power of modifying that Constitution, of perfecting it, of removing every obstacle in the way of its practical working, the power, in short, of dissolving the Tribunate and the Legislative Body ; they conferred upon general Bonaparte the Consulate for life, with power to appoint his successor ; and, moreover, they bestowed upon him the brightest prerogative of royalty, the power of pardoning offences. By these alterations, the Tribunate was deprived of the power of number, and almost of that of publicity, by being thus made a second Council of State, empowered to animadvert on the proceedings of the first ; furthermore, they transferred from the Legislative Body and the Council of State to a Privy Council certain important affairs of the government, as, for instance, the sanction of treaties ; and, finally, they established for the tribunals, a hierarchy and a discipline.

It was still the aristocratic Constitution of M. Sieyès, apt to turn either to aristocracy or to despotism according to the hand which guided it ; tending, at this moment, to absolute power in the hand of general Bonaparte, but after his death, it was capable of being transformed into a downright aristocracy, if before his death, he did not hurl the whole structure into an abyss.

By conferring such high powers upon the Senate, for his own convenience, the First Consul had secured, during his life, a devoted instrument, by whose hand he could do whatever he wished : but, after his death, the instrument, become independent, would be all-powerful in its turn. Under a less great, a less glorious successor, with the minds of men awakened after a long repose, an entirely new spectacle would present itself. The departmental aristocracy, which formed the electoral colleges for life, and the national aristocracy of which the Senate was composed, the one presenting candidates to the other, might easily, at some future period, by a community of interest, both natural and even necessary, create in the Legislative Body and the Tribunate a majority, which could not be shaken by the monarchical authority, under the denomination of First Consul, and thus might revive a sort of freedom, an aristocratic freedom, it is true, but one which, compared with other forms of government, is, in general, not behind them in haughtiness, or consistency, or durability. Besides, liberty is always guaranteed when the power is divided, and its exercise is subject to deliberations. There can never, in fact, exist more than two plausible opinions respecting the great interests of a country. If the executive power has opposed to it an authority capable of successfully resisting it, the latter, whe-

ther aristocratic or otherwise, embraces, by an irresistible propensity to contradiction, the opinion which the former has rejected. It tends to peace, when the executive power is inclined to war; it tends to war when the executive power inclines to peace: it adopts a liberal policy, when the monarchical power is inclined to conservative measures. In short, there is contradiction, and hence arise investigation and freedom; as liberty in all countries consists chiefly in the free and unfettered discussion of the affairs of the State. This Constitution, then, of M. Sieyès might, at some future period, restore things to the end for which it was originally designed; but, at the present, it was but a mask for a dictatorship. A Constitution, of whatever kind it may be, produces results conformable to the actual state of public opinion at the period. There are times when opposition is the prevailing tendency, at others there is a general disposition to adhere to the government. At the present time, the nation was inclined to adhere to the government: the form of power was, therefore, at bottom, of secondary consideration.

We must, however, admit, that this nominal republic possessed unusual grandeur; it recalled, in some measure, the idea of the Roman Republic, when converted into the empire. This Senate possessed the power of the Senate of ancient Rome, a power which it surrendered to the Emperor when the latter was strong, resuming it, on the contrary, in order to exercise it, whenever the Emperor was weak, or liberal. The First Consul had, indeed, the power of the Roman emperors; he possessed the hereditary authority, that is to say the choice of appointing his successor, natural or adopted. Let us add that he enjoyed almost the same power over the world.

The new Constitution thus remodelled, was now ready; the votes required from all the citizens were given. The Consul Cambacérès, always conciliating, suggested a very wise course; namely, to confide to the Senate the duty of reckoning up the collected votes, and of proclaiming their numbers. "It is," he said, with truth, "a very natural mode of extricating this great body from a false situation, occasioned by a mistake." The Senate had, in fact, proposed a prolongation of ten years, and the First Consul had assumed the Consulship for life. Since then, the Senate had become silent, and had neither taken nor could take any step. To concede to that body the task of proclaiming the result, would be making it a party, and extricate it from the state of embarrassment in which it was placed. "Come," said M. Cambacérès to the First Consul, "come to the assistance of men, who have made a mistake, in trying to guess your wishes." The First Consul smiled, with an unusually sarcastic expression, at his prudent colleague, and consented with alacrity to the judicious

proposal made to him. The registers in which the votes had been entered were sent to the Senate to be reckoned up. A total of 3,577,259 citizens had given their suffrages, and out of this number 3,568,885 had voted for the Consulate for life. Amongst this enormous mass of approving votes, there were only 8000 and some hundred dissidents : it was an insignificant minority. No government ever obtained such an assent, and none ever merited it in the same degree.

This result being verified, the Senate issued a *senatus-consulte* in three articles. The first of those articles was couched in these terms: The *French people* APPOINTS, and the *Senate* PROCLAIMS, NAPOLEON BONAPARTE, First Consul for life.

It was from this epoch that the prenomen of NAPOLEON began to appear in the public acts, together with the family name of Bonaparte, which only, up to that time, was known to the world. This illustrious prenomen, which the voice of nations has so many times since repeated, had hitherto been employed but once, namely, in the constituent act of the Italian Republic. In approximating to the sovereign power, the prenomen, being gradually separated from the family name, was destined soon to stand alone conspicuously in the language of the world, and general Bonaparte, at one short moment called Napoleon Bonaparte, was soon to be styled Napoleon only, in conformity with the manner adopted in designating monarchs.

The second article of the *senatus-consulte* declared, that a statue of Peace, holding a laurel in one hand, and in the other the decree of the Senate, should perpetuate the gratitude of the nation to posterity.

Finally, the third article declared, that the Senate, in a body, should proceed to the First Consul, with this *senatus-consulte*, the expression of the CONFIDENCE, LOVE, and ADMIRATION of the French people. These three expressions are used in the decree itself.

A day was fixed for a grand diplomatic reception, when the Senate should proceed to the Tuileries. It was on the morning of the 3rd of August, 1802 (15th Thermidor). All the ministers from the different courts of Europe, now at peace, were assembled in a spacious saloon, where the First Consul was in the habit of receiving them, and where foreigners of distinction were presented. The levee was scarcely commenced when the Senate was announced. All the members of this body were assembled, and were instantly admitted. The president Barthélemy delivered the following speech :

"The French people," said he, addressing the First Consul, "the French people, grateful for the immense services which you have rendered them, are desirous that the first magistracy of the State should remain permanently in your hands. By



thus rendering it secure during your whole life, it only expresses the wishes of the Senate, as set forth in the *senatus-consulte* of the 18th Floréal. The nation, by this solemn act of gratitude, confers upon you the privilege of consolidating our institutions."

After this exordium, the President briefly enumerated the great deeds of general Bonaparte in war and in peace, predicted prosperity for the future, exempt from the calamities which at that time no one foresaw, and reiterated to him, in short, all that Fame, with her thousand tongues, proclaimed throughout the world. The President then read the decree. The First Consul, bowing to the Senate, replied in these noble words :

"The life of a citizen belongs to his country. The French nation wishes that mine should be wholly consecrated to it. I obey its will.

"Through my efforts, by your assistance, Citizens Senators, by the assistance of all the authorities, by the confidence, and by the will of this mighty people, the liberty, equality, and prosperity of France will be rendered secure against the caprices of fate and the uncertainty of futurity. The most virtuous of nations will be the most happy, as they most deserve to be ; and their felicity will contribute to the general happiness of all Europe.

"Proud, then, of being thus called by the command of that power from which every thing emanates, to bring back order, justice, equality, to the earth, when my last hour approaches, I shall yield myself up, with resignation, and without any solicitude respecting the opinion of future generations."

After receiving the affectionate thanks of the Senate, the First Consul accompanied this body back to the antechamber, and afterwards continued to receive the various foreigners who were presented to him by the ministers of England, Russia, Austria, Prussia, Sweden, Bavaria, Hesse, Wurtemberg, Spain, Naples, America, as, indeed, the whole world was at that moment at peace with France. On the same day, lord Holland and lord Grey (the same known to the present generation), were presented to the First Consul, with a number of other persons of distinction.

On the following day, the 4th of August, the new articles modifying the Constitution were submitted to the Council of State. The First Consul presided at this solemn sitting ; he read the articles one by one, and explained the reasons for each with perspicuity and vigour. He expressed his ideas on each article in the manner which we have already represented. He even started objections, and replied to them. Upon the article relating to the appointment of a successor, there was a short discussion, in which some indication of the resistance which he had offered to this arrangement might be discerned. Messrs. Petiet and

Rœderer maintained that the appointment of a successor, by a testamentary act, ought to be as obligatory as if it were made by a solemn adoption, in presence of the public bodies of the State. The First Consul contended that the testamentary act ought not to be obligatory for the Senate, inasmuch as a man deceased, however illustrious he may have been, ceases to be any thing; that his last will might always be cancelled; and that, in submitting it for the ratification of the Senate, he only yielded to an unavoidable necessity. On this occasion, some singular expressions escaped him, when speaking upon hereditary succession, which proved that, for the moment, he had given up all thought of it. He said, in substance, when elucidating the subject, that it was not consonant to the prevailing manners and opinions. He was not addicted by nature to falsehood and hypocrisy; but placed, as men always are, under the influence of the passing moment, he rejected hereditary succession, because he perceived that the minds of the people were but little inclined to adopt it, and that, moreover, invested as he was, with a power altogether monarchical, he was satisfied with the reality without the title. To judge by his words, he had fully made up his mind upon this subject.

Some objections were afterwards offered against the institution of the Privy Council, on behalf of the Council of State, whose power was in some degree diminished by this institution. On this subject the First Consul betrayed some embarrassment towards a body which, up to that moment, he had treated with so marked a predilection, and which he seemed to deprive of some of its importance. He said that the Privy Council was only established for very rare cases, in which the strictest secrecy was requisite, which in a body of forty or fifty persons it was impossible to preserve; that, moreover, the Council of State would always retain the same importance, together with the cognizance of all great affairs.

After some modifications of detail, the *senatus-consulte* was carried up to the Senate, and, after receiving a sort of approbation, was converted into an *organic senatus-consulte*. The following day, 5th of August (17th Thermidor), it was promulgated with the usual formalities, and thus became a supplementary act to the Consular Constitution.

France experienced the most profound satisfaction. The family of the First Consul had neither all their fears nor all their hopes realised; nevertheless, they participated in the general happiness. Madame Bonaparte began to be tranquilised, now that all thoughts of royalty had evaporated. This kind of hereditary succession, which devolved upon the chief of the State the duty of choosing his successor, was all she wished, as she had no child by general Bonaparte, but had one beloved daughter, married to Louis Bonaparte, who was about to become a mother. She wished for, and counted upon having a

grandson. She thought to see in him the heir to the sceptre of the world. Her husband shared in her anticipations. The brothers of Napoleon (we shall call him henceforth by this name) were not so well pleased; at least, Lucien was not, whose perpetual recklessness of mind nothing could tranquillise. But an arrangement had been thought of, with a view of pleasing them, and accordingly it had just been introduced amongst the Organic Articles. The law of the Legion of Honour enacted that the grand council of the Legion should be composed of three consuls, and of a representative of each of the great bodies of the State. The Council of State had appointed Joseph Bonaparte to fill this dignity; the Tribunate had chosen Lucien. One article of the *senatus-consulte* provided, that the members of the grand Council of the Legion of Honour should be *ex officio* senators. The two brothers of Napoleon were accordingly important personages in the noble institution, upon which the duty of distributing rewards devolved, and they were, moreover, as members of the Senate, called upon to exercise a considerable influence over that body. Joseph, moderate in his desires, seemed to wish for nothing beyond. Lucien was only half satisfied; it was not in his nature to be more so. The First Consul, by making his colleagues, Cambacérès and Lebrun consuls for life, sought thereby to place round his person colleagues who were pleased with his own elevation. He had succeeded. One personage, alone, of the time, came out of this crisis, so favourable to the general advancement of every body else, rather ill-treated—this was M. Fouché, minister of police. Whether it was that his personal advice with regard to the family arrangements of the Bonapartes was seen through, or whether the efforts that were made to prejudice him with his master succeeded, or, which is most probable, that the First Consul was desirous of adding to all his recent acts of clemency and conciliation a measure which should have more than any other the appearance of confidence, and of total oblivion of the past; at any rate, the minister of police was left out.

This minister, as we have already said elsewhere, possessed an importance which he never would have had, under a regular régime, thanks to the arbitrary power with which he was invested, thanks to the funds which he disposed of without any control. Emigrants, either returned, or about to return, Vendéans, Republicans, nonjuring priests, all these troublesome agents were under his surveillance, and he performed his duty without any compunction.

Although M. Fouché executed the duties of this ministry with judgment and a good deal of lenity, it had become odious to the parties whom it kept under restraint. The First Consul suppressed it, and made the police a mere general direction, attached to the ministry of justice. The councillor of State, Réal, was invested with this directorship. The department of

justice was taken from M. Abrial, an able, prudent man, wholly devoted to its duties, but whose slow and laborious mode of doing business was disagreeable to the First Consul. It was bestowed upon M. Regnier, since duke of Massa, a learned, eloquent magistrate, who had inspired the chief who disposed of the fortunes of all around, with confidence, and a liking for him. M. Regnier received, with the administration of justice, the title of grand-judge, a title recently created by the organic *senatus-consulte*. His peculiar qualifications rendered him a very fit person to guide M. Réal in the difficult investigations of the police; and, on the other hand, M. Réal, transacting business direct with the First Consul, became himself almost independent of the minister of justice. Unfortunately, the loss of M. Fouché carried with it his great personal knowledge of men, and connexions with parties, which no one possessed in the same degree. This sacrifice, made too hastily to the opinions of the day, had not been sufficiently well-considered; and it produced, as we shall soon see, consequences much to be deplored. Nevertheless, it was not politic to make M. Fouché appear disgraced. A place was accordingly reserved for him in the Senate, and another for M. Abrial. The act by which M. Fouché was raised to the dignity of a senator, contained a flattering recital of his public services. It was even declared in this act, that, if the urgency of the times should require the restoration of the office now suppressed, M. Fouché would be sought after on the benches of the Senate, again to be created minister of police. Some other official changes took place in the ministry: M. Rœderer, who did not coincide altogether with M. Chaptal in his views respecting the duties of the department of public instruction, which was under his care, relinquished this appointment in favour of the learned Fourcroy, and was compensated, like Messrs. Fouché and Abrial, by a seat in the Senate. The First Consul also raised to the Senate the respectable Archbishop of Paris, M. de Belloy. By acting in this mode, he had no intention of giving the clergy an influence in political affairs; but he wished all the social interests to be represented in the Senate, and religion amongst the rest.

The 15th of August (27th Thermidor) was celebrated, for the first time, as the anniversary of the birthday of the First Consul. This marked the progressive introduction of monarchical usages, by which the natal day of the sovereign is an established festival, observed by the whole nation. On the morning of that day, the First Consul received the Senate, the Tribune, the Council of State, the clergy, the civil and military authorities of the capital, the diplomatic body, who waited upon him for the purpose of congratulating him on the public happiness, and on his own private felicity. At noon, a *Te Deum* was sung in the church of Nôtre Dame, and in all the churches of the Republic. At night, brilliant illuminations

represented, in Paris, here an emblematical figure of Victory ; there, another of Peace ; and, further on, upon one of the towers of Nôtre Dame, the sign of the zodiac under which the author of all the good the nation enjoyed, was born, and for whose birth the nation thus offered up their gratitude to Heaven.

Some days afterwards, the 21st of August (3rd Fructidor), the First Consul went in state to take possession of the Presidency of the Senate. All the troops of the division lined the way, from the Tuileries to the Palace of the Luxembourg. The carriage of the new master of France, escorted by a numerous staff, and by the consular guard on horseback, was drawn by eight magnificent horses, like the carriages of our kings in former times. No one shared with him the honour of occupying it. The second and third Consuls, the ministers, and the presidents of the Council of State, followed in their carriages. Upon the arrival of the *cortège* at the Palace of the Luxembourg, the First Consul was received by a deputation of ten senators. Seated upon a chair, similar to a throne, he received the oath from his two brothers, Lucien and Joseph, created senators, *ex officio*, by virtue of their rank, as members of the great council of the Legion of Honour. After this formality, the councillors of State chosen to perform this duty presented five *projets* of *senatus-consultes*, the first relating to the ceremonial to be observed by the great authorities ; the second to the renewal by series of the Legislative Body and the Tribunate ; the third, to the mode of proceeding in the event of a dissolution of these two assemblies ; the fourth, to the designation of the twenty great cities of the Republic ; and finally, the fifth, to the union of the Island of Elba with the territory of France.

In order to put the Senate into immediate possession of the influence promised it in great affairs of State, M. de Talleyrand read a report of the highest importance, respecting the arrangements preparing in Germany, under the direction of France, for indemnifying the dispossessed hereditary princes on the left bank of the Rhine, with the ecclesiastical principalities. It was, as will be presently seen in the sequel of this history, the most important event of that period. That affair being brought to a conclusion, the world seemed likely to remain in a state of repose for a long time to come. By publishing in this report the views of France to the Senate, the First Consul promulgated to all Europe his own ideas upon this important subject, or, to speak more correctly, intimated his will upon the subject ; as it was well known that he was not a man to recoil from the performance of that which he now publicly announced. The reading of this report being concluded, he withdrew, leaving to the Senate the task of examining the five organic *senatus-consultes* which had just been submitted to them.

Accompanied back by the ten senators, who had received him

on his arrival, greeted as he passed by the acclamations of the people of Paris, he returned to the palace of the Tuileries, like a constitutional monarch, who had just held a royal sitting.

The summer was far advanced, as the end of August was now approaching. The First Consul took possession of the château of St. Cloud, which he had at first declined when it was offered him for a country residence. Having changed his mind upon this subject, he had ordered repairs, which although not very extensive at first, had at length extended to the whole château. They were recently completed; the First Consul seized the opportunity of establishing himself in this beautiful mansion. He there received, upon certain fixed days, high functionaries, great personages of all classes, foreigners, and ambassadors. On Sunday, mass was celebrated in the chapel, and the opponents of the Concordat began to attend it, as formerly people attended mass at Versailles. The First Consul, accompanied by his wife, heard a very short mass, and afterwards conversed in the gallery of the château with the company who might be present. The visitors, ranged in two lines, waited for him, and listened to his words in the same way that the words of royalty or of genius are caught up. In this circle he was the exclusive object of observation and attention. No potentate on the earth has ever obtained, or merited in the same degree, the pure homage of which he was at that time the object, both on the part of France and of the whole world.

It was already the imperial authority, which he afterwards assumed, but with the universal assent of the people, with forms less regal, but more worthy of that dignity, as there still remained a certain republican modesty, which was extremely becoming in this new authority, and which reminded the spectator of Augustus retaining, amidst the supreme power, the exterior habits of the Roman citizen.

Sometimes, after a long journey across a vast and beautiful country, the traveller stops a while, to contemplate from some commanding eminence, the tract through which he has passed: let us imitate his example, let us stop here, and, casting a lingering look behind, let us contemplate the prodigious labours of general Bonaparte, since the 18th Brumaire. What a multitude, what a variety of events, and what stupendous greatness reigns throughout the whole!

After having crossed the seas almost by a miracle, he reached France, astonished and delighted at his return; he overthrew the Directory, seized the supreme power, accepted the Constitution of M. Sieyès with some modification in regard to the executive authority; restored some order in the administration, re-established a new system for the collection of the taxes, raised public credit, supplied the most pressing wants of the armies, took advantage of the winter to overwhelm La Vendée by pouring in troops unexpectedly, then suddenly brought back



these troops to the frontiers, and amidst the apparent confusion of all these movements, created an army unperceived at the foot of the Alps, which, as if dropped from the clouds, was destined to fall unexpectedly in the midst of the enemy, who could not even credit its existence. Every thing being prepared for the campaign, he offered Europe peace or war; and war having been its choice, he commanded his troops to pass the Rhine, pushed Moreau upon the Danube, threw Masséna into Genoa, for the purpose of arresting the march of the Austrians, and of detaining them there. Then Moreau, on one side, having forced M. de Kray upon Ulm, whilst Masséna, on the other, was, by an heroic defence, keeping M. de Mélas at Genoa, he had unexpectedly crossed the Alps, despite the want of roads, with his artillery drawn in trunks of trees, appeared suddenly in the heart of astounded Italy, cut off the retreat of the Austrians, and in a decisive battle, lost and won several times during the day, taken their whole army, recovered Italy, annihilated the designs of the coalition, and extorted from Europe, utterly confounded at these exploits, an armistice of six months.

It was during this six months' truce, that the labours of the First Consul became still more surprising. Negotiating, and attending to the administration at the same time, he changed the whole aspect of European affairs, turned the affections of the surrounding nations towards France and against England, gained the heart of Paul I., decided the wavering court of Prussia, inspired Denmark and Sweden with courage to resist the maritime violence of which their commerce was the victim, concocted the league of the neutral powers against Great Britain, closed all the ports of the continent against that power, from the Texel to Cadiz, from Cadiz to Otranto, and prepared immense armaments to succour Egypt. Whilst he was performing all this, he had perfected the re-organisation of the finances, restored public credit, paid the creditors of the State in cash, established the Bank of France, repaired the public roads, suppressed highway robbery, cut magnificent communications over the Alps, founded hospitals on their summits, undertaken the great fortifications of Alexandria, improved Mantua, opened canals, erected new bridges, and commenced the compilation of the Codes. At length, after an armistice of six months, Austria hesitating still to sign peace, he ordered Moreau to advance, and that general, after completing the destruction of the Austrian forces at the memorable battle of Hohenlinden, had extorted, under the very walls of Vienna, the promise of a peace, which was soon after concluded at Lunéville.

It was at this moment that a frightful crime, the infernal machine, placing in peril the life of the First Consul, exasperated his fiery spirit, and urged him to the commission of the only fault which marred the consummate ability and moderation of

conduct then evinced by him—the banishment without trial, of 130 revolutionists. What sad vicissitudes men of violence experience in revolutionary times! The assassins of September, struck down in their turn, found neither laws to protect nor courage to defend them: and the Tribune, which opposed the best measures of the First Consul, durst not offer one word in favour of these proscripts!

All powerful on the continent, having discredited and driven from office the two ministers who had abetted all the coalitions against him, M. de Thugut, at Vienna, and Mr. Pitt, in London, the First Consul had raised the whole of Europe against England. Nelson, by the blow inflicted on the Danes at Copenhagen, and the Russians by assassinating their emperor, had saved England from the disasters which menaced her; but saved though she was from these dangers, she had neither courage nor means to prolong the war.

The English nation, inspired alike with fear and admiration at the achievements of general Bonaparte, had at length consented to the peace of Amiens, the most glorious and advantageous that France ever made.

The temple of Janus was accordingly shut! And now, the First Consul, desirous of adding a peace with the Church to the peace with the European powers, hastened to negotiate the Concordat, to reconcile the Vatican with the Revolution, to raise the altars, to restore to France everything that is essential to civilised society, and having arrived at the third year of his Consulate, he presented himself to the two legislative assemblies, the bearer of peace both on land and at sea, peace with Heaven, amnesty to all the proscribed, a splendid code of laws, an effective scheme of public education, and a glorious system of social distinctions. Although he presented himself with his hands loaded with these gifts, he had, nevertheless, encountered an unexpected, violent, and senseless opposition, attributable partly to worthy, and partly to very unworthy motives—to the envy of some members, and to the love entertained by others of a liberty at that time altogether impracticable. Delivered by the wisdom of his colleague, Cambacérès, from this opposition, which, in his fury, he would have crushed by violence, he had now at length crowned all his labours, and had succeeded in procuring the national assent to the treaties concluded with Europe, to the *Concordat*, his system of lay and national education, and to the institution of the Legion of Honour, and had received, as a reward for all these services, the chief power for life, and thus attained a greatness equal to that of the Roman emperors. At this instant, he resumed the labour of the Codes, adjusted as arbiter the conflicting interests on the continent, reformed the Constitution of Germany, and distributed the territories to the various princes with an equity which was acknowledged by all Europe.

Now if, dismissing from the mind every thing which has happened since, we imagine for a moment this dictator, at that time necessary to the country, continuing as wise as he was great, uniting those opposing attributes, which the Almighty, it is true, has never yet combined in one mortal, that vigour of genius which constitutes a great commander, with that patience which is the distinguishing feature of the founder of an empire, tranquillising, by a long repose, the convulsed French nation, and preparing the people, by slow degrees, for that liberty which is the honour, and the indispensable ingredient in modern societies; then, after having rendered France so great, appeasing, instead of irritating the jealousies of the surrounding nations, establishing the territorial demarcations, fixed by the treaties of Lunéville and Amiens, upon a settled foundation, as the permanent, immutable basis upon which the balance of Europe should rest; at length terminating his career by an act worthy of the Antonines, by selecting, no matter in what quarter, the most worthy successor, in whose hands to place this organised France, now prepared for liberty, and, for ever aggrandised: what man has ever equalled this? But such a man, combining the military genius of Cæsar, and the political talents of Augustus, with the noble qualities and sublime virtues of Marcus Aurelius, would have been more than human; and the Rulers assigned to us by Providence are not divine.

And yet, at this period, he appeared so moderate after having been so victorious, he showed himself so profound a legislator after having proved himself so great a commander, he evinced so much love for the arts of peace after having excelled in the arts of war, that well might he excite illusions in France and in the world. Only some few amongst the personages who were admitted to his councils, who were capable of judging of futurity by the present, were filled with as much anxiety as admiration, on witnessing the indefatigable anxiety in his mind and body, the energy of his will, and the impetuosity of his desires. They trembled even at seeing him do good in the way he did, so impatient was he to accomplish it quickly, and upon an immense scale. The sagacious Tronchet, who both admired and loved him, and looked upon him as the saviour of France, said, nevertheless, one day, in a tone of deep feeling, to Cambacérès, "This young man begins like Cæsar; I fear he will end like him."





**The only authorized Edition.**

---

**HISTORY**  
**OF THE**  
**CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE**  
**OF**  
**FRANCE UNDER NAPOLEON.**

**FORMING A SEQUEL TO**  
**“THE HISTORY OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION.”**

**BY**  
**M. A. THIERS,**  
**LATE PRIME MINISTER OF FRANCE,**  
**MEMBER OF THE FRENCH ACADEMY, AND OF THE INSTITUTE,**  
**&c. &c. &c.**

**TRANSLATED BY**  
**D. FORBES CAMPBELL, Esq.**  
**WITH THE SANCTION AND APPROVAL OF THE AUTHOR.**

**VOL. IV.**

**LONDON:**  
**HENRY COLBURN, GREAT MARLBOROUGH STREET,**  
**SOLD ALSO BY**  
**CHAPMAN AND HALL, STRAND.**

**1845.**



**C. WHITING, BEAUFORT HOUSE, STRAND.**

# CONTENTS

OF

## THE FOURTH VOLUME.

---

### BOOK XV.

#### THE SECULARIZATIONS.

PAGE.

Congratulations addressed to the First Consul by all the Cabinets, on Occasion of the Consulship for Life—First Effects of the Peace in England—British Industry anxious for a Treaty of Commerce with France—Difficulty of harmonising the Mercantile Interests of the two Countries—Pamphlets written in London by Emigrants against the First Consul—Re-establishment of a good Understanding with Spain—Vacancy of the Duchy of Parma, and Desire of the Court of Spain to add that Duchy to the Kingdom of Etruria—Necessity for deferring any Resolution on that Subject—Definitive Annexation of Piedmont to France—Excellent Understanding with the Holy See—Momentary Disagreement on Occasion of a Promotion of French Cardinals—The First Consul obtains the Creation of Five at once—He makes a Present to the Pope of two Brigs of War, the St. Peter and the St. Paul—Quarrel speedily settled with the Dey of Algiers—Disturbances in Switzerland—Description of that Country and of its Constitution—The Unitary Party and the Oligarchic Party—Journey of Reding, the Landammann, to Paris—His Promises to the First Consul soon contradicted by the Event—Expulsion of Reding and Return of the Moderate Party to Power—Establishment of the Constitution of the 29th of May, and Danger of Fresh Disturbances on Account of the Weakness of the Helvetic Government—Efforts of the Oligarchic Party to draw the Attention of the Powers to Switzerland—That Attention exclusively engrossed by the Affairs of Germany—Altered state of Germany since the Treaty of Lunéville—Principle of the Secularizations laid down by that Treaty—Great Changes in the Germanic Constitution occasioned by the Suppression of the Ecclesiastical States—Description of that Constitution—The Protestant Party, and the Catholic Party; Prussia and Austria; their respective Claims—Extent and Value of the Territories to be distributed—Austria strives to obtain Indemnities for the Archdukes deprived of their Dominions in Italy, and urges this as a Motive for seizing Bavaria as far as the Inn and the Isar—Prussia, under Pretext of compensating herself for what she has lost on the Rhine, and obtaining an Indemnity for the House of Orange, aims at a considerable Acquisition of Territory in Franconia—Despair of the Petty Courts, threatened by the Ambition of the Great Powers—All Eyes in Germany turned towards the First Consul

France and England—Comparative Strength of the two Countries—The First Consul boldly resolves to attempt an Invasion—He prepares for it with extraordinary Activity—Works in the Ports and in the Inner Basins of the Rivers—Formation of Six Camps of Troops from the Texel to Bayonne—Financial Means—The First Consul will not have recourse to a Loan—Sale of Louisiana—Subsidies of the Allies—Concurrence of Holland, Italy, and Spain—Incapacity of Spain—The First Consul releases Spain from the Execution of the Treaty of St. Ildefonso, on condition of a Subsidy—Occupation of Otranto and of Hanover—Light in which the new War was considered by all the Powers—Austria, Prussia, Russia—Their Anxieties and their Views—Russia pretends to limit the Means of the Belligerent Powers—She offers her Mediation, which the First Consul accepts with affected Eagerness—England replies coldly to the Offers of Russia—During these Parleys the First Consul sets out on a Tour to the Coasts of France, to hasten the Preparations for the grand Expedition—He is accompanied by Madame Bonaparte—The most laborious Activity mingled with the Pomps of Royalty—Amiens, Abbeville, Boulogne—Means devised by the First Consul for transporting an Army from Calais to Dover—Three Species of Vessels—Their Qualities and their Defects—War Flotilla and Transport Flotilla—Immense Maritime Establishment created at Boulogne by enchantment—Plan for concentrating Two Thousand Boats at Boulogne, when the Works in the Ports and Rivers are completed—Preference given to Boulogne over Dunkirk and Calais—The Strait, its Winds and Currents—Excavation of the Harbours of Boulogne, Vimereux, and Ambleteuse—Distribution of the Troops along the Coast—Their Labours and military Exercises—The First Consul, having inspected and regulated every thing, leaves Boulogne, to visit Calais, Dunkirk, Ostend, and Antwerp—Stay at Brussels—Concourse of Ministers, Ambassadors, and Bishops in that City—Cardinal Caprara in Belgium—Journey of M. Lombard, the King of Prussia's Secretary, to Brussels—the First Consul strives to dispel the Apprehensions of King Frederick William by frank Communications—Return to Paris—The First Consul resolves to put an end to the Russian Mediation, and announces a War with England to the last extremity—He finally determines to oblige Spain to explain herself, and to execute the Treaty of St. Ildefonso, leaving the choice of Means to herself—Strange Conduct of the Prince of the Peace—the First Consul denounces that Favourite and his scandalous Proceedings to the King of Spain—Deep Abasement of the Court of Spain—It submits and promises a Subsidy—Continuance of the Preparations at Boulogne—The First Consul purposes to execute his Project in the Winter of 1803—He creates a small Residence for himself at Pont de Briques near Boulogne, where he frequently makes his appearance—Assemblage of all the Divisions of the Flotilla in the Channel—Brilliant actions of Gunboats with Brigs and Frigates—Confidence acquired in the Expedition—Perfect harmony between the Seamen and Soldiers—Hopes of a speedy Execution of the Plan—Unforeseen Events for a moment call the Attention of the First Consul to Internal Affairs.....	181
--	-----

## BOOK XVIII.

## CONSPIRACY OF GEORGES.

PAGE.

Alarms excited in England by the Preparations at Boulogne—Effects usually produced upon England by War—First Impressions and subsequent Alarm produced in London by the Proceedings of the First Consul—Means suggested for resisting the French, and Parliamentary Debates upon those Means—Return of Mr. Pitt to the House of Commons; Position taken by himself and his Friends—Military Strength of England—Mr. Wyndham proposes to raise a regular Army similar to that of France—Ministers only proceed to form an Army of Reserve and raising Volunteers—Measures taken for protecting the Coast—The British Cabinet, resorting to the former Measures of Mr. Pitt, aid the Plots of the French Emigrants—Intrigues of Messieurs Drake, Smith, and Taylor, the English Diplomatic Agents—The Refugee Princes, at London, league with Georges and Pichegru, and plan an Attack, by a party of Chouans, upon the First Consul, on his Road to Malmaison; they apply to Moreau, the principal of the Malcontents, with the View to obtaining the Consent of the Army—Intrigues of Lajolais—Absurd Hopes founded upon some Expressions of General Moreau—First departure of a Band of Chouans, under the command of Georges; they land at Biville Cliff, and March across Normandy—Georges, concealed in Paris, makes Arrangements for the Execution of the Project—Second Disembarkation, including Pichegru and other leading Emigrants—Interview of Pichegru and Moreau; the latter so far embittered against the First Consul as to desire his Downfall and Death, but by no means friendly to the Restoration of the Bourbons—Disappointment of the Conspirators; their Discouragement, and the consequent Loss of Time—The First Consul, ill-served by the Police subsequently to the Retirement of M. Fouché, discovers the Danger by which he is threatened, and sends some captured Chouans before a Military Commission, to compel them to confess what they know: he thus procures an Informer, and the whole Plot is revealed—Surprise that Georges and Pichegru are in Paris, and that Moreau is connected with them—Extraordinary Council and Determination to arrest Moreau—Feelings of the First Consul, favourable to the Republicans and irritated against the Royalists; his Determination to proceed without Mercy against the latter—He commissions the *Grand Juge* to summon Moreau before him, that all may be settled by a personal and friendly Explanation; this well-intended Procedure is rendered abortive by Moreau's bearing before the *Grand Juge*—The captured Conspirators unanimously depose that they were to be headed by a French Prince, who was to land in France at Biville Cliff—The First Consul determines that the Prince shall be seized and handed over to a Military Commission—Colonel Savary is despatched to Biville to await the Arrival of the Prince and arrest him—Fearful Laws denouncing Death to all who shall harbour the Conspirators—All Egress from Paris prohibited for several Days—Successive Arrests of Pichegru, of the Messieurs de Polignac, of M. de Rivière, and of Georges himself—Avowal of Georges that he had returned to waylay and dispatch the First Consul—Renewed

	PAGE.
Statement that a French Prince was to head the Conspirators—Increasing Irritation of the First Consul—Fruitless stay of Colonel Savary at Biville; Inquiries made as to the then Residences of the Bourbon Princes ; attention is directed to the Duc d'Enghien, resident at Ettenheim, on the Banks of the Rhine—A Sub-officer of the Gendarmerie is sent thither to make Inquiries ; erroneous Report of that Sub-officer, and its fatal Coincidence with a new Deposition of a Servant of Georges—Mistake and headlong Rage of the First Consul—Extraordinary Council, at which the Seizure of the Duc d'Enghien is determined upon ; he is seized and conveyed to Paris—The Mistake is partially discovered, but too late—The Prince is sent before a Military Commission and shot in a Fossé of the Château of Vincennes—Character of this sad Affair.....	261

## BOOK XV.

### THE SECULARIZATIONS.

Congratulations addressed to the First Consul by all the Cabinets, on Occasion of the Consulship for Life—First Effects of the Peace in England—British Industry anxious for a Treaty of Commerce with France—Difficulty of harmonising the Mercantile Interests of the two Countries—Pamphlets written in London by Emigrants against the First Consul—Re-establishment of a good Understanding with Spain—Vacancy of the Duchy of Parma, and Desire of the Court of Spain to add that Duchy to the Kingdom of Etruria—Necessity for deferring any Resolution on that Subject—Definitive Annexation of Piedmont to France—Excellent Understanding with the Holy See—Momentary Disagreement on Occasion of a Promotion of French Cardinals—The First Consul obtains the Creation of Five at once—He makes a Present to the Pope of two Brigs of War, the St. Peter and the St. Paul—Quarrel speedily settled with the Dey of Algiers—Disturbances in Switzerland—Description of that Country and of its Constitution—The Unitary Party and the Oligarchic Party—Journey of Reding, the Landammann, to Paris—His Promises to the First Consul soon contradicted by the Event—Expulsion of Reding and Return of the Moderate Party to Power—Establishment of the Constitution of the 29th of May, and Danger of Fresh Disturbances on Account of the Weakness of the Helvetic Government—Efforts of the Oligarchic Party to draw the Attention of the Powers to Switzerland—That Attention exclusively engrossed by the Affairs of Germany—Altered state of Germany since the Treaty of Lunéville—Principle of the Secularizations laid down by that Treaty—Great Changes in the Germanic Constitution occasioned by the Suppression of the Ecclesiastical States—Description of that Constitution—The Protestant Party, and the Catholic Party; Prussia and Austria; their respective Claims—Extent and Value of the Territories to be distributed—Austria strives to obtain Indemnities for the Archdukes deprived of their Dominions in Italy, and urges this as a Motive for seizing Bavaria as far as the Inn and the Isar—Prussia, under Pretext of compensating herself for what she has lost on the Rhine, and obtaining an Indemnity for the House of Orange, aims at a considerable acquisition of territory in Franconia—Despair of the Petty Courts, threatened by the Ambition of the Great Powers—All Eyes in Germany turned towards the First Consul—He determines to interpose, to cause the Treaty of Lunéville to be carried into Effect, and to put an End to an Affair liable every Moment to involve Europe in War—He favours an Alliance with Prussia, and supports the Claims of that Power to a certain Degree—Plan of Indemnity framed in concert with Prussia and the Petty Princes of Germany—This Plan communicated to Russia—Overture to that Court to concur with France in a general Mediation—The Emperor Alexander accepts the Offer—France and Russia, in quality of Mediating Powers, present the Plan of Indemnity arranged in Paris to the Diet of Ratisbon—Mortification of Austria, deserted by all the Cabinets, and her Resolution to avail herself of the Dilatoriness of the Germanic Constitution to oppose the Plan of the First Consul—The First Consul thwarts that Design, and causes the proposed Plan, with some Modifications, to be adopted by the extraordinary Deputation—Austria, in order to intimidate the Prussian Party, which France supports, takes Possession of Passau—Prompt Resolution of the First Consul, who threatens to have Recourse to Arms—General Intimidation—The Negotiation continued—Discussions in the Diet—The Plan obstructed for a Moment by the Greediness of Prussia—The First Consul, in order to effect a Final Arrangement, makes a Concession to the House of Austria, and allots to it the Bishopric of Eichstädt—The Court of Vienna yields and adopts the *Conclusum* of the Diet—Recess of February, 1803, and definitive Settlement of the Affairs of Germany—Character of that able and difficult Negotiation.





**HISTORY**  
**OF**  
**THE CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE**  
**OF**  
**FRANCE**  
**UNDER**  
**N A P O L E O N.**

---

**BOOK XV.**

**THE SECULARIZATIONS.**

THE elevation of general Bonaparte to the supreme power by the title of Consul for life had neither surprised nor mortified any of the European cabinets. Most of them, on the contrary, had regarded it as a new pledge of peace for all the States. In England, where every circumstance that occurred in France was watched with a restless attention, Mr. Addington, the minister, had warmly expressed to M. Otto, the satisfaction of the British government, and its entire approbation of an event destined to consolidate order and power in France. Though the ambition of general Bonaparte began to excite apprehensions, still there was a disposition to forgive him for it, because it was employed in controlling the French Revolution. The re-establishment of religion and the recall of the emigrants had pleased the English aristocracy, and the pious George III. in particular. In Prussia, testimonies not less significant were given. That court, compromised in the esteem of European diplomacy for having concluded peace with the National Convention, now felt proud of its connexion with a government full of genius, and deemed itself fortunate in seeing the affairs of France definitively placed in

the hands of a man whose concurrence in its ambitious plans relative to Germany it hoped to obtain. M. Haugwitz addressed the most cordial congratulations to our ambassador; he even went so far as to say that the simplest way would be to come to the point at once, and to convert the dictatorship for life, just conferred on the First Consul, into an hereditary sovereignty.

The emperor Alexander, who affected to appear a stranger to the prejudices of the Russian aristocracy, and who kept up a frequent and friendly correspondence with the head of the French government, expressed himself in terms full of courtesy and kindness, respecting the late changes. He caused the new Consul for life to be complimented with equal promptness and cordiality. The subject of the ideas was in all cases the same. In Petersburg, as in Berlin and in London, people rejoiced to see order guaranteed in France in a durable manner, by the indefinite prolongation of the authority of the First Consul. In Vienna, where the wounds inflicted by the sword of the conqueror of Marengo had been more keenly felt than elsewhere, a sort of personal kindness for him seemed to be springing up. So strong was the hatred to the Revolution in that capital of the old Germanic empire, that people were ready to forgive the energetic and obeyed magistrate for the victories of the general. They even affected to consider his government as decidedly counter-revolutionary, though as yet it was but reparative. The archduke Charles, who was then at the head of the war-department, observed to M. de Champagny that the First Consul had proved himself by his campaigns to be the greatest captain of modern times; that, by an administration of three years, he had shown himself the ablest of statesmen; and that, in thus uniting the merit of government with that of arms, he had set the seal to his glory. What will appear still more extraordinary, Caroline, the celebrated queen of Naples, mother of the empress of Austria, a bitter enemy to the Revolution and to France—the queen of Naples, being at Vienna, and receiving M. de Champagny, charged him with the most unexpected congratulations for the chief of the Republic. “General Bonaparte,” said she, “is a great man. He has done me much injury, but that shall not prevent me from acknowledging his genius. By checking disorder among you, he has rendered a service to all of us. If he has attained the government of his country, it is because he is most worthy of it. I hold him out every day as a pattern to the young princes of the imperial family; I exhort them to study that extraordinary personage, to learn from him how to direct nations, how to make the yoke of authority endurable by means of genius and glory.”

Assuredly no tribute could be so flattering to the First Consul as that of this hostile and vanquished queen, not less

remarkable for the superiority of her understanding than for the warmth of her passions.

The Pope, who had just finished in concert with the First Consul the great work of the re-establishment of religion, and who, notwithstanding many crosses, looked to that work for the glory of his reign—the Pope rejoiced to see a man whom he considered as the strongest support of religion against the irreligious prejudices of the age, ascending step by step to the throne. He expressed his satisfaction with a truly paternal affection. Lastly, Spain, which the fickle and incongruous policy of the favourite had estranged for a moment from France, did not continue silent on this occasion, but expressed her gratification at an event which she agreed with the other courts in considering as fortunate for all Europe.

It was, therefore, amidst the applause of the world that this repairer of so many evils, this author of so much good, took possession of the new power with which the nation had just invested him. He was treated like the real sovereign of France. The foreign ministers spoke of him to the French ministers with the forms of respect employed in speaking of kings themselves. The etiquette was already almost monarchical. Our ambassadors had assumed the green livery, which was that of the First Consul. This was thought simple, natural, necessary. This unanimous approval of an elevation so sudden and so prodigious, was sincere. Some secret apprehensions, it is true, were mingled with it; but they were at any rate prudently dissembled. It was possible, in fact, to discern in the elevation of the First Consul his ambition, and in his ambition the speedy humiliation of Europe: but it was the clearest-sighted minds alone that could penetrate so deeply into the future, and it was these that most felt the immense good already effected by the consular government. Congratulations, however, are things of a day: business soon comes again to press with its heavy and continuous weight upon the existence of governments as upon that of individuals.

In England, the first effects of the peace began to be felt. As it almost always happens in this world, those effects fell short of the hopes entertained. Three hundred British vessels, sent into our ports at once, had not been able to sell their entire cargoes, because they brought goods prohibited by the laws of the Revolution. The treaty of 1786 having formerly thrown open our markets imprudently to British productions, French industry, and especially the manufacture of cottons, had sunk in a very short time. Since the renewal of the war, the prohibitory measures adopted by the revolutionary government had been a principle of life for our manufactures, which, amidst the most frightful political convulsions, had made advances and attained an extraordinary development. The First Consul had, as we have

related, at this moment, at the moment of signing the preliminaries of London, no mind to change such a state of things, and to renew the evils which had resulted from the treaty of 1786. English importations were consequently very much circumscribed, and the merchants of the city of London complained bitterly. They had, however, the resource of smuggling, and it was carried on upon a very great scale, either by the frontiers of Belgium, which were still imperfectly guarded, or by way of Hamburg. The merchants of the latter place, by introducing English goods upon the continent, and dissembling their origin, furnished them with the means of penetrating into France as well as into the countries under our domination. In spite, therefore, of the legal prohibitions which awaited British produce in our ports, smuggling was sufficient to create markets for them. The manufactories of Birmingham and Manchester were in full activity.

That activity, the low price of bread, the announced abandonment of the income-tax, were subjects of satisfaction, which balanced to a certain point the discontent of the great merchants. But this discontent was strong, for the great merchants derived no profit from speculations founded on smuggling. They beheld the sea covered with rival and hostile flags; they were deprived of the monopoly of the carrying trade which the war had procured them, and they no longer had the great financial operations of Mr. Pitt to indemnify them. Grievously did they therefore complain of the illusory policy of the peace, of its disadvantages for England, and its exclusive benefits for France. The laying up of the navy had turned adrift a prodigious number of sailors, whom British commerce, in its present state, was not capable of employing; and these poor fellows were seen wandering about the wharfs of the Thames, some of them reduced to the utmost distress—a sight as painful to the English as it would have been to the French to see the conquerors of Marengo or Hohenlinden begging their bread in the streets of Paris.

Mr. Addington, always animated by friendly dispositions, had made the First Consul sensible of the necessity of devising commercial arrangements that should satisfy both countries, and had intimated that there were no means so capable of consolidating the peace. The First Consul, participating in the dispositions of Mr. Addington, consented to appoint an agent and to send him to London, to seek, in concert with the English ministers, in what way the interests of the two nations could be adjusted, without sacrificing French industry.

This was a problem which it was difficult to resolve. Public opinion in London was so impressed with the importance of every thing relating to these commercial arrangements, that a great noise was made about the arrival of the French agent. His name was Coquebert: he was called *Colbert*, and said to be a

descendant of the great Colbert; and the selection of a person of that name to conclude a treaty of commerce was highly commended.

Notwithstanding the good-will and the abilities of that agent, a favourable result of his efforts was scarcely to be hoped for. On both sides, the sacrifices to be made were great, and almost beyond compensation. The iron and cotton manufactures constitute at this day the richest branches of industry both of France and England, and the principal object of their commercial rivalry. We French have found means to forge iron, and to spin and weave cotton, in immense quantity, and of course we are not disposed to sacrifice these two branches of trade. It was chiefly in cottons and hardware that the two nations strove to rival each other. The English desired that our markets should be opened to their productions in those two branches. The First Consul, aware of the alarm of our manufacturers, and impatient to develop the manufacturing wealth of France, refused every concession that would tend to thwart his patriotic intentions. The English, on their part, were no more disposed then than at this day to favour our special productions. Wines and silks were the articles which we were desirous of introducing among them. This they opposed for two reasons: the engagement contracted with Portugal to give a preference to her wines; and the desire to protect the silk manufactures, which had begun to flourish in England. While the interdiction of the communications had encouraged our cotton manufactures, it had encouraged in return their manufactures of silks. It is true that the cotton manufacture among us had attained a prodigious degree of development, because there was nothing to prevent us from completely succeeding in it; while the silk manufactures, on the contrary, prospered but moderately in England, owing to the climate, and likewise to a certain inferiority of taste. The English, however, would not sacrifice to us either the Methuen treaty, which attached them to Portugal, or their rising silk manufactures, of which they had conceived exaggerated hopes.

It was scarcely possible to reconcile such interests. It had been proposed to levy on the entry of goods imported into both countries a duty equal to the profit derived by the smuggler, so as to render free and profitable to the public treasury a trade that was beneficial only to the dishonest. This proposal alarmed both the French and English manufacturers. Besides, the First Consul, convinced of the necessity of great means for great results, and then considering the cotton manufacture as the first and most desirable branch of all, was desirous of insuring to it the immense encouragement of an absolute prohibition of rival productions.

To overcome these difficulties, the French agent devised a system, seductive at first sight, but almost impracticable. He proposed to permit the importation into France of any English productions whatever at a moderate duty, on condition that the vessel which brought them should export immediately French produce



to an equivalent amount. Vessels of our nation going to England were to be required to do the same. This would be a certain method of encouraging the national industry in the same proportion as foreign industry. In this combination there would have been another advantage, that of depriving the English of a medium of influence, of which, in consequence of their vast capitals, they were enabled to make a fearful use in certain countries. It consisted in giving credit to the nations with which they trafficked, and in thus making them their debtors for considerable sums, and themselves partners in their trade. This was the course which they had pursued in Russia and in Portugal. They had become owners of part of the capital circulating in both those countries. In giving these credits they encouraged the sale of their productions, and secured, moreover, the superiority of him who lends to him who borrows. The impossibility for Russian commerce to do without them, an impossibility so absolute that the emperors were no longer free in their choice of peace or war, unless they set the dagger at defiance, sufficiently proved the danger of this superiority.

The proposed combination, which tended to confine English commerce within certain limits, was unluckily attended with such difficulties of execution, that it was scarcely possible to adopt it. It served, however, to occupy the imagination, and left a certain hope of an arrangement. This incompatibility of commercial interests would not have been sufficient to rekindle the war between the two nations, if their political views could have been reconciled, and above all, if Mr. Addington's administration could have maintained its ground against that of Mr. Pitt.

Mr. Addington considered himself as the author of the peace; he knew that herein lay his advantage over Mr. Pitt; and he was desirous to retain this advantage. In a long conversation with M. Otto, he had expressed himself in the most sensible and friendly manner on this subject. "A treaty of commerce," said he, "would be the surest, the most durable guarantee of peace. Until we come to an arrangement on this point, some forbearance on the part of the First Consul on certain points is necessary to keep the English public well disposed towards France. You have really taken possession of Italy, by annexing Piedmont to your territory, and by conferring on the First Consul the presidency of the Italian Republic; your troops occupy Switzerland; you regulate as arbiters the affairs of Germany. We pass over all those extensions of the French power; we give up the continent to you. But there are certain countries in regard to which the mind of the English people would be easily excited: there is Holland, there is Turkey. You are masters of Holland; it is a natural consequence of your position on the Rhine. But beware of adding any thing ostensible to the real domination which you habitually exercise over that country. If you were to attempt, for example, to do there what you have already done in Italy,

and to seek to obtain for the First Consul the presidency of that republic, English commerce would regard this as a sort of incorporation of Holland with France, and would conceive the strongest alarm. As for Turkey, any fresh manifestation whatever of the ideas which produced the expedition to Egypt would cause a sudden and universal explosion in England. Abstain, then, from creating any new difficulty of this kind for us; let us conclude the best arrangement we can respecting our commercial affairs; let us obtain the guarantee of the powers for the Order of Malta, that we may be able to evacuate the island, and you will see peace consolidated, and the last signs of animosity disappear.”\*

These words of Mr. Addington's were sincere, and he proved them to be so by using the utmost diligence to obtain from the powers the guarantee of the new state of things constituted in Malta by the treaty of Amiens. Unluckily, M. de Talleyrand, by a negligence of which he was sometimes guilty in the most important affairs, had omitted to transmit to our agents instructions upon this subject; and left the English agents to solicit alone a guarantee which was the preliminary condition of the evacuation of Malta. Hence arose mischievous delays, and subsequently consequences to be regretted. Mr. Addington, then, was sincere in his desire to maintain the peace. As it had not been procured through the ascendancy of Mr. Pitt, there was ground to hope that it might be preserved. But Mr. Pitt, though out of office, was more powerful than ever. While Dundas, Wyndham, Grenville, had publicly attacked the preliminaries of London and the treaty of Amiens, he had kept himself aloof, leaving to his friends the odium of these open provocations to war, profiting by their violence, keeping an imposing silence, still possessing the sympathies of the old majority by which he had been supported for eighteen years, and abandoning it to Mr. Addington till he should conceive the moment for withdrawing it to have arrived. He abstained, moreover, from every act that could bear the semblance of hostility to the administration. He always called Mr. Addington his friend; but every body knew that there needed but a signal from him to upset the Parliament. The king hated him, and wished for his removal, but the great mercantile interest was devoted to him, and had no confidence in any other. His friends, less prudent than himself, waged an undisguised war against Mr. Addington; and they were supposed to be the organs of his real sentiments. This tory opposition was joined by the old whig opposition of Fox and Sheridan, though there was no concert between them, and they were even hostile to each other. The whigs had constantly demanded peace. Ever since it had been procured for them, they had shown the usual disposition of the human heart to undervalue what it possesses. They seemed no longer to appreciate that peace

---

\* This is an accurate summary of several conversations detailed in the despatches of M. Otto.

so highly extolled, and let the exaggerated friends of Mr. Pitt run on as they pleased when they were declaiming against France. Indeed, the French Revolution, under the new and less liberal form which it had taken, appeared to have lost part of the sympathies of the whigs. Mr. Addington had, therefore, enemies of two kinds—the tory opposition of the friends of Mr. Pitt, who always found fault with the peace; and the whig opposition, who began to congratulate themselves rather less upon it. If that administration were overthrown, Pitt was the only possible minister, and with him would return war, inevitable, rancorous, interminable, save by the ruin of one of the two nations. Unfortunately, one of those faults which the impatience of oppositions often leads them to commit, had procured Mr. Pitt an unparalleled triumph. Though already attacking the Addington administration jointly, but not in concert, with the exaggerated friends of Pitt, the whig opposition always cherished an implacable hatred to the latter. Sir Francis Burdett made a motion tending to call for an inquiry concerning the state in which Pitt had left England after his long administration. The friends of that minister replied with warmth, substituting for that motion another for an address to the king, praying his majesty to bestow some mark of the national gratitude on the great statesman, who had saved the constitution of England and doubled her power. They were for putting it to the vote immediately. The opposition then drew back, and demanded a delay of a few days. Pitt caused it to be granted with a sort of disdain. After those few days, the motion was again brought forward. This time Pitt took care to be absent; and in his absence, after a most vehement debate, an immense majority negatived Burdett's motion, and adopted one which contained the warmest expression of national gratitude to the late minister. Amidst these struggles the Addington administration succumbed; Pitt was aggrandised by all the hatred of his enemies, and his return to office was a threatening peril for the peace of the world. Meanwhile, people surmised more than they knew of his designs, and he uttered not a word that could be construed to signify peace or war.

The English journals, without recurring to the same violent language as formerly, were less friendly to the First Consul, and began to declaim afresh against the ambition of France. Still they were far from displaying the odious violence to which they afterwards descended. That part was left, with pain it must be confessed, to French emigrants, whom the peace robbed of all their hopes, and who strove, by vilifying the First Consul and their country, to rekindle the flames of discord between two nations, which it was but too easy to exasperate. A pamphleteer, named Peltier, devoted to the service of the princes of Bourbon, wrote against the First Consul, against his wife, against his sisters and his brothers, abominable pamphlets, in which they were charged with every vice. These pamphlets, treated by the English with the

contempt which a free nation, accustomed to the licence of the press, feels for its excesses, produced a totally different effect in Paris. They filled the heart of the First Consul with bitterness; and a vulgar writer, an instrument of the basest passions, had the power to reach in his glory the greatest of men, like those insects which instinctively torment the noblest animals of the creation. Happy the countries which have long been accustomed to liberty! there those vile agents of defamation are deprived of the means of injuring; there they are so well known, so despised, that they have not the power to ruffle the minds of the truly great.

To these outrages were added the intrigues of the famous Georges, and those of the bishops of Arras and St. Pol de Leon, who were at the head of the nonjuring bishops. The police had detected their agents carrying pamphlets into La Vendée, and striving to rekindle there scarcely extinguished animosities. These causes, despicable as they were, nevertheless produced extreme irritation, and led to an embarrassing demand to the British cabinet from that of France. The First Consul, too sensible to attacks more worthy of contempt than anger, applied in virtue of the Alien Act for the expulsion from England of Peltier, Georges, and the bishops of Arras and St. Pol. Mr. Addington, closely watched by adversaries ready to reproach him with the slightest condescension towards France, did not precisely refuse what was demanded, and what the English laws authorised: but he endeavoured to temporise, alleging the necessity for paying regard to the public opinion—an opinion extremely susceptible in England, and at the moment liable to be misled under the influence of the declamations of parties. The First Consul, accustomed to despise parties, could not well comprehend these reasons, and complained of the weakness of the Addington administration with a vehemence that was almost offensive. The two cabinets, however, still continued to be upon friendly terms. Both endeavoured to prevent the renewal of a war that was scarcely over. Mr. Addington made this a point of honour, of existence. The First Consul beheld in the continuation of peace the occasion of a new glory for him, and the accomplishment of the noblest ideas of public prosperity.

Spain began to breathe after her long distress. The galleons were, as formerly, the sole resource of her government. Considerable quantities of dollars, buried during the war in the captaincies-general of Mexico and Peru, had been conveyed to Europe. The amount already received was about 3,000,000 francs. If any other government but that of an incapable and reckless favourite had been charged with the destinies of Spain, she might have raised her credit, recruited her naval power, and put herself into a condition to figure in a more glorious manner in the wars with which the world was still threatened. But these metallic riches of America, received and squandered by incapable hands, were not employed for those noble purposes to which they ought to have been devoted. The smallest part went to uphold the credit

of the paper-money ; the greatest to defray the expenses of that court. Nothing or next to nothing was allotted to the arsenals of Ferrol, Cadiz, and Carthagena. All that Spain seemed capable of doing was to complain of the French alliance, to impute to it the loss of Trinidad, as though she had a right to find fault with France for the sorry part which the prince of Peace had made her act both in war and in the negotiations. An alliance is not profitable unless a State brings to its allies a real force which they appreciate, and which they are obliged to make much of. But Spain, when she made common cause with France, drawn into the maritime war by the evidence of her interests, could not keep it up, and, as soon as she was engaged in it, became almost as great a trouble as an aid to her allies, dragging herself along in their train, always discontented both with herself and with others. In this way she had gradually passed from a state of intimacy to a state of hostility in regard to France. The French division sent to Portugal had been unworthily treated, as we have seen, and a thundering denunciation from the First Consul had been required to prevent the consequences of a senseless line of conduct. From that period, the two powers had been upon better terms. There subsisted between them not only general interests which had been common to them for a century past, but interests of the moment, which deeply touched the heart of the king and queen of Spain, and which were of a nature to bind them more closely to the First Consul. These were interests arising from the creation of the kingdom of Etruria.

The court of Madrid complained of the tone of superiority assumed at Florence by general Clarke, the minister of France. The First Consul had attended to these complaints, and ordered general Clarke to be less free and more delicate in giving advice to the young prince and princess who were called to reign. Out of respect to the court of Spain, he had allowed the old grand-duke of Parma, brother of queen Louisa, to die in full possession of that duchy. But, on the death of this prince, his duchy belonged to France, in virtue of the treaty which constituted the kingdom of Etruria. Charles IV. and the queen, his consort, strongly coveted it for their children, for this increase of territory would have made the kingdom of Etruria the second State in Italy. The First Consul did not oppose any absolute refusal to the wishes of the royal family of Spain ; but he begged for time, that he might not give too much umbrage to the great courts by a fresh act of omnipotence. By holding this duchy in trust, he left to the cabinets which protected the old dynasty of Piedmont the hope of an indemnification for that unfortunate house ; it afforded the Pope a glimpse of an improvement in his present condition, which was much reduced since the loss of the Legations ; lastly, it allowed the affairs of Italy, placed for some years so prominently before the eyes of Europe, to rest for a moment. Though deferred, the new transactions relative to Parma had soon



drawn the cabinets of Paris and Madrid closer together. Charles IV., with his wife and his court, had recently travelled with great pomp to Barcelona, to celebrate a double marriage, that of the heir-presumptive to the crown of Spain, afterwards Ferdinand VII., with a princess of Naples, and that of the heir to the crown of Naples with an Infanta of Spain. On this occasion, extraordinary luxury was displayed in the capital of Catalonia, much greater indeed than the state of the Spanish finances warranted. From that city the most gracious communications were exchanged with the consular court. Charles IV. announced the double marriage of his children to the First Consul as to a friendly sovereign. The First Consul replied with the same warmth and in a tone of the most frank cordiality. Ever mindful of serious interests, he was desirous to avail himself of this moment for improving the commercial relations of the two countries. He attempted to introduce our cottons, but without success, because the government of Charles IV. made an especial point of fostering the rising manufactures of Catalonia; but he obtained the re-establishment of the advantages formerly granted in the Peninsula to most of our productions. He was particularly anxious to accomplish one object, of great importance in his estimation: this was the introduction of the fine breeds of Spanish sheep into France. Formerly, the National Convention had conceived the happy idea of inserting in the treaty of Basle a secret article, by which Spain engaged to permit the exportation for five years of 1000 Merino ewes and 100 rams annually, with fifty Andalusian stallions and 150 mares. Amidst the troubles of that period, neither a sheep nor a horse had ever been purchased. By order of the First Consul, the minister of the interior had just sent agents to the Peninsula, with directions to execute in a single year what ought to have been done in five. The Spanish administration, always extremely jealous of the exclusive possession of those fine animals, obstinately refused to comply with the application, alleging in excuse the great mortality of the preceding years. At the same time, there were 7,000,000 Merino sheep in Spain, and there could be no difficulty in picking up five or six thousand of those animals. After a sharp resistance, the Spanish government yielded to the wishes of the First Consul, but not without interposing some delay to their accomplishment. The relations between the two courts had thus become again perfectly amicable. General Beurnonville, recently ambassador in Berlin, had just quitted that capital for the purpose of repairing to Madrid; and he had been invited to the family festivities held in Barcelona.

The safety of navigation in the Mediterranean engaged in a most particular manner the attention of the First Consul. The Dey of Algiers had been ill-advised enough to treat France as he treated the second-rate Christian powers. Two French vessels had been seized on their voyage and carried to Algiers. One of our officers had been molested in the road of Tunis by an Algerine



officer. The crew of a vessel wrecked on the coast of Africa had been made prisoners by the Arabs. The coral fishery was interrupted. Lastly, a Neapolitan vessel had been captured by African corsairs in the waters of the Hyeres Islands. The Algerine government, when applied to for redress of these various grievances, dared to demand a tribute similar to that which it exacted from Spain and the Italian powers, before it would do justice to France. The First Consul was indignant: he immediately despatched an officer of his household, adjutant Hullin, with a letter for the Dey. In this letter he reminded the Dey that he had destroyed the empire of the Mamelukes: he assured him that he would send a squadron and an army, and threatened him with the conquest of the whole coast of Africa, if the French and Italians who were detained and the captured vessels were not instantly restored, and if a formal promise were not given to respect in future the flags of France and Italy—"God has decided," said he, "that all those who are unjust towards me shall be punished. I will destroy your city and your port, I will take possession of your coast, unless you respect France, of which I am the head, and Italy, where I command." What the First Consul threatened he really designed to perform; for he had already remarked that the north of Africa was very fertile and might be advantageously cultivated by European hands, instead of serving for the haunt of pirates. Three ships sailed from Toulon, two were moved into the road, five were ordered to proceed from the Ocean into the Mediterranean: but all these preparations proved needless. The Dey, learning very soon what kind of power he had to deal with, threw himself at the feet of the conqueror of Egypt, released all the Christian prisoners whom he held captive, restored the Neapolitan and French vessels which he had taken, condemned to death the agents of whom we had reason to complain, and spared their lives only on the petition for their pardon presented by the minister of France. He re-established the coral fishery, and promised equal and absolute respect for the French and Italian flags.

Italy was extremely quiet. The new Italian Republic began to organise itself under the direction of the president whom it had chosen, and who repressed by his powerful authority the disorderly movements to which a new and republican State is always liable. The First Consul had at length decided to unite officially the Isle of Elba and Piedmont with France. Elba, exchanged by the king of Etruria for the principality of Piombino, which had been obtained from the court of Naples, had just been evacuated by the English. It had been immediately declared part of the French territory. The incorporation of Piedmont, consummated in fact two years before, passed over in silence by England during the negotiations of Amiens, admitted by Russia herself, who merely demanded some sort of indemnity for the house of Sardinia, was tolerated as an inevitable necessity by all the courts. Prussia and Austria were ready to confirm it by their adhesion upon the pro-

mise of a large share in the distribution of the ecclesiastical States. This incorporation of Piedmont, officially pronounced by an organic *Senatus-consultum* of the 24th Fructidor, year X. (September 11th, 1802)—consequently excited no surprise, and was nothing new. Besides, the vacancy of the duchy of Parma left a hope to all the chafed interests in Italy. The fine country of Piedmont was divided into six departments—the Po, the Doria, Marengo, the Sesia, the Stura, and the Tanaro. It was to send seventeen deputies to the Legislative Body. Turin was declared one of the great cities of the Republic. This was the first step taken by Napoleon beyond what are called the natural boundaries of France, that is to say, beyond the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees. In the eyes of the cabinets of Europe, an aggrandisement would never appear a fault, to judge at least from their usual conduct. There are, nevertheless, aggrandisements which are real faults, as the sequel of this history will show. They ought to be considered as such, when they pass the limit that may be easily defended, when they wound respectable and resisting nationalities. But, it must be confessed, of all the extraordinary acquisitions made by France in this quarter of a century, that of Piedmont was least liable to censure. Had it been possible to constitute Italy forthwith, the wisest thing that could be done would have been to unite the whole of it into one State; but, powerful as the First Consul was at that time, he was not sufficiently master of Europe to venture upon such a creation. He had been obliged to leave one part of Italy to Austria, which possessed the ancient State of Venice as far as the Adige; another to Spain, which had solicited the formation of the kingdom of Etruria for its two Infants. He had found it expedient to suffer the Pope to exist for the sake of a religious interest, and the Bourbons of Naples for the interest of a general peace. To organise Italy definitively and completely was, therefore, impossible for the moment. All that the First Consul could do was to procure for it a transitory state, better than its past state, and suitable as a preparation for its future state. By constituting in its bosom a Republic, which occupied the middle of the valley of the Po, he had there deposited a germ of liberty and independence. In taking Piedmont, he secured a solid base for combating the Austrians. In leaving the Pope, in striving to attach him to himself, in supporting the Bourbons of Naples, he indulged the ancient policy of Europe, yet without sacrificing to it the policy of France. What he was now doing was, in short, a commencement, which did not preclude future arrangements, which, on the contrary, paved the way to a better and a definitive state.

The relations with the court of Rome became daily more cordial. The First Consul listened with great complaisance to the complaints of his Holiness on such matters as chagrined him. The sensibility of the venerable pontiff to every thing connected with the affairs of the Church, was extreme. The loss of the

Legations had greatly reduced the financial resources of the Holy See. The abolition of a multitude of dues formerly levied in France, an abolition which threatened to extend itself to Spain, had impoverished him still more. Of this Pius VII. complained bitterly, not for his own sake, for he lived like an anchorite, but for the sake of his clergy, whom he could scarcely support. Still, as, in the estimation of that worthy pontiff, spiritual interests were far above temporal interests, he complained mildly but with a keen feeling of grief, about the famous organic articles. It will be recollected that the First Consul, after introducing into a treaty with Rome, called Concordat, the general conditions of the re-establishment of the clergy, had embodied in a law all that related to the police of religion. This law he had drawn up agreeably to the maxims of the old French monarchy. The prohibition to publish any bull in writing without the permission of the public authority; the interdiction to every legate of the Holy See to exercise his functions, without the previous recognition of his powers by the French government; the jurisdiction of the Council of State, to which were referred appeals as well as abuses; the rigid rules to which the organisation of seminaries was subjected; the obligation imposed upon their inmates to profess the declaration of 1682; the introduction of divorce into our laws; the prohibition to celebrate religious marriage before civil marriage; the complete and definitive attribution of the registers of the civil state to the municipal magistrates, were so many subjects on which the Pope presented remonstrances, to which the First Consul listened, but without acceding to them, considering those subjects as wisely and definitively settled by the organic articles. The Pope remonstrated with perseverance, but without any intention of pushing his remonstrances to a rupture. Lastly, the state of religious affairs in the Italian Republic, the secularizations in Germany, in consequence of which the Church was about to lose part of her German territory, crowned his mortifications; and, but for the joy which he felt on account of the re-establishment of the Catholic religion in France, his life, he said, would be but a long martyrdom. His language breathed, at the same time, the most sincere affection for the person of the First Consul, who, on his part, suffered his Holiness to say what he pleased, with a patience which was most extraordinary, and altogether foreign to his character.

As for the privation of the Legations and the impoverishment of the Holy See, he often turned his thoughts to that subject, and cherished a vague intention of increasing the domain of St. Peter: but he knew not how to set about it, placed as it was between the Italian Republic, which, so far from being disposed to restore the Legations, demanded, on the contrary, the duchy of Parma; between Spain, which coveted the same duchy; between the great protectors of the house of Sardinia, who were desirous to turn it into an indemnity for that house. He there-

fore offered money to the Pope, till he should have it in his power to meliorate his territorial condition—an offer which the Pontiff would have accepted if the dignity of the Church had permitted him. In default of this kind of aid, he had made a particular point of paying for the support of the French troops during their passage through the Roman States. He had caused Ancona to be evacuated at the same time as Otranto and the whole south of Italy; he had required the Neapolitan government to evacuate Ponte Corvo and Benevento. Lastly, in the affairs of Germany, he showed himself disposed to defend, in a certain extent, the ecclesiastical party, which the Protestant party, that is to say, Prussia, was for weakening and even destroying. To these efforts calculated to gratify the Holy See, he added acts of the most gracious courtesy. He had caused all the subjects of the Roman States detained at Algiers to be delivered up, and had sent them to the Pope. As that sovereign prince possessed not a single vessel to drive the African pirates from his coasts, the First Consul had selected two fine brigs in the naval arsenal of Toulon, ordered them to be completely equipped and fitted up with elegance, and, after giving them the names of St. Peter and St. Paul, had sent them as a present to Pius VII. To such a length did he carry his attention, that a cutter accompanied those vessels to Civita Vecchia, to carry the crews back to Toulon, and to spare the papal treasury all expense whatever. The venerable pontiff insisted on bringing the French seamen to Rome, exhibited to them the pomp of the Catholic worship in the great Church of St. Peter, and sent them back loaded with such humble presents as the state of his finances permitted him to make.

A wish of the First Consul's, ardent and prompt as were all those which he conceived, had recently created a difficulty with the Holy See, which, fortunately, was transient and soon surmounted. He was desirous that the new Church of France should have its cardinals as the old Church had. France had formerly numbered eight, nine, and even ten. The First Consul would have wished to have so many and even more hats at his disposal, if it were possible to obtain them; for he considered them as valuable means of influence with the French clergy, eager after these high dignities, and means of influence still more desirable in the sacred college, which elects the Popes and regulates the great affairs of the Church. In 1789, France numbered five cardinals, Messrs. de Bernis, de La Rochefoucauld, de Lomenie, de Rohan, de Montmorency. The first three, Messrs. de Bernis, de La Rochefoucauld, and de Lomenie, were dead. M. de Rohan had ceased to be a Frenchman, for his archbishopric had become German. M. de Montmorency was one of the recusants who had resisted the Holy See at the time when the prelates were called upon to resign. Cardinal Maury, nominated in 1789, had emigrated, and was then considered as an enemy. There were

two belonging to Belgium and Savoy—cardinal Frankenberg, formerly archbishop of Malines, and the learned Gerdil. The former archbishop of Malines was separated from his see, and had no intention of returning to it. Cardinal Gerdil had always lived in Rome, absorbed in theological studies, and belonged to no country. Neither of these could be considered as French. The First Consul wished that seven cardinals should be granted immediately to France. This was a much greater number than it was possible for the Pope to grant at the moment. There were, it is true, several hats vacant, but the promotion of the crowns was approaching, and it was necessary to provide for that. The promotion of the crowns was a custom which had become almost a law, in virtue of which the Pope authorised six Catholic powers to name each of them a person, on whom he conferred the hat at his presentation. These powers were Austria, Poland, the Republic of Venice, France, Spain, and Portugal. Two of them had ceased to exist—Poland and Venice; but there remained four, including France; and there was not a sufficient number of vacant hats either to satisfy them, or to fulfil the demands of the First Consul. The Pope alleged this reason for refusing what was desired of him. But the First Consul, conceiving that this resistance to his wishes arose not solely from the difficulty respecting the number, which was real, but also from the fear of showing too much condescension towards France, was greatly incensed, and declared that, if the hats for which he applied were refused him, he would do without them, but, in that case, he would not accept one; for he would not suffer the French Church, if it had cardinals, to have fewer than the other Churches of Christendom. The Pope, not fond of exciting the displeasure of the First Consul, accommodated the matter, and consented to grant him five cardinals. But, as there were not hats sufficient for this extraordinary promotion and for that of the crowns, the courts of Austria, Spain, and Portugal were solicited to assent to an adjournment of their just claims, which all three did with great cheerfulness and complaisance. The powers on this occasion took pleasure in gratifying wishes, which ere long they were obliged to fulfil as commands.

The First Consul consented to give the hat to M. de Bayanne, for many years auditor of the Rota for France, and senior of that tribunal. He then proposed to the Pope M. de Belloy, archbishop of Paris; the abbé Fesch, archbishop of Lyons, and his uncle; \* M. Cambacérès, brother of the second Consul and archbishop of Rouen; lastly, M. de Boisgelin, archbishop of Tours. To these five nominations he would fain have added a sixth, that of the abbé Bernier, bishop of Orleans, pacificator of La Vendée and principal negotiator of the Concordat. But the idea of including

---

\* Cardinal Fesch was half-brother of Lætitia Romolino (Napoleon's mother), their mother's second husband having been a Swiss officer named Fesch.—*Trans.*



in so signal a promotion a man who had been so conspicuous in the civil war greatly embarrassed the First Consul. He communicated his sentiments on the subject to his Holiness, and begged him to decide at once that the first vacant hat should be given to the abbé Bernier, but keeping that resolution *in petto*, as the court of Rome expresses it, and writing to acquaint the abbé Bernier with the motive of that adjournment. This was accordingly done, and it became a subject of mortification for that prelate, as yet scantily recompensed for the services which he had rendered. The abbé Bernier was well aware of the good-will borne him by the First Consul, but he was deeply chagrined at the embarrassment that was felt to avow it publicly—a just punishment of the civil war, but falling, indeed, on a man, more worthy by his services than any other of the indulgence of the government of the country.

The Pope sent to France a prince Doria, to carry the hats to the cardinals recently elected. At that moment, the French Church, invested with so large a part of the Roman purple, was one of the most favoured and the most resplendent in Christendom.

The Church of Italy was still to be organised in concert with the Pope. The First Consul demanded a Concordat for the Italian Republic; but this time the Pope would not suffer himself to be overcome. The Italian Republic comprehended the Legations, and, according to him, to treat with the Republic to which they belonged would have been an acknowledgment of the cession of those provinces. It was agreed that the deficiency should be supplied by a series of briefs destined to regulate every affair in a special manner. Lastly, Pius VII. deferred entirely to the First Consul in regard to the definitive constitution of the Order of Malta. The priories had met in the different countries of Europe, to proceed to the election of a new grand-master, and, to facilitate that election, they agreed to leave the choice for this time to the Pope. On the recommendation of the First Consul, who was desirous to organise the Order as speedily as possible, that he might soon transfer to it the island of Malta, the Pope selected an Italian, the *bailli* Ruspoli, a Roman prince of a high family. The First Consul preferred a Roman to either a German or a Neapolitan. The person chosen was moreover a discreet and enlightened man, and worthy of the honour that was decreed him: though, indeed, his acceptance of it was not very probable. No time was lost in writing to him in England where he lived in retirement.

The French troops had evacuated Ancona and the gulf of Tarento. They had returned to the Italian Republic, which they were to occupy till that Republic had formed an army. They laboured upon the roads over the Alps, and the fortifications of Alessandria, Mantua, Legnago, Verona, and Peschiera. Six thousand men guarded Etruria till a Spanish corps should arrive. All the conditions of the treaty of Amiens relative to Italy were therefore fulfilled on the part of France.



While the agitation of the public mind began to subside in most of the States of Europe, under the soothing influence of peace, it was far from being appeased in Switzerland. The people of those mountains were the last to continue in commotion, and that commotion was violent. One might have said that discord, driven from France and Italy by general Bonaparte, had taken refuge in the inaccessible retreats of the Alps. Two parties, by the names of unitarians and oligarchs, that of the revolution and that of the old system, were struggling there against each other. These two parties, nearly balanced in point of strength, produced no equilibrium, but continual and mischievous oscillations. In the space of eighteen months they had alternately possessed themselves of the chief power, and had exercised it without discretion, without justice, without humanity. It may not be amiss to explain in a few words the origin of these parties, and their conduct since the commencement of the Helvetic revolution.

Switzerland, anterior to '89, was composed of thirteen cantons; six democratic—Schwitz, Uri, Unterwalden, Zug, Glarus, Appenzell; seven oligarchic—Berne, Solothurn, Zurich, Lucerne, Freiburg, Basle, Schaffhausen. The canton of Neuchâtel was a principality dependent on Prussia. The Grisons, the Valais, Geneva, formed three separate republics, allies of Switzerland, each under a particular and independent government; but the first, that of the Grisons, from its geographical position, leaning rather towards Austria; the two others, the Valais and Geneva, for the same reason having a bias for France.

The French Republic produced the first change in this state of things. To indemnify herself for the war, she took possession of the country of Bienne and the ancient principality of Porentruy, and, with the addition of part of the old bishopric of Basle, formed the department of Mont Tonnerre. She took also Geneva, with which she formed the department of the Lemman. She indemnified Switzerland, by annexing to it the Grisons and the Valais, reserving in the latter a military road, which was to commence at the extremity of the Lake of Geneva near Villeneuve, to ascend the valley of the Rhone, by Martigny and Sion, as far as Brieg, the point where began the celebrated road of the Simplon, debouching on Lago Maggiore. After these territorial changes, which were suitable to the French Republic, came those that were the consequence of the ideas of justice and equality, which the revolutionary party aimed at making predominant in Switzerland, in imitation of what had been accomplished in France in '89.

The revolutionary party in Switzerland was composed of all those who were adverse to the oligarchic system, and they were spread through the democratic as well as the aristocratic cantons; for they had as much to suffer in the one as in the other. Thus, in the petty cantons of Uri, Unterwalden, and Schwitz, where the entire population, meeting once a year, chose their magistrates and investigated their administration in a few hours, this univer-

sal suffrage, destined to flatter the ignorant and corrupt multitudes for a moment, was a mere farce. A small number of families, having made themselves masters of every thing in the course of time and by corruption, settled affairs and disposed of offices at their pleasure. In Schwitz, for instance, the family of Reding appointed at will all the officers in a Swiss regiment in the service of Spain, which constituted the sole object of solicitude in the country, for these appointments were the only ambition of all who would not remain herdsmen or farmers. The small cantons had moreover the Italian bailiwicks as dependencies, and governed them, by the designation of subject countries, in the most arbitrary manner. These democracies, therefore, were, what all pure democracies come to be in time, nothing but oligarchies disguised under popular forms. This serves to explain how it happened that there were, even in the democratic cantons, minds deeply aggrieved by the old state of things. Subject provinces, after the fashion of the Italian bailiwicks, were attached to more than one canton. Thus Berne governed with harshness the Pays de Vaud and Argau. Lastly, in these aristocratic cantons, the lower class of citizens were excluded from offices. Hence, when the signal was given by the entry of the French armies in 1798, the rising was prompt and general. In the cantons with subject provinces, the oppressed bailiwicks rose against the oppressing master-country; and, in the bosom of the sovereign cities, the middle class rose against the oligarchy. Out of the thirteen cantons, it was proposed to make nineteen, all equal, all uniformly administered, placed under a central and sole authority, imaging the unity of the French government. In acting thus, people were governed by the need of distributive justice, and especially by the ambition of raising themselves above the state of nullity peculiar to federative governments. The hope of figuring rather more actively on the theatre of the world powerfully moved at that time the hearts of the Swiss, proud of their ancient valour and of the part which it had formerly gained for them in Europe, and weary of that perpetual neutrality which necessitated them to sell their blood to foreign powers.

In this application of the ideas of the French Revolution to Switzerland, brought about as much by conformity of wants as by a spirit of imitation, certain cantons were partitioned to form several, as several separate districts were incorporated to compose a single canton. The territory of Berne, forming with Argau and the Pays de Vaud a fourth of Switzerland, was divided; and Argau and the Pays de Vaud were made distinct cantons. The Italian bailiwicks were separated from Uri, and out of them was created the canton of the Tessino. The canton of Appenzell was increased by the annexation of St. Gall, Tockenbourg, and the Rheinthal; to the canton of Glarus were added the bailiwicks of Sargans, Werdenberg, Gaster, Uznach, and Rapperschwill. These additions granted to the cantons of Appenzell and Glarus were de-

signed to destroy for ever the old democratic system, by giving them an extent which would render that system impossible. These nineteen cantons were made dependent on one legislative body, which gave them uniform laws, and one executive power, which executed those laws for all and among all. There were in Switzerland ministers, prefects, and sub-prefects.

The opposite party, against which all this uniformity was directed, adopted the contrary theme, and wanted the federative system in its utmost exaggeration, with its most absurd irregularities, with the complete independence of confederated States in regard to each other. They wanted it in this form, because, under favour of these irregularities, this independence, each petty oligarchy could resume its empire. The aristocracies of Berne, Zurich, Basle, made alliance with the democracies of Schwitz, Uri, Unterwalden, and agreed perfectly together; for, in fact, they aimed at the same thing, that is, the domination of a few powerful families, as well in the petty, mountainous cantons as in the most opulent cities. The one received the name of oligarchs; the others, who sought justice and equality in the uniformity of the government, were denominated unitarians. They had been struggling against one another for some years, without having ever been able to govern unhappy Switzerland with any moderation and for any length of time. Constitutions had followed each other there as rapidly as in France, and at the moment they were bestirring themselves to frame a new one.

One circumstance which served to aggravate the troubles in Switzerland was the disposition of the parties to seek support abroad, which is always the case when a country is too weak to depend on itself alone, and too important, from its geographical position, to be viewed by its neighbours with an indifferent eye. The oligarchic party, having much correspondence with Vienna, London, and even Petersburg, where a Swiss, Colonel Laharpe, had formed the heart and mind of the young emperor, addressed the strongest solicitations to all those courts; beseeching them not to suffer France, in consolidating the revolutionary system in Switzerland, to subject to her influence a country, which, in a military point of view, was the most important of the continent. They were likewise in close intercourse with England. The citizens of Berne and of several sovereign cities had deposited the capital of their municipal savings in the bank of London, conduct which, by the by, did them honour; for while the free cities of all Europe, and especially in Germany, were ruined by debts, the cities of Switzerland had amassed considerable sums. The English government, making a handle of the French occupation, had, without scruple, seized the funds so deposited; and it had not restored them since the peace. The oligarchs of Berne besought it, if it would not afford them assistance, to retain at least the capitals which they had remitted to the bank of England. They had placed about ten millions in that bank and two in that of Vienna.

The revolutionary party naturally sought support from France, and it was easy to derive it from her, since the French armies had never ceased to occupy the Helvetic territory. But such an occupation could not last long. It would be necessary very soon to evacuate Switzerland, as Italy had been evacuated. Though the obligation to evacuate the one was not so formally stipulated as the obligation to evacuate the other, still, as the treaty of Lunéville guaranteed the independence of Switzerland, the execution of the treaties might be deemed incomplete, and the peace uncertain, so long as our troops had not withdrawn. Political observers, therefore, had their eyes particularly fixed on Switzerland, which was still in a state of agitation, and on Germany, where the ecclesiastical territories were parcelling out, to see whether the attempt at a general pacification making at that moment was likely to be durable. The First Consul had taken the formal resolution not to compromise the peace on occasion of what might happen in either of these countries, unless, indeed, the counter-revolution, which he would not suffer on any of the frontiers of France, should strive to establish itself amidst the Alps. It would have been easy for him to cause himself to be accepted as legislator of Helvetia, as he had been for the Italian Republic; but the *Consulta* of Lyons had produced such an effect in Europe, especially in England, that he durst not exhibit the same scene twice. He confined himself, therefore, to prudent advice, which was listened to, but little followed, notwithstanding the presence of our troops. He recommended to the Swiss to give up the chimera of absolute unity, a unity impossible, in a country so peculiarly circumstanced as theirs, insupportable, moreover, to the small cantons, which could not pay heavy taxes, like Berne or Basle, or bow to the yoke of a general rule. He advised them to institute a central government for the foreign affairs of the Confederation; and as for the internal affairs, to leave the local governments to organise themselves, according to the soil, and the manners and character of the inhabitants. He exhorted them to take from the French Revolution whatever it had that was good and incontestably useful—equality among all classes of the citizens, equality between all parts of the territory: to leave separated from each other incompatible provinces, such as Vaud and Berne, the Italian bailiwicks and Uri; but to renounce certain incorporations of territory which ran counter to nature in several of the small cantons, such as those of Appenzell and Glarus; to put an end in the great cities to the alternate domination of the oligarchs and of the populace, and to adopt the government of the middle *bourgeoisie*, but without systematically excluding any class; to imitate, in short, that compromising policy between all the parties, which had restored tranquillity to France. These counsels, comprehended by enlightened men, misconceived by passionate men, who always form the majority, produced no effect. As, however, they tended to give some slight check to

the Revolution, they were received with pleasure by the oligarchic faction, lulling itself with illusions, as did certain French emigrants in Paris, and believing that the First Consul, because he was moderate, purposed to restore the ancient system.

A question of territory added a very serious difficulty to this situation. During the Revolution, France and Switzerland, being in some respects blended, had passed from a system of neutrality to that of offensive and defensive alliance. In this system, the Swiss had not hesitated to concede to France, by the treaty of 1798, the military road through the Valais, terminating at the foot of the Simplon. At the time of the last treaties, Europe had not dared to remonstrate against this state of things, the result of a long war; it had merely stipulated the independence of Switzerland. The First Consul, preferring from system the neutrality of Switzerland to her alliance, thought to enjoy the road of the Simplon, without being obliged to borrow the Helvetic territory, which was incompatible with neutrality; and, to this end, he conceived the idea of obtaining the gift of the Valais. This was not asking any great thing, for it was of France that Switzerland held the Valais, formerly independent. But the First Consul did not desire to have it without compensation: he offered in exchange a province which Austria had ceded to him by the treaty of Lunéville; this was the Frickthal, a small country, but of great importance as a frontier, comprehending the road through the Forest Towns, extending from the conflux of the Aar and the Rhine, to the boundary of the canton of Basle, and consequently connecting that canton with Switzerland. This little tract, facing the Black Forest, besides its intrinsic value, possessed a high conventional value. Thanks to this exchange, France, having become proprietor of the Valais, would have no further need of the Helvetic territory for the passage of her armies, so that one might revert from the system of alliance to the system of neutrality. The Swiss, both unitarians and oligarchs, vied with each other in declaiming upon this subject. They would not on any account give up the Valais for the Frickthal. They demanded other concessions along the Jura, especially the country of Bienne, the Erguel, and some detached districts of Porentruy. This would have been sacrificing to them a portion of the department of Mont Terrible. Even on these conditions, they had a repugnance to the cession of the Valais; and as, under the interests called general, very particular interests often lurked concealed, the little cantons, apprehensive of the effect of the rivalry of the Simplon route on that of the St. Gothard, pushed the proposed exchange to a refusal. The First Consul had caused the Valais to be provisionally occupied by three battalions, resolved not to take any decided step before the arrangement of the Helvetic affairs.

Until the definitive organisation of Switzerland, a temporary government, composed of an executive council and a not nume-



rous legislative body, had been formed. Various plans of constitution had been digested and secretly submitted to the First Consul. Among these different plans, he had preferred one, which seemed to originate in wise and enlightened views, and had sent it back to Berne with a sort of recommendation. The provisional government, composed itself of the most moderate patriots, had adopted this constitution, and had presented it for the acceptance of a general Diet. In this Diet, the hot-headed unitarian party had a considerable majority—fifty voices out of eighty. It soon declared the Diet constituent, drew up a new plan consistent with the ideas of absolute unity, and, affecting even to defy France, proclaimed the Valais an integral part of the territory of the Helvetic Confederation. The representatives of the small cantons withdrew, declaring that they would never submit to such a constitution. Masters of the provisional government, the moderate patriots, seeing what was passing, concerted with Verninac, minister of France, and issued a resolution, by which they dissolved the Diet, for having exceeded its powers and made itself a constituent assembly, when it was not called upon to be so. They themselves put in force the new constitution of the 29th of May, 1801, and proceeded to the election of the authorities instituted by it. These authorities were the senate, the little council, and the landammann. The senate was composed of twenty-two members. It nominated the little council, consisting of seven, and the landammann, who was the head of the Republic. Not only did the senate appoint these two authorities, it counselled them also. As the moderate patriots had upon their hands the furious unitarians, who had been dispersed by the dissolution of the Diet, they were obliged to court the contrary party, that of the oligarchs. They chose from among it the most discreet men, and incorporated them with themselves by adding them to the senate. They so mingled them with revolutionists as to secure a majority to the latter. But, in their irritation, five of the revolutionists chosen refused to serve. The majority was consequently changed in a manner the more unlucky, since the senate, once formed, was to complete itself. Accordingly, it did complete itself, but in the spirit of the oligarchs. Thus, when it was to proceed to the election of landammann and to choose between two candidates, M. Reding, who was the head of the oligarchs, and M. Dolder, who was the chief of the moderate revolutionists, M. Reding won by a single vote. M. Dolder was a prudent, able man, but of not much energy. M. Reding, formerly a military officer, not particularly enlightened but energetic, having served among the Swiss troops in the pay of foreign powers, and displayed intelligence in the mountain war against the French in 1798. He was a native of the little canton of Schwitz, and the head of that privileged family which disposed of all commissions in Reding's regiment. The oligarchs of all Switzerland had adopted this chieftain, as it were, of a clan, and had given him their confidence. Rough as he was, M. Reding



was not destitute of a certain tact. He was flattered with his new dignity and solicitous to retain it: but this he knew he could not long do against the will of France. In concert with his party, he determined to make a rapid journey to Paris, and strive to persuade the First Consul that the party of the oligarchs was the party of the honest men; that he ought to suffer him to retain the chief power, to permit him to do what he pleased, and on these conditions he should have a Switzerland devoted to France. The First Consul received M. Reding with courtesy and listened to him with some attention. M. Reding affected to exhibit himself as free from prejudices, and more of a soldier than an oligarch; he appeared flattered to approach the greatest general of modern times, and who was disposed like him to place himself above the passions of party. He proposed various adjustments, which might be accepted till it should be seen whether his conduct corresponded with his promises. According to these proposed adjustments, the senate was to be raised to thirty members, and the five new members were to be chosen exclusively from among the patriots. There was likewise to be chosen from among them a second landammann, taking turns with the first in the exercise of power. Cantonal commissions, composed half by the senate and half by the cantons themselves, were to be appointed for the purpose of giving to each of them the constitution best adapted to it. It was, moreover, assented to that Argau and the Pays de Vaud should remain separated from Berne; and on the other hand that the incorporations of territory which had disfigured certain small cantons should be revoked. With all these reservations, the First Consul promised to recognise Switzerland, to replace it in a state of perpetual neutrality, and to withdraw the French troops. To insure to him the military road which he demanded, the Valais was dismembered, and that portion of it which is on the right bank of the Rhone was ceded to France. France engaged to cede the Frickthal, besides an *arrondissement* of territory towards the Jura, in exchange. M. Reding left Paris full of hope, conceiving that he had gained the favour of the First Consul, and that he could thenceforward do whatever he pleased in Switzerland.

But no sooner had this head of the oligarchs arrived in Berne, than, hurried away by his party, he became all that he could and must necessarily be under such influences, and with ideas of government so unsettled as his own. Five new members taken from the patriot party were added to the senate, and a colleague was given to M. Reding, to perform alternately with him the functions of landammann, which colleague was not M. Dolder himself, but M. Rugger, a considerable personage among the moderate revolutionists. These new elections, which procured for the revolutionary party a majority in the little council, vested with the executive power, left it to the oligarchic party in the senate. Moreover, M. Reding, being landammann for this year, composed the authorities agreeably to the interests of his party. He sent both to Vienna and to

other courts agents devoted to the counter-revolution, with instructions hostile to France, and with which she was soon acquainted. M. Reding, in particular, desired that representatives of all the powers might be accredited to him, in order to second him against the influence of M. Verninac, chargé-d'affaires of France. The only agent abroad whom he durst not remove was M. Stapfer, minister in Paris, a respectable man, devoted to his country, who had found means to win the confidence of the French government, and for this reason could not well be recalled. M. Reding had promised to leave the Pays de Vaud and Argau independent, and yet petitions were circulating in all parts for claiming the restitution of those provinces to the canton of Berne. Notwithstanding the promise to enfranchise the Italian bailiwicks, Uri loudly insisted, and with threats, that the Levantine valley should be restored to it. The cantonal commissions, charged with framing the particular constitution of each canton, were, with the exception of two or three, composed in a spirit contrary to the new order of things, and favourable to the re-establishment of the old. No further mention was made of the Valais or of the road promised to France. Lastly, the Vaudois, seeing that a counter-revolution was imminent, had risen, and, rather than submit to M. Reding, solicited their incorporation with France.

Thus, unhappy Switzerland, suffering a year before from the extravagances of the absolute unitarians, was this year a prey to the counter-revolutionary machinations of the oligarchs. The First Consul then made up his mind respecting the Valais; he declared that he detached it from the confederation and restored its ancient independence. This was evidently the best solution of the question, for, to divide that extensive valley, and to give one bank to Switzerland and the other to France would be running counter to the nature of things; to leave it entire to Switzerland while creating a French military road and establishments in it, would be rendering Helvetic neutrality impossible. When M. Reding was apprised of this resolution, he was enraged: he declared that the First Consul had violated his promises, which was false, and proposed to the little council a letter so violent that the council shrunk back in alarm. The situation was not more tenable between the oligarchs of the great and little cantons, labouring to reconstruct the ancient system, and the revolutionists, who had risen in the Pays de Vaud, to obtain its incorporation with France. M. Dolder and his friends in the little council united. In this little council, invested with the executive power, they were six to three. Availing themselves of the absence of M. Reding, who had gone for a few days into the small cantons, they cancelled all that had been done by him, annulled the cantonal commissions, and summoned an assembly of notables, composed of forty-eight persons, selected from among the most respectable and the most moderate men of all opinions, to meet at Berne. The constitution of

the 29th of May recommended by France was to be submitted to them; such modifications as should be thought indispensable were to be made in it, and the public authorities were to be immediately organised in conformity with that constitution.

To deprive the oligarchs of the support of the senate, in which they had a majority, the council pronounced the suspension of that body. On these tidings, M. Reding hastened back, and protested against the resolutions that had been taken. But, having lost the support of the senate, which was suspended, he withdrew, declaring that he renounced his quality of first magistrate, and proceeded to the small cantons to foment insurrection there. He was considered as having resigned, and the office of first land-ammann was conferred on citizen Ruttimann. Thus Switzerland, snatched by turns from the hands of the absolute unitarians and from those of the oligarchs, was replaced, by means of a series of petty strokes of policy, in the hands of the moderate revolutionists. Unluckily, these latter had not at their head, like the French moderates on the 18th Brumaire, a powerful chief to give to wisdom the support of force. Enlightened, however, by events, the partisans of revolution, of whatever shade they might be, were disposed to agree, and to adopt the constitution of the 29th of May, after the introduction of certain alterations. But M. Reding was endeavouring to excite a rising in the little cantons, and the necessity of recurring to a powerful arm out of Switzerland, since there was not one in Switzerland, became almost inevitable. Manifest as was this necessity, still no one durst avow it. The oligarchs, who anticipated their certain ruin from the intervention of France, made it a crime in the revolutionists to wish for that intervention. The latter, that they might not furnish their adversaries with such a cause of complaint, loudly disclaimed it. At length, the First Consul himself, desirous to spare Europe uneasiness, decided, unless in case of extraordinary events, not to compromise the French troops in the commotions in Switzerland. Thus, though 30,000 French were dispersed amidst the Alps, never did our generals comply with the requisitions of the different parties, and our soldiers, with the piece upon their arms, were quiet spectators of the disturbances. Their very immobility became a subject of reproach, and the patriots said, with some show of reason, that, now general peace prevailed in Europe, the French army, not having to defend them against the Austrians, not choosing to defend them against internal insurrections, they reaped no other fruit from its presence but the burden of maintaining it and the unpleasantness of a foreign occupation. The removal of our troops soon became a sort of patriotic satisfaction, which the moderates conceived themselves obliged to grant to all the parties, and they demanded it of the First Consul, while M. Reding was kindling the flames of insurrection in the mountains of Schwitz, Uri, and Unterwalden. It seemed the more necessary to grant the desired satisfaction, as the separation

of the Valais, definitively resolved upon, was a keen mortification to the hearts of the Swiss patriots. The First Consul consented to the evacuation, wishing to give entire moral support to the moderate party, though at bottom, he had great dread of the experiment that was about to be made. Orders for the evacuation were immediately despatched. Three thousand Swiss troops remained at the disposal of the new government. There were left, moreover, close to the frontier, the Helvetic demi-brigades in the service of France; and it was hoped that these might settle matters without ulterior recourse to our army. A momentary calm succeeded these agitations. The constitution of the 29th of May, adopted with certain modifications, was everywhere accepted. The little cantons alone refused to put it in force among them. Still they appeared disposed to keep quiet, at least for the moment.

The separation of the Valais was accomplished without difficulty. That country was constituted anew into a small independent State, under the protection of France and of the Italian Republic. France reserved, as the only mark of paramountship, a military road which she was to keep up at her own expense, and to provide with magazines and barracks. The road was declared exempt from every kind of toll, which was an immense benefit for the country. In opening the Simplon, in creating the fine road which now crosses it, France bestowed on the Valais a magnificent boon, which was assuredly worth the price that she demanded for it.

The affairs of Switzerland remained, therefore, in suspense. The oligarchs, at first rejoicing at the removal of the French troops, soon became alarmed at it. They feared that, in losing inconvenient masters, they had also lost useful protectors, in the probable case of new revolutionary convulsions. It was the wisest of them, it is true, who reasoned thus. The others flattered themselves that they should be able to overthrow once more the government of the moderate patriots, ardently wishing that the evacuation might be definitive, and, by means of their secret agents, they besought the different courts not to permit the French troops to enter Switzerland again. They might have been able, they said, to endure the continuance of their presence as a consequence of the war; but their return, if it took place, could not be considered in any other light than the violation of an independent territory guaranteed by all Europe.

The First Consul was aware of their underhand manœuvres, for the correspondence of Reding had just been discovered and sent to Paris. But he appeared to care very little about it; he even entered freely and unreservedly into explanations on this subject, as he was accustomed to do on all occasions. He said that he did not want Switzerland, that he preferred general peace to the conquest of such a territory, but that he would not tolerate there

a government hostile to France; and that on this point his resolutions were irrevocable.

In England, the solicitations of the Swiss oligarchs produced some effect, not on the cabinet, but on the Grenville and Wyndham party, who sought in every thing fresh grievances against France. Austria and Prussia were too much engaged with the territorial arrangements of Germany to interfere in the affairs of Helvetia. They had too much need of the favour of the First Consul, to think of giving him the slightest displeasure. M. de Cobentzel, at Vienna, carried his courtesy to such a length, as to show to our ambassador, M. de Champagny, all that the Reding party wrote to him, and the discouraging answers which he returned to the urgent solicitations of that party. Russia, perfectly enlightened respecting the views of the First Consul, was aware that the commotions in Switzerland were an embarrassment from which he would be glad to escape, rather than an occasion wilfully prepared to obtain an increase of territory or of influence for himself.

Serious as the Swiss affairs were in themselves, serious more especially as they were liable to become, if our troops were brought back to the Helvetic territory, they could not, at the moment, divert the attention of the powers from the affairs of Germany. We have already seen that the cession of the left bank of the Rhine to France had left a great number of princes without dominions, and that it had been agreed at Lunéville to indemnify them by secularizing the ecclesiastical principalities with which ancient Germany was covered. It was a forced occasion for a general remoulding of the Germanic territory. Such a question left no attention for others in most of the courts of the North.

Austria, exhausted by a long struggle, was striving to repair her dilapidated finances, and to raise the credit of her paper-money. The archduke Charles had gained all the influence which M. de Thugut had lost. This prince, who had proved himself an able warrior, was a declared partisan of peace. He had seen the glory which he had acquired on the banks of the Rhine, in fighting generals Jourdan and Moreau, eclipsed in a moment on the banks of the Tagliamento in fighting general Bonaparte, and he was not tempted to try his fortune anew against this formidable adversary. Still more exalted motives influenced his political dispositions. He saw his house ruined by two long and sanguinary wars, in which passion had had a greater share than reason; and he said to himself that Austria, fortunate enough, though beaten, to find in the acquisition of the Venetian States an indemnity for the loss of the Netherlands and the Milanese, would perhaps lose, in a third war, the Venetian States themselves, and that without compensation. This prince, having become minister, applied himself to the formation of an army, which was better organised and less expensive than those which for the last ten years had in vain opposed the French army. The emperor with a discreet mind, more solid than bril-



liant, shared the opinions of the archduke, and was intent only on deriving all the advantage possible from the affair of the indemnities. He hoped to find in it some favourable conjuncture for repairing the late reverses of his house.

Prussia, which had separated herself in 1795 from the coalition to make her peace with the French Republic at Basle, which had since that time re-established her finances by means of neutrality, and gained new provinces in consequence of the last insurrection in Poland—Prussia now sought, in the partition of the territories of the Germanic Church, an occasion to aggrandise herself in Germany, a sort of aggrandisement which she preferred to any other. She had a very young and very discreet king, who was particularly tenacious of being accounted honest; who really was so; but who was extremely fond of acquisitions of territory, on condition, however, that they were not purchased by war. For the rest, they had in Prussia a singular method of explaining every thing in an honourable manner. Equivocal acts, of disputable honesty, were attributed to M. Haugwitz, to whom was generally imputed all that could not well be justified, and who suffered himself to be sacrificed with a good grace to the reputation of his sovereign. This court, possessing intelligence and having few prejudices, had managed to live tolerably with the Convention and the Directory, and on very good terms with the First Consul. On the accession of the latter, it had shown for a moment a disposition to interpose between the belligerent powers, to force them to peace; and since the First Consul had forced them to it alone, it made the most, at any rate, of its good intentions; it caressed him incessantly, and held forth to him a prospect of an alliance offensive and defensive, on condition of being favoured in the division of the spoils of the Germanic Church.

Russia, uninterested in the territorial question which was agitating Germany, was neither called upon nor authorised by the treaty of Lunéville to meddle in it; but she would gladly have performed a part. To be taken for umpire would have flattered the vanity of the young emperor, a vanity which began to peep forth from beneath an apparent modesty and ingenuousness. This prince had at first shown submission to two persons, who had borne him through a frightful catastrophe to the throne: these were count Pahlen and count Panin. But his honesty and his pride suffered equally from such a yoke. It was painful to him to have at his side men who reminded him of horrible circumstances: he felt humbled in having ministers who treated him like a minor. We have already observed that, surrounded by companions of his early years, Messrs. de Strogonoff, Nowosiltzoff, and Czartoryski, and a more mature friend, M. de Kotschubey, he soon seized with them the reins of government. He had taken advantage of an occasion offered by the impetuous character of count Pahlen to banish him to Courland. He had done the same by count Panin and introduced M. de Kotschubey into the cabi-



net. For vice-chancellor, he had just taken an old member of the Russian government, prince Kurakin, a man of easy temper, fond of the pomp of power, and complaisantly lending his name, known throughout Europe, to three or four young men, who began secretly to govern the empire. In this strange association of a czar of twenty-four and a few Russian and Polish nobles of the same age, singular ideas, as we have already seen, had been formed on all subjects. Paul I. and Catherine herself were there considered as barbarous and unenlightened sovereigns. The partition of Poland was regarded as an outrage, the war against the French Revolution as the result of blind prejudices. Russia was thenceforth to give herself a totally different mission: she was to protect the weak, to curb the strong, to oblige France and England to confine themselves within the limits of justice, to force both of them to respect in their struggle the interest of nations. Happy pretensions, noble ideas, if they had been serious; if they had not resembled those liberal impulses of the French noblesse, brought up in the school of Voltaire and Rousseau, talking of humanity and liberty, till the day when the French Revolution came to require them to conform their acts with their theories. Then those titled philosophers became the emigrants of Coblenz. As, however, there was in France a minority of the nobles faithful to the end to its first sentiments, so among those young governors of Russia there were two distinguished for more settled views, for a more serious character: these were M. de Strogonoff and prince Adam Czartoryski. M. de Strogonoff manifested a solid and sincere mind. Prince Czartoryski, industrious, well-informed, serious, at twenty-five, had gained a sort of ascendancy over Alexander, was full of the hereditary sentiments of his family, that is to say, of the desire to re-establish Poland, and he strove, as we shall presently see, to direct the combinations of Russian policy to this end. These young men, with the dispositions which animated them, could not but feel desirous to commence in Germany that equitable and sovereign arbitration, which was so seductive for them. Austria had the skill to discover their dispositions, and thought to avail herself of them. Clearly perceiving the predilection of the First Consul for Prussia, she had turned towards the emperor Alexander; she flattered him, and offered him the part of arbiter in the affairs of Germany. It was not for want of ambition that the czar declined such a part; it was not easy to seize it in presence of general Bonaparte, whom a formal treaty invested with the right and duty of interfering in the question of the Germanic indemnities, and who was not a man to leave others to do what it was his province to do himself. Hence the emperor Alexander, though impatient to figure on the stage of the world, manifested a reserve ineritorious at his age, especially with the ambitious sentiments which filled his heart.

We must now penetrate into the obscure and difficult affair of the Germanic indemnities. This affair, taken up at the congress of

Rastadt, after the peace of Campo Formio, abandoned in consequence of the murder of our plenipotentiaries and the second coalition, resumed after the peace of Lunéville, frequently begun, never finished, was a serious question for Europe, a question which people thrust aside, not knowing how to solve it. It was only by the firm will of the First Consul that it could be solved, for it was impossible that Germany alone should perform the task.

By the treaties of Campo Formio and Lunéville the left bank of the Rhine had become our property, from the point where that noble river issues from the Swiss territory, between Basle and Huningue, to that where it enters the Dutch territory between Emerick and Nimeguen. But, by the cession of this bank to France, German princes of all ranks and conditions, as well hereditary as ecclesiastic, had suffered considerable losses in territory and revenue. Bavaria had seen the duchy of Deux-Ponts, the Palatinate of the Rhine, and the duchy of Juliers, taken from her. Wirtemberg, Baden, had been deprived of the principality of Montbeliard and other domains. The three ecclesiastical electors of Mayence, Treves, and Cologne, had been stripped of nearly all their dominions. The two Hesses had lost several lordships; the bishop of Liege and the bishop of Basle had been completely dispossessed of their sees. Prussia had been obliged to renounce, in favour of France, the duchy of Gueldres, part of that of Cleves, and the little principality of Mörs, territories situated on the lower course of the Rhine. Lastly, a great number of princes of the second and third order had seen their principalities and their imperial fiefs swept away. Nor were these all the dispossessions caused by the war. In Italy, two archdukes of Austria had been forced to renounce, the one Tuscany, the other the duchy of Modena. In Holland, the house of Orange-Nassau, allied to Prussia, had lost the stadtholdership, besides a vast amount of private property.

According to the rules of strict justice, the German princes only ought to have been compensated on the Germanic territory. The archdukes, uncles or brothers of the emperor, having long been considered as Italian princes, had no title for obtaining compensation in Germany, none whatever, unless that of being relations of the emperor. Now, it was the emperor who had urged unfortunate Germany into the war, who had thus exposed it to considerable losses of territory, and yet he wished to force it to indemnify his own kinsmen, who also had been constrained against their will to take part in that foolish and ill-conducted war! The same might be said of the stadtholder. If that prince had lost his dominions, there was no reason why Germany should have to pay for the faults which he had been induced to commit. But the stadtholder was brother-in-law of the King of Prussia, and that king, feeling it incumbent on him to do no less for his family than the emperor was doing for his, required that the house of Orange-Nassau should be indemnified in Germany. It

was necessary, therefore, in addition to the German princes, to indemnify the archdukes deprived of their dominions in Italy, and the Orange-Nassaus dispossessed of the stadtholdership. Application had been made to France, at the treaty of Lunéville and earlier, at the treaty of Campo Formio, to consent to the archdukes receiving an indemnity in Germany. Prussia at the congress of Basle, and England at the congress of Amiens, had required that the stadtholder should be indemnified, without the designation of any place, but with the avowed intention of choosing that place within the limits of the Germanic territory. France, who had only to consider the indemnities from the point of view of the general equilibrium, France, to whom it was of no consequence whether a bishop or a prince of Nassau was settled at Fulda, whether an archbishop or an archduke was established at Salzburg, could not do otherwise than consent.

The treaty of Lunéville having been ratified by the Diet, the burden which the emperor insisted on imposing upon the Germanic territory was accepted with regret but in a formal manner. The treaties of Basle and Amiens, which stipulated an indemnity for the stadtholder, were, it is true, foreign to the confederation; but England, with the influence which she derived from the possession of Hanover, Prussia, with her power over the Diet, both of them, moreover, assured of the concurrence of France, had no refusal to fear when claiming a territorial indemnity for the stadtholder. It was, therefore, agreed, with almost unanimous consent, that the stadtholder, as well as the two Italian archdukes should have their share of the secularized bishoprics. Assuredly fine domains were not wanting for indemnifying the German, Italian, and Dutch princes. Those subject to the ecclesiastical rule were numerous and very considerable. By secularizing them, it would be possible to find extensive territories, covered with inhabitants, yielding large revenues, to form dominions for all the victims of the war.

It would be difficult to specify the precise value in territory, inhabitants, and revenues, of the whole of the German principalities susceptible of secularization. The peace of Westphalia had already secularized a great number; but those which were left formed about one-sixth of Germany, properly so called, both in extent and in population. As for the revenues, if we refer to the estimates of the time, which were very incomplete and strongly contested, they might amount to 13 or 14 millions of florins. But we should be in error if we were to consider this sum as the total revenue of the principalities in question. It was the revenue, deducting the costs of collection and administration, deducting, also, a great number of ecclesiastical benefices, such as abbeys, canonries, &c., not comprehended in the net product which we have just stated, and which, in consequence of the secularization, were to belong to the new possessor; that is to say, if we were to calculate the product of

these countries as that of France was calculated in 1803; and as it is much more closely calculated at the present day, we should arrive at an estimate three or four times as considerable, consequently at 40 or 50 millions of florins (100 or 120 millions of francs).

It is therefore impossible to fix the value of those States more precisely, than in affirming that they comprehended about a sixth of Germany, properly so called. Their enumeration will be sufficient, to show that several of them compose at this day flourishing provinces; and some of the finest in the confederation. Beginning at the east and south of Germany, there were in the Tyrol the bishoprics of Trent and Brixen, which Austria considered as belonging to her, and which, for this reason, she would never suffer to figure in the group of the Germanic indemnities, but which had been entered, in spite of her, in the list of disposable possessions. The estimate of their revenues varied from 200,000 to 900,000 florins. Passing from the Tyrol into Bavaria, you came to the superb bishopric of Salzburg, now one of the most important provinces of the Austrian monarchy, comprising the valley of the Salza, producing, according to some, 1,200,000 florins, according to others, 2,700,000, and furnishing a race of excellent soldiers, as skilful marksmen as the Tyrolese. In the bishopric of Salzburg was included the provostship of Berchtoldsgaden, valuable for the produce of salt. On fairly entering Bavaria, you met with the bishopric of Augsburg on the Lech, that of Freisingen on the Isar, and, at the conflux of the Inn and the Danube, that of Passau, all three much coveted by Bavaria, whose territory they would have advantageously completed; they produced together 800,000 florins, an amount, as usual, very differently estimated, and the subject of dispute. On the other side of the Danube, that is to say, in Franconia, was the rich bishopric of Wurtzburg, whose bishops formerly aspired to the title of dukes of Franconia, and were opulent enough to build at Wurtzburg a palace almost as magnificent as that of Versailles. The revenue of this benefice was estimated at 1,400,000 florins, and, with that of Bamberg, adjoining to it, at 2,000,000. It was the lot that could best round the territory of Bavaria in Franconia, and indemnify her for her immense losses. Prussia coveted this lot, on account of its value and its contiguity to the margravates of Anspach and Bayreuth. There is still to be mentioned the bishopric of Eichstädt in the same province, far inferior to the two preceding, but still very considerable.

There was left that part of the archbishoprics of Mayence, Treves, and Cologne, situated on the right of the Rhine, archbishoprics and electorates at one and the same time, producing a revenue difficult to be estimated. There were also left portions of the electorate of Mayence, enclosed in Thuringia, as Erfurt and the territory of Eichsfeld; then, descending towards Westphalia, the duchy of that name, the revenue of which was estimated

at four or five hundred thousand florins; the bishoprics of Paderborn, Osnabrück, and Hildesheim, which were supposed to produce about 400,000 florins each; and, lastly, the vast bishopric of Münster, the third in Germany in revenue, the most extensive in territory, yielding, it was said, at that time, 1,200,000 florins.

If to these archbishoprics, we add bishoprics and duchies, to the number of fourteen, to those remnants of the ancient ecclesiastical electorates, the wrecks of the bishoprics of Spire, Worms, Strasburg, Basle, and Constance, a quantity of rich abbeys, besides forty-nine free cities, which were not designed to be secularized, but incorporated with the neighbouring States—which was then called *mediatizing*—we shall have a tolerably accurate idea of all the possessions that were available to make the secular princes forget the calamities of the war. It should be observed that, if it had not been arranged to indemnify the archdukes and the stadtholder, who demanded for their three shares at least one-fourth of the disposable territories, it would not have been necessary to suppress all the ecclesiastical principalities, and the Germanic Constitution might have been spared the destructive blow which was about to be inflicted upon it.

It was, in fact, giving a deep wound to that constitution to secularize all the ecclesiastical States at once, for they acted a considerable part. Some details are here necessary to convey an idea of that ancient constitution, the oldest in Europe, the most respectable after the English constitution, and which was about to perish from the greediness of the German princes themselves.

The Germanic empire was elective. Though, for a long series of years, the imperial crown had not gone out of the house of Austria, it was requisite that a formal election, at each change of reign, should transfer it to the heir of that house, who, in his own full right, was King of Bohemia and Hungary, archduke of Austria, duke of Milan, of Carinthia, of Styria, &c., but not head of the empire. The election was made formerly by seven, and at the period of which we are speaking, by eight princes electors. Five of the eight were laymen, and three ecclesiastics. The five lay princes were, the house of Austria for Bohemia; the elector palatine for Bavaria and the Palatinate; the duke of Saxony for Saxony; the King of Prussia for Brandenburg; the King of England for Hanover. The three ecclesiastical electors were: the archbishop of Mayence, possessing part of both banks of the Rhine in the environs of Mayence, the city of Mayence itself, and the banks of the Mayn, to above Aschaffenburg; the archbishop of Treves, possessing the country of Treves, that is, the valley of the Moselle, from the frontiers of old France to the junction of that river with the Rhine, towards Coblentz; lastly, the archbishop of Cologne, possessing the left bank of the Rhine from Bonn to near the frontiers of Holland. These three archbishops, according to the general practice of the Church, wherever royalty had not usurped the ecclesiastical nominations, were,



elected by their chapters, saving the canonical institution reserved to the Pope. The canons, members of these chapters and electors of their archbishops, were chosen from among the highest of the German nobility. Thus, for Mayence they were required to be members of the immediate nobility, that is to say, of the nobility holding direct from the empire, and not from the territorial princes in whose domains they were situated. Hence, neither the archbishop, nor the canons who had to elect him, could be dependent subjects of any prince whatever, excepting the emperor. This precaution was requisite for so high a personage as the archbishop-elect of Mayence, who was chancellor of the confederation. He it was who presided over the German Diet. The archbishops electors of Treves and Cologne had only the titles of ancient functions which Time had swept away. The archbishop of Cologne was formerly chancellor of the kingdom of Italy; the archbishop of Treves chancellor of the kingdom of Arles.

These eight princes electors conferred the imperial crown. In the first half of the last century, at the time of the Austrian war of succession, they had been obliged to choose for emperor a prince of Bavaria; but they had soon reverted, from ancient usage and a traditional respect, to the descendants of Rudolph of Hapsburg. Besides, the Catholic electors had the majority, that is to say, they were five to three; and the preference of the Catholics for Austria was natural and secular. The empire was not only elective, it was, if I may so express myself, in speaking of a time which had no analogy with ours, it was representative. The affairs of the confederation were discussed in a general Diet, which met at Ratisbon, under the direction of the chancellor, the archbishop of Mayence.

This Diet was composed of three colleges: the electoral College, composed of the eight electors whom we have just mentioned; the College of the princes, in which sat the princes lay or ecclesiastical, each of them for the territory of which he was direct sovereign (certain houses having several votes, according to the importance of the principalities which they represented in the Diet; others, on the contrary, having only part of a vote, as the counts of Westphalia); lastly, the College of the cities, in which met, to the number of forty-nine, the representatives of the free cities, almost all in debt, and having but very little influence in that deliberative government of ancient Germany.

The process of collecting the votes was extremely complicated. When the protocol was open, each of the three Colleges voted separately. The electors, besides their representative in the College of the electors, had representatives in that of the princes, and thus had seats in two colleges at once. Austria had a seat in the electoral College for Bohemia, in the College of the princes for the archduchy of Austria. Prussia had a seat in the College of the electors for Brandenburg, in the College of the princes for Anspach, Bayreuth, &c. Bavaria had a seat in the College of the



electors for Bavaria, in the College of the princes for Deux-Ponts, Juliers, &c.; and such was also the case with others. There was no absolute debating, but each State, called upon in an hierarchic order, expressed its opinion verbally through the medium of a minister. These opinions were collected several times, and thus each had leisure to modify his. When the Colleges differed in opinion, they entered into conference with one another, and sought to come to an agreement. This was called *relation* and *correlation* between the colleges. They made concessions to each other, and at length came to one general decision, which was styled *conclusum*.

The importance of these three colleges was not equal. That of the cities was estimated at next to nothing. Formerly, in the middle ages, when all the wealth was concentrated in the free cities, they had, in giving or refusing their money, the means of making their importance felt. This was no longer the case, after Nuremberg, Augsburg, Cologne, ceased to be the centres of commercial and financial power. Not only were the forms employed in regard to them offensive, but little respect was paid to their opinion. The electors, that is the great houses, with their votes in the College of the electors, with their votes and their dependents in the College of the princes, carried things their own way in almost all the deliberations.

We should not convey a complete idea of this constitution, were we not to add that, independently of this general government, there was a local government for the protection of the particular interests and the assessment of the general charges of the confederation. This local government was that of the circles. All Germany was divided into ten circles, the last of which, that of Burgundy, was an empty name, for it comprehended provinces which had been long wrested from the empire. The most powerful prince of the circle was its director. He summoned the States composing it to deliberate; he executed their resolutions; and went to the assistance of such as were threatened with violence. Two tribunals of the empire, one at Wetzlar, the other in Vienna, rendered justice between these very different classes of confederates—kings, princes, bishops, abbots, and republics.

Such as it was, this constitution was a venerable monument of ages. It exhibited some of the characteristics of liberty, not of that which affords protection to each citizen in modern society, but of that liberty which protects weak States against powerful States, by allowing them to defend, in the bosom of a confederation, their existence, their property, their particular rights, and to appeal from the tyranny of the stronger to the justice of all. Hence arose a certain development of mind, a profound study of the law of nations, great art in managing men in assemblies, very similar, though seemingly different to that which is practised in the representative governments of the present day.

The secularizations could not but produce a considerable change in this constitution. In the first place, they removed

from the electoral College the three ecclesiastical electors, and from the College of the princes a great number of Catholic members. The Catholic majority, which had been, in this second College, fifty-four votes to forty-three, was changed into a minority, for the princes destined to inherit the ecclesiastical votes were almost all Protestants. It was a great shock given to the constitution and to the balance of power. It is true that the tolerance resulting from the spirit of the age had taken from the terms Protestant party and Catholic party their ancient religious signification; but these expressions had acquired an extremely serious political signification. The Protestant party signified the Prussian party; the Catholic party signified the Austrian party. Now, these two influences had long divided Germany between them. It might be said that in the empire Prussia was the head of the opposition, Austria the leader of the government party. Frederick the Great, in making Prussia a power of the first order by means of the spoils of Austria, had kindled a violent animosity between the two great German houses. This animosity, subsiding for a moment in the presence of the French revolution, had soon blazed forth again, when Prussia, separating herself from the coalition, had made her peace with France, and had enriched herself by her neutrality, while Austria was exhausting herself to maintain single-handed the war that had been undertaken jointly. Now, more especially, that, the war being over, the patrimony of the Church was to be parcelled out, the greediness of the two courts had added new fuel to the passion which divided them.

Prussia naturally wished to profit by the occasion of the secularizations to weaken Austria for ever. The latter was, at the conclusion of the 18th century, as in the Thirty Years' war, as in the wars of Charles V., the main stay of the Catholic party: not that in all cases the Protestants were in favour of Prussia and the Catholics of Austria: jealousies of neighbourhood, on the contrary, often modified these relations. Thus Bavaria, stanch Catholic, but incessantly alarmed respecting the designs of Austria upon her territory, usually voted with Prussia. Saxony,\* though Protestant, was often opposed to Prussia, from distrust of neighbourhood, and voted with Austria. But, in general, Austria had for clients the Catholic princes, and particularly the ecclesiastical States. The latter gave her their votes in elections for emperor; and they conformed to her opinion in the meetings in which the general affairs were discussed. Having no armies of their own, they suffered Austrian recruiting officers to enlist soldiers in their territories; and moreover they furnished apanages for the younger branches of the imperial house. The archduke Charles, for instance, had just been presented with a

---

\* It must be observed, however, that, at this period, the elector of Saxony was Catholic, while his country was Protestant, and counted for such.

rich benefice in the grand-mastership of the Teutonic Order recently conferred upon him. The bishop of Münster and the archbishop of Cologne being dead, the chapters of those two sees had chosen the archduke Anthony to succeed the deceased prelates. Thus here, as in all aristocratic countries, the Church furnished establishments for the junior members of the great families. Prussia of course was not pleased with the ecclesiastical States for giving to Austria soldiers, apanages, and votes in the Diet.

Having once engaged in constitutional reforms, the German princes were soon led into further changes, particularly the suppression of the free cities and of the immediate nobility.

The free cities owed their origin to the emperors. As of old the kings of France had emancipated the communes from the tyranny of the lords, so the emperors had given to the cities of Germany, formed by industry and commerce, an independent existence, acknowledged rights, and frequently privileges also. It was this that had introduced into that vast German feudal system democratic republics celebrated for their wealth and their genius, beside feudal lords, beside sovereign priests wearing the crowns of counts or dukes. In regard to the arts, manufactures, and commerce, Augsburg, Nuremberg, and Cologne, had formerly deserved well of Germany and of the whole human race. All these cities had fallen under the yoke of petty local aristocracies, and most of them were deplorably administered. Those whose commerce had maintained its ground, escaped the general ruin, and even exhibited very prosperous republics. But they were coveted by the neighbouring princes, who sought to annex them to their territories. Prussia, in particular, would fain have incorporated Nuremberg with her dominions, and Bavaria Augsburg, though both these cities had declined greatly from their ancient splendour.

The immediate nobility had an origin very like that of the free cities, for its title was derived from the imperial protection granted to the lords who were too weak to defend themselves. Hence it was particularly numerous in Franconia and Suabia, because, at the epoch of the destruction of the house of Suabia, the nobles of that country, finding themselves without liege-lord, had given themselves to the emperor. They were called *immediate*, because they depended directly on the emperor, and not on the princes in whose territories their domains were situated. The same title of immediate was given to every State, city, fief, abbey, depending directly on the empire. Every State directly dependent on the prince in whose territory it lay, was called *mediate*. This immediate nobility, whose obedience was divided between the local sovereign and the emperor, whom it acknowledged as its only liege-lord, was proud of this higher vassalage, served in the armies and in the imperial chancelleries, and allowed the Austrian officers to take recruits from the population of the towns and villages belonging to it.

The territorial princes, to whichever party they belonged, ardently wished for the double incorporation of the immediate nobility, and of the free cities with their dominions. Austria, backward enough to support the free cities, a certain number of which she coveted for herself, was ardent, on the contrary, for maintaining the immediate nobility, for which she cherished a particular affection. In general, however, she desired the preservation of all that could be preserved.

From our modern point of view, nothing ought to appear more natural, more legitimate, than the annexation of all these parcels of territory, cities, or immediate lordships, to the body of the State. No doubt it would have been better if, as was done in France in 1789, they had in Germany substituted for these local liberties, a general liberty, guaranteeing at once all existences and all rights. But these incorporations would have increased the absolute power of the kings of Prussia, of the electors of Bavaria, of the dukes of Wirtemberg. On this account it was allowable to view them with some regret.

In the history of the European monarchies, there are two revolutions, extremely different in their object and in their date: the first, is that by means of which loyalty conquers the petty local sovereignties from feudalism, thus absorbing many particular existences to form a single State; the second, is that by means of which royalty, after it has formed this single State, is obliged to settle accounts with the nation, and to grant a general, uniform, regular liberty, far preferable assuredly to the particular liberties of feudalism. France, in 1789, after she had achieved this first revolution, set about the second. Germany, in 1803, was yet at the first, and to this day she has not completed it. Austria, with no other view but to preserve her influence in the empire, defended the old Germanic constitution, and with it the feudal liberties of Germany. Prussia, on the contrary, eager after incorporations, longing to absorb the free cities and the immediate nobility, became an innovator from ambition, and sought to give to Germany the forms of modern society, that is to say, to commence, without intending, without knowing it, the work of the French Revolution in the old Germanic empire.

If the constitutional views of these two powers were at variance, their territorial pretensions were not less so.

Austria was desirous to obtain large indemnities for her two archdukes, and upon this pretext to extend and improve the frontier of her own dominions. She concerned herself but little about the duke of Modena, to whom, by the treaties of Campo Formio and Lunéville, had long before been assigned the Brisgau (a small province of the country of Baden), which he cared little about, preferring to live quietly in Venice on his immense wealth, accumulated by dint of avarice. But she interested herself seriously for the archduke Ferdinand, lately sovereign of Tuscany. For him she coveted the fine archbishopric

of Salzburg, which would connect the Tyrol with the body of the Austrian monarchy; likewise the provostship of Berchtoldsgaden, enclosed in the archbishopric of Salzburg. These two principalities were formally promised her; but she wished to obtain more. She wanted for the same archduke the bishopric of Passau, which would secure to her house the important fortress of Passau, situated at the conflux of the Inn and the Danube, the superb bishopric of Augsburg, extending longitudinally upon the Lech, in the very heart of Bavaria; lastly, the county of Werdenfels,\* and the abbey of Kempten, two possessions situated on the slope of the Tyrolese Alps, commanding both of them the sources of the rivers which run through Bavaria, as the Inn, the Isar, the Loisach, and the Lech. If to these we add nineteen free cities in Suabia, besides twelve great immediate abbeys, and if we consider that Austria, exclusively of what she demanded for the archduke in Suabia, had a multitude of ancient possessions in that country, we shall easily comprehend the designs she then meditated. She was desirous, by means of the pretended indemnity for the archduke Ferdinand, to obtain a position in the centre of Bavaria by Augsburg; above, by Werdenfels and Kempten; beyond, by her possessions in Suabia, and by thus squeezing her in the claws of the imperial eagle, to force her to cede that part of her territory which she had long coveted, that is to say, the line of the Inn, perhaps even that of the Isar.

It was one of the most ancient schemes of Austria to extend herself into Bavaria, in order to obtain a better frontier, and at the same time to prolong her posts in the Tyrolese Alps to the borders of Switzerland. The possession of the line of the Isar was the fondest of her wishes, and, had it been gratified, it would not have been the last. To have obtained the country as far as the Isar, she would have relinquished to the house of Bavaria Augsburg (bishopric and city) besides all the Austrian possessions in Suabia. According to this plan, the city of Munich, seated on the Isar, would be on the frontier, and as it could not continue to be the seat of the Bavarian government, Augsburg would have been the new capital offered to the elector palatine. But this would be absorbing nearly half that electorate, and entirely throwing back the palatine house into Suabia. In default of the realisation of this far too flattering dream, the course of the Inn would have consoled Austria for her misfortunes. She possessed only the lower part of the Inn, from Braunau to Passau. But above, between Braunau and the Tyrolese Alps, it was Bavaria that had both banks of that river. Austria would have wished for the whole course of the Inn, from its entry into Bavaria at Kufstein to its junction with the Danube. This line would have comprehended a less extent of country than that of the Isar; still it was a fine slice, and more solid in a military point of view. It was by way of exchange that

---

\* This county was a dependency of the bishopric of Freisingen.



Austria proposed to acquire one or the other of these frontiers. Accordingly, from the time that the question of the indemnities began to be discussed by the cabinets, she never ceased to beset with her offers, and when these were not listened to, with her menaces the unfortunate elector of Bavaria, who immediately communicated his anxieties to his two natural protectors, Prussia and France.

Such was the share which Austria would fain have allotted to herself in the distribution of the indemnities. Let us see what she proposed to give to the others.

For the losses sustained by Bavaria on the left bank of the Rhine, losses which exceeded those of all the other German princes—for that house had lost the duchy of Deux-Ponts, the palatinate of the Rhine, the duchy of Juliers, the margravate of Bergen-op-Zoom, and a multitude of domains in Alsace—Austria assigned to her two bishoprics in Franconia, those of Wirtemberg and Bamberg, very conveniently situated for Bavaria, since they were contiguous to the Upper Palatinate, but scarcely equal to two-thirds of what was due to her. To this lot Austria would perhaps have added the bishopric of Freisingen, situated on the Isar, quite close to Munich. To Prussia, Austria designed to give a large bishopric in the north, for instance Paderborn, perhaps two or three abbeys, as Essen and Werden; lastly, to the stadtholder, some territory or other in Westphalia, that is to say, a fourth at most of what the house of Brandenburg expected for itself and for its kinsman. After conceding to the two Hesses, Baden, and Wirtemberg, some of the spoils of the inferior clergy, and a certain number of abbeys to the multitude of petty hereditary princes, who she said would be extremely glad to take what was given them, Austria proposed, with the bulk of the territories in the north and the centre of Germany, such as Münster, Osnabrück, Hildesheim, Fulda, with the wrecks of the electorates of Cologne, Mayence, and Treves, to preserve the three ecclesiastical electors, and thereby to retain her influence in the empire.

The first of the three ecclesiastical electorates, that of Mayence, had recently devolved to the coadjutor of the last archbishop. This new incumbent, a member of the house of Dalberg, was a prelate of high attainments, a man of talent, and a man of the world. The electorate of Treves belonged to a Saxon prince, who lived retired in the bishopric of Augsburg, which see he held along with that of Treves, forgetting his lost electoral grandeur in the strict observance of the practices of religion and in the opulence which pensions from his family secured to him. The electorate of Cologne had become vacant by the death of the last possessor. The bishoprics of Münster, Freisingen, and Ratisbon, and the provostship of Berchtolsgaden had also recently become vacant. Whether Austria was in league with the chapters or not, she had permitted the archduke Anthony to be nominated bishop of Münster and elector of Cologne, in the presence of an imperial



commissioner. Prussia had loudly remonstrated, alleging that this nomination of new incumbents was designed to raise obstacles to the secularizations, and to obstruct the free execution of the treaty of Lunéville. The object of her remonstrances was to prevent the yet vacant benefices of Freisingen, Ratisbon, and Berchtolsgaden from being filled in like manner.

An accurate idea of the plans of Prussia might be formed by imagining precisely the reverse of those of Austria. In the first place, she considered the loss of the grand-duke of Tuscany as exaggerated two-fold at least. It was alleged at Vienna that he had lost a revenue of 4,000,000 florins. This assertion was greatly exaggerated; it was founded on the confusion of net revenue with gross revenue. The net revenue which the grand-duke had lost amounted at most to 2,500,000 florins. Prussia insisted that the revenues of Salzburg, Passau, and Berchtolsgaden equalled, if not exceeded, the revenue of Tuscany; without taking into account that Tuscany, separated from the Austrian monarchy, had no value from position for the latter, whereas Salzburg, Berchtolsgaden, and Passau, attached to the very body of that monarchy, gave it a capital frontier, and in the mountaineers of Salzburg a numerous military population. It was thought that Austria might raise there 25,000 men. There was of course no just ground for adding to the lot of the archduke the bishoprics of Augsburg and Eichstädt, the abbey of Kempten, the county of Werdenfels, as well as all the free cities and abbeys demanded in Suabia. Still Prussia insisted less upon the extravagance of the pretensions of Austria than upon the reasonableness of her own. She estimated the losses which she said she had sustained at double their real value, and diminished by one half the worth of the territories which she claimed in compensation. In the first place, she, like Austria, was desirous of extending herself towards the centre and the south of Germany. She would fain be doing in Franconia what Austria was endeavouring to do in Suabia; she wished to double at least her territory there. It was the constant ambition of those two great courts to take advanced positions in the centre of Germany, either against one another, or against France, or else, to maintain their influence over the States in the centre of the confederation. In the first flights of ambition, Prussia had demanded nothing less than the bishoprics of Wurtzburg and Bamberg, contiguous to the margravates of Anspach and Bayreuth, which, according to universal opinion, were destined to indemnify Bavaria. This claim had met with such objections, especially in Paris, that Prussia had been obliged to relinquish it.

In default of Wurtzburg and Bamberg, Prussia, which had lost only the duchy of Gueldres, part of the duchy of Cleves, the little principality of Mörs, some tolls suppressed on the Rhine, and the enclosed districts of Savenaer, Huissen, and Marburg, ceded to Holland, producing a revenue of 700,000 florins according to Russia, 1,200,000 according to France, wished for

nothing less than a portion of the north of Germany, namely the bishoprics of Münster, Paderborn, Osnabrück, and Hildesheim, besides the relics of the electorate of Mayence in Thuringia, such as Eichsfeld and Erfurt, and further in Franconia, where she abated none of her claims, the bishopric of Eichstädt and the famous city of Nuremberg.

Making, in regard to the indemnity of the stadtholder, the same calculations as Austria in regard to the indemnity of the duke of Tuscany, she demanded for the house of Orange-Nassau an establishment contiguous to the Prussian territory, and comprehending the following countries: the duchy of Westphalia, the district of Recklinghausen, and the remnant of the electorates of Cologne and Treves on the right bank of the Rhine. Hence would result for the stadtholder, not only the advantage of being backed upon Prussia, a very important advantage both for himself and for her, but also that of being situated near Holland, ready to take advantage of any turn of fortune there. Now, if we consider the fallacy of the estimates of Prussia, if we consider that, after doubling and even trebling the value of her losses, she misrepresented in the like proportion the value of the compensations which she demanded, that she estimated the bishopric of Münster, for instance, at 350,000 florins, while, in Paris, the most impartial calculations raised it to 1,200,000; that she estimated the bishopric of Osnabrück at 150,000 florins, whereas in Paris it was computed at 369,000, and so of the rest, we shall have some idea of the wild extravagance of her pretensions.

She proved herself more generous than Austria towards the princes of the second and third order, for these were so many Protestant votes to introduce into the Diet. She was for suppressing the ecclesiastical electors of Cologne and Treves, for suffering at most the elector of Mayence alone to exist, with the relics of his territory, situate on the right bank of the Rhine; for filling the places of these two suppressed ecclesiastical electors by two Protestant electors, taken from among the princes of Hesse, Wirtemberg, Baden, even Orange-Nassau, if possible. The support which Austria sought from Russia, Prussia sought from France. She offered, on condition that her claims were seconded, to unite her policy with that of the First Consul, to bind herself to him by a formal alliance, to guarantee all the arrangements made in Italy, such as the creation of the new kingdom of Etruria, the new constitution given to the Italian Republic, and the annexation of Piedmont to France. She made, at the same time, great efforts to fix in Paris the negotiation which Austria was striving to transfer to Petersburg. She knew that out of Paris she was not regarded in the most favourable light; that in all the courts she was keenly censured for having deserted the cause of Europe for that of the French Revolution; that, if the pretensions of the emperor were blamed, her own were criticised with much more severity, for they had not the excuse of the great losses sus-

tained by the house of Austria in the late war; she knew, in short, that she had no support to hope for but on the part of France; that to consent to change the place of the negotiation would be disobliging the First Consul, and accepting umpires unfavourably disposed towards herself. Accordingly, she gave a plump refusal to all the overtures of Austria, who, hopeless of her cause, proposed that they should arrange matters between them, allot to each other the lion's share, sacrificing all the second and third rate princes, and then apply to Petersburg for a confirmation of the division which they should have made with the especial view of withdrawing Germany from the yoke of the French.

All the German princes, following the example of Prussia, had recourse to France. Instead of soliciting in London, Petersburg, Vienna, Berlin, they solicited in Paris. Bavaria, tormented by Austria; the dukes of Baden, Wirtemberg, and Hesse, jealous of each other; the petty families, alarmed at the rapacity of the great ones; the free cities threatened with incorporation; the immediate nobility, exposed to the same danger as the free cities—all, great and small, republics and hereditary sovereigns, pleaded their cause in Paris, some through the medium of their ministers, others directly and in person. The late stadtholder had sent thither his son, the prince of Orange, since king of the Netherlands, a distinguished prince, whom the First Consul had received with great favour. Several other princes also had repaired to the French capital. All of them assiduously frequented that palace of St. Cloud, where a general of the Republic was not less courted than any crowned monarch.

Singular, indeed, was the spectacle which Europe then presented, and which strongly proves the inconsistency of human passions, and the depth of the designs of Providence.

Prussia and Austria had dragged Germany into an unjust war against the French Revolution, and they had been vanquished. France, by the right of victory, an incontestable right when the victorious power has been provoked, had conquered the left bank of the Rhine. Part of the German princes were thenceforward without dominions. It was natural to indemnify them in Germany, and to indemnify none but them. Prussia and Austria, who had caused their ruin, nevertheless strove to indemnify, at the expense of this unfortunate Germany, their own relations, Italians as the archdukes, or Dutch as the stadtholder; and what is still more strange, they strove, under the name of their relations, to indemnify themselves, at the expense of that Germany, the victim of their faults. And where did they look for these compensations? among the possessions of the Church; that is to say, the professed champions of the throne and altar, on returning home after being beaten, purposed to indemnify themselves for a disastrous war by despoiling the altar which they had gone forth to defend, and by imitating the French Revolution which they had come to attack. And, what was still more extraordinary, if

possible, they applied to the victorious representative of that Revolution to divide between them these spoils of the altar, which they knew not how to divide themselves!

The First Consul gave himself very little concern about the efforts making around him to transfer the negotiation sometimes to one place sometimes to another. He knew that it would be held nowhere but in Paris, because such was his pleasure, and because that was the best point for it. Free in his movements ever since the signature of the general peace, he listened successively to the interested parties: Prussia, who desired to act only with him and by him; Austria, who, while striving to remove the arbitration to Petersburg, neglected nothing to dispose him in her favour; Bavaria, who solicited his advice and support against the threatening offers of Austria; the house of Orange, which had sent its heir to Paris; the houses of Baden, Wirtemberg, and Hesse, who promised entire devotedness if their interests were considered; lastly, the mass of petty princes, who appealed to their old alliance with France. After hearing these different claimants, the First Consul soon perceived that, without the interference of a powerful will, the peace of Germany, and of course that of the continent, would continue indefinitely in peril. He determined, therefore, to offer, in reality to impose, his mediation, and to submit such arrangements as should do honour to the justice of France and to the wisdom of his policy.

Nothing could be more judicious, more admirable, than the views of the First Consul at this happy epoch of his life, when, covered with as much glory as he ever had, he possessed not yet sufficient material force to despise Europe and to dispense with having recourse to a profoundly calculated policy. He perceived, indeed, that, with the precarious dispositions of England, it behoved him to think of preventing the danger of a new general war; that to this end it was requisite to secure a solid alliance on the continent; that the alliance of Prussia was the most suitable; that this court, innovating by nature, by origin, by interest, had affinities with the French Revolution which no other court could have; that, by seriously attaching it to him, he should render coalitions impracticable; for at the degree of power to which France had attained, it was as much as they dared do to attack her when all the powers were united against her; but that, if only one were missing from the coalition, and if that one had ranged itself on the side of France, the rest would never risk the chances of a new war. Still, while purposing to ally himself with Prussia, the First Consul concluded, with rare sagacity, that he ought not to make her so strong as to crush Austria, for then she would become, in her turn, the dangerous power, instead of being the useful ally; that he ought not to sacrifice to her either the petty princes, old allies of France, or the ecclesiastical States without exception, States that were not compact, not military, and preferable as neighbours to lay and warlike princes; or the free

cities, respectable for the historical recollections attached to them, respectable more especially as Republics to the French Republic; that, to sacrifice at once to Prussia all the petty hereditary, ecclesiastical, republican States would be favouring the realization of that German unity, more dangerous to the equilibrium of Europe, if it were ever accomplished, than the power of Austria had ever been; that, in short, in turning the scale in favour of the Protestant and innovating party, it was necessary to make it sink gently not to upset the other, for that would be driving Austria to despair, perhaps to accelerate her downfall, to exalt one enemy instead of another, and to prepare for France in time to come a rivalry with the house of Brandenburg, quite as formidable as that which had for several centuries kept her at war with the house of Austria.

Impressed with these wise considerations, the First Consul first set about leading Prussia into more moderate views. When he had established a good understanding with her, he purposed to negotiate with the interested parties of the second rank, and to satisfy them by means of a just share of the indemnities; he then intended to open a negotiation of pure courtesy in Petersburg, to gratify the pride of the young emperor, which he plainly discovered under a feigned modesty, and to gain by civilities his assent to the territorial arrangements which should be decided upon. With the concurrence of Prussia satisfied and Russia flattered, he hoped to render the resignation of Austria inevitable, that is to say, if care were taken not to exasperate her too much by the arrangements adopted.

In combinations so complicated, it was to be expected that it would be necessary to travel through several plans before they came to the definitive plan. The idea of the First Consul relative to the territorial distribution of Germany had at first been to keep the three great central powers of the continent, Austria, Prussia, and France, apart from one another, and to place between them the entire mass of the Germanic confederation. With this view, the First Consul would have conceded to Austria not only the whole of her claims, that is the course of the Isar, for the Palatine house must, in this case, have been removed into Suabia and Franconia, but he would have conceded to her the Inn throughout its whole course, that is the bishopric of Salzburg, the provostship of Berchtolsgaden, the country between the Salza and the Inn, besides the bishoprics of Brixen and Trent, situated in Tyrol. Austria, thus indemnified on her own account and that of the two archdukes, must have renounced all possessions in Suabia; she would have been placed completely behind the Inn; there she would have been compact and covered by an excellent frontier; she would have found repose and given it to Bavaria by the solution of the old question about the Inn.

As Austria was to be induced to renounce her possessions in Suabia, so Prussia was to be induced to renounce her possessions



in Franconia, and to be required to give up the margravates of Anspach and Bayreuth. With these margravates and the contiguous bishoprics of Wurtzburg and Bamberg, with the possessions sacrificed by Austria in Suabia, with the bishoprics of Freisingen and Eichstädt, enclosed in the Bavarian dominions, might have been formed a well-rounded territory, extending at once into Bavaria, Suabia, and Franconia, and capable of serving for a barrier between France and Austria. At this rate, the Palatine house could have afforded to give up the remnant of the Palatinate of the Rhine and the fine duchy of Berg, situated at the other extremity of Germany, that is towards Westphalia. Prussia, excluded from Franconia, as Austria from Suabia, would have been moved back towards the north. To effect her complete removal to it, the obstacle which separated her from it was to be done away with, that is to say, the two branches of the house of Mecklenburg were to be settled in the territories which had become vacant in the centre of Germany. Prussia would thus have found herself on the shore of the Baltic; the bishoprics of Münster, Osnabrück, and Hildesheim were, moreover, to have been given to her. Indemnified in this manner for her old and her new losses, she might well have abandoned the whole duchy of Cleves, the part of which situated on the left bank of the Rhine was transferred to France, while the part on the right bank would have served to augment the mass of the indemnities. Then, separated from Austria by the relinquishment of Franconia, she would also have been separated from France by her removal from the banks of the Rhine.

There would have been left in the vacant duchies of Cleves, Berg, and Westphalia, in the remnants of the electorates of Cologne, Treves, and Mayence, in the Mayence districts of Erfurt and Eichsfeld, in the bishopric of Fulda and other ecclesiastical possessions, in the wrecks of the Palatinate of the Rhine, in the great number of abbeys, mediate or immediate, scattered all over Germany, there would have been left wherewithal to compose a State for the house of Mecklenburg and for that of Orange, and to indemnify the houses of Hesse, Baden, Wirtemberg, and the multitude of inferior princes. Lastly, in the sees of Eichstädt, Augsburg, Ratisbon, and Passau, there would have been sufficient to retain two of the three ecclesiastical electors, as the First Consul thought of doing, for he wished to avoid altering the Germanic constitution too much, and, besides, he took pleasure in protecting the Church in every country.

In this plan, so profoundly conceived, Austria, Prussia, and France, were kept widely asunder; the Germanic confederation was collected into one mass, placed amidst these three great powers of the continent, and had the useful, important, and honourable part assigned to it of separating them, and of preventing collisions between them; the limits of the German States were accurately defined; the Germanic constitution was beneficially reformed, not destroyed.



The plan of the First Consul, first proposed to Prussia, was not immediately refused. It suited that power to become compact, to border the Baltic, to occupy the whole north of Germany. Her definitive consent depended on the quantities that would be offered to her when the details of the partition came to be regulated. But if the princes in the centre of Germany, whose States rested for the moment on the variable will alone of the negotiators, might be easily removed to the north or to the south, to the east or to the west, the case was different with two princes confined to the northern extremity of the Confederation, such as the princes of Mecklenburg, firmly established among subjects whose affection they had possessed for ages, strangers to all the territorial vicissitudes occasioned by the war, and difficult to persuade, when so considerable a displacement should be proposed to them. Besides, if they said but a word to England, she would not fail to thwart a project for putting the coast of the Baltic into the hands of Prussia.

Whether spontaneously or not, they refused in a peremptory manner what was offered them. Nevertheless, Prussia, which had been charged with the overture, had clearly insinuated that France, in wishing to have them for neighbours, wished also to make them her friends, and that she would behave liberally to them in the distribution of the indemnities.

Important as was this part of the plan which had been refused, it was worth while to prosecute the realisation of the rest. It was still desirable, in fact, to confine Austria behind the Inn, and to concede to her once for all that everlasting object of her wishes; it was still desirable to concentrate Prussia towards the north of Germany, and to exclude her from Franconia, where her presence was not serviceable to any one, and might even become dangerous for herself in case of war; for, the provinces of Anspach and Bayreuth lying in the route of the French and Austrian armies, it was rendered very difficult to respect her neutrality. The sequel of this history will show the serious inconvenience of such a situation.

But Prussia and Austria were extremely tenacious in what related to themselves. Though Austria found the boundary of the Inn particularly seducing, she would not give up any thing in Suabia; she still pretended to have possessions there, even after the acquisition of the Inn. She demanded, besides Salzburg and Berchtolsgaden, besides the country between the Salza and the Inn, the bishopric of Passau. The bishoprics of Brixen and Trent, which were conceded to her, she scarcely considered as a gift; for they were in Tyrol, and whatever was in Tyrol appeared to belong to her so rightfully that, in receiving them, she thought she was receiving nothing new. Prussia, on her part, would not waive any of her claims in Franconia. In this state of things, the First Consul resolved to give up the desirable for the possible—a painful necessity, but frequent in important affairs.

He endeavoured to come to a definitive arrangement with Prussia, that he might afterwards concert with Russia, reserving for the conclusion of the negotiation the agreement with Austria, who manifested a provoking obstinacy, which it was found impossible to overcome until the whole of the adhesions were obtained.

In the first place, he declared it to be his firm resolution not to suffer any interest to be sacrificed, not to give every thing to the great houses at the expense of the less, not to suppress all the free cities, not to destroy completely the Catholic party. General Beurnonville, ambassador of France in Berlin, was at this moment on leave in Paris. He was directed, in the month of May, 1802 (Floreal, year X.), to confer with M. de Lucchesini, minister of Prussia, and to sign a convention stipulating the separate arrangements of the houses of Brandenburg and Orange.

Prussia re-asserted all her claims, but with no power had she such a chance of treating advantageously as with France. She was, therefore, obliged to be content with an arrangement, which, though far inferior to what she desired, could not but appear to all Germany an act of great partiality towards her.

This power lost, as we have observed, on the left bank of the Rhine, the duchy of Gueldres, part of the duchy of Cleves, and the little principality of Mörs; to Holland she ceded a few enclosed districts; lastly, in consequence of a general arrangement, relative to navigation, she had been recently deprived of certain tolls on the Rhine. These united losses produced a diminution of revenue, which she estimated at 2,000,000 of florins, Austria at 750,000, Russia at 1,000,000, and France, by favour, at 1,200,000 or 1,300,000. By a convention, signed on the 23rd of May, 1802 (3rd Prairial, year X.), France promised to procure for Prussia the bishoprics of Hildesheim and Paderborn, part of the bishopric of Münster, the districts of Erfurt and Eichsfeld, remnants of the old electorate of Mayence, lastly, certain abbeys and free cities, the whole producing a revenue of about 1,800,000 florins, 500,000 more than the supposed amount of the losses for which compensation was to be made. Prussia obtained nothing in Franconia, which was a subject of deep regret to her, for her ambition was persevering in that quarter; but Eichsfeld and Erfurt were intermediate points, which served for stages for reaching her provinces in Franconia. While pretending to make up her mind to great sacrifices, she signed, satisfied at bottom with the acquisitions which she had obtained. Next day, a separate convention was concluded with her for the indemnity of the house of Orange-Nassau. That house was not placed in Westphalia, as it would have wished to be, but in Upper Hesse. The bishopric and abbey of Fulda, the abbey of Corvey, not far distant from Fulda, that of Weingarten, and some others, were allotted to it. By this arrangement, without being placed too near Holland and the recollections of the stadtholdership, it nevertheless found it-

self near enough to the country of Nassau, where all the branches of that family were to be indemnified.

These advantages were granted to Prussia and to her kindred, with a view to secure her alliance. The First Consul, therefore, purposed to avail himself of the occasion to wring from her a formal adhesion to all that he had done in Europe. He required and obtained from the head of the house of Orange-Nassau the recognition of the Batavian Republic and the renunciation of the stadtholdership: he required of Prussia the recognition of the Italian Republic, the recognition of the kingdom of Etruria, and an implicit approval of the incorporation of Piedmont with France. King Frederick William thus found himself linked to the policy of the First Consul in all its most disagreeable bearings towards the rest of Europe. He made no hesitation, however, and gave the required adhesion in the same act that assigned to him his share of the Germanic indemnities.

Having settled the claims of Prussia, the First Consul, adhering to his plan of arranging successively and individually with the parties principally interested, signed on the same day a convention with Bavaria. In this convention, he treated her as an old ally of France. He insured to her all the ecclesiastical principalities enclosed in her territories, the bishopric of Augsburg (excepting the city, which was to be retained as a free city) the bishopric of Freisingen; the slopes of the mountains of Tyrol, coveted by Austria, such as the abbey of Kempten and the county of Werdenfels; the fortress of Passau, without the bishopric of Passau, enclosed in the Austrian territory, and destined for the Archduke Ferdinand; the bishopric of Eichstädt, situated on the banks of the Danube; the two extensive bishoprics of Wurtzburg and Bamberg, forming a considerable part of Franconia; lastly, several free cities and abbeys in Suabia, which Austria, in her ambitious dreams, had demanded for herself, particularly Ulm, Memmingen, Buchorn, &c. The question of the Inn between Austria and Bavaria was not resolved: the two interested powers were left to settle that by way of exchange. The Palatine house, concentrated in Suabia and Franconia, thus acquired a very compact territory. There was now nothing but the duchy of Berg, situated on the confines of Westphalia, that was at a distance from the mass of her dominions. It was with a view to agglomerate her territory that France had persuaded her to give up the whole Palatinate of the Rhine; but she was fully indemnified for what was taken from her; for, if she had lost a revenue of 3,000,000 florins, she received 3,000,000 and some thousands in compensation.

The indemnity of Prussia and Bavaria being fixed, the greatest difficulty was overcome. France had satisfied two friends, and the two most considerable States in Germany, next to Austria. No *insurmountable* opposition was thenceforward to be apprehended.

Still there were left Baden, Wirtemberg, and the two Hesses, to settle with. Baden and Wirtemberg were clients and relations of Russia. It was with Russia that their share was to be arranged. It consisted, as we have observed, with the plan of the First Consul, to allow the emperor Alexander to participate in the arrangements of Germany, to interest him in them, by treating his protégés well, by flattering his pride, by appearing to rate his influence very highly. In the first place, he was bound to admit him to this participation by the secret articles annexed to the late treaty of peace, articles by which he had engaged to concert with the Russian cabinet respecting the Germanic indemnities. The First Consul, had thought that he ought not to leave him time to claim his right of intervention, and, in his personal correspondence with the young emperor, descanting confidentially on all the important affairs of Europe, he had inquired his intentions in regard to the houses of Wirtemberg and Baden, which had the honour of being allied to the imperial family. In fact, the empress-dowager, widow of Paul I., mother of Alexander, was princess of Wirtemberg; the reigning empress, consort of Alexander, was a princess of Baden. The latter was one of those three brilliant sisters, born at the little court of Carlsruhe, and seated at this period on the thrones of Bavaria, Sweden, and Russia.

The czar, flattered by these advances, cheerfully accepted the overtures of the First Consul, and had not for a moment any idea of entering into the scheme of Austria, who was desirous to remove the negotiation to Petersburg. Gratified as he would have been to see the most important affair of the continent arranged in this capital, he had the good sense not to pretend to any thing of the kind for an instant. He therefore authorized M. de Markoff to negotiate on this subject in Paris. Wirtemberg and Baden were to him inferior interests in this negotiation. His essential interest was to participate ostensibly in the whole of the negotiation. The First Consul left nothing to be wished by the emperor Alexander in regard to the exterior of the part to be acted, and offered to place him ostensibly on a level with the French cabinet, by proposing to constitute France and Russia mediating powers between the various States of the Germanic confederation.

This was a most happy idea. It was necessary, in fact, after deciding with the principal parties interested what share they were to have, to enter into communication at length with the Germanic body assembled at Ratisbon, and to lead it to ratify the arrangements individually subscribed. The First Consul conceived the idea of combining these arrangements into one general plan, and to submit it to the Diet of Ratisbon in the name of France and Russia, spontaneously constituting themselves mediating powers. This form saved the dignity of the Germanic body, which no longer appeared to be dictatorially organized by France, but which, in the embarrassment into which it was thrown by the rival ambitions excited within its bosom, accepted as arbiters the two

greatest and the most disinterested, powers of the continent. It was impossible to disguise the real will of France under a form better suited to Germany, and more flattering to a young sovereign, who was but just entering upon the theatre of the world. The First Consul, in thus accepting an equality of character with a young prince who had not yet done any thing, while he himself was covered with glory, consummate in arms and politics, pursuing the most skilful line of conduct, for, by means of some concessions, he brought all Europe into his views. The character of true policy is always to place the real result before the external effect. Besides, the effect is inevitably produced, when the real result is obtained.

The proposal of the First Consul to the emperor Alexander being accepted, it was agreed to present to the Germanic Diet a note signed by the two cabinets, and containing the spontaneous offer of their mediation. They had yet to agree upon the arrangements to be introduced into that note. The First Consul had great difficulty to induce M. de Markoff to admit the stipulations already made with the principal German powers, and which were contrary to the views of Austria, without being seriously injurious to her. While young Alexander affected to share none of the passions of the European aristocracy, M. de Markoff in Paris, M. de Woronzoff in London, displayed without reserve the passions which a French emigrant, an English tory, or an Austrian grandee might have felt. M. de Markoff, in particular, was a Russian, full of haughtiness, destitute of that attractive flexibility which is frequently met with in the distinguished men of his nation, having intelligence, still more pride, and an idea of the power of his cabinet which was at that time quite extravagant. The First Consul was not a man to endure the ridiculous arrogance of M. de Markoff, and contrived to keep the ambassador in his place by paying all due respect to the sovereign. He offered him, for Wirtemberg, for Baden, for Bavaria, advantages certainly superior to the losses which those three houses had sustained. But M. de Markoff, indifferent to the imperial kindred, and even to Russian policy, which began, after the peace of Teschen, to favour the petty powers of Germany, M. de Markoff, in his zeal for the cause of old Europe, showed himself not Russian but Austrian. It was Austria that seemed to interest him exclusively. Prussia was hateful to him; he disputed all her assertions, admitted, on the contrary, all those of Austria, and demanded for the latter as much as they could have demanded in Vienna. The bishopric of Salzburg and the provostship of Berchtolsgaden, granted by general consent to the archduke Ferdinand, produced very nearly as much as Tuscany, that is to say, 2,500,000 florins. To these principalities were nevertheless added the bishoprics of Trent and Brixen. But M. de Markoff, the advocate of Austria, insisted that no account *ought* to be taken of this addition. Those bishoprics were in



Tyrol, and consequently, he contended, they were so completely the property of Austria, that it was robbing the emperor to give to an archduke. To this it was replied that Trent and Brixen were ecclesiastical principalities, wholly independent, though enclosed within the Austrian territory, and that they would not belong to Austria till they had been formally assigned to her.

Austria wanted, moreover, the bishopric of Passau, which would secure to her the important fortress of Passau, situated at the conflux of the Inn and the Danube, and forming a tête de pont upon Bavaria. It was agreed to give to Austria the bishopric of Passau without the fortress, which was possible and expedient; for the territory of that bishopric was wholly enclosed in Austria, and the fortress of Passau in Bavaria. To have given this place to Austria would have been giving her an offensive and threatening position in regard to Bavaria. Nothing, therefore, was more natural than to assign the bishopric to the archduke Ferdinand, and Passau to the elector palatine. But Austria clung to Passau as to a capital position, and M. de Markoff defended it for Austria with extreme warmth. It was desirable, however, to conclude this long negotiation, and M. de Markoff, sensible that in the end the mediation of Russia might be dispensed with altogether, at last consented to a compromise, and agreed with M. de Talleyrand in the definitive plan.

The advantages already conceded by the First Consul to Prussia and to the house of Orange, though vehemently contested by M. de Markoff, were inserted entire in the definitive plan. These were, as we have already seen, for Prussia, the bishoprics of Hildesheim, Paderborn, and Münster (part only of the latter), the districts of Eichsfeld and Erfurt, besides some abbeys and free cities; and for the house of Orange-Nassau, Fulda and Corvey. In the same plan were also inserted the conditions already stipulated for Bavaria, that is to say, the bishoprics of Freisingen and Augsburg, the county of Werdenfels, the abbey of Kempten, the city of Passau without the bishopric, the bishoprics of Eichstädt, Wurtzburg, and Bamberg, besides several free cities and abbeys in Suabia.

Austria was to receive for the archduke of Tuscany the bishoprics of Brixen, Trent, Salzburg, Passau (this latter without the fortress of Passau), and the provostship of Berchtolsgaden. It was a revenue of 3,500,000 florins, in compensation for a net revenue of 2,500,000, with the advantage of a contiguity of territory not presented by Tuscany. Austria gained nothing in Suabia; she merely retained her old possessions there. She had a right, if she pleased, to exchange them for the frontier of the Inn. The Brisgau was, as in anterior treaties, insured to the duke of Modena.

The house of Baden, for which M. de Markoff showed a very moderate degree of interest, was most favourably treated. It had lost various lordships and lands in Alsace and Luxemburg, yield-



ing a revenue of 315,000 florins at most. There was secured to it, in territories which lay handy, such as the bishopric of Constance, the remnant of the bishoprics of Spire, Strasburg, and Basle; the bailiwicks of Ladenburg, Bretten, and Heidelberg, there was secured to it a revenue of 450,000 florins, besides the electoral dignity, which was destined for it.

The house of Wirtemberg was not less favourably treated. The provostship of Ellwangen and various abbeys, forming a revenue of 380,000 florins, were conceded to it in compensation for the 250,000 which it had lost.

The houses of Hesse and Nassau were also indemnified in territories situated within their reach and proportionate to their losses. The inferior princes were carefully defended by France, and obtained revenues nearly equivalent to those which had been taken from them. The houses of Aremberg and Solms were placed in Westphalia. The counts of Westphalia obtained the lower bishopric of Münster. Very little notice was taken of England, which seemed to feel no great interest in the question of the Germanic indemnities. It was not, however, forgotten that King George III. was elector of Hanover, and that he attached great value to that ancient crown of his family. He even regarded it as his last resource, in those moments of gloomy depression, when he fancied that he beheld England convulsed by a revolution. A desire was felt to dispose him favourably, and as he had been required to give up certain duties, in favour of the cities of Bremen and Hamburg, and to make several little sacrifices in favour of Prussia, there was conceded to him in compensation the bishopric of Osnabrück, contiguous to Hanover—an indemnity far superior to what he had lost, and the object of which was to interest him strongly in the success of the mediation.

A certain number of mediate abbeys were reserved to complete the indemnities of such princes as might be ill used in this first division, and to furnish pensions for the members of the suppressed clergy. In general, the princes who received ecclesiastical territories were required to pay the pensions of all the incumbents living, as well bishops and abbots as members of the chapters, and the officers attached to their service. It was the least duty of humanity towards the former holders of benefices, whose possessions were taken from them and their princely existence destroyed. But, if provision had thus been made for the wants of the suppressed clergy on the right bank of the Rhine, there were still the dispossessed clergy on the left bank, and these being, in consequence of treaties, without redress against France, would have found no means of subsistence anywhere. It was for their support that great part of the reserved mediate abbeys were destined.

Such were the territorial arrangements agreed upon with M. de Markoff. Indemnities to the amount of nearly 14,000,000 *had been distributed* to compensate for losses to the amount of

13,000,000; and what proves the greediness of the great courts, Austria took about 4,000,000 of them for her archdukes; Prussia 2,000,000 for herself, 500,000 for the stadtholder; Bavaria took 3,000,000, the exact equivalent of her losses; Wirtemberg, Baden, the two Hesses, Nassau, about 2,000,000; all the petty princes together 2,500,000. Thus Austria and Prussia obtained the greater part for themselves, or for princes forming no part of the Germanic confederation.

There were still left the constitutional arrangements which also it was very necessary to settle. The First Consul, inclining originally to retain two ecclesiastical electors, afterwards thwarted by the obstinacy of Austria, deprived of resources by the greediness of the great courts, could do no more than preserve one. The elector of Cologne was dead, and his place filled merely for form by the archduke Anthony, but without any pretension on the part of Austria to establish the validity of the election. The elector-archbishop of Treves, a Saxon prince, who had retired to his second see, the bishopric of Augsburg, was neither to be pitied nor regretted. A pension of 100,000 florins was to be given to him. The present elector of Mayence was a prince of the house of Dalberg, of whom we have already made mention. Independently of his personal qualities, he had a title to be retained, namely the importance of his see, to which were attached the chancellorship of the German empire and the presidency of the Diet. He was confirmed, therefore, in the quality of arch-chancellor of the empire, and president of the Diet, and the bishopric of Ratisbon, the place where the Diet met, was conferred on him. The bailiwick of Aschaffenburg, a remnant of the old electorate of Mayence was also left him, and it was agreed to compose for him a revenue of 1,000,000 florins by means of the reserved domains.

Consequently, one only of the three ecclesiastical electors was to be left, and this, with the five lay electors, made six in all. The First Consul was for increasing the number and making that number unequal. He proposed to create nine. The title was conferred on the margrave of Baden, for the good conduct of that prince towards France, and on account of his relationship to Russia, on the duke of Wirtemberg and the landgrave of Hesse, on account of their importance in the confederation. These were three additional Protestant electors, making six Protestants against three Catholics. The majority in the electoral college was thus changed in favour of the Protestant party, but not to such a degree as to take from Austria her legitimate influence, for she was always sure of the votes of Bohemia, Saxony, and Mayence, most frequently of that of Hanover, and in certain cases of those of Baden and Wirtemberg.

It was agreed that the princes indemnified with ecclesiastical possessions should sit in the College of princes for the lordships to which they should acquire a title. This again changed the

majority in the College of princes in favour of the Protestant party; but, owing to the respect which the imperial house had so long inspired, and owing to the interest which the petty princes had in preserving the Germanic constitution, the Protestant votes recently created were not all hostile to Austria. It was supposed that the Protestant or Prussian party, as people were pleased to call it, having, in consequence of the new arrangements acquired a numerical majority in the Colleges of the electors and of the princes, Austria, with the old spell which encompassed her, with the prerogatives attached to the imperial crown, with her direct influence over the elector of Ratisbon, with the power of ratification which she possessed in regard to all the resolutions of the Diet, would still have means to counterbalance the opposition of Prussia, and continue sufficiently powerful to prevent the introduction of anarchy into the Germanic body. It was calculated that, in taking the majority from Austria, the arbitrators had taken from her at most the power of swaying Germany at pleasure, and of dragging it into war to gratify her pride or her ambition. Such was the opinion of the new arch-chancellor, who was deeply versed in the practical knowledge of the Germanic constitution.

It was, lastly, requisite to organize the College of the cities, which had but little influence at all times, and was not destined to have more in future. Though the treaty of Lunéville had made no mention of the suppression of the free cities, and specified only the suppression of the ecclesiastical principalities, still the existence of many of these cities was so illusory, their administration was so burdensome to themselves, the exception which they formed amidst the Germanic territory was so annoying and so frequent, that it was necessary to suppress the greater number of them. The protection which they had formerly sought in their quality of immediate cities, that is to say, dependent on the emperor alone, they found in the justice of the time and in a much stricter observance of the laws than formerly. It would, nevertheless, have been too harsh to suppress them all; and it may be affirmed that, but for the First Consul, the most celebrated would have sunk under the ambition of the neighbouring governments. He made it a point of honour to uphold the principal of them. He resolved to preserve Augsburg and Nuremberg, on account of their historical celebrity; Ratisbon, on account of the presence of the Diet; Wetzlar, on account of the imperial chamber; Frankfort and Lübeck, on account of their commercial importance. He proposed to unite two of them, which though very considerable, nay, the most considerable of all, Hamburg and Bremen, had not even the quality of imperial cities. Bremen was dependent on Hanover. It was separated from it, in exchange for part of the bishopric of Osnabrück. Hamburg enjoyed a real independence, but it had no vote in the college of the cities. The First Consul caused useful privileges to be attached to the exceptional existence of the

free cities. They were declared to be thenceforth neutral in the wars of the empire, exempt from all military charges, such as recruiting, the financial contingent, the quartering of troops. This was a way to legitimize the neutrality which was granted to them, and cause it to be respected. Another boon, from which they were destined to derive greater benefit than any other part of the Germanic States was the suppression of the vexatious and onerous tolls established on the great rivers of Germany. The feudal tolls on the Rhine, on the Weser, and on the Elbe, were suppressed. The losses resulting from this suppression for the bordering States had been calculated and compensated beforehand. Certain princes who had property in some of the free cities, such as Augsburg, Frankfort, Bremen, were even obliged to renounce it at the price of an augmentation of indemnity. It was to France alone, and to her persevering efforts, that these benefits were owing. Thus the number of those cities was diminished by all those which had lost their importance, but increased by the two richest, which had hitherto been excluded. Their existence was aggrandized and meliorated; they were placed in a position to render great services to freedom of commerce, and to derive profit from them.

This matter once settled was introduced into a convention, signed on the 4th of June by M. de Markoff and the French plenipotentiary. Apprized, day by day, of the proceedings of M. de Markoff, Austria had held back. The First Consul, on his part, had taken little pains to gain her, striving, as he had done from the beginning, to obtain the majority of individual assents, that by the mass of them he might overcome the refractory. In this view, direct conventions with Wirtemberg and the other States made out of the details of the plan so many particular treaties between France and the indemnified countries.

For the rest, M. de Markoff would not enter into any but a conditional engagement, and insisted on referring the matter to his court. It was agreed that, if his court accepted the proposed plan, the note which was to contain it should be carried immediately to Ratisbon and presented to the Diet, in the name of France and Russia, constituting themselves mediators for the Germanic body. The First Consul, in thus binding Russia to his plan, agreeing, moreover, in regard to this plan with Prussia, Bavaria, and the principal States of the second and third order, could not fail to overcome the resistance of Austria. But he was fearful of the efforts which she might make at Petersburg to shake the young emperor, to awaken his scruples, and to interest his justice against his vanity, so highly flattered by the part that was offered to him. He, therefore, directed general Hedouville, our ambassador in Petersburg, to declare that he should not wait longer than ten days for the consent of the Russian cabinet and the ratification of the convention of the 4th of June. He caused this declaration to be made in the most measured but positive terms. It plainly intimated that, if Russia did not appreciate highly

enough the honour of regulating jointly with France the new state of Germany, the First Consul would do without her and constitute himself sole mediator. In the condescension shown to the court of Russia there had been ability and tact; neither was there less in the firmness shown at the end of the negotiation begun with her.

At this moment, the emperor Alexander was absent from Petersburg: he was gone to Memel to have an interview with the King of Prussia. Though the Russian diplomacy was wholly favourable to Austria, and unfavourable to Prussia, whose ambition and condescension towards France it severely censured, the emperor Alexander shared not these dispositions. He was persuaded, without exactly knowing why, that Prussia was a much more formidable power than Austria; he believed that the secret of the great art of war had continued, ever since the death of Frederick II., in the ranks of the Prussian army, and in this persuasion he even remained till the battle of Jena. He had heard of the reigning sovereign of Prussia, of his youth, of his virtues, of his understanding, of his resistance to his ministers, and, fancying that he discovered more than one analogy between the position of that king and his own, he had conceived a desire to make his personal acquaintance. In consequence, he had caused an interview at Memel to be proposed to him. This proposal the king of Prussia had eagerly embraced, for he was still full of his scheme for interposing between Russia and France, still persuaded that he should exercise a beneficial influence over their relations, that he should induce them to live in harmony, that, holding the balance between them, he should hold it in Europe, and that to the importance of the part was added the certainty of preserving peace, the maintenance of which had become the most constant subject of his thoughts. This part, which he had dreamt of for a moment, in the life-time of Paul, was rendered far more easy under the emperor Alexander, with whom similarity of age and disposition seemed to ally him more closely. Confirmed in this idea by M. Haugwitz, he had repaired to Memel with a head full of the most honourable illusions. Frederick William and Alexander, now together, seemed to agree perfectly, and vowed everlasting friendship to each other. The king of Prussia was simple and a little awkward; the emperor Alexander was neither simple nor awkward; on the contrary, he was amiable, courteous, lavish of demonstrations. He hesitated not to make the first advances towards the successor of the great Frederick, and expressed the warmest affection for him. The beautiful queen of Prussia was present at this interview: from this period the emperor Alexander devoted to her a respectful and chivalrous homage. They parted highly delighted with each other, and convinced that they loved one another, not like sovereigns, but like men. In fact, the emperor Alexander prided himself upon continuing to be a man, *though seated upon a throne*. He returned, repeating to all who



came near him, that he had at last found a friend worthy of himself. To all that was alleged concerning the Prussian cabinet, its ambition, its greediness, he replied by the explanation constantly employed when Prussia was talked of, that what was said might be true of M. Haugwitz, but was false of the young and virtuous king. He could not have wished for any thing better than to see all the acts of the court of Russia explained in the same manner. At the moment when the two monarchs were on the point of parting, a courier, arriving at Memel, delivered to king Frederick William a letter from the First Consul. This letter communicated the advantages granted to Prussia, and the definitive plan agreed upon with M. de Markoff. Every thing, added the First Consul, now depended on the assent of the emperor of Russia. King Frederick William, enchanted with this result, would fain have taken advantage of the occasion to talk over the affairs of Germany with the young friend whom he imagined that he had gained for life. But that slippery friend refused to listen to him, and promised to answer as soon as he should have received from his ministers the communication of the plan arranged in Paris.

It was now the middle of June, 1802 (the end of Prairial, year X.). Couriers were waiting for the emperor Alexander at Petersburg; and general Hedouville, extremely punctual in his obedience, had already presented a note intimating that if by a certain time no positive explanation was given, he should consider the answer as negative, and write to Paris accordingly. Kurakin, the vice-chancellor, who was better disposed towards France than his colleagues, prevailed upon general Hedouville to withdraw his note, lest it should offend the emperor Alexander, promising that, on the arrival of his sovereign, the business should be immediately submitted to him and an answer given without delay. The emperor, on his return to the capital, gave audience to his ministers, and was strongly urged by several of them to reject the proposed plan. The cabinet appeared divided, but yet more disposed in favour of Austria than of Prussia. Alexander, though he perceived, with his precocious subtlety, that the governor of the affairs of the West gave up to him the appearance of a part, the reality of which he retained in his own hands; though he found that the conditions which they were to dictate jointly at Ratisbon came to him ready-made from Paris—Alexander was, nevertheless, touched with the outward respect paid to his empire, and satisfied with a precedent which, added to that of Teschen, would in future establish the right of Russia to interfere in the affairs of Germany. He was convinced that the First Consul would proceed, if the Russian cabinet hesitated any longer; moreover, the pretensions of Austria, who was at this moment making her last efforts in Petersburg, seemed to him quite unreasonable; and, lastly, the letters of the king of Prussia became daily more urgent:



from all these motives he decided in favour of the proposed plan, and ratified the convention on the 4th of June, in spite, as it were, of his ministers. At the moment of giving his assent, prince Louis of Baden arrived at Petersburg to claim the rights of relationship, and to obtain the approval of a plan for increasing the territories and titles of his house; but he found his wishes granted. A few days afterwards, this unfortunate prince died in Finland from the effects of a carriage accident, on his way from his sister the empress of Russia to his sister the queen of Sweden.

The emperor Alexander, though he had given his assent, had, however, made two reservations, not express, but verbal, and which he left it to the courtesy of the First Consul to take into consideration. The first was relative to the bishop of Lübeck, duke of Oldenburg, and his uncle. This prince lost by the suppression of the toll of Elsfleth, on the Weser, a very considerable revenue, and solicited an augmentation of indemnity. There were a few thousand florins more to look for—that was all. The second reservation of the emperor related to the electoral dignity which he was desirous of conferring on the house of Mecklenburg, which itself appeared to care very little about it. This was a more difficult affair; for this new favour would have raised the number of the electors to ten, and placed another Protestant in the electoral college. It was a matter for ulterior settlement with the Diet.

Things had been so arranged that the couriers returning from Petersburg should come back by way of Ratisbon, and deliver to the ministers of Russia and France orders to act immediately. Russia had appointed, as her minister extraordinary on this occasion, M. de Buhler, her ordinary representative at the court of Bavaria. The First Consul on his part had chosen for the same character the minister of France at Munich. M. de Laforest, by his acquaintance with German affairs, and by his activity, combined the qualities suitable for the difficult functions with which he was about to be charged. The note announcing the mediation of the two courts had been drawn up beforehand, and sent to the two ministers, French and Russian, that they might deliver it as soon as the couriers should have returned from Petersburg. Both had orders to leave Munich immediately for Ratisbon. M. de Laforest executed this order forthwith, M. de Buhler promising to follow without delay. They arrived at Ratisbon on the 16th of August (28th Thermidor).

The Diet had transferred the difficult work of the new Germanic organisation to an extraordinary deputation composed of some of the principal German States. It was in imitation of what had been done at former periods in similar circumstances, particularly at the peace of Westphalia. The eight States selected were: Brandenburg (Prussia), Saxony, Bavaria, Bohemia (Austria), Wirtemberg, Teutonic Order (Archduke Charles), Mayence,

Hesse-Cassel. These eight States were represented in the extraordinary deputation by ministers deliberating agreeably to the instructions of their governments.

All these ministers were not present. M. de Laforest was obliged to make great efforts to bring them to Ratisbon, efforts the more difficult since Austria, reduced to despair, had determined to oppose the tardiness of the Germanic constitution to the vivacity of French action. The note, in the form of a declaration, was delivered on the 18th of August (30th Thermidor), in the name of the two courts, to the directorial minister of the Diet, charged to preside over all official communications. A copy was given to the imperial plenipotentiary, for there was in the grand deputation, as well as in the Diet itself, a plenipotentiary exercising the imperial prerogative, which consisted in receiving communication of proposals addressed to the confederation, in examining them, and in ratifying or rejecting them, on behalf of the emperor.

The note of the mediating powers, worthy, amicable, but firm, merely said that the German States, not having yet been able to come to an agreement respecting the execution of the treaty of Lunéville, and it being to the interest of all Europe that the work of peace should be crowned by the arrangement of the Germanic affairs, France and Russia, friendly and disinterested powers, offered their mediation to the Diet, submitted a plan to it, and declared that the interest of Germany, the consolidation of peace, and the general tranquillity of Europe, required that every thing concerning the regulation of the Germanic indemnities should be settled in the space of two months. This fixed time had something imperious, it is true, but it rendered the proceedings of the two courts serious, and in this respect it was indispensable.

This declaration was designed to produce, and it did produce, the strongest effect. The directorial minister, that is to say, the president, transmitted it immediately to the extraordinary deputation.

While the ministers of the two powers were proceeding so resolutely at Ratisbon, an official step was taken at Vienna by the ambassador of France, to communicate to the court of Austria the plan of mediation, to declare that France had never wished, neither did she now wish, to offend her; but that the impossibility of arranging with her had obliged France to take a definitive part, a part imperatively required by the peace of Europe. It was insinuated, moreover, that the plan did not settle every thing in an irrevocable manner; that there were yet left many means for serving the court of Vienna, either in its negotiations with Bavaria, or in its efforts to secure to the archdukes the succession of the Teutonic Order and of the last ecclesiastical electorate; that, in all these things, the condescension of the First Consul would be proportionate to the condescension of the emperor. For the

rest, M. de Champagny, our ambassador, was ordered not to enter into any detail, and to cause it to be understood that all serious discussion would take place exclusively at Ratisbon.

During these inevitable delays of diplomacy, the indemnified princes became extremely impatient to occupy the territories awarded to them, and had demanded authority to take possession of them immediately. France had assented to it, in order to render the proposed plan nearly irrevocable. All at once, Prussia caused Hildesheim, Paderborn, Münster, Eichsfeld, and Erfurt to be occupied. Wirtemberg and Bavaria, not less impatient than Prussia, sent detachments of troops into the ecclesiastical principalities which were assigned to them. The resistance, if any were made by these principalities, could not be great, for they were either aged prelates or chapters administering the vacant sees, having neither means nor will to defend themselves. The harshness of the occupants equalled in some respects that formerly laid to the charge of the French Revolution. The natural protector of these unfortunate ecclesiastics was Austria, charged with the exercise of the imperial power. But most of them were situated at a great distance from her territory; and those who were within her reach, as the bishops of Augsburg and Freisingen, could not be assisted without violating the Bavarian territory, which would have been an act pregnant with the most serious results. There was, however, one of these bishoprics, easy to secure from Bavarian occupation and important to retain; this was the bishopric of Passau. To undertake its defence would have been an act of vigour tending to raise Austria from her very lowly situation.

We have already described the geographical position of this bishopric, completely enclosed by Austria, and having only one point on the Bavarian territory, namely Passau. The court of Vienna had been desirous, as we have seen, that this fortress should be given to the archduke along with the bishopric itself. The Austrian troops were at the gates of Passau: a step would have carried them into the town. The temptation must have been strong, and pretexts were not wanting. In fact, the unfortunate bishop, on seeing the Bavarian troops approach, had applied to the emperor, the natural protector of every State of the empire exposed to violence. The plan which gave his bishopric partly to Bavaria, partly to the archduke Ferdinand, was still but a project, not yet a law of the empire, and till then the execution of it might be considered as an illegal act. Acts of this kind, it is true, were committed throughout all Germany; but where it was possible to prevent them, why not do it, why not give some sign of life and vigour?

Austria was exasperated in the highest degree. She complained of every body: of France, who, without saying any thing to her, had negotiated with Russia the plan that was to change the face of Germany; of Russia herself, who, at Petersburg, had kept secret

from her the adoption of the plan of mediation ; of Prussia and her confederates, who supported themselves upon foreign governments to overturn the empire completely. Her complaints had but little foundation, and she had to reproach none but herself, her exaggerated pretensions, and her ill-judged subtleties, for the forlorn state in which she was left by all at that moment. She had sought to negotiate with Russia unknown to France, and France had negotiated with Russia unknown to her. She had wished to call foreigners into the empire by having recourse to the emperor Alexander, and Prussia and Bavaria, imitating her example, had called France, with this difference that Prussia and Bavaria obtained the intervention of a power in friendship with the Germanic body, and obliged by treaties themselves to intervene. As for previous occupations, they were premature acts, it is true, and strictly considered illegal ; but, unfortunately for the logic of Austria, she had herself just occupied Salzburg and Berchtolsgaden.

Be this as it may, Austria, exasperated and determined to show that her courage was not depressed by a concurrence of unfortunate circumstances, committed an act by no means in keeping with her usual circumspection. She ordered her troops to march through the suburbs of Passau, and to occupy the fortress, and accompanied this act with explanations tending to extenuate its effect. She declared that, in thus acting, she complied with a formal demand of the bishop of Passau ; that she meant not by any means to decide by force one of the knotty questions submitted to the Germanic Diet ; that she intended to perform a purely conservatory act ; and that, immediately after the decision of that Diet, she would withdraw her troops, and leave the contested town to the proprietor who should be legally invested with it by the definitive plan of the indemnities.

Her troops entered Passau on the 18th of August. While they were on their march, the Bavarian troops, on their side, were marching too. There had well nigh been a serious collision, which might have set all Europe in flames. However, the prudence of the officers charged with these movements prevented that calamity. The Austrians remained masters of the place.

This conduct was bold, bolder than it was prudent for Austria to pursue, for it was opposing a formal act of resistance to the declaration of the mediating powers on an important point. It produced a very great effect at Ratisbon, among the numerous German public assembled in that city. There were representatives of all the States, maintained or suppressed, satisfied or dissatisfied, seeking some of them to procure the adoption of the proposed plan, others to change it in what concerned them. There were magistrates of the free cities, abbots, prelates, immediate nobles, in abundance. The immediate nobles, in particular, filling the armies and the chancelleries of the German courts, figured in great numbers as ministers to the Diet. Even those who represented courts which had been treated liberally, and who, on that account,

should have appeared content, retained, nevertheless, their personal passions, and, as German nobles, were far from being satisfied. M. de Görtz, minister of Prussia at Ratisbon, for example, was a partisan of the plan of indemnities on account of his court; but, in quality of immediate noble, he deeply regretted the old order of things. Several other ministers of the German courts were in the like predicament. These persons composed of themselves a public, under the influence of strong passions, and well-disposed towards Austria. It was not with France that they found most fault, for they saw that she was disinterested in all this, and that she had no other aim but to bring the affairs of Germany to a conclusion, but they poured forth their severest censure upon Prussia and Bavaria. The greediness of these courts, their connexion with France, their eagerness to destroy the old Constitution, were spoken of in terms of extraordinary bitterness. The news of the occupation of Passau produced among this public the strongest and most agreeable sensation. It was necessary, it was alleged, to act with vigour. France had no troops upon the Rhine; her peace with England was not so solid that she could lightly engage herself with the affairs of Germany; besides, the First Consul had just received a sort of monarchical authority, in recompense for the peace which he had given to the world; he could not so soon withdraw a benefit for which such a high price had been paid. The only course, therefore, was to display energy, to cross the Inn, to give a lesson to Bavaria, and to put down the numerous hands lifted all at once against the Germanic Constitution.

The effect produced at Ratisbon speedily spread over all Europe. The First Consul, attentive to the progress of these negotiations, was struck by it. Thus far, he had carefully abstained from any step which could have affected the general peace. His object had been to consolidate not to endanger it. But he was not of a humour to suffer himself to be publicly defied, and especially to allow a result which he had pursued with so many efforts, and with such excellent intentions, to be put in jeopardy. He was aware what this boldness of Austria might produce at Ratisbon, if he did not repress it, and especially if he appeared to hesitate. He immediately sent for M. de Lucchesini, minister of Prussia, and M. de Cetto, minister of Bavaria. He pointed out to both of them the importance of a prompt and energetic resolution, to meet the new attitude taken by Austria, and the danger to which the plan of the indemnities would be exposed if the least hesitation were to be shown on this occasion. These two ministers were as sensible of all this as any body; for the interest of their courts was sufficient to enlighten them on the subject. They adhered, therefore, without hesitation to the ideas of the First Consul. The latter proposed to them to bind themselves by a formal convention, in which they should declare anew that they were disposed to employ all necessary means to carry into effect *the plan of mediation*, and that if, within the sixty days assigned to



the labours of the Diet, the city of Passau were not evacuated, France and Prussia would unite their forces with those of Bavaria to secure to the latter the share promised her by the plan of the indemnities. This convention was signed in the evening of the very day on which it was proposed, that is to say, the 5th of September, 1802 (18th Fructidor, year X.). The First Consul did not send for M. de Markoff, because he foresaw that a thousand difficulties would be raised by him in favour of Austria. Besides, he had no need of Russia for performing an act of energy. The convention itself became more threatening signed by two powers, which were both seriously resolved to carry it into execution. It was merely communicated to M. de Markoff, who was requested to transmit it to Petersburg, that his cabinet might adhere to it if it should think fit.

Next day, the First Consul despatched Lauriston, his aide-de-camp, with the convention which had just been signed, accompanied by a letter to the elector of Bavaria. In this letter, he begged the elector to be of good cheer, guaranteed to him anew the whole of the indemnity that had been promised him, and assured him that at the time fixed a French army should enter Germany, to keep the word of France and Prussia. Lauriston was ordered to proceed to Passau for the purpose of showing himself there, and judging with his own eyes what number of Austrians were assembled on the frontier of Bavaria. He was then to show himself at Ratisbon, to go to Berlin, and to return through Holland. He was the bearer of letters for most of the princes of Germany.

This was more than was requisite for acting powerfully upon German heads. Colonel Lauriston set out immediately, and arrived without losing a moment at Munich. His presence gave the greatest joy to the unfortunate elector. All the details contained in the letter of the First Consul passed from mouth to mouth. Colonel Lauriston continued his journey without delay, convinced himself with his own eyes that the Austrians upon the Inn were far too few for any thing but a bravado, proceeded to Ratisbon, and from Ratisbon to Berlin.

This promptness of action surprised Austria, struck terror into all the opposing party in the Diet, and proved to them that a power like France had not entered into a public engagement with another power like Prussia to insure the success of a plan, without seriously intending to produce that effect. Besides, the object of the mediators was so evident, they aimed so plainly at securing the peace of the continent by the conclusion of the German affairs, that reason could not help joining the sentiment of a superior force to put down all resistance. Still, it is true, there remained difficulties of form to be overcome, and of these Austria would be likely to avail herself to retard the adoption of the plan, unless she obtained some concession to soothe her chagrin, and to save the



dignity of the head of the empire, which was much compromised on this occasion.

The extraordinary deputation charged by the Diet to prepare a *conclusum* to be submitted to it, was at this moment assembled. The eight States composing it, Brandenburg, Saxony, Bavaria, Bohemia, Wirtemberg, the Teutonic Order, Mayence, and Hesse Cassel, were present in the persons of their ministers. The protocol was open; each had begun to give his opinion. Of the eight States, four admitted without hesitation the plan of the mediators. Brandenburg, Bavaria, Hesse-Cassel, Wirtemberg, expressed their gratitude to the high powers who had condescended to come to the assistance of the Germanic body, and to extricate it from embarrassment by their disinterested arbitration; and moreover declared the plan to be wise, acceptable in its details, with the exception of a few points, on which the grand deputation might without inconvenience give its opinion and propose useful modifications. Lastly, they added, with reference to the term fixed, that it was urgent to bring matters to a close as speedily as possible, for the sake of the peace not of Germany only but of all Europe. Still the four approving States did not explain themselves in a precise manner relative to this term of two months. It would have been compromising their dignity to refer to this rigorous term for the purpose of proposing to submit to it; but this was what they meant to say, when they exhorted their co-Estates to decide as speedily as possible.

One would have expected the approbation of Mayence, since that ancient ecclesiastical electorate alone was preserved and a revenue of 1,000,000 florins attached to it. But baron d'Albini, who represented the elector-archbishop, a very sensible, clever man, wishing from the bottom of his heart the success of the mediation, was extremely embarrassed to approve, in presence of the whole ecclesiastical party, of a plan which swept away the ancient feudal Church of Germany, and to approve it solely because the electorate of his archbishop had been retained. Besides, that archbishop was not completely satisfied with the combinations which related to himself. The bailiwick of Aschaffenburg, the last remnant of the electorate of Mentz, formed the only portion of revenue that was secured to him in territory. The rest was to be given in various assignations on the reserved possessions of the Church, and for this part of the promised 1,000,000, the most considerable part, since the bailiwick of Aschaffenburg was worth scarcely 300,000 florins, he was not without uneasiness.

M. d'Albini, on behalf of Mayence, expressed, therefore, an ambiguous opinion, warmly thanked the high mediating personages for their amicable intervention, deplored at great length the misfortunes of the Germanic Church, and distinguished in the plan two parts, one comprehending the distribution of the territories, the other the general considerations with which the plan was ac-

accompanied. As for the distributions of territory, excepting the petty indemnities, the minister of Mayence approved the proposals of the mediating powers. With regard to the general considerations, containing the indication of the regulations to be made, he thought them insufficient, and in particular the pensions of the clergy appeared to him to be not clearly enough insured. On this point, it must be confessed that the observations of the representative of Mayence, were not destitute of reason.

Thus his opinion did not comprehend a formal approbation.

Saxony begged leave to reserve her vote for the present, which was a very common practice in the deliberations of the Germanic Diet. As the votes were collected several times, any member might defer giving his opinion till a subsequent sitting. This State, very disinterested, very discreet, placed in general under the influence of Prussia, but in heart preferring Austria, Catholic moreover, by the religion of the sovereign, though Protestant by the religion of the people, felt painful scruples, divided as it was between its affections and its reason, its affections which spoke for old Germany, its reason which spoke for the plan of the mediators.

Bohemia and the Teutonic Order were absolutely Austrian States. As for the first, that was a matter of course, since the emperor was king of Bohemia. Charles, brother of the emperor, his generalissimo, his minister at war, was grand-master of the Teutonic Order. In Vienna and at Ratisbon, they affected to make a difference between the minister of Bohemia, for instance, and the imperial minister. The minister of Bohemia, specially representing the house of Austria, might indulge in the expression of the family passions: he was therefore prompted to use the bitterest language. The imperial minister, speaking in the name of the emperor, affected to express himself more gravely, and to keep in view the general interests of the empire. He was less sincere and more pedantic. M. de Schraut was minister for Bohemia, M. von Hugel for the emperor. This latter, one of the most consummate of formalists, was at the same time extremely acute, like many of those Germans who had grown old in the Diet, and who disguised under the pedantry of forms all the subtilty of lawyers. As for the minister of the Teutonic grand-master, M. de Rabenau, he was wholly dependent on the Austrian deputation, who drew up his very notes for him with the knowledge and before the face of the Diet; a part which caused that worthy minister great chagrin, and of which he complained himself. M. de Hugel, minister for the emperor, directed the Austrian votes, and was instructed to resort to artifices and delays in the struggle against the Prussian party and the mediating powers.

In the first sitting, M. de Schraut, for Bohemia, complained loudly of the conduct pursued towards Austria, and replied with acrimony to the reproach thrown out against that court of having

never come to a conclusion—a reproach which constituted the chief argument of the mediating powers for interfering. This minister declared that, for nine months past, the imperial cabinet had not been able to obtain a single answer on the part of the French government to its overtures; that it had been left in complete ignorance of the negotiations going on in Paris; that its ambassador never could get initiated into the secret of the mediation, and that the plan of that mediation was unknown to him till the very moment of the communication made concerning it at Ratisbon. M. de Schraut then complained of the lot assigned to the archduke Ferdinand, asserting that the treaty of Lunéville was violated, for that guaranteed to the archduke an entire indemnity of all his losses, and now there was given him a revenue of 1,350,000 florins at most, as an equivalent for 4,000,000 which he had lost. Salzburg, according to M. de Schraut, produced only 900,000 florins, Berchtolsgaden 200,000, Passau 250,000. This was a downright falsehood. For the rest, Bohemia came to no conclusion.

The Teutonic Order, more moderate in language, would not admit the plan but as a document to be consulted.

Thus there were four approving votes, Brandenburg, Bavaria, Hesse-Cassel, Wirtemberg; one vote, Mayence, which at bottom was approbatory, but which it was requisite to bring round to be completely so; one vote, Saxony, which followed the majority, when that majority was pronounced; lastly two votes, Bohemia and the Teutonic Order, directly contrary, until satisfaction should be given to Austria.

This result was immediately communicated to the First Consul. When he was made acquainted with the first opinion of Bohemia, which imputed to the obstinate silence of France the impossibility of bringing the negotiation of the Germanic affairs to a conclusion, he determined not to put up quietly with this imputation. He replied immediately by a note which M. de Laforest was directed to communicate to the Diet. In this note he expressed regret that he was forced to publish negotiations, which, from their nature, ought to have remained secret; but he added that, since Austria compelled him to it by publicly calumniating his intentions, he declared that these pretended overtures of the cabinet of Vienna to the French cabinet related not to the general arrangement of the affair of the indemnities but to the extension of the Austrian frontier to the Isar and even to the Lech, that is to say, the erasure of Bavaria from the list of German powers; that the pretensions of Austria, carried from Paris, where they were unsuccessful, to Petersburg, where they were equally unsuccessful, lastly to Munich, where they had assumed a threatening tone, had obliged the mediating powers to interfere with a view to insure the peace of Germany, and with the peace of Germany that of the continent.

This reply, richly deserved, but exaggerated in one point, the *imputation* upon Austria of having been desirous to extend her-

self to the Lech (she had in fact made mention of the Isar only)—this reply deeply mortified the imperial cabinet, which clearly saw that it had to deal with an adversary as resolute in politics as he was in war.

Meanwhile, it was requisite that the negotiation should be kept going. M. de Laforest, authorized by his cabinet, employed the necessary means for deciding the vote of Mayence. A promise was given to M. d'Albini, representing the elector of Mayence, to insure the revenue of the arch-chancellor not in annuities, but in immediate territories, not dependent on any prince. To this promise, which was made in a formal manner, were added some tolerably plain threats, in case the plan should be thwarted. In this manner the vote of M. d'Albini was decided. But it was not possible to obtain the pure and simple admission of the plan. The honour of the Germanic body required that the extraordinary deputation, in taking it for the ground-work of its labour, should make at least some slight alterations in it. The interest of some of the petty princes demanded several modifications of detail; and Prussia, moreover, from motives not to be avowed, agreed with Mayence to separate the general considerations from the plan itself, and to recast them in a new form. Among these considerations, in fact, there was one relative to the mediate possessions of the Church, which had been reserved either to supply some complements of indemnity, or ecclesiastical pensions. Many of these domains were enclosed in the territory of Prussia, and that power, already so favourably treated, entertained a hope of saving them from any new assignation and appropriating them exclusively to herself. She coincided, therefore, in the ideas of Mayence, and agreed with that State to remodel the part of the plan comprehending the general considerations; but she agreed, at the same time, to adopt the principal bases of the territorial division in a previous *conclusum*, declaring that the changes which were to be made in it, should be made in concert with the ministers of the mediating powers. It was understood, moreover, that this whole business should be finished by the 24th of October, 1802 (2nd Brumaire, year XI.), which was two months, reckoning, not from the date of the declaration of the powers, but from the day on which their note had been *dictated* to the deputation, that is to say read and transcribed into the minutes of the Diet.

On the 8th of September (21st Fructidor) this previous *conclusum* was adopted, in spite of all the efforts of the imperial minister, M. de Hugel. Brandenburg, Bavaria, Wirtemberg, Hesse-Cassel, Mayence, that is to say, five States out of eight, admitted the previous *conclusum*, comprehending the entire plan, excepting some accessory modifications, which were to be introduced into it in concert with the mediating ministers. In this sitting, Saxony advanced a step by expressing a middle opinion. That State wished the plan to be received as a *clue* to guide them through the labyrinth of the indemnities.

Bohemia and the Teutonic Order opposed the adoption. Ac-

conform to the constitutional forms, the imperial minister ought to have communicated the *conclusum* voted to the mediating ministers. M. de Hugel obstinately refused to do so. For the rest, he was incessantly excusing himself for the obstacles which he was throwing in the way of the negotiation, and using his utmost efforts to draw a friendly overture from the ministers of France and Russia, repeating to them every day that the slightest advantage conceded to the house of Austria, to save at least her honour, would decide her to allow the *conclusum* to pass. His whole policy now consisted in tiring out the French and Russian legations, in order to induce the First Consul either to a concession of territory on the Inn, or to a combination of votes in the three colleges, which should insure the preservation of the Austrian influence in the empire. The conduct which M. de Laforest, an adept in this sort of tactics, adopted and persuaded his cabinet to adopt, was to proceed resolutely towards the goal, in spite of the Austrian legation, to grant nothing at Ratisbon, and to refer the Austrian ministers to Paris, saying that there they might perhaps obtain something, not before, but after the facilities which should have been obtained from them in the course of the negotiation.

The imperial legation, in order to gain time for negotiating in Paris, strove to procure the passing of a new modified *conclusum*, which was to be sent to the mediating ministers, for the purpose of consulting them upon the changes which it might appear expedient to adopt. This attempt ended in nothing but putting the legation of Saxony into an ill humour, and adding that member of the grand deputation to the majority of five votes, which was already pronounced.

Though the *imperial plenipotence* stood like a wall, as M. de Laforest wrote, between the extraordinary deputation and the mediating ministers—for it still persisted in refusing to communicate to the latter the acts of that extraordinary deputation—it was, nevertheless, agreed that the claims addressed to the Diet by the petty princes should be officially communicated to those two ministers; that all this should take place by means of mere notes; and that the modifications admitted in consequence of these claims should be specified in resolutions, the whole of which should form the *definitive conclusum*.

As soon as the way was opened to claims, they were not long in arriving, as it may easily be supposed; but they came from petty princes, for the shares of the great houses had been settled in Paris, at the time of the general negotiation. These petty princes bestowed themselves in all directions to gain protectors. Unfortunately, and this was the only circumstance to be regretted in this memorable negotiation, French *employés*, men bred in the schools of the Directory, soiled their hands with the pecuniary transactions which the German princes, impatient to improve their condition, lavished without discernment. In general, the wretched *employés* received these presents, sold an influence which they



did not possess. M. de Laforest, a man of perfect integrity, and principal representative of France at Ratisbon, paid little attention to the recommendations addressed to him in favour of this or that house; he even denounced them to his government. The First Consul, when apprized, wrote several letters to the minister of the police, with a view to put an end to this odious traffic, which only made dupes; for these pretended recommendations, paid for at a high rate, had no influence whatever upon the arrangements concluded at Ratisbon.

The greatest difficulty consisted not in settling the supplements to indemnities, but in laying them upon the reserved domains, which were moreover to supply the pensions of the abolished clergy. The efforts of Prussia to save the domains situated in her States from this double charge, occasioned vehement disputes, and were very injurious to the dignity of that court. It was necessary, in the first place, to find the complement of revenue promised to the prince arch-chancellor, elector of Mayence. The following plan of making it up for the moment was devised. Among the free cities retained were Ratisbon and Wetzlar, the latter maintained in its quality of free city on account of the imperial chamber, which was seated there. Both ill administered, like most of the free cities, they had an existence the continuance of which was not very desirable. They were assigned to the prince arch-chancellor. This was a perfectly suitable arrangement; for Ratisbon was the city where the Diet met, and Wetzlar that where the supreme court of the empire sat. It was natural to give them to the prince-director of the affairs of Germany. Those two cities, Ratisbon in particular, were overjoyed at their new destination. The prince arch-chancellor, possessing Aschaffenburg, Ratisbon, and Wetzlar, would have a revenue of 650,000 florins secured in territory. It was necessary to find 350,000 more for him: 53,000 were wanted for the house of Stolberg and Isenburg, and 10,000 for the duke of Oldenburg, uncle and protégé of the emperor Alexander. These made a total of 413,000 florins, to be charged upon the reserved possessions of the Church, besides ecclesiastical pensions. Baden and Wirtemberg had already assented to the sum payable upon the reserved possessions situated in their dominions. Prussia and Bavaria had each to bear one-half of the 413,000 florins that were yet to be found. Bavaria was, in a financial point of view, very heavily burdened, as well by the quantity of pensions which had devolved upon her, as by the debts which had been transferred from her old States to the new. Prussia would not even contribute 200,000 of the 413,000 florins which were still deficient. She had devised a method of procuring them, which was to make the free cities of Hamburg, Bremen, and Lübeck, which she strongly coveted, pay these 413,000 florins. This rapacity excited scandal at Ratisbon; and M. de Görtz, the Prussian minister, was so ashamed of it that, for a moment, he was ready to resign his post; but M. de La-



forest dissuaded him from it, for the interest of the negotiation itself.

The faculty of preferring claims granted to the petty princes had revived a great number of extinct pretensions. Another cause had contributed to this revival, namely, the rumour generally current at Ratisbon, that Austria was on the point of obtaining in Paris a supplementary indemnity for the archduke Ferdinand. Hesse-Cassel, jealous of what had been done for Baden, Hesse-Darmstadt of what had been done for Hesse-Cassel, Orange-Nassau, of the reported addition destined for the late duke of Tuscany, demanded supplements, which, by the by, were nowhere to be found. The occupations by main force, continued without interruption, increased the general confusion. The Germanic body found itself in precisely the same state that France was under the Constituent Assembly, at the moment of the abolition of the feudal system. The margrave of Baden, to whom Mannheim, formerly the property of the house of Bavaria, had been allotted, was at variance with this latter house about a collection of pictures. Detachments of troops belonging to the two princes had nearly come to blows. To complete this melancholy spectacle, Austria, having pretensions of feudal origin to a multitude of domains in Suabia, caused the poles with the arms of Baden, Wirtemberg, and Bavaria to be pulled down in the different towns or abbeys assigned to those States by the plan of the indemnities. Lastly, Prussia, seizing the bishopric of Münster, would not put into possession the counts of the empire, who were sharers with her in that bishopric.

Amidst these disorders, Austria, aware that she must compromise, offered to adhere immediately to the plan of the mediating powers, if the bank of the Inn were conceded to her, on condition of her relinquishment to Bavaria of some of her possessions in Suabia. She again proposed to that house the city of Augsburg for its capital. She demanded, moreover, the creation of two additional electors; one was to be the archduke of Tuscany, destined to become sovereign of Salzburg, and the other the archduke Charles, then grand-master of the Teutonic Order. On these conditions, she was ready to consider the archdukes as sufficiently indemnified, and to yield to the wishes of the mediating powers.

After all that had occurred in regard to Passau, the First Consul could not prevail on Bavaria to cede the frontier of the Inn; and it would have been still more difficult for him to induce Germany to accept three electors at once belonging to the single house of Austria, namely, Bohemia, Salzburg, and the Teutonic Order. Lastly, he was determined not to sacrifice the free city of Augsburg. He insinuated that he might perhaps go so far as to propose to Bavaria to give up a bishopric, such as Eichstädt, but that beyond this it was impossible for him to go.

*Time passed:* it was now Vendemiaire (October), and the

final term, fixed for the 2nd Brumaire (October 24) approached. The mediators were in haste to finish. They had heard all the petty claims, entertained such as deserved to be listened to, and drawn up the regulations which were to accompany the distribution of the territories. The electoral dignity, claimed by the emperor Alexander for Mecklenburg, had not appeared to any one possible to be granted, for that would have been another Protestant elector added to the six already existing in a College of nine. The disproportion was too great to admit of further increase. This claim had been set aside. There had been made a new distribution of the *virile votes* (so the votes in the College of the princes were called); and the votes of the princes dispossessed on the left bank had been transferred to their new States. Hence resulted, in the College of the princes, as in the College of the electors, a considerable change in favour of the Protestants, for the places of prelates or abbots were filled up by secular princes of the reformed religion. To form a sort of counterpoise, new votes had been attributed to Austria for Salzburg, for Styria, for Carniola and Carinthia. But the Catholic princes had not principalities which could afford a pretext for the creation of new votes in the Diet. Notwithstanding all that had been done, the proportion, which, as we have said, was formerly fifty-four Catholic votes to forty-three Protestant, was now thirty-one Catholic votes to sixty-two Protestant. Hence, however, it must not be inferred that the Austrian party was in an inferiority proportionate to these numbers. All the Protestant votes, as we have elsewhere observed, were not votes insured to Prussia; and, with the imperial prerogatives, with the respect still enjoyed by the house of Austria, with the apprehensions which the house of Brandenburg began to excite, the balance might still be maintained between the two rival houses.

As for the College of the cities, it had been organized in an independent manner, and pains had been taken to render it less inferior to the two others. The eight free cities were reduced to six, since Wetzlar and Ratisbon had been granted to the arch-chancellor. Prussia was for suppressing this third college, and giving to each of the cities a vote in the College of the princes. This would have been the means of suppressing one or two more, particularly Nuremberg, the possession of which she coveted. The French legation obstinately refused its assent.

Nothing was said concerning the condition of the *immediate nobility*, who were in the most painful anxiety, being openly threatened by Prussia and Bavaria.

At length, the 2nd of Brumaire being near at hand, the new plan was submitted to the extraordinary deputation to be deliberated upon. Brandenburg, Bavaria, Hesse-Cassel, Wirtemberg, Mayence, approved it. Saxony, Bohemia, and the Teutonic Order, declared that they would take it into consideration, but that, before they pronounced definitively, they would await the con-

clusion of the negotiation begun in Paris with Austria; for otherwise, said they, we might be liable to vote a plan, which it would afterwards be necessary to modify.

The extraordinary deputation had still to give its definitive vote, and only three or four days of the term of two months were unexpired. The honour of the great mediating powers was concerned in obtaining the adoption of their plan within the time fixed. M. de Laforest and M. de Buhler, who sincerely cooperated together, made the utmost efforts to procure the definitive adoption of the *conclusum* on the 29th Vendemiaire (21st October). They encountered infinite difficulties, for M. de Hugel reported everywhere that a courier from Paris, bringing important changes, was expected every moment; that in Paris itself a postponement was desired. He even went so far as to threaten M. d'Albini, telling him that, according to certain intelligence, orders were coming from the elector of Mayence disavowing his conduct and enjoining him not to vote. This was shaking one of the five favourable votes and thus far one of the most steady. These threats were carried so far that M. d'Albini was affronted, and only rendered the more firm in his resolution. To crown the embarrassment, Prussia, at the very last moment, created fresh obstacles: she desired an article dispensing her from furnishing, out of the reserved domains, her share of the 413,000 florins that remained to be provided. She even aspired to appropriate to herself certain dependencies of the ecclesiastical domains enclosed in her States, and assigned to various princes by the plan of the indemnities. She had, in short, a thousand pretensions, each more vexatious, more misplaced than the other, which, brought forward in an unexpected manner at the close of the negotiation, were of a nature to render it abortive. It was not the Prussian minister, M. de Görtz, a very worthy personage, blushing for the part which he was obliged to act, but a financier who had been joined with him, that raised these difficulties. At length, Messrs. de Laforest and de Buhler gave a last impulsion, and on the 29th Vendemiaire (October 21st) the definitive *conclusum* was adopted by the extraordinary deputation of the eight States, and the mediation was in some sort accomplished within the term fixed by the mediating powers. On the last day, Saxony voted like the five States forming the usual majority, out of respect for that majority.

Still, however, there were many details to be settled. The division of the territories and the organic regulations did not form one and the same act. It had been proposed that the latter should be embodied in a single resolution, which was to have a title already known in German diplomacy, that of *recess*. The work of the extraordinary deputation being finished, had then to be carried to the Germanic Diet, of which the extraordinary deputation was but a commission. The precaution had been taken in the *draft of the definitive conclusum* to say that the *recess* would be

communicated directly to the mediating ministers. This was intended to prevent the refusal of communications on the part of the imperial ministers to the mediating ministers, a refusal which had already occasioned mischievous delays.

It now remained to blend the principal act and the regulations into one paper: this work was set about immediately. It afforded M. de Hugel a new opportunity for raising embarrassing questions. Thus, on occasion of this definitive digest, he doggedly asked if members were not aware that in the *recess* there was an assignment, upon some security or other, of the 413,000 florins due to the arch-chancellor, to the duke of Oldenburg, and to the houses of Isenburg and Stolberg; he asked if this was not the moment for providing for the pensions of the archbishop of Treves, the bishops of Liege, Spire, and Strasburg, whose States had passed with the left bank of the Rhine to France, and who knew not to whom to address themselves to obtain alimentary pensions; whether an indemnity was not to be granted to the immediate nobility for the loss of their feudal rights, a loss for which they had heretofore been promised compensation.

To all demands for new allotments Prussia replied by refusals, or by referring to the free cities. Bavaria alleged with reason that she was overwhelmed with debt, and that her resources were likely to be further diminished by what would be granted to Austria in the negotiation set on foot in Paris. M. de Hugel replied that this was not the way to meet sacred debts.

These controversies produced a most mischievous effect at Ratisbon. The greediness of Prussia and the complaisance shown her by France were especial subjects of complaint: people, it was said, no longer recognised the lofty character of the First Consul, who allowed his name and his favour to be so abused. All minds rallied around Austria, and even those which were not in general well disposed towards her. It was better, they thought, to be under a preponderant influence in the empire, it was better to be under that of the ancient house of Austria, which, no doubt had formerly abused its supremacy, but which had as often protected as oppressed the Germans. Among the second-rate States, such as Bavaria, Wirtemberg, the two Hesses, Baden, there arose a disposition to form, in the centre of Germany, a league to resist Prussia as well as Austria.

At length, in spite of all the art employed to foster these difficulties, the *recess* was digested and adopted by the extraordinary deputation on the 2nd Frimaire, year XI. (23rd November). No resource was pointed out for defraying the payment of the 413,000 florins left without assignation. The agents of Austria wished to know, they said, before they put a finishing hand to the work, the result of the negotiations between their court and France.

The imperial legation thus found itself definitively vanquished by the activity and the perseverance of the mediating ministers.

who steadily pursued their way, supported by a majority of five votes, sometimes of six, out of eight, when Saxony had been induced to join that majority by the obstinate resistance of Austria. M. de Hugel resolved to let things take their course. It was necessary to carry the *recess* of this special commission, called the extraordinary deputation, to the Diet itself. To pass from one to the other, the members of the majority had determined to dispense with the medium of the ministers of the emperor, if they refused the transmission. The Germans, however, even those most favourable to the plan of indemnity, were inclined to the faithful observance of the constitutional regulations. They found the empire, indeed, terribly shaken, and in the overthrow of the constitution they discerned a new domination, which they dreaded quite as much as the old one. Even those who at first were partisans of Prussia rallied to those who had always venerated Austria as the most perfect image of the old order of things. They had arrived at that point at which people soon arrive in revolutions—to distrust new masters and to hate the old ones rather less. They wished, therefore, not to have to dispense with the imperial ministers; and the news of a conference in Paris between Austria and the First Consul gave rise to a hope of reconciliation, which was hailed with joy by all.

M. de Hugel, brought at length into the system of condescension, agreed to communicate the acts of the extraordinary deputation to the mediating ministers, that the latter might address themselves to the Diet and require the adoption of the *recess* as a law of the empire. But, with a meanness worthy of an old formalist, M. de Hugel refused to send the *recess* itself, clothed with the imperial colours; he communicated a printed copy, with a despatch guaranteeing its authenticity.

Without loss of time, on the 4th of December (13th Frimaire) the two French and Russian ministers communicated the *recess* to the Diet, declaring that they approved the whole of it in the name of their respective courts; and they begged that it might be taken into consideration immediately, and adopted as a law of the empire with the least possible delay. This promptness in laying hold of the Diet was one way to bring forward either the ministers of the German States who were absent, or the instructions of those who had not yet received any.

Here new precautions relative to the composition of the Diet became necessary. To admit all the States suppressed on the left bank by the conquest of France, and on the right bank by the system of secularizations, to vote, would be running the risk of an invincible resistance on their part, or condemning them to pronounce their own suppression. It was agreed with the directorial minister, that is the arch-chancellor, to convoke exclusively the States preserved in the empire, whether their title was changed or not. Thus, in the College of the electors, neither Treves nor Cologne was summoned, but Mayence, whose title was constituted



*ex jure novo*, was convoked. In the College of the princes were excluded those whose territories had been incorporated with the French Republic or with the Helvetic Republic, as, for example, the secular and ecclesiastical princes of Deux-Ponts, Montbelliard, Liege, Worms, Spire, Basle, Strasburg. There were provisionally retained the princes who had obtained new principalities, with the proviso of regularizing their title by and by, and causing it to be transferred to the secularized territories which had devolved to them. In the College of the cities, the whole mass of the incorporated cities was suppressed, and only the six cities preserved were retained, namely, Augsburg, Nuremberg, Frankfort, Bremen, Hamburg, and Lübeck.

These precautions were indispensable and they obtained the result expected from them. None of the suppressed States presented themselves, and in the first days of January the Diet commenced its deliberations. The protocol was opened. The States in the three colleges were successively called. Some gave their opinion immediately, others reserved it for the present, as was customary in the Diet. They awaited, before they pronounced definitively, the last remoulding which the proposed *conclusum* would have to undergo, in consequence of the negotiation begun in Paris between France and the court of Vienna.

Things had been conducted to the point desired by the First Consul to permit him at length to grant a satisfaction to Austria. Strictly one might have dispensed with her good-will to the end and made the three Colleges vote in spite of her opposition. The Germans, even such of them as were most mortified, were well aware that it was necessary to bring the business to a conclusion, and they were resolved to vote for the *recess*, after which the occupations of territory already consummated would have been clothed with a sort of legality, and the refusal of sanction on the part of the emperor would not have prevented the indemnified parties from quietly enjoying their new possessions. Still the opposition of the emperor to the new constitution, how unreasonable soever it might be, would have placed the empire in a false, uncertain situation, a situation far from conformable to the pacific intentions of the mediating powers. It was better to compromise, and to obtain the adhesion of the court of Vienna. This was the intention of the First Consul: he had waited so long only that he might have fewer sacrifices to make to Austria and fewer sacrifices to require of Bavaria; for it was from her that he should be obliged to demand what would be granted to the other.

Accordingly, towards the end of December, he had consented to confer with M. de Cobentzel, and he had at length agreed with him upon some concessions in favour of the house of Austria. Bavaria having shown an invincible repugnance to concede the line of the Inn, either on account of the very valuable salt-works situated between the Inn and the Salza, or on account



of the position of Munich, which would have been too near the new frontier, he had been obliged to renounce this sort of arrangement. The First Consul was then reduced to the necessity of ceding the bishopric of Eichstädt, situated on the Danube, containing 70,000 inhabitants, yielding a revenue of 350,000 florins, and originally destined for the Palatine house. In consequence of this augmentation granted to the archduke Ferdinand, the bishoprics of Brixen and Trent were withdrawn from his lot and secularized for the advantage of Austria. The latter thus avowed in a manner sufficiently plain the interest that lurked beneath her zeal of relationship. It is true that, in consideration of this secularization, she took from her own domains the little district of the Ortenau to increase the lot of the duke of Modena, consisting as we have seen, of the Brisgau. The Ortenau was in the country of Baden and near the Brisgau.

Austria had demanded the creation of two more electors of her house ; one of them was granted: this was the grand-duke Ferdinand, thus destined to be elector of Salzburg. Thus there were to be ten electors instead of nine, according to the plan of the mediators, and instead of the eight comprehended in the late Germanic constitution. There were consequently four Catholic electors, Bohemia, Bavaria, Mayence, and Salzburg, against six Protestant, Brandenburg, Hanover, Saxony, Hesse-Cassel, Wirtemberg, and Baden.

These conditions were inserted in a convention signed in Paris on the 26th of December, 1802 (5th Nivôse, year XI.), by M. de Cobentzel and Joseph Bonaparte. M. de Markoff was invited to accede to it on behalf of Russia, and he needed not much inviting, devoted as he was to Austria. Prussia looked cold but made no resistance. Bavaria submitted, demanding to be indemnified for the sacrifice required of her, and especially to be relieved from her share of those 413,000 florins, which nobody was willing to pay.

Austria had promised to raise no further obstacle to the work of the mediation, and she almost kept her word. Besides the concessions obtained in Paris, she wished to obtain one more, which could not be negotiated but at Ratisbon with the persons who had to draw up the *recess*. This concession related to the number of the virile votes in the College of the princes. While the protocol was open at the Diet, and opinions were expressed there in succession, the extraordinary deputation was sitting at the same time and remodelling once more the plan of the mediation agreeably to the convention of Paris. Thus the Diet was giving opinions upon a plan which the grand deputation was altering every day. The territorial changes agreed upon in Paris had been inserted; the creation of the new elector of Salzburg had been added; lastly, the new virile votes, which changed the proportion of the Protestant and Catholic votes in the College of the princes, and raised the Catholic votes to fifty-four

against seventy-seven Protestant, instead of thirty-one against sixty-two, had been introduced. It was necessary, however, to settle all these questions and especially that relating to the 413,000 florins. Bavaria, which had lost 350,000 florins with Eichstädt, could not be compelled to give 200,000 of that amount. She had refused to do so, and this refusal was thought but natural. But Prussia, though she had lost nothing, would not bear her share of so light a burden. They will not go to war for 200,000 florins, said M. Haugwitz—a sorry remark, which had offended every body at Ratisbon, and placed the part of Prussia far beneath that of Austria, which, in resisting, defended at least territories and constitutional principles.

The First Consul, had he acted strictly, could have overcome this penuriousness; but, having need of Prussia to the end, in order to ensure the success of his plan, he was obliged to humour her. Nobody could tell how either the arch-chancellor, or the pensions of the clergy, or some other debts formerly assigned upon the reserved domains, were to be paid. To divide this charge, in the form of *Roman months*\*, among the whole Germanic body, was impossible, on account of the insurmountable difficulty at all times of making the confederation pay the general expenses. The state of dilapidation of the federal fortresses was a proof of this. No other resource was left but to devise an expedient which somewhat diminished the liberality of the first French plan in regard to the navigation of the rivers. All the tolls on the Elbe, the Weser, and the Rhine had been abolished. It was necessary, however, to provide for some indispensable expenses; for instance, the keeping up of the towing-paths, without which the navigation would soon have been stopped. It was resolved to establish a moderate toll upon the Rhine, far inferior in amount to all the tolls of a feudal nature with which the river was formerly burdened, and from the surplus left by this toll to take the 350,000 florins for the prince arch-chancellor, the 10,000 florins for the duke of Oldenburg, the 53,000 for the houses of Isenburg and Stolberg, and a few thousand florins more, to humour various princes, who meanly refused to pay the contributions imposed upon them. In this manner, the avarice of Prussia was gratified; Bavaria was relieved from the 200,000 florins which she should have furnished for her share, the loss which she had sustained by ceding Eichstädt was reduced; and the promise given to the prince arch-chancellor to ensure to him an independent revenue was fulfilled. All Germany approved this arrangement, for they thought that a revenue of 1,000,000 florins was barely sufficient for the prince who had the honour to preside over the Germanic Diet, and who was the last representative of the three ecclesiastical electors of the Holy Empire. He was constituted

---

\* The ordinary expenses divided among the whole confederation, according to proportions anciently established, were called *Roman months*.

sole administrator of this toll, in concert with France, who had the right to control the expense incurred on the left bank. In this point of view, France had no reason to complain of this arrangement, for from this moment, the prince arch-chancellor had every interest to keep on good terms with her.

At length the plan, re-modelled for the last time, was adopted on the 25th of February (6th Ventôse, year XI.), as a final act\* by the extraordinary deputation, and sent immediately to the Diet, where it was voted almost unanimously by the three Colleges. It met with no opposition but on the part of Sweden, whose sovereign, already exhibiting symptoms of that derangement of mind which hurled him at last from the throne, astonished Europe by his royal vagaries. He launched violent censures against the mediating powers and the German princes who had concurred in giving so grievous a shock to the ancient Germanic Constitution. This ridiculous sally of a prince who was held of no account in Europe, lessened not the satisfaction that was felt on seeing an end put to the long anxieties of the empire.

The Germans, even those who regretted the old order of things, but who retained some equity in their judgment, acknowledged that on this occasion they reaped the inevitable fruits of an imprudent war; that, the left bank of the Rhine having been lost in consequence of that war, it was absolutely necessary to make a new division of the Germanic territory; that this division was certainly more advantageous to the great than to the petty houses, but that, had it not been for France, this inequality would have been carried still further; that the Constitution, modified in various respects, was nevertheless saved, as regarded the groundwork, and could not have been reformed in a more enlightened spirit of conservation. Lastly, they acknowledged that, but for the vigour of the First Consul, anarchy would have crept into Germany, in consequence of the pretensions of all kinds raised at the moment. What proves more strongly than any words the feeling then entertained for the head of the French government is that, on consideration of the various questions left in suspense, it was desired that his powerful hand should not be withdrawn immediately from the affairs of Germany. It was wished that France should in quality of guarantee, undertake to watch over her work.

There was, in fact, more than one question, general or particular, which the mediation had not been able to resolve. Prussia was in open quarrel with the city of Nuremberg, and ventured upon tyrannical proceedings towards it. The same power had as yet declined to put the counts of Westphalia in possession of their share of the bishopric of Munster. Frankfort was at variance with the neighbouring princes on account of a charge imposed upon it in their favour, in compensation for certain possessions which they had ceded. Prussia and Bavaria,

---

\* This important paper is given at full length in Schoell's "*Histoire abrégée des traités de paix*," chap. xxxii.—Translator.

taking advantage of the silence of the *recess*, were for incorporating the immediate nobility with their States. Austria asserted in Suabia a great number of feudal rights of obscure origin, and infringing on the sovereignty of the dukes of Wirtemberg, Baden, and Bavaria. She had above all committed an unheard-of violation of property. The ecclesiastical principalities recently secularized had funds deposited in the bank of Vienna, funds which belonged to them, and which ought to have been transferred to the indemnified princes. The Austrian administration had seized these funds, amounting to the sum of 30,000,000 florins, which reduced certain princes to despair. All these acts of violence excited a wish for the institution of an authority which should attend to the execution of the *recess*, as had been the case after the peace of Westphalia. The re-composition of the ancient circles charged to provide for the defence of particular interests, was also desired. The German Church yet remained to be organized: deprived of its princely existence, it had great need of a new organization.

The First Consul could not undertake to resolve these last difficulties, for he would have been obliged to constitute himself the permanent legislator of Germany. All that he had a right to occupy himself with was to save the equilibrium of the empire, part of the European equilibrium, by determining what share each State ought to have, either in territory, or influence in the Diet. The rest was the exclusive province of the Diet itself, the only authority invested with the legislative power: and to this task it would be equal, if seconded by France, the guarantee of the new Germanic Constitution, as she was of the old. The weak, threatened by the strong, already invoked this guarantee. It was for the most powerful German courts to prevent by their moderation the new intervention of a foreign arm. Unfortunately, that was scarcely to be reckoned upon, considering the actual conduct of Prussia and Austria.

The emperor, after delaying his ratification, had at length sent it, but with two reservations. One had for its object the maintenance of all the privileges of the immediate nobility; the other a new distribution of the Protestant and Catholic votes in the Diet. This was keeping but in part the promise given to the First Consul, as the price of the convention of the 26th of December.

However, the difficulties truly European, those of territory, were surmounted, thanks to the energy and prudent intervention of general Bonaparte. If any thing had made evident his ascendancy over Europe, it was this most ably conducted negotiation, in which, uniting address and firmness with justice, making use by turns of the ambition of Prussia and the pride of Russia to resist Austria, curbing the latter without driving her to despair, he had imposed his own will upon Germany, for the welfare of Germany itself and the peace of the world—the only case in which it is allowable and useful to interfere in the affairs of other States.



## BOOK XVI.

---

### RUPTURE OF THE PEACE OF AMIENS.

Efforts of the First Consul to re-establish the Colonial Greatness of France—Ambition of all the Powers to possess Colonies—America, the West and the East Indies—Mission of General Decaen to India—Efforts to recover St. Domingo—Description of that Island—Revolution of the Blacks—Character, Power, and Policy of Toussaint Louverture—He aspires to render himself independent—The First Consul sends an Expedition to ensure the Authority of the Mother-Country—Landing of the French Troops at Saint Domingo, at the Cape, and at Port au Prince—Burning of the Cape—Submission of the Negroes—Temporary Prosperity of the Colony—Endeavours of the First Consul to restore the Navy—Mission of Colonel Sébastiani to the East—Attention bestowed on the Internal Prosperity—The Simplon, Mont Genève, the fortress of Alessandria—Camp of Veterans in the conquered Provinces—New Towns founded in La Vendée—La Rochelle and Cherbourg—The Civil Code, the Institute, the Administration of the Clergy—Visit to Normandy—The Jealousy of England excited by the Greatness of France—The English Mercantile Interest more hostile to France than the English Aristocracy—Violence of the Newspapers conducted by the Emigrants—Pensions granted to Georges and to the Chouans—Remonstrances of the First Consul—Subterfuge of the British Cabinet—Articles in retaliation inserted in the *Moniteur*—Continuation of the Swiss Affair—The Petty Cantons rise under the conduct of Reding, the Landamman, and March upon Berne—The Government of the Moderates obliged to flee to Lausanne—The Interposition of the First Consul solicited; it is at first refused, afterwards granted—He despatches General Ney with 30,000 Men, and summons to Paris Deputies chosen from among all the Parties to give a Constitution to Switzerland—Agitation in England; outcries of the War-Party against the Interposition of France—The English Cabinet, alarmed by these outcries, commits the Fault of countermanding the Evacuation of Malta, and sending an Agent into Switzerland to subsidize the Insurgents—Promptness of the French Interference—General Ney master of Helvetia in a few Days—The Swiss Deputies assembled in Paris are presented to the First Consul—His Speech to them—Act of Mediation—The Wisdom of that Act admired by Europe—The English Cabinet embarrassed at the Promptness and the Excellence of the Result—Stormy Debates in the British Parliament—Violence of the party of Grenville, Wyndham, &c.—Noble Language of Mr. Fox in favour of Peace—Public Opinion calmed for a moment—Arrival of Lord Whitworth in Paris and of General Andréossi in London—Courteous Reception given on both sides to the two Ambassadors—The British Cabinet sorry for having retained Malta, would fain evacuate it, but dares not—Unseasonable Publication of the Report of Colonel Sébastiani on the State of the East—Mischievous Effect of this Report in England—The First Consul



determines to have a Personal Explanation with Lord Whitworth—Long and memorable Interview—The frankness of the First Consul misunderstood and misinterpreted—Report of the State of the French Republic, containing an Expression offensive to British Pride—Royal Message in reply—The two Nations address a sort of Challenge to each other—Irritation of the First Consul, and public Attack on Lord Whitworth in presence of the Diplomatic Body—The First Consul suddenly passes from ideas of Peace to ideas of War—His first Preparations—Cession of Louisiana to the United States, for the sum of 80,000,000—M. de Talleyrand strives to pacify the First Consul, and opposes a studied Inertness to the increasing Irritation of the two Governments—Lord Whitworth seconds him—Prolongation of this Situation—Necessity for putting an end to it—The British Cabinet finally declares its Determination to retain Malta—The Addington Administration, for fear of losing its Influence in Parliament, persists in demanding Malta—Various Middle Terms devised but without success—Offer of France to place Malta as a Deposit in the hands of the Emperor Alexander—Refusal of that Offer—Departure of the two Ambassadors—Rupture of the Peace of Amiens—Public Anxiety both in London and Paris—Causes of the Shortness of that Peace—Who is to blame for the Rupture?

## BOOK XVI.

## RUPTURE OF THE PEACE OF AMIENS.

WHILE the First Consul was regulating like supreme arbiter the affairs of the European continent, his ardent activity, embracing both worlds, extended to America and the Indies for the purpose of re-establishing there the ancient colonial greatness of France.

Now that the nations of Europe have become manufacturing rather than commercial; now that they have successfully imitated and even surpassed the productions which they formerly imported from beyond the seas; now, in short, that great colonies, emancipated from the mother-countries, have raised themselves to the rank of independent States, the aspect of the world is so changed as scarcely to be recognized. New objects of ambition have succeeded those which then divided it, and we find it difficult to comprehend the motives for which, a century ago, the blood of men was spilt. England possessed, by the title of colony, North America; Spain, by the same title, possessed South America; France was mistress of the principal West India islands, and the most flourishing of all, St. Domingo. Each of these powers imposed on its colonies the obligation not to dispose of any tropical productions but to herself, to take no European productions but from her, to admit no vessels but hers, to form no seamen but for her navy. Thus each colony was a plantation, a market, and a port, closed to all others. England wished to draw exclusively from her American provinces their sugar, their timber, and their raw cotton; Spain wished to be the only one to extract from Mexico and Peru the metals so coveted by all nations; England and France wished to rule India, that they might export from it the cotton thread, the muslins, the printed calicoes, objects in universal request; they wished to furnish their productions in exchange, and to carry on this traffic under their own flag alone. These ardent desires of nations have now given place to others. Sugar, which used only to be extracted from a reed bred and cultivated beneath the hottest sun, is now extracted from a plant grown on the Elbe and on the Scheldt. The cottons then spun with such fineness and patience by Indian hands, are now spun in Europe by machines set in motion by the combustion of coal. Muslin is woven in the mountains of Switzerland

and of the Forez. The cottons, woven in Scotland, in Ireland, in Normandy, in Flanders, printed in Alsace, fill America and inundate the markets of India. With the exception of coffee and tea, productions which art cannot imitate, every thing has been equalled or surpassed. European chemistry has already superseded most of the dye stuffs formerly brought from between the tropics. Metals are extracted from the flanks of European mountains. Gold is obtained from the Ural; Spain is beginning to find silver in her own bosom. A great political revolution has accompanied these revolutions of industry. France has favoured the insurrection of the English colonies in North America; England, in return, has contributed to the independence of the South American colonies. Both are at this day nations either great already or destined to become so. Under the influence of the same causes, an African society, whose destinies are not to be foreseen, has developed itself in St. Domingo. Lastly, India, under the sceptre of England, is now nothing but a conquest, ruined by the progress of European industry, and made use of to provide for a few military officers, a few civil servants, and a few officials of the mother-country. In our days, nations wish to produce every thing themselves, to dispose of their surplus produce to their less skilful neighbours, and to consent to import none but raw materials, nay, even to raise those materials as near as possible to their own soil: witness the repeated attempts to naturalize cotton in Egypt and in Algeria. In this manner, the grand spectacle of colonial ambition has been succeeded by the spectacle of manufacturing ambition. Thus the world is incessantly changing, and each age needs some efforts of memory and intelligence to comprehend the age which preceded it.

This immense revolution in commerce and industry, began under Louis XVI. with the American war, and ended under Napoleon with the continental blockade. The long struggle between England and France was the principal cause of it; for while the first was anxious to secure to herself the monopoly of exotic productions, the second revenged herself by imitating them. The promoter of this imitation was Napoleon, whose destiny it thus was to give a new face to the world in every respect. But, before he threw France into the continental and manufacturing system, as he did at a later period, Napoleon the consul, full of the ideas of the century which had just closed, more confident in the French naval power than he afterwards was, attempted several vast enterprises for the restoration of our colonial prosperity.

This prosperity had formerly been great enough to justify the regrets and the attempts of which it was then the object. In 1789, France imported from her colonies, sugar, coffee, indigo, &c., to the value of 250 millions a year; she consumed from 80 to 100 millions' worth, and re-exported 150, which she distributed throughout all Europe, principally in the form of refined sugar. *We must double these amounts if we would ascertain their*

equivalents at the present day ; and, assuredly, we should highly value, should rank among our first interests, colonies furnishing materials for a commerce of 500 millions. France would find in this commerce the means of drawing into her hands part of the specie of Spain, who would give us her dollars for our colonial and manufactured productions. At the period of which we are treating, that is in 1802, France, deprived of colonial produce, principally of sugar and coffee, not having any even for her own use, procured it from the Americans, from the Hanseatic towns, from Holland, from Genoa, and, since the peace, from the English. She paid them in specie, not yet having in her scarcely reviving industry the means of paying in the productions of her manufactures. Coin had never appeared, since the time of the assignats, in its former abundance ; it was frequently scarce : and this was shown by the continual efforts of the new Bank to obtain dollars smuggled out of Spain. Hence nothing was more common among the commercial class than to hear complaints of the scarcity of money, and of the inconvenience of being obliged to buy at high prices the sugar and coffee which we formerly obtained from the French possessions. This language must, no doubt, be attributed to certain erroneous ideas respecting the manner in which the balance of trade adjusts itself ; but it must also be attributed to an indisputable fact—the difficulty of procuring colonial produce, and the still greater difficulty of paying for it, either in cash, which had been scarce ever since the assignats, or in the productions, as yet but scanty, of our industry.

If we add that numerous colonists, formerly opulent, but now ruined, encumbered Paris, and joined their complaints to those of the emigrants, the reader may form a complete idea of the motives which operated upon the mind of the First Consul, and inclined him to great colonial enterprizes. It was under these powerful influences that he had given Etruria to Charles IV. to obtain Louisiana. The conditions of the contract were fulfilled on his part, since the Infants were placed on the throne of Etruria, and recognized by all the continental powers ; he wished these conditions to be fulfilled on the part of Charles IV., and he had therefore required that Louisiana should be delivered up to us immediately. An expedition of two ships of the line and some frigates had assembled in the waters of Holland, at Helvoetsluys, to convey troops to the mouth of the Mississippi, and to bring that fine country under the dominion of France. The First Consul having the duchy of Parma at his disposal, was ready to cede it to Spain, at the price of the Floridas and the cession of a small portion of Tuscany, the Siennese, with which he purposed to indemnify the king of Sardinia. The indiscretion of the Spanish government having allowed the particulars of this negotiation to come to the knowledge of the ambassador of England, British jealousy raised a thousand obstacles to the conclusion of this new bargain. The First Consul directed his attention at the same time to the East Indies, and had conferred

the government of our settlements of Pondichery and Chander-nagor on one of the most valiant officers of the army of the Rhine, general Decaen. This officer, whose intelligence was equal to his courage, and who was qualified for the greatest enterprizes, had been selected and sent to India with distant but profound views. The English, said the First Consul to general Decaen in the admirable instructions which he addressed to him, the English are masters of the continent of India; there they are restless, jealous; we must not give them any umbrage, conduct ourselves with mildness and simplicity, submit in those parts to all that honour will allow us to put up with, have no further relations with the neighbouring princes than are indispensable for the maintenance of the French troops and the settlements. But, added the First Consul, you must watch those princes and those people, who support with impatience the British yoke; study their manners, their resources, the means of communicating with them in case of war; ascertain what European force would be necessary to assist them to shake off the English domination; with what *materiel* that force ought to be provided, above all things, the means of victualling it; discover a port which might serve a fleet laden with troops for the point of disembarkation; calculate the time and the means necessary for carrying that port by a *coup de main*; draw up, after a residence of six months, a first report on these various topics; send it by an intelligent and trusty officer, who has seen the whole, and is capable of adding verbal explanations to the written explanations of which he is the bearer; six months afterwards, report again on the same topics from recently acquired information, and send this fresh report by a second officer, equally trust-worthy and intelligent; perform the like task and send off a like messenger every six months; weigh well, in the composition of these reports, the value of every expression, for a word might be liable to influence the most important resolutions; lastly, in case of war, act according to circumstances—either remain in Hindostan or retire to the Isle of France, despatching a great many light vessels to the mother-country, to apprise her of the resolutions adopted by the captain-general. Such were the instructions given to general Decaen, with a view, not to rekindle war, but to profit skilfully by it, if it should happen to break out again.

The greatest efforts of the First Consul were directed towards the West Indies, the principal seat of the colonial power of France. It was with Martinique, Guadeloupe, and St. Domingo that French commerce formerly kept up its most profitable relations. St. Domingo especially figured for at least three-fifths of the 250 millions' worth of produce which France formerly received from her colonies. St. Domingo was then the most flourishing, the most envied, of our possessions beyond sea. Martinique had been fortunate enough to escape the consequences of the revolt of the Negroes; but Guadeloupe and St. Domingo had been turned completely topsy-turvy, and it would require at least an army to

re-establish there, not slavery, for that had become impossible, at least in St. Domingo, but the legitimate sway of the mother-country.

On this island, one hundred leagues long and thirty wide, happily situated at the entrance of the Gulf of Mexico, resplendent with fertility, suited to the cultivation of sugar, coffee, indigo—on this magnificent island, twenty and some thousand white planters, twenty and some thousand free people of different colours, and 400,000 black slaves cultivated the soil and raised immense crops of colonial produce, worth 150 millions of francs, which 30,000 French seamen were employed in conveying to Europe, to be exchanged for home manufactures to a like amount. What should we now think of a colony which supplied us with produce to the value of 300 millions, and opened to us a market for goods to the amount of 300 millions!—for 150 millions in 1789 were equivalent to at least 300 millions in 1845. Unhappily, among these white people, mulattoes, and blacks, were fermenting violent passions, owing to the climate and to a state of society which comprehended alone the two social extremes, haughty wealth, and crouching slavery. In no other colony were these whites so opulent and so wrong-headed, mulattoes so jealous of the superiority of the white race, blacks so inclined to shake off the yoke of both. The opinions professed in the Constituent Assembly at Paris, re-echoed amidst the passions natural to such a country, could not fail to raise a violent tempest, like the hurricane produced in those seas by the sudden meeting of two contrary winds. The whites and the mulattoes, scarcely sufficient to defend themselves if they had been united, were at variance, and, after communicating to the blacks the contagion of their passions, had caused them to rise against themselves. They had felt first their cruelty, then their triumph and their domination. There, as in all societies where war breaks out amongst the classes, the first had been conquered by the second, the first and second by the third. But, unlike what is seen elsewhere, they bore upon their faces the stamp of their diverse origins; their hatred partook of the violence of the physical instincts, and their rage was ferocious as that of wild beasts. Hence the horrors of that revolution surpassed every thing that was witnessed in France in '93, and, notwithstanding the distance, which always blunts the feelings, Europe, already so touched by the spectacles of the continent, had been deeply moved by the unparalleled atrocities to which imprudent, sometimes cruel, masters had driven ferocious slaves. The laws of human society, everywhere alike, had produced there, as elsewhere after long storms, the fatigue which demands a master, a superior being qualified to become such. This master was of the colour of the triumphant race, that is to say, black. His name was Toussaint Louverture. He was an old slave, destitute of the generous daring of Spartacus, but gifted with profound dissimulation and a most extraordinary turn for government. Not much of a soldier, ac-



quainted at most with the art of ambuscades in a country difficult of access, and inferior even in this point to some of his lieutenants, he had, by his intelligence in the general direction of affairs, acquired a prodigious ascendancy. This barbarous race, which bore a grudge to Europeans for despising it, was proud of having in its ranks a man whom the whites themselves admitted to possess high faculties. It beheld in him a living title to liberty, to the consideration of the rest of mankind. Accordingly, it had accepted his iron yoke, a hundred times as heavy as that of the former planters, and submitted to the dire obligation of labour, an obligation which, by slaves, is most heartily detested.

This black slave, having become dictator, had re-established a tolerable state of society in St. Domingo, and accomplished things which one might almost venture to call great, if the theatre had been different, and if they had been less ephemeral.

In that island of St. Domingo, as in every country which has been a prey to a long civil war, a separation had taken place between the martial race, fit for arms, having a propensity for them, and the working race, less disposed to fighting, easy to be led back to labour, yet ready to front dangers, if its liberty should be threatened. The second was of course ten times as numerous as the first.

With the first Toussaint Louverture had composed a permanent army of about 20,000 men, formed into demi-brigades, upon the model of the French armies, having black, and some mulatto, or white officers. These troops, well paid, well fed, formidable enough in a climate which they alone could endure, and on broken ground covered with strong thorny bushes, were formed into several divisions, and commanded by generals of their own colour, most of them tolerably intelligent, but more ferocious than intelligent, such as Christophe, Dessalines, Moses, Maurepas, Laplume. Devoted to Toussaint, they all acknowledged his genius and submitted to his authority. The rest of the population, under the name of cultivators, had resumed their labours. They had been allowed to retain their fire-arms, that they might use them in case of need, if the mother-country should make an attack on their liberty; but they had been obliged to return to the plantations abandoned by the colonists. Toussaint had proclaimed that they were free, but obliged to work five years longer on the estates of their old masters, with a right to a fourth of the gross produce. The white proprietors had been encouraged to return, even such of them as, in a moment of despair, had joined the English in their attempt upon St. Domingo. They had been well received and reinstated in their plantations, peopled with negroes calling themselves free, to whom they gave up, agreeably to the regulation of Toussaint, a fourth of the gross produce, valued in practice in the most arbitrary manner. A very great number of the rich proprietors, who had either fallen in the disturbances in the colony, or emigrated with the old French

nobility, to which they belonged, had neither made their appearance again nor sent out representatives. Their possessions, sequestered like the national domains in France, had been farmed to black officers at a rate which enabled them to enrich themselves. Certain generals, such as Christophe and Dessalines, had in this manner acquired a yearly income of more than a million. These black officers were designated inspectors of cultivation in the districts of which they were military commandants. They were incessantly going their rounds and treating the Negroes with the harshness peculiar to new masters. Sometimes they saw to it that justice was done them by the planters; but more frequently ordered them to be flogged for idleness or insubordination, and engaged in a sort of incessant chase for the purpose of bringing back to work those who had contracted a fondness for a vagabond life. Frequent visits to the parishes enabled them to discover what labourers had left their original habitations, and furnished the means of bringing them back. Often too, Dessalines and Christophe caused them to be hanged in their presence. Hence labour had been resumed with incredible activity under these new chiefs, who made the submission of the so-called free Negroes a profit to themselves. And, far be it for us to treat such a sight with contempt!—for these chiefs, assuming the authority to force their fellows to work, even for their exclusive advantage; those blacks, submitting to it without any great profit to themselves, compensated solely by the idea that they were free, excite in us more esteem than the spectacle of the idleness, profligacy, and moral debasement exhibited by the Negroes left to themselves in the recently enfranchised colonies of England, where premature emancipation has proved a total failure.

Thanks to the system established by Toussaint, most of the abandoned plantations had been again brought into cultivation. Hence, in 1801, after ten years of commotion, the soil of St. Domingo, drenched with so much blood, presented an appearance of fertility nearly equal to that which it exhibited in 1789. Toussaint, independent of France, had given to the colony an almost absolute freedom of trade. Such a system of liberty, dangerous for colonies of moderate fertility, which, producing but little and at a dear rate, have an interest in taking the productions of the mother-country, that she may take theirs, is excellent, on the contrary, for a rich and fertile colony, needing no favour for the sale of its produce, interested thenceforward in trading freely with all nations and resorting for articles of necessity or luxury to the best and the cheapest markets. This was the case with St. Domingo. The island had derived infinite advantage from the free admission of foreign flags, especially of the American flag. Provisions were abundant. European commodities fetched a good price, and its own produce found purchasers the moment it was offered for sale. Add to this that the new planters, some of them blacks, who had

raised themselves by the revolt, others reinstated whites, all relieved from engagements towards the mortgagees of the mother-country, were not, like the old colonists in 1789, oppressed with debts, and obliged to deduct from their profits the interest of enormous borrowed capitals. They were more opulent with less profit. The towns of the Cape, Port au Prince, St. Marc, and Cayes, had recovered a sort of splendour. The traces of the war were almost obliterated: in most of them were seen elegant habitations erected by the black officers, inhabited by them, and rivaling the fine houses of the old white proprietors, formerly so proud and so noted for their luxurious and dissolute habits.

The black chief of the colony had crowned its recent prosperity by the bold occupation of the Spanish part of St. Domingo. This island was formerly divided into two portions, one of which, situated to the east, and first made by ships coming from Europe, belonged to the Spaniards; while the other, situated to the west, nearer Cuba and the interior of the Gulf of Mexico, belonged to the French. This western part, composed of two advanced promontories, forming, besides a vast inner gulf, a multitude of roadsteads and little harbours, was more suitable than the other for plantations, which require to be situated near points of embarkation. Hence it was covered with rich establishments. The Spanish part, on the contrary, not very mountainous, having scarcely any gulfs, contained fewer sugar and coffee plantations; but, on the other hand, it bred more cattle, horses, and mules. United, these two portions were capable of rendering great services to each other, whereas, when separated by an exclusive colonial system, they were like two remote islands, the one having what the other was deficient in, and what it was not able to procure on account of the distance. Toussaint, after expelling the English, had turned all his thoughts towards the occupation of the Spanish part. Affecting a scrupulous submission to the mother-country, though acting wholly according to his own pleasure, he had armed himself with the treaty of Basle, by which Spain ceded to France the entire possession of St. Domingo, and summoned the Spanish authorities to deliver up to him the province which they still held. There was at this moment a French commissioner in St. Domingo, for, since the Revolution, the mother-country had been represented in the island only by commissioners, to whom little attention was paid. This agent, apprehensive of the complications which might result in Europe from this proceeding, having, moreover, received no orders from France, had combated to no purpose the resolution of Toussaint. The latter, disregarding the objections addressed to him, had set in motion all the divisions of his army, and demanded of the Spanish authorities, incapable of resistance, the keys of St. Domingo. Those keys had been delivered to him and he had then proceeded to the other towns, assuming no higher title than

that of representative of France, but conducting himself in reality like a sovereign, and requiring the clergy to receive him in the churches with holy water and canopy.

The union of the two parts of the island under one rule had produced excellent and instantaneous effects upon commerce and internal order. The French part, abundantly provided with all the productions of the two worlds, had given a considerable quantity to the Spanish colonists in exchange for cattle, mules, and horses, which it had great need of. At the same time, the Negroes who attempted to withdraw themselves from labour by roving, no longer found, in the Spanish portion, an asylum against the incessant search of the black police.

By all these combined means, Toussaint had in two years restored the colony to a flourishing condition. We should not have a correct idea of his policy, unless we knew at the same time how he conducted himself between France and England. This slave, having made himself free and absolute, retained in his heart an involuntary partiality for the nation whose chains he had worn, and disliked to see the English in St. Domingo. Accordingly, he had made noble efforts to expel them and had succeeded. His political intelligence, profound though uncultivated, confirmed him in his natural sentiments, and taught him that the English would be the most dangerous masters, for they possessed a maritime power which would render their authority on the island effective and absolute: he would not, therefore, submit to their sway on any account. The English, on evacuating Port au Prince, had offered him the royalty of St. Domingo, and the immediate recognition of that royalty, if he would insure to them the commerce of the colony. He had refused it, whether from some remnant of attachment to the mother-country, or, alarmed by the news of the peace, he dreaded a French expedition capable of reducing his royalty to nothing. Besides, the vanity of belonging to the first military nation in the world, the secret pleasure of being a general in the service of France, under the hand of the First Consul himself, had outweighed in his mind all the offers of England. He was, therefore, resolved to continue French. To keep the English at a distance, while living peaceably with them, to recognize the nominal authority of France, and to pay her just so much obedience as not to provoke the display of her strength—such was the policy of this singular man. He had received the commissioners of the Directory and then sent them away in succession, particularly general Hedouville, alleging that they misunderstood the interests of the mother-country and required of him things that either could not be executed or were injurious to her.

His internal policy is not less worthy of attention than his external policy. His conduct towards all the classes of inhabitants, whites, blacks, or mulattoes, corresponded with what we have already said of him. He detested the mulattoes as nearest to his own race, and, on the contrary, caressed the whites with extreme

care, so he but obtained from them some tokens of esteem which should prove to him that his genius caused his colour to be overlooked. On this point he showed the vanity of an upstart black, of which the concentrated vanity of all the upstart whites in the world cannot afford any idea. As for the blacks, he treated them with incredible severity, but yet with justice; he made use with them of religion, which he professed with ardour, and more especially of liberty, which he promised to defend till his death, and of which he was the glorious emblem for the people of his colour, for they saw in him what, by means of it, a Negro might become. His wild eloquence charmed them. From a chair, which he frequently mounted, he spoke to them of God, of the equality of the races of men, and spoke of these subjects in the most extraordinary and apposite parables. One day, for example, with a view to inspire them with confidence in themselves, he filled a glass with grains of black maize, mixed with them a few grains of white maize; then, shaking the glass, he bade them take notice how soon the white grains were lost among the black. "There," said he, "that is what the whites are among you. Work; insure your prosperity by labour; and, if the whites of the mother-country attempt to ravish our liberty from us, again we will take up our muskets, and again we will conquer them." Adored on account of these sentiments, he was dreaded at the same time for his rare vigilance. Endowed with surprising activity for his age, he had placed in the interior of the island relays of horses of extreme swiftness, and, attended by a few guards, moved with prodigious rapidity from one part of the island to another, sometimes travelling forty leagues on horseback in a day, and coming like lightning to punish offences of which he had been apprized. Provident and avaricious, he formed hoards of money and arms in the mountains of the interior, and buried them, it is said, in a place called Mornes du Chaos, near a house which had become his ordinary abode. These were resources for a future struggle, which he never ceased to consider as probable and not far distant. Making a point of imitating the First Consul in every thing, he had given himself a guard, a retinue, a sort of princely residence. In this residence he received proprietors of all colours, particularly whites, and rated the blacks who were deficient in good breeding. Hideous to see, even in his uniform of lieutenant-general, he had flatterers, toad-eaters, and, melancholy to relate, he more than once induced white women, belonging to the most ancient and wealthy families in the island to prostitute themselves to him to obtain his protection. His courtiers persuaded him that he was in America what general Bonaparte was in Europe, and that he ought to assume the same dignity. When, therefore, he was informed of the conclusion of peace, and could foresee the re-establishment of the authority of the mother-country, he hastened to convoke the council of the colony in order to frame a constitution. The council assembled, *and did in fact frame a most ridiculous constitution. According to the dispositions of this crude work, the council of the colony was to*



decree laws, the governor-general to sanction them and to exercise executive power in all its plenitude. Toussaint of course was appointed governor, and, moreover, governor for life, with the faculty of naming his successor. There could not be a more complete and puerile imitation of what had been done in France. As for the authority of the mother-country, it was not even mentioned. Only, the constitution was to be submitted to it for its approval; but, this approval once granted, the mother-country had no longer any power over the colony, for the council made laws. Toussaint governed, and could, if he pleased, deprive French commerce of all its advantages; which was the case at the moment—a state of things rendered excusable by the war, but which was not to be tolerated any longer. When Toussaint was asked what were to be the relations of St. Domingo with France, he replied, “The First Consul will send me commissioners *to confer with me*.” Some of his friends who were wiser, particularly the French colonel Vincent, charged with the direction of the fortifications, warned him of the danger of this conduct, told him that he ought to be on his guard against his flatterers of all colours, that he would provoke a French expedition, and that it would be his ruin. The vanity of this slave on becoming dictator, got the better of him. He was determined, he said, that the first of the blacks should be in fact and of right, in St. Domingo, what the first of the whites was in France, that is to say, chief for life, with the faculty of appointing his successor. He despatched colonel Vincent to Europe with directions to explain his new constitutional establishment and obtain the First Consul’s assent to it. He required, moreover, the confirmation of all the military ranks conferred on black officers.

This imitation of his greatness, this pretension to assimilate himself to him, made the First Consul smile, but, be it understood, had no effect upon his resolutions. He was ready to suffer himself to be called the first of the whites by him who entitled himself the first of the blacks, on condition that the bond uniting the colony to the mother-country should be that of obedience, and that the possession of this colony, French for ages, should be real and not nominal. To confirm the military appointments which these blacks had attributed to themselves was not a difficulty in his estimation. He confirmed them all and made Toussaint lieutenant-general commanding in St. Domingo for France. But he purposed to have there a French captain-general, whose first lieutenant Toussaint was to be. Without this condition, St. Domingo would not belong to France. He resolved therefore to send thither a general and an army. The colony was again flourishing; it was not less valuable than it had formerly been; the planters who had remained in Paris loudly claimed their estates; France enjoyed peace, perhaps for some time; she had troops idle, officers full of ardour, longing for active service, no matter in what part of the world; it was impossible, therefore, to let such a possession slip out of her hands, without em-



ploying the forces which she had at her disposal to retain it. Such were the motives of the expedition, the departure of which we have already related. General Leclerc, brother-in-law of the First Consul, had instructions to soothe Toussaint, to offer him the post of lieutenant of France, the confirmation of the rank and property acquired by his officers, the guarantee of the liberty of the blacks, but with the positive authority of the mother-country represented by the captain-general. In order to prove to Toussaint the good-will of the French government, his two sons educated in France were sent back to him, accompanied by their tutor, M. Coisson. The First Consul, moreover, added a noble and flattering letter, in which, treating Toussaint as the first man of his race, he seemed graciously to indulge a sort of comparison between the pacificator of France and the pacificator of St. Domingo.

But he had also foreseen resistance, and proper measures were taken to overcome it by main force. Had the First Consul been less impatient to avail himself of the signature of the preliminaries of peace for crossing the sea, which was then thrown open, he might have made the squadrons wait for one another in some place agreed upon, so that they might arrive altogether at St. Domingo and surprise Toussaint before he was in a condition to defend himself. Unfortunately, in the uncertainty respecting the signature of the definitive peace which prevailed at the moment of the expedition, he was obliged to let them sail from the ports of Brest, Rochefort, Cadiz, and Toulon, without obligation to wait for one another, and with orders to proceed as speedily as possible to their destination. Admiral Villaret Joyeuse, putting to sea from Brest and Lorient, with sixteen sail of the line and a force of about seven or eight thousand men, had orders to cruize for some time in the Gulf of Gascony, and try to fall in there with admiral Latouche Treville, who was to leave Rochefort with six ships of the line, six frigates, and three or four thousand men. Admiral Villaret, if he could not meet with admiral Latouche, was to proceed to the Canaries, to see whether he might not there find Linois' division from Cadiz, and Ganteaume's from Toulon, both with a convoy of troops. He was then to steer for the Bay of Samana, the first that is reached by a squadron arriving from Europe. Conforming to the orders which they had received, these different squadrons, looking for one another, without losing time in waiting to join, arrived at different times at the general rendezvous of Samana. Admiral Villaret arrived there on the 20th of January, 1802 (9th Pluviôse, year X.). Admiral Latouche soon followed. The Cadiz and Toulon divisions did not reach St. Domingo till much later. But admiral Villaret, with the squadron from Brest and L'Orient, admiral Latouche Treville with the squadron from Rochefort, brought no fewer than from eleven to twelve thousand men. After conferring with the commanders of the fleet, captain-general Leclerc thought

that it was of importance not to lose time, and that he ought to make his appearance before all the ports at once, in order to seize the colony before Toussaint had time to look about him. Besides, many accounts received from the West Indies caused him to apprehend an unfriendly reception. In consequence, general Kerversau, with 2000 men embarked in frigates, was to proceed to Saint Domingo, the capital of the Spanish part; admiral Latouche Treville, with his squadron having on board Boudet's division, was to steer for Port au Prince; lastly, the captain-general himself, with admiral Villaret's squadron, intended to sail for the Cape and make himself master of it. The French part, comprehending, with a considerable portion of the island, the two promontories running out to the west, was divided into the departments of the north, the west, and the south. In the department of the north, the Cape was the principal sea-port; and the chief town; in the department of the west, Port au Prince. In the south, Les Cayes and Jacmel rivalled these in wealth and influence. By occupying Saint Domingo in the Spanish part, the Cape and Port au Prince in the French part, the captain-general would have possession of nearly the whole island, though not, indeed, of the mountains in the interior, a conquest which time alone could permit him to achieve.

These naval divisions left the bay in which they had anchored, to proceed to their respective destinations, in the first days of February. Toussaint, apprized of the appearance of a great number of ships at Samana, had hastened thither in person, to judge from personal observation of the danger with which he was threatened. No longer doubtful, when he beheld the French squadron, of the fate that awaited him, he determined to resort to the last extremities rather than submit to the authority of the mother-country. He was not quite certain that there was any design to reduce the Negroes to slavery again; he could not even believe it; but he conceived that there was a determination to enforce obedience to France, and this was sufficient to decide him to resist. He resolved, therefore, to persuade the Negroes that their liberty was in danger, and thus to induce them to abandon agriculture for war, to ravage the sea-port towns, to burn the habitations, to massacre the whites, and then retire to the mornes or bluffs (such is the name given to the mountains of a particular form with which the French part is everywhere studded), and wait in these retreats till, after the climate had thinned the whites, he could fall upon them and complete their extermination. Hoping, however, to stop the French army by mere threats, perhaps also fearing, if he gave orders too soon for atrocious acts, that they would not be punctually obeyed by the black chiefs, who, after his example, had cultivated an intercourse with the whites, he directed his officers to reply to the first summons of the French squadron that they had no orders to receive it; then, if it persisted, to threaten, in case of a land-

ing, the total destruction of the towns; and lastly, if a landing were effected, to destroy and slaughter all before them, while retiring into the interior of the island. Such were the orders given to Christophe, who governed the north, to the ferocious Dessalines, chief of the west, and to Laplume, a more humane black, commanding in the south.

Villaret's squadron having reached Monte-Christ, applied for pilots to steer it into the roads of Fort Dauphin and the Cape, had great difficulty to procure them, detached Magon's division upon Fort Dauphin, and arrived on the 3rd of February (14th Pluviôse) off the Cape. All the buoys were taken up, the forts armed, and there was an evident disposition to resistance. A frigate sent to communicate with the shore, received the answer dictated by Toussaint. Christophe said that he had no instructions; that he must await the answer of the commander-in-chief, who was absent at the moment; that any attempt at landing executed by main force would be resisted by conflagration and massacre. The municipality of the Cape, composed of notables, whites and people of colour, went to the captain-general Leclerc, to express their alarm. They at once rejoiced at the arrival of the troops of the mother-country and were filled with terror by the horrible threats of Christophe. Their perturbation was soon communicated to the mind of the captain-general, who found himself placed between the obligation to fulfil his instructions and the fear of exposing a white and French population to the fury of the Negroes. It was necessary, however, that he should land. He promised the inhabitants of the Cape to act with promptness and vigour, so as to take Christophe by surprise, and not leave him time to execute his horrible instructions. He earnestly exhorted them to arm for the defence of their persons and property, and delivered to them a proclamation of the First Consul's, destined to make the blacks easy in regard to the object of the expedition. He was then obliged to stand out to sea in compliance with a state of the winds that is regular in these parts. The captain-general, when once at sea, arranged with admiral Villaret Joyeuse a plan for landing. This plan consisted in putting the troops on board frigates, setting them on shore in the environs of the Cape, beyond the heights which command the town, near a spot called the landing-place of Limbé; then, while they should endeavour to turn the Cape, to push with the squadron up the channels, and thus make a double attack by land and sea. It was hoped, by acting with great celerity, to take the town before Christophe had time to execute his atrocious threats. Captain Magon and general Rochambeau, if they were successful at Fort Dauphin, which they were directed to occupy, were to second the movement of the captain-general.

Next day, the troops were transferred to frigates and light vessels, and then put ashore near the landing-place of Limbé. This operation took a whole day. On the following, the troops marched for the purpose of turning the town, and the squadron

entered the channels. Two ships of the line, the *Patriote* and the *Scipion*, brought up with a spring cable before Fort Picolet, which fired red-hot balls, and soon silenced it. The day was advanced; the land-breeze, which in the evening succeeds the sea-breeze, again obliged the squadron to stand off till the next morning. While getting out to sea, the crews had the pain to perceive a reddish glare rise above the surface of the water, and soon to behold the flames consuming Cape Town. Christophe, though less ferocious than his chief, had nevertheless, obeyed his orders; he had set fire to the principal quarters, and, confining himself to the slaughter of a few whites, had obliged the others to follow him to the bluffs. While some of these unfortunate whites were falling beneath the weapons of the Negroes, or were dragged away by them, the rest, following the municipality in a troop, had escaped from Christophe and were seeking to save their lives by throwing themselves into the arms of the French force. Great was the anxiety during that terrible night, both among the unfortunate creatures exposed to so many dangers and among our soldiers and seamen, who witnessed the destruction of the town and the frightful situation of their countrymen, without being able to afford them any assistance. On the following day, February 6th, while captain-general Leclerc was marching in all haste for the Cape, on turning the heights, the admiral sailed into the harbour and came to an anchor. The resistance had ceased with the retreat of the Negroes. He immediately landed 1200 seamen, under the command of general Humbert, to hasten to the assistance of the town, save the remnant of it from the fury of the blacks, and give a hand to the captain-general. The latter arrived, on his side, without being able to intercept Christophe, who had already betaken himself to flight. Those of the inhabitants who had followed the municipality, were found wandering about disconsolate; but they were soon cheered on finding themselves so speedily relieved and definitively protected from danger. They ran to their burning houses. The seamen assisted to extinguish the flames: the land forces pursued Christophe into the country. This pursuit, briskly kept up, prevented the blacks from destroying the rich plantations in the plain of the Cape, and caused a great number of whites, whom they had not time to carry along with them, to be rescued from their hands.

During these occurrences at the Cape, the brave captain Magon had landed Rochambeau's division at the entrance of the Bay of Mancenille, and then stood with his ships into the bay itself to second the operations of the troops. His vigorous conduct, ominous already of what he was destined to do at Trafalgar, concurred so well with the attack of Rochambeau's division, that Fort Dauphin was suddenly carried, and the French gained possession of it before the Negroes could commit any ravage. This second landing completely cleared the country

in the environs of the Cape, and obliged Christophe to retire finally to the bluffs.

The captain-general Leclerc, established in Cape Town, had caused the fire to be extinguished. Luckily the disaster was not commensurate with the frightful threats of Toussaint's lieutenant. The roofs only of the houses had taken fire. The number of the whites put to death was not so great as had at first been feared. Many of them returned successively, accompanied by the servants who had remained faithful to them. The rage of the black hordes had been particularly wreaked on the rich magazines of the Cape. The troops and the population did their best to obliterate the traces of the conflagration. An appeal was made to the black labourers who were weary of this life of ravage and of blood, in which people would fain have involved them again, and many of them returned to their masters and to their work. In a few days the town resumed a certain aspect of order and activity. The captain-general sent part of his vessels to the continent of America, to procure provisions and supplies in place of the resources that had been destroyed.

Meanwhile, the squadron of admiral Latouche Treville, standing to the west, had doubled the point of the island, and proceeded to the bay of Port au Prince to effect its landing there. A white engaged in the service of the blacks, named Agé, an officer full of excellent sentiments, commanded there in the absence of Dessalines, residing at St. Marc. His repugnance to execute the orders which he had received, the vigour of admiral Latouche Treville, the promptness of general Boudet, lastly Fortune, which favoured this part of the operations, saved the town of Port au Prince from the calamities which had overtaken the Cape. Admiral Latouche had rafts constructed and armed with artillery, and thus succeeded in suddenly landing the troops at Point Lamentin, and then set sail in all haste for Port au Prince. During this rapid movement of the ships, the troops advanced on their side towards the town. Fort Bizoton was in their route. They approached it without firing. "Let us kill without noise," exclaimed general Boudet, "to prevent a collision, and to save, if we can, our unfortunate countrymen from the fury of the blacks." This was in fact the only way of avoiding the massacre with which the whites were threatened. The black garrison of Fort Bizoton, on seeing the amicable and resolute attitude of the French troops, surrendered and placed themselves in the ranks of Boudet's division. The troops reached Port au Prince at the very same moment that admiral Latouche Treville came off it with his ships. Four thousand blacks formed the garrison. From the heights on which the army was marching, were seen these blacks posted in the middle of the principal places or in advance of the walls. General Boudet caused the town to be turned by two battalions, and marched with the bulk of the division upon the redoubts that covered it—We are friends, cried *the first black troops*; don't fire. Trusting to these words, our



soldiers advanced with the musket on the arm. But a discharge of musketry and grape, fired nearly point blank, swept down two hundred of them, some killed, the others wounded. The gallant general Pamphile Lacroix was among the latter. The soldiers then rushed with the bayonet upon those wretched blacks and sacrificed such of them as had not time to escape. Admiral Latouche, who, during the voyage, had continually assured the generals of the army, that a squadron was far superior for its fire to any position on land, and that he would very soon prove it, admiral Latouche brought to under the batteries of the blacks, and silenced them in a few moments. The blacks, cannonaded so closely, and attacked in the streets by the troops of Boudet's division, fled in disorder, without setting the town on fire, leaving the public chests full of money, and in the magazines an immense quantity of colonial produce. Unfortunately, they carried off with them troops of whites, to whom they showed no pity in their precipitate flight, and marked their track by the conflagration and ravage of the habitations. Columns of smoke rose to a great distance along the line of their retreat.

The ferocious Dessalines, when apprized of the landing of the French, had left St. Marc, passed behind Port au Prince, and by a rapid march occupied Leogane, to dispute the department of the south with the French. General Boudet sent thither a detachment, which drove Dessalines from Leogane. The French were informed that General Laplume, less barbarous than his colleagues, distrusting, moreover, a district full of mulattoes, implacable enemies of the blacks, was disposed to submit. General Boudet immediately despatched emissaries to him. Laplume surrendered and gave up intact to our troops that rich department, comprehending Leogane, Great and Little Goave, Tiburon, the Cayes, and Jacmel. This submission of Laplume was a fortunate event, for one-third of the colony was thus saved from the ravages of barbarity. Meanwhile, the Spanish part fell under the sway of our troops. General Kerversau, sent to Santo Domingo with a few frigates and 2000 land troops, seconded by the inhabitants and by the influence of the French bishop, Mauvielle, took possession of one-half of the Spanish part, that under the government of Paul Louverture, brother of Toussaint. Captain Magon, established in Fort Dauphin, succeeded, on his part, by adroit negotiations and the influence of the same bishop Mauvielle, in gaining the mulatto general Clervaux, and wresting from him the rich plain of St. Jago. Thus, in the first ten days of February, the French troops made themselves masters of the coast, the sea-ports, the chief towns of the island, and the greater part of the cultivated lands. Toussaint had nothing left but three or four black demi-brigades, with generals Maurepas, Christophe, and Dessalines, with his treasures and stores of arms, buried in the bluffs of Chaos. Unfortunately, there were also left with him a great number of whites, carried off



hostages, and cruelly treated, till they should be set at liberty or slaughtered. It was requisite to take advantage of the season, which was favourable, to complete the reduction of the island.

The mountainous and broken tract in which Toussaint had shut himself up, was situated to the west between the sea and Mount Cibao, the central knot into which all the other chains of the island converge. This tract pours its scanty waters in several streams into the river Artibonite, which throws itself into the sea between the Gonaives and Port au Prince, quite close to St. Marc. It was requisite to march thither from all points at once, from the Cape, from Port au Prince, and from St. Marc, so as to place the blacks between two fires, and to drive them back upon the Gonaives for the purpose of surrounding them there. But to penetrate to these bluffs, the troops must pass through narrow gorges, rendered almost impenetrable by the vegetation of the tropics, and in the bottoms of which the blacks, squatting as sharpshooters, presented a resistance difficult to be overcome. Still the veteran soldiers of the Rhine, transported across the Atlantic, had nothing to fear but the climate. That alone could conquer them; that alone did actually conquer them; for they fell only beneath the sun of St. Domingo and the frost of Moscow.

The captain-general Leclerc was resolved to make the best use of the months of February, March, and April to complete this occupation; because, later in the season, the heats and the rain would render military operations impossible. In consequence of the arrival of the naval divisions from the Mediterranean, under admirals Ganteaume and Linois, the land-troops were increased to 17,000 or 18,000 men. Some of the soldiers, it is true, were ill; but there were 15,000 fit to act. The captain-general had, therefore, all the means for accomplishing his task.

Before he proceeded with its execution, he resolved to send a summons to Toussaint. This black, capable of the greatest atrocities to further his designs, was, nevertheless, sensible to the affections of nature. By order of the First Consul, the captain-general had brought with him, as we have said, the two sons of Toussaint, educated in France, for the purpose of trying the influence of filial solicitations upon his heart. The tutor who had been charged with their education was to conduct them to their father, to deliver to him the letter of the First Consul, and to endeavour to attach him to France by promising him the second authority in the island.

Toussaint received his two sons and their preceptor at Ennery, his usual retreat. He clasped them long in his arms, and appeared for a moment overcome by his emotion. That old heart, devoured by ambition, was shaken. The sons of Toussaint, and the worthy man who had brought them up, then represented to him the power and the humanity of the French nation, the advantages attached to a submission which would leave his situation in St. Domingo high enough, and would secure to his children a

brilliant futurity; the danger, on the contrary, of almost certain ruin if he persisted in hostilities. The mother of one of these youths joined in trying to overcome Toussaint. Touched with these solicitations, he determined to take a few days to reflect, and during these few days appeared extremely wavering, sometimes alarmed by the danger of an unequal struggle, sometimes swayed by the ambition of being sole master of the fine empire of Haïti; sometimes, also, enraged at the idea that the whites should come to plunge the blacks again into slavery. Ambition and the love of liberty got the better of paternal affection. He sent for his two sons, again he embraced them, left them their choice between France, which had made them civilised creatures, or himself, the author of their existence, and declared that he should continue to love them, were they even in the ranks of his enemies. Those unhappy children, agitated like their father, hesitated also like him. One of them, however, throwing his arms around his neck, declared that he would die a free black at his side. The other, undecided, accompanied his mother to one of the seats of the dictator.

The answer of Toussaint left no doubt of the necessity of immediately resuming hostilities. The captain-general Leclerc made his preparations, and commenced operations on the 17th of February.

His plan was to attack at once, from the north and from the west, the woody and almost inaccessible tract to which Toussaint had retired with his black generals. Maurepas occupied the narrow gorge called Trois Rivières, which debouches towards the sea at Port de Paix. Christophe had established himself on the slopes of the bluffs towards the plain of the Cape. Dessalines was at St. Marc, near the mouth of the Artibonite, with orders to burn St. Marc, and to defend the bluffs of the Chaos on the east and the south. He had for appui a well-constructed and well-defended fort, full of military stores, collected through the foresight of Toussaint. This fort, called Crête à Pierrot, was situated in the flat country which the Artibonite traverses and inundates, while forming a thousand windings before it throws itself into the sea. In the centre of this tract, between Christophe, Maurepas, and Dessalines, Toussaint kept himself in reserve with a body of picked troops.

On the 17th of February, the captain-general Leclerc broke up the camp, his army formed into three divisions. On his left, Rochambeau's division, setting out from Fort Dauphin, was to march upon St. Raphael and St. Michael; Hardy's division was to march by the north plain upon la Marmelade; Desfourneaux's division was to proceed by Limbé to Plaisance. These three divisions had narrow gorges to clear and steep heights to scale, in order to penetrate into the region of the bluffs, and to make themselves masters of the streams which form the upper course of the Artibonite. General Humbert, with a detachment, was ordered to

land at Port de Paix, to ascend the gorge of the Trois Rivières, and to drive back the black general Maurepas upon the Gros Morne. General Boudet had orders, while these four corps were marching from north to south, to ascend from south to north, setting out from Port au Prince, and to occupy the Mirabalais, the Verrettes, and St. Marc. Attacked thus on all sides, the blacks would have no asylum till towards the Gonaives, where the French generals hoped to enclose them. These dispositions were judicious against an enemy whom it was necessary to envelop and to drive before one rather than to fight according to rule. Each of these French corps was, in fact, strong enough not to experience a serious check anywhere. Against an experienced commander, having European troops, capable of concentrating himself suddenly on any one of the assailing corps this plan would have been defective.

Breaking up on the 17th, the three divisions of Rochambeau, Hardy, and Desfourneaux valiantly performed their task, scaled tremendous heights, traversed frightful jungles, and surprized the blacks by their daring march, almost without returning a shot to an enemy firing from all sides. On the 18th, the division of Desfourneaux was in the environs of Plaisance, Hardy's division at Dondon, Rochambeau's division at St. Raphael.

On the 19th, Desfourneaux's division occupied Plaisance, which was delivered up to it by Jean Pierre Dumesnil, a very humane black, who surrendered to the French with his troops. Hardy's division penetrated by main force into Marmelade, overturning Christophe, who was there at the head of 2400 Negroes, half troops of the line and half armed labourers. Rochambeau's division took St Michael. The Negroes were surprized at such a fierce attack, and had never yet seen such troops among the whites. Only one of them made a vigorous resistance; Maurepas, who defended the gorge of Trois Rivières against general Humbert. The latter not having a sufficient force, general Debelle had been sent by sea to his succour, with a reinforcement of from twelve to fifteen hundred men. General Debelle was unable to land till rather late at Port de Paix, and, thwarted in his attacks by tremendous rain, gained little ground.

The captain-general, having halted for two days in the same places, as soon as the bad weather was over pushed Desfourneaux's division upon Gonaives, Hardy's division upon Ennery, and Rochambeau's division upon a formidable position called the Ravine aux Coulevres. On the 23rd of February, Desfourneaux's division entered Gonaives, which it found in flames; Hardy's division made itself master of Ennery, the principal residence of Toussaint; and Rochambeau's gallant division carried the Ravine aux Coulevres. To force the latter position, the troops had been obliged to penetrate into a narrow gorge, bordered by precipitous heights, studded with gigantic trees and thorny bushes, and defended by blacks who were good marksmen. They had then to debouch upon a plain, occupied by Toussaint, with 3000 grenadiers of his colour and all his

artillery. The intrepid Rochambeau boldly entered the gorge, in spite of a most annoying fire of sharpshooters, scaled both the steep sides, killing with the bayonet the blacks who were too slow in retiring, and debouched on the plateau. On reaching it, the old soldiers of the Rhine finished the affair with a single charge. Eight hundred blacks were left upon the plain. The whole of Toussaint's artillery was taken.

Meanwhile, general Boudet, in execution of the orders of the captain-general, had left general Pamphile Lacroix with a garrison of six or eight hundred men in Port au Prince, and marched with the rest of his troops for St. Marc. Dessalines was there waiting for the French, and ready to commit the greatest atrocities. Armed with a torch, he set fire himself to a fine house which he possessed at St. Marc, was imitated by his people, and then retired, slaughtering part of the whites and dragging the rest along with him into the frightful retreat of the bluffs. General Boudet, therefore, was left in possession of nothing but ruins drenched with human blood. While he was pursuing Dessalines, the latter advanced by a rapid march upon Port au Prince, which he supposed to be weakly defended and which actually had but a very small garrison. But the gallant general Pamphile Lacroix had assembled his scanty force and harangued it in spirit-stirring language. Admiral Latouche, apprized of the danger, landed with his seamen, saying to general Lacroix, "At sea, you would be under my command, on land I am under yours, and we will defend together the lives and property of our fellow-countrymen." Dessalines, repulsed, could not glut his barbarity, and fell back to the bluffs of Chaos. General Boudet, returning in the utmost haste to Port au Prince, found it saved by the united land-forces and sailors; but, amidst these marches and counter-marches, it had been impossible for him to second the operations of the general in chief. The blacks could not be surrounded and driven towards Gonaives.

They were beaten, however, at all points. The taking of the Ravine aux Coulevres from Toussaint himself had deeply discouraged them. Captain-general Leclerc, in order to dishearten them completely, resolved to cut off Maurepas, the black, who maintained his ground against generals Humbert and Debelle at the extremity of the gorge of Trois Rivières. Attacked on all sides, Maurepas had no resource but to surrender. He made his submission with 2000 of the bravest of the Negroes. This was the severest shock to the moral power of Toussaint.

There yet remained the fort of Crête à Pierrot, and the bluffs of Chaos to be reduced, before Toussaint could be forced from his last asylum, unless he retired to the mountains in the interior of the island, to lead there the life of a partisan, deprived of all means of acting, and stripped of every spell. The captain-general ordered Hardy's and Rochambeau's divisions to advance from one side on the fort and the bluffs, and Boudet's from the other.

Some hundreds of men were lost in attacking with too much confidence the works of the Crête à Pierrot, which were better defended than they were supposed to be. It was found necessary to undertake a sort of regular siege, to execute works of approach, to establish batteries. Two thousand blacks, good soldiers, commanded by officers less ignorant than the others, guarded this repository of the resources of Toussaint. The latter, seconded by Dessalines, strove to interrupt the siege by night attacks, but without success; and, in a short time, the fort was pressed so closely, that an assault became practicable. The garrison, reduced to despair, then resolved to make a nocturnal sortie, in order to break through the lines of the besiegers and to escape. In the first moment they contrived to elude the vigilance of our troops, and to traverse their encampments; but, being soon discovered and attacked on all sides, they were partly driven back into the fort and partly destroyed by our soldiers. This sort of arsenal was stormed, and in it were found considerable stores of arms and ammunition, and many whites cruelly murdered.

The captain-general then directed the surrounding bluffs to be scoured in all directions, that the fugitive bands of Toussaint might have no retreat left, and be reduced before the hottest part of the season. At Verrettes the army witnessed a horrible sight. The blacks had long hurried away with them numbers of whites, whom they forced by beating to march as fast as they did. Having no hope of preventing them from falling into the hands of the troops by whom they were closely pursued, they butchered eight hundred of them, men and women, children and aged people. The earth was found covered with this hecatomb; and our generous soldiers, who had seen so much service in all parts of the world, who had been present at so many scenes of carnage but had never yet seen women and children slaughtered, were filled with profound horror and a humane indignation, which proved fatal to all the blacks whom they could catch. They pursued them with the utmost perseverance, and gave no quarter to any whom they fell in with.

It was now the month of April. The blacks had no more resources, at least for the present. Profound was the discouragement which prevailed among them. The chiefs, struck by the courtesy shown by the captain-general Leclerc to those who had surrendered, and whom he suffered to retain their rank and their possessions, began to think of laying down their arms. Christophe addressed himself, through the medium of the blacks who had already submitted, to the captain-general, and offered to make his submission, if he were promised the same appointments as the generals Laplume, Maurepas, and Clervaux. The captain-general who had as much humanity as good sense, assented cheerfully to the proposals of Christophe and accepted his offers. The surrender of Christophe soon led to that of the ferocious Dessalines, and lastly that of Toussaint himself. The latter was almost alone,



being merely attended by a few blacks attached to his person. To rove about in the interior of the island, without attempting any thing important that was likely to regain him his influence over the Negroes, seemed to him of little use, and calculated only to exhaust the zeal of his last partisans. His courage, moreover, was depressed, and he had no hope left but that which the climate was capable of inspiring. In fact, he had been long accustomed to see Europeans, especially soldiers, swept away by the action of that pernicious climate, and he flattered himself that he should find a formidable auxiliary in the yellow fever. He thought it advisable, therefore, to wait quietly for the propitious moment, and then, perhaps, a new appeal to arms might prove successful. In consequence, he offered to treat. The captain-general, who had little hopes of taking him, unrelentingly as he might pursue him among the numerous and remote fastnesses of the island, consented to grant him a capitulation similar to that which he had granted to his lieutenants. His rank, appointments, and property were restored to him on condition that he should reside in a specified place, and not change his abode without the permission of the captain-general. His house at Ennery was the place fixed upon for his retreat. The captain-general Leclerc was far from supposing that the submission of Toussaint would be definitive; but he kept a good guard over him, ready to secure him on the first act that should prove his bad faith.

From this period, the end of April and beginning of May, order was restored in the colony, and the prosperity which it had enjoyed under its dictator began to revive. The regulations adopted by him were again enforced. The labourers had almost all returned to the plantations. A black gendarmerie pursued the runaways, and brought them back to the lands, to which, in virtue of anterior censuses, they were attached. Toussaint's troops, greatly reduced, subordinate to the French authority, were quiet, and seemed not disposed to rise, in case they were kept upon the same footing as before. Christophe, Maurepas, Dessalines, Clervaux, confirmed in their rank and possessions, were ready to accommodate themselves to this system as well as to that of Toussaint Louverture. To this end, nothing more was requisite than to set them at ease respecting the preservation of their wealth and their liberty.

The captain-general Leclerc, who was not only a brave soldier, but a mild and discreet man, set about restoring order and security in the colony. To encourage the import of provisions, he had continued to admit foreign flags, and had assigned to them four principal ports, the Cape, Port au Prince, les Cayes, Santo Domingo, with a prohibition to touch elsewhere, to prevent the clandestine introduction of arms along the coast. He had restricted importation solely in regard to European productions, the exclusive supply of which he had reserved for the French merchants of the mother-country. A great number of merchantmen had, in fact, arrived from Havre, Nantes, and Bordeaux; and



there was reason to hope that the prosperity of St. Domingo would soon be re-established, not for the benefit of the English and the Americans, as under the government of Toussaint, but for the benefit of France, and without loss to the colony of any of its advantages.

A two-fold danger, however, was to be apprehended: on the one hand, the climate, always fatal to European troops; on the other, the incurable distrust of the Negroes, whose fears of the return of slavery, it was impossible by any efforts to remove. To the seventeen or eighteen thousand men already transported to the colony, fresh naval divisions, sailing from Holland and France, had added three or four thousand, which made the number of the soldiers engaged in the expedition twenty-one or twenty-two thousand. But from four to five thousand were already *hors de combat*, a like number in the hospitals, and 12,000 at most remained for a new conflict, if the Negroes should again have recourse to arms. The captain-general was particularly careful to let them have rest, refreshments, and healthy cantonments, and neglected nothing to render the success of the expedition intrusted to him complete and definitive.

At Guadeloupe, the brave Richepanse, landing with a force of three or four thousand men, quelled the revolted Negroes, and reduced them again to slavery, after destroying the leaders of the rebels. This species of counter-revolution was possible and without danger in an island like Guadeloupe; but it was attended with a serious inconvenience: it alarmed the blacks of St. Domingo respecting the lot that was reserved for them. For the rest, the affairs of our West India islands were as prosperous as could well be hoped in so short a time. In all our sea-ports vessels were equipping to recommence the valuable traffic which France formerly carried on with them.

The First Consul, prosecuting his task with perseverance, had removed to the coast the depôts of the demi-brigades serving in the colonies. He was continually pouring recruits into them, and taking advantage of the sailing of merchantmen or ships of war to send off fresh detachments. He had increased the sums granted to the navy, and raised the special budget of that department to 130 millions—a considerable sum in a total budget of 589 millions, equal to 720 at the present day. He had ordered 20 millions per annum to be devoted to the purchase of naval stores in all countries. He had, moreover, directed that twelve ships of the line should be built and launched every year. He was incessantly repeating that it was during peace that a navy must be created, because during peace the field for manœuvres, that is the sea, was free, and the way for supplies open. “The first year of a ministry,” he wrote to admiral Decrès, “is a year of apprenticeship. The second year of your ministry is commencing. You have the French navy to re-establish—a fine vocation for a man in the flower of life, and the more so the more

conspicuous our past misfortunes have been. Fulfil it without intermission. *Every hour wasted, at the period in which we live, is an irreparable loss.*" (Feb. 14, 1803.)

From India and America the active mind of the First Consul reverted to the Ottoman empire, the fall of which seemed to be at hand ; and he was by no means disposed to let its wrecks serve to extend the Russian or English possessions. He had renounced Egypt while England should respect the peace ; but, if peace were broken through her fault, he held himself at liberty to resume his first ideas relative to a country which he still regarded as the route to India. However, he formed no plans for the moment ; his intention was only to prevent the English from taking advantage of the peace to establish themselves at the mouth of the Nile. A formal engagement bound them to evacuate Egypt in three months ; now it was twelve or thirteen since the signature of the preliminaries of London, seven or eight since the signature of the treaty of Amiens, and they seemed not yet disposed to leave Alexandria. The First Consul, therefore, sent for Colonel Sébastiani, an officer endowed with extraordinary intelligence, and directed him to put himself on board a frigate, to skirt the coast of the Mediterranean, to visit Tunis and Tripoli, to cause the flag of the Italian Republic to be acknowledged there ; then to proceed to Egypt, to examine the situation of the English and the nature of their establishment in that country ; to endeavour to learn how long that establishment was to last ; to observe what was passing between the Turks and the Mamelukes ; to visit the Arab sheiks and compliment them in his name ; to go to Syria to the Christians, and to place them again under French protection ; to obtain an interview with Djezzar Pacha, who had defended Acre against us, and to promise him a renewal of the good graces of France, if he were lenient to the Christians and favoured our commerce. Colonel Sébastiani was ordered then to return by way of Constantinople, and to deliver the fresh instructions of the cabinet to General Brune, our ambassador. Those instructions enjoined General Brune to display great magnificence, to pay court to the sultan, to give him reason to hope for our support against his enemies, whoever they might be, to neglect nothing, in short, to render France imposing in the East.

Though much engaged with these distant enterprizes, the First Consul never ceased to pay the greatest attention to the internal prosperity of France. He had caused the digest of the civil code to be resumed. A section of the Council of State and a section of the Tribunate, met every day at the residence of Cambacérès the consul, to resolve the difficulties natural to that great work. The repair of the roads had been prosecuted with the same activity. The First Consul had divided them, as we have said, into series of twenty each, transferring successively from some to others the extraordinary grants allotted to them. The progress of the canals of the Ourcq and St. Quentin had not been

suspended for a moment. The works ordered in Italy, as well those upon the roads as those of the fortifications, continued to engage the attention of the First Consul. He purposed that, if a maritime war should again break out, and lead to a continental war, Italy should be definitively connected with France by great communications and strong defensive works. The possession of the Valais having facilitated the construction of the high road of the Simplon, that astonishing creation was almost completed. The works of the road over Mont Cenis had been somewhat slackened, in order to apply all the disposable resources to that of Mont Genève, so that one at least might be finished in 1803. As for the fortress of Alessandria, it had become the subject of a daily correspondence with Chasseloup, the able engineer. Barracks were preparing there for a permanent garrison of 6000 men, hospitals for 3000 wounded, magazines for a large army. The re-founding of all the Italian artillery had been commenced for the purpose of reducing it to the calibres of 6, 8, and 12 pounds. The First Consul recommended to the vice-president Melzi the manufacture of a great quantity of muskets. "You have but fifty thousand muskets," he wrote to him; "that is nothing. I have five hundred thousand in France, besides those which are in the hands of the army. I shall not rest till I have a million."

The First Consul had recently entertained the idea of military colonies, an idea borrowed from the Romans. He had directed soldiers and officers numbering long years of service and honourable wounds to be selected from the army and conducted to Piedmont, where national domains situated around Alessandria, of a value proportionate to their condition, from the common soldier to the officer, were to be allotted to them. These veterans, thus provided for, were to marry Piedmontese women, to assemble twice a year to manœuvre, and, on the first danger to throw themselves into the fortress of Alessandria with their most valuable effects. This was a way to infuse at once French blood and French sentiments into Italy. The same institution was to be introduced into the new departments of the Rhine around Mayence.

The author of these fine conceptions meditated something of the same kind for the provinces of the Republic still infected with a bad spirit, such as La Vendée and Bretagne. He proposed to found there not only large establishments but towns. The agents of Georges, coming from England, called at the islands of Jersey and Guernsey, landed on the north coast, crossed the peninsula of Bretagne by Loudéac and Pontivy, and then spread themselves over the Morbihan or the Loire Inferieure, to keep up disaffection, and, if opportunity offered, to kindle revolt. The First Consul, corresponding with the gendarmerie, directed himself its movements and its investigations, and, foreseeing the possibility of new disturbances, had conceived the idea of erecting in the principal passes of the mountains or forests towers having at top a piece

of artillery, turning upon a pivot—capable of holding a garrison of fifty men, some provisions, and some ammunition, and to serve for appui to the moveable columns. Full of the notion that it was not less incumbent on the government to civilize than to curb the country, he had ordered the course of the Blavet to be improved, for the purpose of rendering that stream navigable as far as Pontivy. Thus was formed the first plan of that fine navigation, which runs along the coast of Bretagne from Nantes to Brest, penetrating by several navigable channels into the interior of the country, and insuring at all times the supply of the great arsenal of Brest. The First Consul had resolved to erect at Pontivy extensive buildings for the reception of troops, a numerous staff, tribunals, a military administration, lastly, manufactures, which he purposed to create at the expense of the State. He had directed the fittest places for founding new towns to be sought out, both in Bretagne and La Vendée. At the same time, he had works in progress at the fortifications of Quiberon, Belle-Isle, and Ile-Dieu. Fort Boyard was begun after his own plans, with a view to make the basin, situated between La Rochelle, Rochefort, and the isles of Ré and Oleron, a vast road, safe and inaccessible to the English. Cherbourg could not fail, of course, to engage his particular attention. Having no hope of finishing the dyke soon enough, he ordered its construction to be hastened more especially at three points, that they might be raised above the water as speedily as possible, and three batteries constructed capable of keeping off an enemy.

Amidst these labours, undertaken for the maritime, commercial, and military greatness of France, the First Consul contrived to find time to attend to the Schools, the Institute, the advancement of the sciences, and the administration of the clergy.

His sister Elisa, his brother Lucien, formed with Messrs. Suard, Morellet, and Fontanes, what in our literary history has been called a *bureau d'esprit*. They affected a strong predilection for the past, especially in the department of literature; and, it must be confessed, if a predilection for the past is justifiable, it is in this department. But with this perfectly legitimate predilection they united other very puerile tastes. They affected to prefer the old literary societies to the Institute, and talked unreservedly of a plan for re-constituting the French Academy with the literary men who had survived the Revolution, and who were no friends to it, such as Messrs. Suard, La Harpe, Morellet, &c. The reports circulated on this subject produced an unpleasant effect. Cambacérès, the consul, attentive to every circumstance likely to prejudice the government, gave timely notice to the First Consul of what was passing, and the First Consul, in his turn, roughly gave notice to his brother and sister of the displeasure excited in him by this kind of affectation.

On this occasion, he turned his attention to the Institute. He declared that any literary society, which should assume any other

title than that of Institute, which should call itself, for instance, French Academy, should be dissolved, if it pretended to give itself a public character. The second class, that which then corresponded with the old French Academy, continued to be devoted to the belles-lettres. But he suppressed the class of the moral and political sciences, from an aversion strongly manifested already, not precisely against philosophy—we shall see by and by what he thought on that subject—but against certain persons, who affected to profess the philosophy of the eighteenth century in those points in which it was most contrary to religious ideas. He made this class enter into that which was appropriated to the belles-lettres, saying that they had a common object; that philosophy, politics, morality, the observation of human nature, were the groundwork of all literature; that the art of writing was but its form; that it was not right to separate what ought to continue united; that the class devoted to the belles-lettres was extremely frivolous, the class devoted to the moral and political sciences extremely pedantic, if they were absolutely separated; that writers who would never be thinkers, and thinkers who would never be writers, would be neither the one nor the other; and in short an age, even rich in talents, would scarcely be able to supply one of those companies with members worthy of it, unless recourse was had to mediocrity. These ideas, true or false, were with the First Consul a pretext rather than a reason for getting rid of a literary society, which was hostile to his views in regard to the re-establishment of religion. Out of the two classes, therefore, he made but one, by adding to it Messrs. Suard, Morellet, and Fontanes, and declared it the second class of the Institute, answering to the French Academy. While this union was in progress, he applied to the celebrated Haüy for an elementary work on natural philosophy, which was yet wanting among our books of instruction; and replied to Laplace, who had just dedicated to him his great work, *Mécanique céleste*, in these nobly proud words: “I thank you for your dedication, and I hope that future generations, when reading your work, will not forget the esteem and friendship which I felt for its author.” (Nov. 26, 1802.)

The First Consul observed with attention the conduct of the clergy since the restoration of religious worship. The bishops appointed were almost all settled in their dioceses. Most of them behaved well there; some, however, still filled with a sectarian spirit, were to blame for not bringing with them into their new functions evangelical mildness and indulgence, which alone could put an end to schism. If Messrs. de Belloy in Paris, de Boisgelin at Tours, Bernier at Orleans, Cambacérès at Rouen, de Pancemont at Vannes, showed themselves genuine pastors, pious and wise, others had manifested mischievous tendencies in the exercise of their ministry. The bishop of Besançon, for instance, a Jansenist, and an old constitutionalist, endeavoured to prove to his priests,



that the civil constitution of his clergy was a truly evangelical and orthodox institution, conformable to the spirit of the primitive Church. Hence agitation prevailed in his diocese. It must be confessed, however, that he was the only constitutionalist who afforded any cause for complaint. The faults to be found in the clergy proceeded chiefly from the intolerance of the orthodox bishops. Several of them affected the pride of a victorious party, and harshly spurned the priests who had taken the oath. The bishops of Bordeaux, Avignon, Rennes, removed these priests from the service of the parishes, and strove to humble them, and thus galled that part of the population which was attached to them.

Nothing was more energetic on this subject than the language of the First Consul. He wrote himself to certain bishops, or obliged the cardinal-legate to write to them, threatening to turn out of their sees and to summon before the Council of State such prelates as should disturb the new Church. It was my intention, said he, to raise the overturned altars, to put an end to religious quarrels, but not to make one party triumph over another, and especially a party inimical to the Revolution. When the constitutional priests have adhered stedfastly to the rules of their condition and been observers of good morals, when they have not given cause for scandal, I prefer them to their adversaries; for, after all, they are decried only for having embraced the cause of the Revolution, which is ours, he wrote to the prefects. Cardinal Fesch, his uncle, seeming in the diocese of Lyons to forget the injunctions of the government, the First Consul wrote to him as follows: "To mortify the constitutional priests, to remove them, is a violation of justice, of the interest of the State, of my interest, of your own, monsieur le cardinal; it is violating my express desires, and seriously displeasing me."

There were no bounds to his liberality to those bishops who conformed to his policy, at once firm and conciliatory. To some he gave church ornaments, to others furniture for their residences, and to all considerable sums for their poor. Twice or three times in a single winter, he gave 50,000 francs to M. de Belloy, for him to distribute personally among the poor of his diocese. He sent to the bishop of Vannes, a perfect model of a prelate, mild, pious, beneficent, 10,000 francs to furnish his episcopal mansion, 10,000 to remunerate the priests whose conduct he approved, 70,000 to give to his poor. In the current year, the year XI., he addressed 200,000 francs to bishop Bernier, for the purpose of secretly relieving the victims of the civil war in La Vendée—a sum of which that prelate made a humane and skilful use. For these donations he had recourse to the chest of the ministry of the interior, supplied by various proceeds which were not then paid into the treasury, and the source of which he purified by devoting them to the noblest purposes.

It was now the autumn of 1802: the weather was splendid.



Nature seemed disposed to confer on this happy year a second spring. Owing to the extreme mildness of the temperature, the shrubs flowered a second time. The First Consul conceived a desire to visit a province of which very different accounts were given him: this was Normandy. Then, as at the present day, that fine country exhibited the interesting spectacle of rich manufactories rising amidst the most verdant and the best cultivated fields. Sharing in the general activity, which was awakening throughout all France at once, it exhibited a most animated appearance. Several persons, however, and especially Lebrun, the consul, had endeavoured to persuade the First Consul that this province was royalist. One might have apprehended as much, on recollecting the energy with which it spoke out in 1792 against the excesses of the Revolution. The First Consul resolved to travel through it, to see it with his own eyes, and to try the ordinary effect of his presence upon the inhabitants. Madame Bonaparte was to accompany him.

The First Consul spent a fortnight in this tour. He passed through Rouen, Elbeuf, Havre, Dieppe, Gisors, Beauvais. He inspected the farms and the manufactories, examining every thing himself, showing himself without guards to the population eager to see him. His progress was retarded by the homage universally paid him: every moment, he was met on his route by the country clergy bringing holy water, the mayors offering the keys of their towns and addressing to him and to madame Bonaparte speeches such as were formerly addressed to the kings and queens of France. He was delighted with this reception, and above all by the nascent prosperity which he everywhere remarked. The town of Elbeuf charmed him by its extraordinary increase. "Elbeuf," he wrote to his colleague Cambacérès, "is increased one-third since the Revolution. It is now but a single manufactory." He was singularly struck by Havre, and presaged the high commercial destinies to which that port was called. "I find everywhere," he again wrote to Cambacérès, "the best spirit. Normandy is not what Lebrun represented it to me. It is frankly devoted to the government. I here find again that unanimity of sentiments which rendered the days of '89 so bright." What he said was true. A better choice could not have been made than of Normandy, for expressing to him the sentiments of France. It accurately represented that honest and sincere population of '89, at first enthusiastic in behalf of the Revolution, then alarmed at its excesses, accused of royalism by the proconsuls, whose atrocities it condemned, and now enchanted to find again in an unhoped-for manner order, justice, equality, glory, minus indeed liberty, for which unfortunately it did not care.

By the middle of November the First Consul had returned to St. Cloud.

Imagine an envious man witnessing the success of a dreaded rival, and you will have a tolerably correct idea of the sentiments

with which England beheld the prosperity of France. That mighty and illustrious nation had, nevertheless, in its own greatness wherewithal to console itself for the greatness of another. But it was a prey to a singular jealousy. While the successes of general Bonaparte had been an argument against the administration of Mr. Pitt, they had been hailed in England with a sort of applause. But since these successes continued, and, heightened, were those of France herself; since she was seen to grow greater by peace as well as by war, by policy as much as by arms; since in eighteen months the Italian Republic had been seen to become, under the presidency of general Bonaparte, a French province, Piedmont added to our territory with the assent of the continent, Parma and Louisiana increasing our possessions by the mere execution of treaties, lastly, Germany reconstituted by our sole influence; since all this had been seen accomplished peaceably, naturally, as a thing arising from a universally accepted situation, a manifest spite had seized all English hearts, and this spite was no more dissembled than are usually the feelings of a passionate, proud, and free people.

The classes which had least share in the advantages of the peace displayed this jealousy more strongly than the others. We have already said that the manufacturers of Birmingham and Manchester, compensated by smuggling for the difficulties which they met with in our ports, complained but little; but that the great merchants, finding the seas covered with rival flags, and the source of financial gains cut off with the loans, publicly regretted the war, and manifested greater dissatisfaction with the peace than the aristocracy itself. That aristocracy, usually so proud and so patriotic, not leaving to any class of the nation the honour of serving and loving British greatness more than itself, was not sorry for this occasion of distinguishing itself from the mercantile interest by more elevated and more generous sentiments. It cherished Mr. Pitt rather less, since he was so fondly cherished by the mercantile world, eagerly rallied round the prince of Wales, the *beau ideal* of aristocratic manners and licentiousness, and especially round Mr. Fox, who delighted it by the nobleness of his sentiments and incomparable eloquence. But the mercantile interest, omnipotent in London and in the sea-ports, having for its organs Messrs. Wyndham, Grenville, and Dundas, drowned the voice of the rest of the nation and animated the British press with its passions. Hence the newspapers of London began to grow extremely hostile, leaving, however, to the journals conducted by French emigrants the duty of slandering the First Consul, his brothers, his sisters, and his whole family.

Unfortunately the Addington administration was wholly destitute of energy, and suffered itself to drive at the mercy of the gale that began to blow. It committed, from weakness, acts of downright perfidy. It still paid Georges Cadoudal, whose perseverance in conspiring was known; it placed at his disposal con-

siderable sums to pay cut-throats, whose band was incessantly hurrying from Portsmouth to Jersey, and from Jersey to the coast of Bretagne. It continued to suffer Peltier, the pamphleteer, to reside in London, notwithstanding the legal means furnished by the Alien Act; it treated the exiled princes with a respect that was very natural, but it did not confine itself to respect, and invited them to reviews of troops, to which they were admitted with the insignia of the ancient royalty. It acted thus, we repeat it, from weakness; for the probity of Mr. Addington, delivered from the influence of party, would have shrunk from such acts. It well knew that in paying Georges it was keeping a conspirator; but it durst not, in the face of the Wyndham, Dundas, and Grenville party, send him away, and perhaps estrange these old instruments of English policy.

The First Consul was deeply hurt at this conduct. To repeated applications for a treaty of commerce he replied by requiring the suppression of certain journals, the expulsion of Georges and Peltier, the removal of the French princes. Grant me, said he, the satisfactions that are due to me, that you cannot refuse me without declaring yourselves accomplices of my enemies, and I will then seek the means for granting satisfaction to your galled interests. But among the demands of the First Consul the English ministry found not one with which it could comply. As for the suppression of certain newspapers, Mr. Addington and lord Hawkesbury replied very justly, The press is free in England, imitate us; we despise its licentiousness. If you choose, actions shall be commenced, but at your risk and peril, that is to say, standing the chance of affording a triumph to your enemies. As for Georges, Peltier, and the emigrant princes, Mr. Addington had no legal excuse to urge; for the Alien Act gave him a right to send them out of the country. He appealed to the necessity of humouring public opinion in England—a very sorry argument it must be confessed, in regard to some of the men whose expulsion was demanded.

The First Consul did not consider himself as beaten. In the first place, said he, the advice which you give me to despise the licentiousness of the press would be good, if the question for me were to despise the licentiousness of the French press in France. It is natural that in one's own country one decides on enduring the inconveniences of freedom of writing, in consideration of the advantages which it procures. This is a wholly domestic question, in which each nation is the judge of that which it suits itself to do. But it is not right ever to suffer the daily press to abuse foreign governments and thus to impair the relations between State and State. It would be a grievous abuse, a danger without compensation. And the proof of this danger lies in the present relations of France with England. We should be at peace but for the newspapers; and here we are nearly at war. Your legislation relative to the press is therefore bad. You ought to

permit every thing against your own government, nothing against foreign governments. Nevertheless, I set aside the abuse of the English papers. I respect your laws, in spite of what they have in them injurious to other nations. It is a disagreement of neighbourhood to which I must submit. But the French, who make in London so odious a use of your institutions, who write such base calumnies, why do you suffer them in England? You have the Alien Act, the very object of which is to prevent foreigners from doing mischief: why do you not apply it? And Georges and his gang, all proved accomplices in the infernal machine, and the bishops of Arras and St. Pol de Leon, publicly exciting the population of Bretagne to revolt—why do you refuse to expel them? What becomes in your hands of the treaty of Amiens, which stipulates expressly that no underhand dealings shall be suffered in one of the States against the other? You give an asylum to the emigrant princes—that is worthy of respect, no doubt. But the head of their family is at Warsaw; why not send them all off to him? Why, above all, allow them to wear decorations which the French laws no longer recognize, and which occasion great inconveniences when those decorations are worn beside the ambassador of France, in his presence, often at the same table? You ask me, added he, for a treaty of commerce and of better relations between the two countries; begin then by showing yourselves less spiteful towards France, and then I shall be able to seek whether there exist means of reconciling our rival interests.—There was assuredly nothing to find fault with in such arguments, nothing but the weakness of the great man, who, swaying Europe, took the trouble to advance them. What, in fact, needed the all-powerful conqueror of Marengo to care about either Georges, or Peltier, or count d'Artois, with his royal decorations? Against the daggers of assassins he had his fortune; against the outrages of pamphleteers he had his glory; against the legitimacy of the Bourbons he had the love of France. But, oh weakness of great hearts! This man, raised so high, tormented himself about what was so low! We have already deplored this error on his part, and we cannot refrain from deploring it again,—as we approach the moment when it produced such baneful consequences.

The First Consul, no longer master of himself, took revenge by answers inserted in the *Moniteur*, frequently of his own writing, and the origin of which may be detected by an incomparable vigour of style. He there complained of the complaisance of the British administration toward Georges, the conspirator, towards Peltier, the libeller. He asked why such guests were suffered; why they were allowed to do such acts towards a friendly government, when it was a duty imposed by treaties, and an existing law furnished the means, to repress them. The First Consul went further, and, addressing the British government itself, he asked, in those articles inserted in the *Moniteur*, whether that government

approved, whether it was pleased with, those odious proceedings, those infamous diatribes, since it tolerated them, or whether, if not pleased with them, it was too weak to prevent them. And he came to the conclusion that there existed no government where one could not repress calumny, prevent assassination, protect, in short, the social order of Europe.

The English administration then complained in its turn—Those journals, it argued, whose language offends you, are not official; we cannot be answerable for them; but the *Moniteur* is the avowed organ of the French government; it is, moreover, easy to discover by the very language the source of these inspirations. It slanders us every day; we, therefore, and with more foundation, demand satisfaction.

Such were the sorry recriminations with which for several months the despatches of the two governments were filled. But more momentous events all at once supervened, and furnished their irascible dispositions with a more dangerous, though indeed a more worthy object.

Switzerland wrested from the hands of Reding, the oligarch, had fallen into those of Dolder, the landammann, the head of the party of the moderate revolutionists. The retirement of the French troops was a concession made to that party, in order to render it popular, and a proof of the impatience felt by the First Consul to get rid of Swiss affairs. However, he reaped not the fruit of his excellent intentions. Almost all the cantons had adopted the new constitution, and approved the men appointed to put it in force; but in the little cantons, Schwitz, Uri, Unterwalden, Appenzell, Glarus, and the Grisons, the spirit of revolt, excited by M. Reding and his friends, had soon raised the people of the mountains. The oligarchs, flattering themselves that they should carry their point by force, after the departure of the French troops, assembled the people in the churches, and induced them to reject the proposed constitution. They had persuaded them that Milan was besieged by an Austro-Russian army, and that the French Republic was as near its downfall as in 1799. Though the constitution was rejected, they had not been able to urge them into civil war. The little cantons proceeded no further than to send deputies to Berne, to declare to Verninac, the minister of France, that they had no intention to overthrow the new government, but that they were resolved to separate from the Helvetic confederation, to constitute themselves apart in their mountains, and to revert to their proper system, which was pure democracy. They even desired to settle their new relations with the central government established in Berne under the auspices of France. Verninac, the minister, had of course been obliged to decline such communications, and to declare that he knew no other Helvetic government than that which was sitting at Berne.

In the Grisons were passing tumultuous scenes, that revealed more clearly than all the rest the influences by which the Swiss



were then agitated. In the middle of the valley of the Upper Rhine, cultivated by the Grison mountaineers, was situated the lordship of Bazuns, belonging to the emperor of Austria. This lordship conferred on the emperor the quality of a member of the Grison leagues and a direct action on the composition of their government. He chose the ammann of the country from among three candidates who were presented to him. Since the Grisons had been united by France with the Helvetic confederation, the emperor, continuing to be proprietor of Bazuns, had managed his domain through the medium of an intendant. This intendant had put himself at the head of the insurgent Grisons, and had taken part in all the meetings in which they had declared their separation from the Helvetic confederation, and their return to the old order of things. He had been charged with and accepted the commission to lay their wishes at the feet of the emperor, and with their wishes their urgent prayer to take them under his protection.

Assuredly, it was impossible to show more clearly on what party persons sought to support themselves in Europe. To all this agitation of mind was superadded something still more serious: people were arming, repairing the muskets left by the Austrians and the Russians in the late war, offering and giving eighteen sous per day to the old soldiers of the Swiss regiments driven out of France, and replacing their former officers. The poor inhabitants of the mountains, simply believing that their religion and their independence were threatened, came tumultuously to fill the ranks of these insurgent bands. The money profusely distributed among them was advanced by the wealthy Swiss oligarchs out of the millions deposited in London, and speedily recoverable if they should happen to triumph. Reding, the landammann, had been declared head of the league. Morat and Sempach were the recollections invoked by these new martyrs of Helvetic independence.

Such an imprudence on their part is almost incomprehensible, the French lining the Swiss frontiers on all sides. But they had been persuaded that the First Consul had his hands tied, that the powers had interfered, and that he could not make a single regiment re-enter Switzerland, without exposing himself to a general war—a threat which assuredly he would not defy for the sake of supporting Dolder, the landammann, and his colleagues.

Notwithstanding all this agitation, however, the poor mountaineers of Uri, Schwitz, and Unterwalden, most deeply engaged in this lamentable adventure, did not proceed so fast as their leaders would have wished, and had declared that they would not leave their cantons. The Helvetic government had at its disposal from four to five thousand men, a thousand or twelve hundred of whom were employed in guarding Berne, a few hundred dispersed in various garrisons, and 3000 in the canton of Lucerne, on the border of Unterwalden: these latter destined to observe the in-



surrection. A body of insurgents was posted at the village of Hergyswil. The two parties soon began to exchange shots, and a few men were killed and wounded on either side. While this collision was taking place on the frontier of Unterwalden, general Andermatt, commander of the government troops, would have placed a few companies of infantry in the city of Zurich, to guard the arsenal there and to save it from the hands of the oligarchs. The aristocratic burghers of Zurich resisted and closed the gates against the soldiers of general Andermatt. The latter sent to no purpose a few howitzers to the city: the inhabitants declared that they would submit to be burned before they would surrender and deliver up Zurich to the oppressors of the independence of Helvetia. At the same moment, the partisans of the old aristocracy of Berne in the country of Argau and the Oberland were in such a state of commotion as to excite apprehensions of a rising. In the canton of Vaud was raised the usual cry for incorporation with France. The Swiss government knew not how to extricate itself from this perilous situation. Combated with open force by the oligarchs, it had not on its side either the ardent patriots, who wished for absolute unity, or the peaceable masses, who were well disposed to revolution, but knew nothing of that revolution excepting the horrors of war and the presence of foreign troops. It was now capable of judging the worth of the popularity acquired at the price of the removal of the French troops.

In its embarrassment, it agreed to an armistice with the insurgents, and then addressed itself to the First Consul, earnestly soliciting the intervention of France, which the insurgents on their part also applied for, since they wished that their relations with the central government should be finally settled under the auspices of Verninac, the minister.

When this demand for intervention was known in Paris, the First Consul repented of having given way too readily to the ideas of the Dolder party, as well as to his own desire to disengage himself from the affairs of Switzerland, which had induced him to withdraw the French troops prematurely. To send them back again now, in the face of England, so maliciously disposed and complaining of our too manifest action on the States of the continent, was an extremely serious proceeding. For the rest, he was still unacquainted with what was passing in Switzerland; he knew not to what degree the instigators of the movement in the little cantons had revealed their real designs, so as to show that they were the agents of the European counter-revolution, and the allies of Austria and England. He refused, therefore, the universally solicited intervention, the inevitable consequence of which would have been the return of the French troops to Switzerland and the military occupation of an independent State guaranteed by Europe.

This answer threw the Helvetic government into consternation. Threatened with a speedy rupture of the armistice and a rising of

the peasants of the Oberland, they knew not how to act at Berne. Certain members of the government were for sacrificing Dolder, the landammann, the head of the moderates, and who, as such, was hated alike by the unitary patriots and by the oligarchs. Both promised themselves that quiet would be restored on this condition. They repaired to the residence of citizen Dolder, they used a sort of violence, and demanded his resignation, which he had the weakness to give. The senate, more firm, refused to accept this resignation, but citizen Dolder persisted in it. They then had recourse to the usual expedient of assemblies which are at a loss what resolution to adopt, and appointed an extraordinary commission, charged to devise means of safety. But at this moment the armistice was broken: the insurgents advanced upon Berne, obliging general Andermatt to fall back before them. These insurgents consisted of peasants, to the number of fifteen hundred or two thousand, carrying crucifixes and carbines, and preceded by the soldiers of the Swiss regiments formerly in the service of France, old wrecks of the 10th of August. They soon made their appearance at the gates of Berne, and fired a few cannon-shot with wretched pieces which they dragged after them. The municipality of Berne, under pretext of saving the city, interfered and negotiated a capitulation. It was agreed that the government, to spare Berne the horrors of an attack by main force, should retire with the troops of general Andermatt to the Pays de Vaud. This capitulation was immediately executed. The government repaired to Lausanne, whither it was followed by the minister of France. Its troops, concentrated since the cession of the country to the insurgents, were at Payern, to the number of 4000 men, well disposed enough, encouraged moreover by the sentiments manifested in the Pays de Vaud, but incapable of recovering Berne.

The oligarchic party immediately established itself at Berne, and, to do things completely, reinstated the avoyer who was at the head of affairs in 1798, at the very time when the first revolution took place. This avoyer was M. de Mulinen. Thus this counter-revolution was not deficient either in regard to groundwork or to form; and, but for the silly illusions of the parties, but for the absurd reports circulated in Switzerland respecting the alleged impotence of the French government, so extravagant an attempt would have been incomprehensible.

Things having been carried to this point, however, it was impossible to reckon upon the further patience of the First Consul. The two governments, sitting at Lausanne and Berne, had despatched envoys, the one beseeching him to interpose, the other conjuring him to do nothing of the kind. The envoy of the oligarchic party was a member of the Mulinen family. He was commissioned to renew the promises of good conduct of which M. Reding had been so lavish, and which he had so ill kept, to

confer at the same time with the ambassadors of all the powers in Paris, and to place Switzerland under their special protection.

Supplications to the First Consul to act or not to act were henceforth useless. Face to face with a flagrant counter-revolution, having for its object to deliver up the Alps to the enemies of France, he was not a man to hesitate. He would not receive the agent of the oligarchic government, but to the intermediate persons charged to speak for that agent he replied that his resolution was taken—I cease, said he to them, to be neuter and inactive. I had resolved to respect the independence of Switzerland, and to spare the susceptibilities of Europe; I have carried my scruples to an absolute fault—the removal of the French troops. But this is sufficient condescension for interests inimical to France. While I saw in Switzerland nothing but conflicts which could end only in making one party a little stronger than another, it was my duty to leave her to herself; but, now that an open counter-revolution is on foot, accomplished by soldiers, formerly in the service of the Bourbons, who have since been taken into the pay of England, I cannot make any mistake: if these insurgents wished to leave me under any illusion, they would introduce more dissimulation into their conduct, and not place soldiers of Buchmann's regiment at the head of their columns. I will not suffer counter-revolution anywhere, either in Switzerland, in Italy, in Holland, any more than in France itself. I will not deliver up to fifteen hundred mercenaries, paid by England, those *formidable bastions of the Alps*, which the European coalition has not been able in two campaigns to wrest from our exhausted soldiers. People talk to me about the will of the Swiss people; I cannot discover it in the will of two hundred aristocratic families. I esteem that brave people too highly to believe it to be desirous of such a yoke. But, at any rate, there is something that I estimate more highly than the will of the Swiss people, that is the safety of forty millions of men, over whom I rule. I will declare myself mediator of the Helvetic confederation, and give it a constitution founded on equality of rights and the nature of the soil. Thirty thousand men shall be on the frontier to insure the execution of my beneficent intentions. But if, contrary to my expectation, I cannot insure the tranquillity of an interesting people, for whom I wish to do all the good that it deserves, my resolution is taken. I shall unite to France all that in soil or manners resembles Franche-Comté; I shall unite the rest with the mountaineers of the petty cantons, give them the government which they had in the fourteenth century, and leave them to themselves. My principle is henceforth fixed: either a Switzerland friendly to France, or no Switzerland at all.

The First Consul enjoined M. de Talleyrand to make the envoy of Berne leave Paris within twelve hours, and to tell him that it was only in Berne itself that he could any longer serve his consti-

tients, by advising them to separate instantly if they would avoid bringing a French army into Switzerland. He drew up with his own hand a proclamation to the Helvetic people, short, energetic, conceived in these terms:

“Inhabitants of Helvetia, for two years past, you have exhibited an afflicting spectacle. Hostile factions have successively seized the chief power; they have marked their transient rule by a system of partiality, which proved their weakness and their incompetence.

“In the course of the year X., your government desired that the small number of French troops then in Helvetia should be withdrawn. The French government gladly seized this occasion to honour your independence; but it was not long before your different parties were agitated with new fury: the blood of Swiss was spilt by the hands of Swiss.

“You have been quarrelling three years without coming to any understanding. If you are left longer to yourselves, you will be killing one another for three years more, without any better prospect of agreeing. Your history, moreover proves that your intestine wars never could be terminated but by the friendly interference of France.

“It is true that I had resolved to abstain from intermeddling at all in your affairs; I had constantly seen your different governments apply to me for my advice and not follow it, and sometimes make an improper use of my name, according to their interests and their passions. But I cannot, and ought not, to remain insensible to the calamities to which you are a prey: I revoke my resolution. I will be the mediator of your differences; but my mediation shall be efficacious, such as befits the great nation in whose name I speak.”

To this noble preamble were subjoined imperative dispositions. Five days after the notification of this proclamation, the government, which had withdrawn to Lausanne was to remove to Berne, the insurrectional government was to dissolve itself, all the armed assemblages, excepting the army of general Andermatt, were to disperse, and the soldiers of the old Swiss regiments were to lay down their arms in the communes in which they resided. Lastly, all those who had held public offices during the last three years, let them belong to what party they would, were invited to Paris, there to confer with the First Consul on the means of putting an end to the troubles of their country.

The First Consul ordered his aide-de-camp, colonel Rapp, to proceed immediately to Switzerland; to deliver his proclamation to all the legal or insurrectional authorities; to go first to Lausanne, then to Berne, Zurich, Lucerne, to every place, in short, where there was any resistance to overcome. Colonel Rapp was, moreover, to concert respecting the movements of the troops with general Ney, who was to command them. Orders had already been despatched for these troops to march. A first corps of seven

or eight thousand men, drawn from the Valais, Savoy, and the departments of the Rhone, was forming at Geneva. Six thousand men were assembling at Pontarlier, six thousand at Hunningen and Basle. A division of the like force was concentrating in the Italian Republic, for the purpose of entering Switzerland by the Italian bailiwicks. General Ney was to wait at Geneva for the information that he was to receive from colonel Rapp, and, at the first signal from the latter, to enter the Pays de Vaud with the column formed at Geneva, to join by the way that which had penetrated by Pontarlier, and to advance upon Berne with twelve or fifteen thousand men. The troops from Basle had orders to form a junction in the little cantons with the detachment which should have come through the Italian bailiwicks.

|| All these dispositions, arranged with extraordinary despatch, for in forty-eight hours the resolution was taken, the proclamation drawn up, the order for marching sent off to all the corps, and colonel Rapp on his route for Switzerland, the First Consul awaited with calm courage the effect produced on Europe by so bold a resolution, which, added to all that he had done in Italy and Germany, must render more conspicuous a power that already dazzled all eyes. But, whatever might result from it, even war, his resolution was an act of wisdom; for, the point was to rescue the Alps from the European coalition. Energy, under the control of prudence is one of the finest spectacles that policy can exhibit.

The agent of the oligarchy of Berne, sent to Paris, had not failed, on finding himself so roughly received, to have recourse to the ambassadors of the courts of Austria, Russia, Prussia, and England. M. de Markoff, though he declaimed every day against the conduct of France in Europe, M. de Markoff himself dared not reply. All the other representatives of the powers were silent, excepting Mr. Merry, the minister of England. This latter, after placing himself in communication with the envoy of Berne, immediately despatched a courier, to acquaint his court with what was passing in Switzerland, and to apprise it that the government of Berne formally claimed the protection of England.

Mr. Merry's courier arrived at lord Hawkesbury's at the same time that the French papers reached London. Immediately there was heard in England but one cry in favour of the brave people of Helvetia, who, it was said, were defending their religion and their liberty against a barbarous oppressor. That emotion which we have seen in our times communicated to all Europe in behalf of the Greeks slaughtered by the Turks, people in England affected to feel for the oligarchs of Berne, exciting unfortunate peasants to arm on account of their privileges. Great zeal was feigned and subscriptions were opened. The emotion, however, was too factitious to be general: it descended no lower than those elevated classes, who in general take an interest only in the political circumstances of the day. Grenville, Wyndham, Dundas,



made excursions to inflame people's minds, and railed with fresh vehemence against what they called the weakness of Mr. Addington. Parliament had just been dissolved and new elections were to take place. The English cabinet, between the Pitt party, which was visibly falling off from it, and the Fox party, which though mollified since the peace, had not ceased to be in opposition, knew not upon whom to support itself. It had great fears of the first meetings of the new parliament, and deemed it expedient to take some diplomatic steps which might serve for arguments against its adversaries.

The first step decided upon was to transmit a note to Paris, to remonstrate in favour of the independence of Switzerland, and to protest against all material intervention on the part of France. This was not the way to restrain the First Consul, but merely to draw upon itself an exchange of disagreeable communications. But the Addington cabinet did not stop there. It sent an agent, Mr. Moore, to Switzerland, with instructions to see and hear the chiefs of the insurgents; to judge whether they were fairly resolved to defend themselves, and in this case to offer them the pecuniary assistance of England. He had orders to purchase arms in Germany, to be forwarded to them. This step, it must be confessed, was neither honourable nor easy to justify. Still more serious communications were addressed to the court of Austria, to rekindle its old aversion against France, to exasperate its recent resentment on account of the affairs of Germany, and to alarm it above all respecting the frontier of the Alps. The English minister went so far as to offer it a subsidy of 100 millions of florins (225 millions of francs) if it would espouse the cause of Switzerland. Such, at least, was the information transmitted to Paris by Haugwitz himself, who took great pains to acquaint himself with every thing that could interest the maintenance of peace. A less open attempt was made upon the emperor Alexander, who was known to be rather deeply involved in the policy of France, in consequence of the mediation exercised at Ratisbon. No overture was made to the Prussian cabinet, which was notoriously attached to the First Consul, and which, on this account, was treated with reserve and coldness.

These steps of the British cabinet, unbecoming as they were in a state of absolute peace, could not be of much consequence, for that cabinet found all the courts of the continent more or less bound to the policy of the First Consul, some, as Russia, because they were then associated in his proceedings, others, as Prussia and Austria, because they were on the point of obtaining from him purely personal advantages. It was, in fact, the moment when Austria was soliciting an extension of indemnities in favour of the archduke of Tuscany, which she ultimately obtained. But the English cabinet committed an act of far greater importance, and which had subsequently immense consequences. The order to evacuate Egypt was despatched; that for the evacuation of



Malta was not yet sent. Thus far this delay had arisen from excusable motives, and was rather imputable to the French ministry for foreign affairs than to the English. M. de Talleyrand, as the reader may recollect, had neglected to follow up one of the stipulations of the treaty of Amiens. This stipulation purported that Russia, Prussia, Austria, and Spain, should be requested to guarantee the new order of things established in Malta. Ever since the first days after the signature of the treaty, the English ministers, urged to obtain this guarantee before the evacuation of Malta, had been most zealous in their applications for it to all the courts. But the French agents had not yet received instructions from their minister. M. de Champagny had the prudence to act at Vienna as if he had received them, and the guarantee was granted. The young emperor of Russia, on the contrary, not sharing the passion of his father for every thing that concerned the Order of St. John of Jerusalem, considering the solicited guarantee as onerous to him, because it might sooner or later involve the obligation of taking part between France and England, was not disposed to give it. The ambassador of France, having no instructions to second the proceedings of the English minister, and not daring to act without them, the Russian cabinet was in no hurry to explain, and availed itself of the circumstance to give no answer. The same thing, and from the same motives, took place in Berlin. Owing to this negligence, prolonged for several months, the question of the guarantee remained in suspense, and the English ministers, without any ill intention, had been authorized to defer the evacuation. The Neapolitan garrison, which, according to the treaty, was to be sent to Malta, till the reconstitution of the Order, had been received upon the island, but only outside the fortifications. The French chancellerie had at length bestirred itself, but too late. This time, the emperor of Russia, urged to explain himself, had refused his guarantee. Another difficulty had arisen. The grand-master nominated by the Pope, the *bailli* Ruspoli, deterred by the fate of M. de Hompesch, his predecessor, seeing that the duty of the Order consisted no longer in fighting the infidels, but in keeping itself in equilibrium between two great maritime nations, with the certainty of falling a prey to one or the other, would not accept the vain and onerous dignity which was offered him, and resisted the solicitations of the court of Rome as well as the pressing invitations of the First Consul.

Such were the circumstances which had caused the evacuation of Malta to be deferred till the month of November, 1802. Hence arose the dangerous temptation for the British cabinet to defer it still longer. Accordingly, on the very day that Moore, the agent, set out for Switzerland, a frigate sailed for the Mediterranean to carry orders to the garrison of Malta to remain there. It was a grievous fault on the part of an administration anxious to preserve peace, for it excited in England a national covetousness

which no one could withstand after it had been excited. Moreover, it was a formal infringement of the treaty of Amiens, in the face of an adversary, who had taken a pride in executing it punctually, and who would take a great deal more in causing it to be executed by all the parties who had signed it. This was conduct at once imprudent and irregular.

The remonstrances of the British cabinet in behalf of the independence of Switzerland met with a most discourteous reception from the French cabinet ; and, though it was easy to foresee the consequences of this reception, the First Consul was not to be shaken. He persisted more than ever in his resolutions. He repeated his orders to general Ney, and enjoined the most speedy and decisive execution of them. He insisted that this alleged national rising was but a ridiculous attempt, instigated by the interest of a few families, and no sooner made than suppressed.

He was convinced that in this circumstance he was obeying a great national interest, but he was, moreover, excited by the sort of challenge which had been given him in the face of Europe, for the insurgents loudly asserted, and their agents everywhere repeated, that the First Consul had his hands tied and durst not act. In the answer addressed by his order to lord Hawkesbury, there was something truly extraordinary. We give its substance, without advising any person whatever to imitate it.—“ You are charged to declare,” wrote M. de Talleyrand to M. Otto, “ that if the British administration, in the interest of its parliamentary situation, has recourse to any notification or any publication, from which it may be inferred that the First Consul has not done this or that, because he has been prevented, that very instant he will do it. For the rest, as for Switzerland, whatever may be said or not said, his resolution is irrevocable. He will not give up the Alps to fifteen hundred mercenaries, paid by England. He will not suffer Switzerland to be turned into another Jersey. The First Consul does not wish for war, because he believes that the French people can find in the extension of its commerce as many advantages as in the extension of its territory. But no consideration would stop him, if the honour or the interest of the Republic commanded him to resume arms.—You will never talk of war,” wrote M. de Talleyrand in another place to M. Otto, “ but you will never suffer it to be mentioned to you. The least threat, how indirect soever it be, must be taken up with the greatest warmth. Besides, with what war would they threaten us? With a maritime war? But our commerce has scarcely revived, and the booty which we should give up to the English would be of very little value. Our West India Islands are provided with soldiers inured to the climate; St. Domingo alone contains twenty-five thousand. They would blockade our ports, it is true, but at the very instant of a declaration of war, England would find herself blockaded in her turn. The coasts of Hanover, of Holland, of Portugal, of Italy, as far as Tarento, would be occupied by our

troops. Those countries which we are accused of ruling too openly, Liguria, Lombardy, Switzerland, Holland, instead of being left in that uncertain situation, in which they raise up for us a thousand embarrassments, would be converted into French provinces, from which we should derive immense resources; and we should thus be forced to realize that empire of the Gauls, with which incessant efforts are made to terrify Europe. And how would it be, if the First Consul, leaving Paris, were to establish himself at Lille or at St. Omer, collecting all the flat-bottomed boats of Flanders and Holland, preparing means of transport for a hundred thousand men, keeping England in constant apprehension of an invasion, always possible, almost certain? Would England kindle a continental war? But where would she find allies? Not in Prussia and Bavaria, who owe to France the justice which they have obtained in the territorial arrangements of Germany. Not in Austria, exhausted through having chosen to be subservient to British policy. At any rate, if war should be renewed on the continent, it would be England that would have obliged us to conquer Europe. The First Consul is but thirty-three years old; as yet he has destroyed none but States of the second order! Who knows what time it would take him, if he were forced to it, to change anew the face of Europe and to resuscitate the empire of the West?"

All the misfortunes of Europe, all those of France also, were comprehended in those formidable words, which one would suppose to have been written after the events, so prophetic are they.\* Thus the lion, having become adult, began to feel his strength, and was ready to make use of it. Covered by the barrier of the Ocean, England delighted in chafing him. But this barrier is not impossible to be passed, and how very little was wanting to its having been passed!—and, had it been, England would have bitterly deplored the excitements to which she was instigated by an incurable jealousy. It was, besides, a cruel policy towards the continent, for it had to suffer all the consequences of a war provoked without reason as without justice.

M. Otto had orders not to mention either Malta or Egypt, for one would not have it even supposed that England could violate a solemn treaty, signed before the face of the world. The only injunction given him was to sum up the whole policy of France in these words, *The whole treaty of Amiens, nothing but the treaty of Amiens.*

M. Otto, a man of discretion, very submissive to the First Consul, but capable, for a useful object, of introducing a little of his own in the execution of the orders which he received, greatly softened down the haughty language of his government. Nevertheless,

---

\* The despatch, the substance of which we have given above, is dated the 1st Brumaire, year XI: it is written by M. Talleyrand to M. Otto, at the dictation of the First Consul.

with this answer, even when softened down, he embarrassed lord Hawkesbury, who, fearful of the approaching meeting of parliament, would fain have had something satisfactory to say. He insisted on having a note. M. Otto had orders to refuse it, and did refuse it, declaring, however, that the meeting of the principal citizens of Switzerland in Paris was not designed to imitate what had been done at Lyons, at the time of the Italian Consulta, but solely to give Switzerland a wise constitution, based on justice and the nature of the country, without the triumph of one party or another. Lord Hawkesbury, for whom, during this conference with M. Otto, the British cabinet, sitting at this moment, was waiting to learn the answer of France, appeared agitated and displeased. To the declaration, *The whole treaty of Amiens; nothing but the treaty of Amiens*, of the purport of which he was perfectly aware, for it alluded to Malta, he replied with this maxim, *The state of the continent at the time of the treaty of Amiens; nothing but that state*.

This manner of putting the question provoked an instantaneous and categorical answer on the part of the First Consul. France, said M. de Talleyrand, by his orders, France accepts the condition laid down by lord Hawkesbury. At the time of the signature of the treaty of Amiens, France had ten thousand men in Switzerland, thirty thousand in Piedmont, forty thousand in Italy, twelve thousand in Holland. Would they have things replaced on this footing? At that time England was invited to join in arranging the affairs of the continent, but on condition that she should recognize and guarantee the States recently constituted. She refused; she chose to know nothing about the kingdom of Etruria, the Italian Republic, the Ligurian Republic. She had thus the advantage of not giving her guarantee to these new States, but she also lost the means of interfering subsequently in what concerned them. For the rest, she knew all that was already done, all that was to be done. She was aware of the presidency conferred by the Italian Republic on the First Consul; she was aware of the design of annexing Piedmont to France, because she had been refused the indemnity demanded for the king of Sardinia; and she nevertheless signed the treaty of Amiens! What then does she complain of? She stipulated one thing, the evacuation of Tarento in three months, and Tarento was evacuated in two. As for Switzerland, it was known that the business of constituting it had been taken in hand, and it could not be imagined by any one that France would suffer a counter-revolution to be effected there. But, at any rate, even on the ground of strict right, what is there still to object? The Helvetic government has claimed the mediation of France. The small cantons have claimed it also, by desiring to establish, under the auspices of the First Consul, their relations with the central authority. The citizens of all parties, even those of the oligarchic

party, Messrs. Mulinen and d'Affry, are in Paris, conferring with the First Consul. In the affairs of Germany what is there new for England? What are they but the literal execution of the treaty of Lunéville, known and published long before the treaty of Amiens? Why has England signed the arrangements adopted for Germany, if it seemed wrong to her to secularize it? Why has the elector of Hanover, who is also king of Great Britain, approved the Germanic negotiation by accepting the bishopric of Osnabrück? Why, moreover, has the house of Hanover been so well, so liberally, treated, unless in consideration of England? The British cabinet had no wish to interfere six months ago in the affairs of the continent; it would do so now: let it if it pleases. But has it more interest in those affairs than Prussia, than Russia, than Austria? Well, these three powers adhere at this moment to what has recently taken place in Germany. How could England allege a better right to judge of the interests of the continent? It is true that, in the great Germanic negotiation, the name of the king of England has not figured. It has not been mentioned, and this may perhaps offend his people, tenacious of holding, and having a right to hold, a conspicuous place in Europe. But whose fault is it, unless that of England herself? The First Consul would have desired nothing better than to show her friendship and confidence, than to resolve jointly with her the great questions which he has just resolved jointly with Russia; but for friendship and confidence there should be a return. Now, in England are raised none but cries of hatred against France. The English constitution, we are told, will have it thus. Be it so: but it does not command French pamphleteers and the authors of the infernal machine to be tolerated in London, members of the house of Bourbon to be received and treated as princes with all the honours due to sovereignty. When other sentiments are shown for the First Consul, he will be led to cherish others too, and to share with England the European influence which he has thought fit to share this time with Russia.

Indeed, we know not whether we are blinded by our patriotic sentiments, but we seek truth without respect to nation, and it seems to us that the vigorous reasoning of the First Consul is unanswerable. England, when signing the treaty of Amiens, was aware that France swayed the neighbouring States, occupied by her troops, Italy, Switzerland, Holland, and was about to proceed to the distribution of the German indemnities: she was not ignorant of this, and, having need of peace, she signed the treaty of Amiens, without concerning herself about the interests of the continent. And now that peace had in her eyes fewer charms than in the first days; now that her commerce found in it less advantage than she had at first hoped for; now that the party of Mr. Pitt was raising its head; now, finally, that quiet, succeeding the agitations of war, permitted the power and the glory of



France to be more clearly discerned, England was seized with jealousy ; and, without having it in her power to specify any violation of the treaty of Amiens, she harboured the design of violating it herself in the most audacious and unheard-of manner.

It seems to us that M. Haugwitz, with his rare perspicacity, properly appreciated the British cabinet, when, on this occasion, he said to our ambassador, " This weak Addington administration was in such a hurry to sign the peace that it passed over every thing without raising any objection ; it now perceives that France is great ; that she is reaping the consequences of her greatness ; and it wants to tear the treaty that it has signed."

During this exchange of angry communications between France and England, Russia, which had received the demands of the Swiss insurgents and the complaints of the English, Russia had sent to Paris a despatch written in very guarded terms, in which, without repeating any of the recriminations of Great Britain, she nevertheless insinuated to the First Consul that it was necessary, for the preservation of peace, to allay certain jealousies excited in Europe by the power of the French Republic, and that it belonged to him, by his moderation, out of respect for the independence of the neighbouring States, to extinguish those jealousies. This was very wise advice, which had reference to Switzerland, which had nothing offensive to the First Consul, and well became that character of impartial moderation, which the young emperor seemed at that time desirous to make the glory of his reign. As for Prussia, she had declared that she highly applauded the First Consul for not suffering a focus of English and Austrian intrigues in Switzerland ; that he did well to make haste and not give his enemies time to profit by such embarrassments ; and that he would do still better, if he would deprive them of all pretext for complaint, and refrain from renewing in Paris the Consulta of Lyons. Lastly, as for Austria, she affected not to interfere in the matter, and indeed she durst not, having still need of France for the winding up of the German affairs.

The First Consul was of the same opinion as his friends : he resolved to act promptly, and not to imitate in Paris the Consulta of Lyons, that is to say, not to make himself president of the Helvetic Republic. For the rest, that desperate resistance which, it was reported, the Swiss were to make against him was not, neither could it be, any thing but an extravagance of emigrants. The moment colonel Rapp, on his arrival at Lausanne, appeared at the advanced posts of the insurgents, unaccompanied by a single soldier, and bringing only the proclamation of the First Consul, he found people entirely disposed to submit. General Bachmann, expressing regret that he had not twenty-four hours more to fling the Helvetic government into the Lake of Geneva, retired, nevertheless, towards Berne. There he found preparations for resistance on the part of the oligarchs. These were absolutely bent on



obliging France to employ force, thinking thereby to compromise her with the European powers. Their wishes were gratified, for that force arrived in the utmost haste. The French troops, placed on the frontiers under the command of general Ney, entered, and then the insurrectional government hesitated no longer to dissolve itself. The members of which it was composed withdrew, declaring that they yielded to violence. The people everywhere readily submitted, excepting in the little cantons, where the agitation was greater, and where the insurrection had originated. There, however, as in other parts, the opinion of rational persons finally prevailed on the approach of our troops, and all serious resistance ceased in their presence. The French general Serras, at the head of some battalions, took possession of Lucerne, Stanz, Schwitz, and Altorf. M. Reding was apprehended with some agitators: the insurgents suffered themselves to be successively disarmed. The Helvetic government, which had fled to Lausanne, returned to Berne, under the escort of general Ney, who repaired thither in person, with a single demi-brigade. In a few days, the city of Constance, where Moore, the English agent, had established himself, swarmed with emigrants of the oligarchic party, returning after having uselessly expended the money of England; and acknowledging publicly the absurdity of that rash enterprize: Mr. Moore returned to London, to report the ill success of this Helvetic Vendée, which his government had endeavoured to raise up amidst the Alps.

This prompt submission was attended with one great advantage, for it proved that the Swiss, whose courage, even against a superior force, could not be doubted, did not deem themselves obliged by honour or by interest to oppose the intervention of France. It thus did away with all ground of complaint on the part of England.

It was requisite to complete this work of pacification by giving Switzerland a constitution, and founding that constitution on reason and the nature of the country. The First Consul, with a view to divest the mission of general Ney of the too military character which it appeared to have, conferred on him, in lieu of the title of commander-in-chief, that of minister of France, with the most precise instructions to conduct himself mildly and moderately towards all the parties. There were, moreover, only 6000 French in Switzerland. The surplus had remained on the frontiers.

Men of all opinions, stanch revolutionists as well as decided oligarchs, had been called to Paris, provided that they were influential persons in the country, and enjoyed some consideration. The revolutionists of all shades appointed by the cantons went without hesitation. The oligarchs refused to nominate representatives. They wished to have no hand in what was about to be done in Paris, and thus to reserve the right of protesting. The First Consul was obliged to select himself the persons who were to

represent them. He chose several, three in particular of the most noted, Messrs. de Mulinen, d'Affry, and de Watteville, all distinguished for their families, their talents, and their character. These gentlemen persisted in staying away. M. de Talleyrand represented to them that it was a mistaken pique on their part; that they were not invited for the purpose of attending the sacrifice of opinions which were dear to them; that, on the contrary, the balance would be kept equal between them and their adversaries; that they were good citizens, enlightened men, and ought not to refuse to contribute to a constitution, in which the French government would strive sincerely to reconcile all the legitimate interests, and by which, moreover, the destiny of their country would be fixed for a long time. Touched by this invitation, they had the good sense to withdraw themselves from the influences of faction, and answered the honourable appeal addressed to them by repairing immediately to Paris. The First Consul received them with distinction, told them that what he wished all moderate men must wish along with him, for he proposed the constitution which Nature herself had given to Switzerland, that is to say the ancient constitution, but without the inequalities between citizen and citizen, between canton and canton. After he had endeavoured to soothe the oligarchs in particular, because it was against them that he had just employed force, he appointed four members of the senate, Messrs. Barthelemy, Roederer, Fouché, and Demeunier, and desired them to assemble the Swiss deputies, to confer with them together or separately, to bring them over as much as possible to reasonable views, always reserving to himself, be it remarked, the decision of all questions on which they could not agree. Before these conferences began, he admitted to an audience the principal of them, who had been selected by their colleagues to be presented to him. He addressed them in an extempore speech, full of sound sense, profundity, and originality of language, which was taken down\* at the moment, for the purpose of being transmitted to the entire deputation.

You must remain, said he to them in substance, what Nature has made you, that is to say, a union of small confederate States, differing in government as in soil, attached to each other by a mere federal bond—a bond which is neither annoying nor expensive. It is necessary also to put an end to the unjust domination of canton over canton, which renders one territory subject to another; it is necessary to put an end to the government of the aristocratic burghers, who in the great towns constitute a class subject to another class. These are barbarisms of the middle ages, which France, called to constitute you, cannot tolerate in your

---

\* This speech was noted down by several persons; there exist different versions of it, two of which are in the archives of the foreign affairs. I have here embodied what is common to both, and what agrees with the letters written on the subject by the First Consul.

laws. It is important that genuine equality, that which forms the glory of the French Revolution, should triumph among you as among us; that every territory, every citizen, should be equal to the others in rights and in duties. These things granted, you must admit no inequalities, but the differences which Nature herself has established among you. I am not for comprehending you under a uniform and central government like that of France. Nobody shall ever persuade me that mountaineers, descendants of William Tell, can be governed in the same manner as the wealthy inhabitants of Berne or Zurich. The former must have absolute democracy and a government without imposts. For the latter, on the contrary, pure democracy would be a contradiction. Besides, what would be the use of a central government? To have greatness? It will not come to you, at least not such as the ambition of your unitarians dreams of. To have a greatness after the fashion of that of France? Then you must have a central government, liberally endowed, and a permanent army. Would you like to pay for all this? could you? And then beside France, which numbers five hundred thousand men, beside Austria, which numbers three hundred thousand, Prussia, which numbers two hundred thousand, what would you do with an army of fifteen or twenty thousand permanent troops? You cut a distinguished figure in the fourteenth century against the dukes of Burgundy, because all the States were then parcelled out and their strength divided. Now, Burgundy is a point of France. You ought to be able to cope with France or Austria entire. If you want that kind of greatness, do you know what you must do? You must become French, blend yourselves with the great nation, share its charges that you may share its advantages, and then you would be associated in all the chances of its high fortune. But you do not want this, neither do I. The interest of Europe commands different resolutions. You have your peculiar greatness, which is worth as much as any other. You must be a neutral people, whose neutrality all the world respects, because it obliges all the world to respect it. To stay at home, to be free, invincible, respected, is a noble condition enough. For this the federative system is the best. It has less of that unity which dares, but it has more of that inertness which resists. It is not conquered in a day like a central government; for it resides everywhere, in every part of the confederation. Thus, too, militia is better for you than a permanent army. You ought to be all soldiers, the moment the Alps are threatened. Then the permanent army is the entire population, and, in your mountains, your intrepid hunters form a respectable force both by sentiments and by number. You ought not to have any paid and permanent soldiers, but those who go to your neighbours to learn the military art, and to bring back their traditions to you. A confederation leaving to each his native independence, the difference of his manners and his soil, and invincible in its mountains—such is

your true moral greatness. If I were not a sincere friend to Switzerland, if I designed to keep it dependent on me, I should wish it to have a central government, entirely resident at one spot. To this I would say, Do this, do that, or I will pass the frontier in twenty-four hours. A federative government, on the contrary, saves itself by the very impossibility of returning a speedy answer; it saves itself by its tardiness. In gaining two months' time, it escapes all foreign urgency. But, in desiring to remain independent, forget not that you must be friends of France. Her friendship is necessary for you. You have enjoyed it for ages, and you are indebted to it for your independence. Switzerland must not on any account become a focus of intrigues and of underhand hostilities; it must not be to Franche-Comté and Alsace what the islands of Jersey and Guernsey are to Bretagne and La Vendée. It must not, either for its own sake or for that of France. Besides, I would not suffer it. I am speaking only of your general constitution: there my knowledge ends. As for your cantonal constitutions, it is for you to enlighten me in regard to them, to make me acquainted with your wants. I will listen to you and endeavour to satisfy you, at the same time retrenching from your laws the barbarous injustices of past times. In particular, forget not that you want a just government, worthy of an enlightened age, conformable to the nature of your country, and, above all, economical. On these conditions it will last, and I desire that it should last; for, if the government which we are about to constitute together should happen to fall, Europe would say either that I contrived it so in order to make myself master of Switzerland, or that I could not produce any thing better: now I do not mean to give it a right to doubt either my sincerity or my skill.

Such was the exact sense of the words of the First Consul. We have changed them merely for the purpose of abridgment. It was impossible to think with more force, justice, loftiness. The work was taken in hand immediately. The federal constitution was discussed at a meeting of all the Swiss deputies. The cantonal constitutions were prepared with the deputies of each canton, and revised at a general meeting. When the passions have cooled, and good sense prevails, the constitution of a people is easily framed, for all that is to be done is to write down a few just ideas, which are already impressed upon every mind. The passions of the Swiss were far from being entirely appeased, but their deputies assembled at Paris were more calm. The change of place and the presence of a superior, benevolent, enlightened authority had considerably modified them. And then, that authority was on the spot, to instil into them those just and not numerous ideas, which must subsist alone after the storms of the passions are dispelled.

The arrangements decided upon were the following:

The chimera of the unitarians was discarded; it was agreed that

each canton should have its particular constitution, its civil legislation, its judicial forms, its system of imposts. The cantons were confederated solely for the interests common to the whole confederation, and especially for their relations with the other States. This confederation was to be represented by a Diet, composed of an envoy sent by each canton; and this envoy was to have one or two voices in the deliberations, according to the extent of the population which he represented. The representatives of Berne, Zurich, Vaud, St. Gall, Argau, and the Grisons, whose population exceeded one hundred thousand souls, were to possess two votes. The others were to have but one. Thus the Diet consisted of twenty-five members. It was called to sit for one month in each year, but each year in a different place. It was to meet alternately in the following cantons: Freiburg, Berne, Solothurn, Basle, Zurich, Lucerne. The canton where the Diet was sitting was the directing canton for that year. The chief of that canton, avoyer, or burgomaster, was for that same year landammann of all Switzerland. He received foreign ministers, accredited the Swiss ministers, called out the militia, exercised in short the functions of the executive power of the confederation.

Switzerland was to keep on foot for the service of the confederation, a permanent force of 15,000 men, entailing an expense of 490,500 livres. The assessment of this contingent in men and money was made by the constitution itself among all the cantons, in proportion to their population and wealth. But every Swiss sixteen years of age was a soldier, a member of the militia, and might, in case of need, be called upon to defend the independence of Helvetia.

The confederation had but one and the same coin for the whole country.

There were to be in future no custom-house tariffs but on the general frontier, and these tariffs were to be approved by the Diet. Each canton applied to its own benefit the duties levied on its frontiers.

The tolls of a feudal nature were suppressed. There were retained only such as were necessary for the maintenance of the roads or the navigation. A canton violating a decree of the Diet, might be cited before a tribunal composed of the presidents of the criminal courts of the other cantons.

Such were the very limited powers of the central government. The other attributes of sovereignty not expressed in the federal act were left to the sovereignty of the cantons. There were formed nineteen cantons, and all the territorial questions, so strongly contested between the old sovereign States and the subject States were decided in favour of the latter. Vaud and Argau, formerly subject to Berne, Thurgau, formerly subject to Schaffhausen, the Tessin, formerly subject to Uri and Unterwalden, were constituted independent cantons. The small cantons, such as Glarus and Appenzell, which had been enlarged to an unnatural



size, were relieved from the inconvenient greatness which had been forced upon them. The canton of St. Gall was composed out of all that Appenzell, Glarus, and Schwitz shook off. Schwitz alone retained some accessions. If to the nineteen following cantons, Appenzell, Argau, Basle, Berne, Freiburg, Glarus, Grisons, Lucerne, St. Gall, Schaffhausen, Schwitz, Solothurn, Tessin, Thurgau, Unterwalden, Uri, Vaud, Zug, and Zurich, we add Geneva, then a French department, the Valais, constituted separately, Neufchatel, a principality belonging to Prussia, we shall have the twenty-two cantons at present existing.

As for the particular government imposed upon each of them, it had been rendered conformable to their ancient local constitution, purified indeed from all that was feudal or aristocratic. The *landsgemeinde*, or assemblies of the citizens twenty years of age, meeting once a year to regulate all affairs and to appoint the landammann, were re-established in the small democratic cantons of Appenzell, Glarus, Schwitz, Uri, and Unterwalden. It was impossible to do otherwise, without driving them into revolt. The government of the *bourgeoisie* was re-established in Berne, Zurich, Basle, and such like cantons, but on condition that the ranks should always remain open. Whoever possessed an income of a thousand livres at Berne, or five hundred at Zurich, became a member of the governing *bourgeoisie*, and eligible for all public functions. There were, as formerly, a great council charged to make laws, a little council charged to enforce their execution, an avoyer or burgomaster invested with the executive functions, under the superintendence of the little council. In the cantons where Nature had occasioned particular administrative divisions, such as the *inner and outer Rhodes* in Appenzell, the *Leagues* in the Grisons, these divisions were respected and maintained. It was, in short, the old Helvetic constitution, corrected agreeably to the principles of justice and the enlightenment of the times: it was old Switzerland remaining federative, but increased by the subject countries which were raised to the rank of cantons, maintained in a state of pure democracy where Nature would have it so, in the state of governing but not exclusive *bourgeoisie*, where Nature commanded that form. In this operation, so just and so wise, each party gained and lost something, gained what it wanted of justice, lost what it wished unjust and tyrannical. The unitarians saw their chimera of absolute unity and democracy swept away, but they gained the enfranchisement of the subject countries and the opening of the ranks of the *bourgeoisie* in the oligarchic cantons. The oligarchs saw the subject countries wrested from them (Berne, in particular, lost Argau and the Vaud), they saw the patriciate abolished; but they obtained the suppression of the central government and the consecration of the rights of property in the opulent cities, such as Zurich, Basle, and Berne.

The work, however, would be left incomplete, if, while deter-



mining the form of the institutions, its authors were not at the same time to decide upon the choice of the persons called to put it in force. In presenting the French Constitution of the year VIII, and the Italian Constitution of the year X., the First Consul had designated in the Constitution itself the persons invested with the high constitutional offices. This was very wise, for, when the point is to pacify a long agitated country, men are of not less importance than things.

The usual tendency of the First Consul was at once to put every thing in its place again. To recall the high classes of society to power, without making those descend who by their merit had raised themselves to it, while insuring to all who should be worthy of it in future the means of rising to it in their turn—this is what he would have done immediately in France, if it had been in his power. But he had not even tried to do it, because the old French aristocracy had emigrated or scarcely returned from emigration, and become by emigrating strangers to the country and to business. Besides, he was obliged to take his point of support in France itself, from one of the parties which divided it; and of course he had taken that point of support from the revolutionary party, which was his. In France, then, he had exclusively surrounded himself, at least at that time, with men belonging to the Revolution. But in Switzerland he was more free; he had not to support himself upon a party, for he acted from without, from the pinnacle of French power: neither had he to do with an emigrant aristocracy. He hesitated not, therefore, and, indulging the natural bent of his mind, he called to power, in equal portions, the partisans of the old system and of the new. Commissions, nominated in Paris, were to go to each canton, to carry to it the cantonal constitution, and to select there the persons called to form part of the new authorities. He took care to place in each an equal number of revolutionists and oligarchs, so as to balance one another. Having at last to choose the landammann out of the whole Helvetic confederation, the first destined to hold that office, he boldly selected the most distinguished, but also the most moderate personage of the oligarchic party, M. d’Affry.

M. d’Affry was a wise and a firm man, devoted to the profession of arms, formerly in the service of France, a citizen of the canton of Freiburg, then the least agitated of the cantons of the confederation. In becoming landammann, M. d’Affry raised his canton to the quality of directing canton. A man of other times, reasonable, a soldier, attached from habit to France, member of a quiet canton—these were decisive reasons in the eyes of the First Consul, and he appointed M. d’Affry. Besides, having defied Europe by interfering, it was right to avoid multiplying impressions painful to it by installing rampant democracy and its turbulent chiefs in Switzerland. It behoved him neither to do ~~that~~ nor to assume himself the presidency of the Helvetic Republic, as he had attributed to himself that of the Italian Republic.

To settle Switzerland by judiciously reforming it; to wrest it from the enemies of France, by leaving it independent and neutral—such was the problem which he had to resolve, and it was resolved courageously and prudently in a few days.

When that clever work, which, by the title of Act of Mediation, has procured for Switzerland the longest period of tranquillity and good government that it has enjoyed for fifty years past—when that clever work was completed, the First Consul sent for the deputies assembled in Paris, delivered it to them in the presence of the senators who had presided over the whole composition, addressed them in a short and energetic speech, recommended to them union, moderation, impartiality, in short, the conduct that he was pursuing in France, and sent them to their own country, to supersede the provisional and impotent government of the landammann Dolder.

In Switzerland there were astonishment, disappointed passions, discontent, but in the masses, alone sensible to the real benefit, submission and gratitude. This sentiment was more particularly remarked in the little cantons, which, though vanquished, were not treated as such. In fact, M. Reding and his partisans had been immediately released. In Europe there was as much surprise as admiration of the promptness of this mediation and its perfect equity. It was a new act of moral power, like those which the First Consul had accomplished in Germany and Italy, but still more skilful, more meritorious, if possible, for in it Europe was at once braved and respected: braved, in as far as suited the interest of France; respected in its legitimate interests, which were the independence and the neutrality of the Swiss people.

Russia warmly congratulated the First Consul, on having brought so difficult an affair to so speedy and so happy a conclusion. The Prussian cabinet, through the medium of M. Haugwitz, expressed its opinion in terms of the most cordial approbation. England was stupified, embarrassed, as if deprived of a grievance about which she had made a great noise.

The parliament, so dreaded by Addington and Hawkesbury, had spent in brisk discussions the time which the First Consul had employed in constituting Switzerland. These discussions had been stormy, brilliant, worthy in particular of admiration, when Fox had pleaded the cause of justice and humanity against the ardent jealousy of his countrymen. They had revealed, no doubt, the incompetence of the Addington cabinet, but also shown so conspicuously the violence of the war-party, that this party was momentarily weakened in parliament and Mr. Addington strengthened. With this minister peace recovered some of its last chances.

It was the King's speech, delivered on the 23rd of November, that had become the theme of these discussions.

“In my intercourse with Foreign Powers,” said his Britannic

Majesty, "I have been actuated by a sincere disposition for the maintenance of peace ; it is nevertheless impossible for me to lose sight of that established and wise system of policy, by which the interests of other States are connected with our own ; and I cannot, therefore, be indifferent to any material change in their relative condition and strength. My conduct will be invariably regulated by a due consideration of the actual situation of Europe, and by a watchful solicitude for the permanent welfare of my people. You will, I am persuaded, agree with me in thinking that it is incumbent upon us to adopt those measures of security, which are best calculated to afford the prospect of preserving to my subjects the blessings of peace."

This speech, which marked the new position taken by the British cabinet in regard to France, was followed up by an application for supplies to raise the peace establishment of the navy to 50,000 men, though, according to the first arrangements of Mr. Addington, it was not to have exceeded 30,000. The ministers added that, on the first emergency, fifty sail of the line might be ready to put to sea in less than a month.

The debate was long and stormy, and the administration could perceive that it had gained but little by making concessions to the Grenville and Wyndham party. Mr. Pitt chose to be absent. His friends undertook, in his stead, the violent part which he disdained. "What !" exclaimed Grenville and Canning, "what ! has the administration at last discovered that we have interests on the continent ; that attention to those interests is an important part of British policy ; and that they have never ceased to be sacrificed since the hollow peace signed with France ? And is it the invasion of Switzerland that led ministers to perceive this ? Was it not till then they began to discover that we were excluded from the continent ; that our allies there were immolated to the insatiable ambition of that pretended French Republic, which has desisted from threatening European society with a demagogue convulsion, only to threaten it with a frightful military tyranny ? Were your eyes," said they to Addington and Hawkesbury—"were your eyes then shut to the light, while the preliminaries of peace were negotiating, while the definitive treaty was negotiating, while that treaty was beginning to be executed ? Scarcely had you signed the preliminaries of London, before our eternal enemy openly seized the Italian Republic, upon pretext of having the presidency of it decreed to him, appropriated Tuscany to himself, upon pretext of granting it to an Infant of Spain, and, as the price of this false concession, made himself master of the finest part of the American continent—of Louisiana. This he did openly, immediately after the signature of the preliminaries, while you were busy negotiating in the city of Amiens ; and this never struck you ! Scarcely had you signed the definitive treaty—the wax which you had stamped with the arms of England upon that treaty was scarcely cold—when

our indefatigable foe, disclosing the intentions which he had dexterously concealed from you, united Piedmont to France, and dethroned the worthy king of Sardinia, the constant ally of England, who adhered to her with invariable fidelity during a ten years' struggle ; who, shut up in his capital by the troops of general Bonaparte, and having no means of saving himself but by a capitulation, would not sign it because it contained the obligation to declare war against Great Britain ! When Portugal, when even Naples, closed their ports against us, the king of Sardinia opened his, and he has fallen, because he determined to leave them ever open to us. But this is not all : the definitive treaty was concluded in March ; in June, Piedmont was united to France, and, in August, the consular government intimated to Europe, plumply and plainly, that the Germanic Constitution had ceased to exist. All the German States were blended together, and divided, as it were, into lots, which France assigned to whomsoever she pleased ; and the only power on which we have reason to reckon for curbing the ambition of our enemy, Austria, has been so weakened, abased, humbled, that we know not whether she will ever be able to raise herself again. And that stadtholder, for whom we promised to obtain an indemnity equal to his losses, has been treated in a manner scornful to him, scornful to you, who have set yourselves up for protectors of the house of Orange. That house receives for the stadtholdership a paltry bishopric, nearly the same as the house of Hanover, which has been unworthily robbed of its personal property. Often," exclaimed lord Grenville, "has it been alleged that England had suffered on account of Hanover ; that cannot be said now, for it is on account of England that Hanover has suffered. It is because he was king of England, that the king of Hanover has been thus despoiled of his ancient patrimony. Not even the forms of civility, customary between powers of the same order, have been observed ; no communication was made to your king that Germany, the native land of his house, to this day his associate in the Confederation—that Germany, the most extensive country of the continent, was about to be turned upside down. Your king knew nothing of it, nothing but what he could learn from a message of Talleyrand, the minister, to the Conservative Senate. Germany, then, is not one of the countries whose situation is of importance to England ! Otherwise, the ministers who tell us, by the lips of his Majesty, that they cannot be indifferent to any material change in Europe, would have roused themselves, on this occasion, from their apathy and stupor. Lastly, within these few days, Parma has been erased from the list of independent States. Parma is become a territory which the First Consul of the French Republic is at liberty to dispose of as he pleases. All this has been done before your eyes, and almost without interruption. Not a month, during the fourteen months of this baleful peace—not a month has passed unmarked by the fall of a State in alliance

or in friendship with England. You have seen nothing, perceived nothing of it! All at once you awake—why? in behalf of whom? In behalf of the brave Swiss, very interesting people, assuredly, most deserving of all the sympathy of England, but not more interesting for her than Piedmont, than Lombardy, than Germany. And what have you discovered there more extraordinary, more prejudicial than all that has occurred during the last fourteen months? What! nothing drew your attention to the continent, neither Piedmont, nor Lombardy, nor Germany? and it is the Swiss alone who lead you to think that England ought not to be indifferent to the equilibrium of the European powers!" "You have been," said Mr. Canning, "the most incapable of men; for, in remonstrating on behalf of Switzerland, you have rendered England ridiculous, you have exposed her to the contempt of our enemy. At Constance there was an English agent, as every body knew. Could you tell us what he did there—the part which he acted? It is matter of public notoriety that you addressed remonstrances to the First Consul in favour of Switzerland; can you tell us what answer he gave you? All we know is, that, since your remonstrances, the Swiss have laid down their arms before the French troops, and that deputies from all the cantons, assembled in Paris, are receiving laws from the First Consul. You remonstrate, then, in the name of Great Britain, without insisting on being listened to! Better be silent, as you were when Piedmont was swept away, when Germany was overturned, than remonstrate without gaining attention. And how could it be otherwise, when you spoke as inconsiderately as you had held your peace; when you spoke before you had prepared your means, before you had a fleet, an army, or an ally. Either be silent, or raise your voice with the certainty of enforcing attention; then you will not expose the dignity of a great nation to hazard. You ask us for supplies: what would you do with them? If it is for peace, they are too large; if for war, not large enough. We will give you them, nevertheless, but on condition that you leave the duty of employing them to the man whom you succeeded, and who alone can save England in the crisis into which you have imprudently precipitated her."

Thus the English ministers obtained no credit even for their concessions to the party hostile to peace, for their very remonstrances in behalf of Switzerland were made a subject of reproach: and, it must be confessed, on this point and on this only, there was a foundation for those reproaches. Their conduct on this occasion had been puerile.

However, amidst these declarations, lord Grenville had advanced something momentous and most extraordinary for one who had been minister for foreign affairs. In censuring Mr. Addington and lord Hawkesbury for having dismantled the fleet, disbanded the army, evacuated Egypt, given up the Cape, he commended them on one point, for not having yet withdrawn the



English troops from Malta. It is from negligence, from levity, that you have acted thus, he exclaimed; lucky negligence, the only thing that we can approve in you! But we hope you will not let this last pledge, left by accident in your hands, slip from your grasp, and that you will hold it fast to indemnify us for all the violations of treaties committed by our insatiable enemy.

It was impossible to advocate in a more barefaced manner the violation of treaties.

Amidst this vituperation, the eloquent and generous Fox had recourse to the language of good sense, moderation, and national honour, in the genuine acceptation of the latter term—I have but little intercourse with the members of the cabinet, said he, addressing the Grenville and Canning opposition, and besides, I am not in the habit of defending the ministers of his Majesty; but I am astonished at all I hear, astonished particularly, on considering who they are that say such things. Indeed, I am more grieved than any of the honourable colleagues and friends of Mr. Pitt at the growing greatness of France, who is daily extending her power in Europe and in America. I am grieved at it, though I share not the prepossessions of the honourable members against the French Republic. But, after all, when was this extraordinary aggrandizement, which astonishes and alarms you, when was it produced? Was it during the administration of Mr. Addington and lord Hawkesbury, or during the administration of Mr. Pitt and lord Grenville? Under the administration of Mr. Pitt and lord Grenville, had not France acquired the line of the Rhine, gained possession of Holland, Switzerland, Italy as far as Naples? Was this because no resistance had been made to her, because her encroachments had been tamely endured, that she had thus outstretched her giant arms? I apprehend not, for Mr. Pitt and lord Grenville had banded together the most formidable of coalitions to crush that ambitious France. They laid siege to Valenciennes and Dunkirk, and already destined the first of these places for Austria, the second for Great Britain. That France, who is charged with intruding by force in the affairs of others, was then to be invaded, for the purpose of forcing upon her a government to which she would not submit, of obliging her to accept the family of the Bourbons, whose yoke she spurned: and, by one of those sublime movements, which History ought to preserve an eternal record of and to recommend to imitation, France repelled her invaders. Valenciennes and Dunkirk were not wrested from her; laws were not dictated to her; on the contrary, she has dictated laws to others. Now we, though warmly attached to the cause of Great Britain, have felt an involuntary movement of sympathy with that generous outburst of liberty and patriotism, and we have no desire to conceal it. Did not our ancestors applaud the resistance made by Holland to the tyranny



of the Spaniards? Has not old England applauded every noble inspiration in all nations? And you, who now deplore the greatness of France, was it not yourselves who provoked her victorious efforts? Was it not you, who, by striving to take Valenciennes and Dunkirk, urged her to take Belgium; who, by striving to impose laws upon her, urged her to give laws to half the continent? You talk of Italy; but was it not in the power of the French when you were treating? Did you not know that it was? Was not this one of your grievances? Did this circumstance prevent you from signing the peace? And you, colleagues of Mr. Pitt, who then felt how necessary this peace was rendered by the sufferings of a ten years' war, how indispensable it was for assuaging the evils which were your work, you consented that the present ministers should sign it for you! Why did you not oppose it then? And if you did not oppose it, why not suffer them now to execute its conditions! The king of Piedmont interests you much—well and good: but Austria, whose ally he was much more than yours, Austria had abandoned him. She did not even choose to mention him in the negotiations, lest the indemnity that might be given to this prince should diminish the part of the Venetian States which she coveted for herself. England, then, would pretend to uphold the independence of Italy more effectively than Austria! You talk of Germany turned upside down: but what has been done in Germany? The ecclesiastical States have been secularized to indemnify the hereditary princes, by virtue of a formal article of the treaty of Lunéville, a treaty signed nine months before the preliminaries of London, more than twelve months before the treaty of Amiens, and signed at what period? When Mr. Pitt and lord Grenville were ministers of England. When Mr. Addington and lord Hawkesbury came into office, the pretended partition of Germany was agreed upon, promised, decreed, as was notorious to all the world. This, according to you, was turning Germany upside down. Why then do you not complain of Russia, who went halves with France in consummating the convulsion? The elector of Hanover, you say, because, unfortunately for himself, he was king of England, has been very ill-used. I have not heard that he was extremely dissatisfied with his lot; for, without losing any thing, he has obtained a rich bishopric. Besides, I strongly suspect those who so warmly interest themselves for the elector of Hanover, who manifest such solicitude for him, of aiming to gain through this medium the confidence of the king of England, and so striving to advance themselves in his councils. No doubt France is great, much greater than a good Englishman ought to wish; but with that greatness, of which the late ministers of England are the authors, we were acquainted before the preliminaries of London, before the negotiations of Amiens; and that ought not to be a motive for violating solemn treaties. Look vigilantly to the execution of

those treaties; if they are violated, claim the fulfilment of the plighted oath; it is your right and your duty. But because France now appears too great to us, greater than we thought her at first,—to break a solemn engagement, to retain Malta, for instance, would be an unworthy breach of faith, which would compromise the honour of Britain. If the conditions of the treaty of Amiens have really not been performed, we have a right to keep Malta until they are, but not a moment longer. I hope our ministers will not give cause for saying of them what was said of the French ministers after the treaties of Aix-la-Chapelle, Paris, and Versailles, that they had signed them with the secret intention of breaking them on the first opportunity. I think Mr. Addington and lord Hawkesbury incapable of such conduct; it would be a stain to the honour of Great Britain. After all, these continual invectives against the greatness of France, these alarms which they are intended to excite, serve only to keep up jealousy and animosity between two great nations. I am certain that, if there were in Paris an assembly similar to this which is debating here, the British navy and its domination over the seas, would be talked of in the same terms as we talk in this house of the French armies and their domination over the continent. I can imagine a noble rivalry between two mighty nations; but to think of war, to propose it because a nation grows great, because it prospers, would be senseless and inhuman. If you were to be told that the First Consul were making a canal to carry the sea from Dieppe to Paris, there are people who would believe it, and would propose to you to go to war. They talk of the French manufactures, of their improved state: I have seen those manufactures; I have admired them; but, if I must give my opinion, I am no more afraid of them than of the navy of France. I am certain that the English manufactures will gain the day, whenever a competition takes place between them and the manufactures of France. Let them try their strength; but let them try it at Manchester, at St. Quentin. There the lists are open, that is the field in which the two nations ought to meet. To make war, in order to insure the success of the one or the other, would be barbarous. The French are abused for prohibiting the importation of our goods into their ports; but is that a right which you can prevent the exercise of? And you who complain, is there a nation that employs prohibitions more actively than you do? Part of our commerce is drooping, that is possible; but this has been the case at all times, after the peace of 1763, after the peace of 1782. In those days there were branches of industry which had been developed by the war beyond their usual proportions, which, were obliged at the peace to contract themselves within narrower limits; and others, on the contrary, which were destined to acquire a greater expansion. What is to be done in this case? Must we then, to gratify the ambition of our merchants, spill torrents of British blood? For my part, my choice is made. If we must

sacrifice thousands of men for insensate passions, I am for reverting to the extravagances of antiquity: I had rather blood should flow for romantic expeditions like that of Alexander, than for the gross cupidity of a few merchants greedy after gold.

These noble words, in which the sincerest patriotism detracted nothing from humanity, for those two sentiments may be reconciled in a generous heart, produced a powerful effect on the English parliament. The progress of our manufactures and of our navy had been exceedingly exaggerated. Both, it is true, had begun to revive; but things scarcely commenced were represented as done and accomplished; and these exaggerations, repeated by the great merchants, were circulated with mischievous effect among all classes of the British nation. The eloquent and sensible language of Mr. Fox came seasonably to counteract that effect, and was heard with benefit, though it was galling to the national sympathies. Besides, though people were dissatisfied and alarmed at our greatness, they had yet no wish for war. The Grenville and Wyndham party had compromised itself by its violence. Mr. Fox had done himself honour in lending support to the cabinet. It was imagined from this conduct, new on his part, that he was likely to come into power. It was even asserted that he would soon reinforce that weak administration, which had acted a paltry and wavering part in the debates, approving what was said in favour of the peace, but not daring to say as much itself. For the rest, the address proposed in reply to the king's speech was voted without amendment; the supplies were voted in like manner. For a certain time, the ministers appeared to be saved, which pleased Mr. Addington, though he was not ambitious, and which was much more gratifying to lord Hawkesbury, who was far more solicitous to keep his place than Mr. Addington. This species of good luck disposed those two statesmen to a more friendly intercourse with France; for they were desirous to preserve peace, knowing that they had come in with the peace and that they should go out with it. In fact, on the firing of the first shot, Mr. Pitt could not fail to be called by all classes of the nation to resume the reins of government.

The Swiss business, settled with wisdom and promptness, had done away with the principal grievance, and lord Hawkesbury had desired that general Andreossi, ambassador of France, might set out for London, offering to despatch lord Whitworth, the English ambassador, to Paris. The First Consul cheerfully complied, for, in spite of some gusts of passion excited in his soul by British malignity, in spite of an unexampled greatness of which he sometimes had glimpses as a consequence of war, he was still wholly intent upon peace. By provoking, by irritating him, his enemies no doubt urged him to say to himself that, after all, war was his natural vocation, his origin, perhaps his destiny; that he knew how to govern in a superior manner, but that before he governed he knew how to fight; that this was his profession, his art *par excel-*

*lence* ; and that if Moreau, with the French armies, had reached the gates of Vienna, he would go much further. These things he frequently repeated to himself, and at this moment, in fact, extraordinary visions sometimes flitted before his mind. He beheld empires destroyed, Europe reconstructed, and his consular power changed into a crown, not inferior to the crown of Charlemagne. Whoever threatened or irritated him called forth these fatal and seducing images, one after another, before his excited imagination. It was easy to perceive this in the strange loftiness of his daily language, in the despatches which he dictated to his minister for foreign affairs; lastly, in the thousand letters which he addressed to the agents of the administration. At any rate, he said to himself that all this greatness must be his sooner or later, and he thought that the peace had been too brief, that St. Domingo was not definitively reconquered, that Louisiana was not occupied, that the French navy was not re-established. In his opinion, he needed four or five years' incessant efforts in the bosom of a profound peace, before he recommenced the war. The First Consul shared that passion for the construction of great works, which is natural to the founders of empires; he took delight in those fortresses which he was erecting in Italy, in those vast roads which he was cutting over the Alps, in those plans of new towns which he was projecting in Bretagne, in those canals which were to unite the basins of the Seine and the Scheld. He enjoyed absolute power, universal admiration, and all this amidst profound peace, which could not but be the more soothing, after fighting so many battles, traversing so many countries, exposing his fortune and his life to so many risks.

The First Consul was therefore sincerely desirous of the continuance of the peace, and he assented to every thing that could tend to prolong it. In consequence, he directed general Andreossy to proceed to London, and received lord Whitworth in Paris with great distinction. This personage, destined to represent George III. in France, was a true English gentleman, simple though magnificent in his style of living, sensible, upright, but stiff and proud like his countrymen, and utterly incapable of that skilful and delicate management which was necessary with a character alternately passionate and amiable, like that of the First Consul. It would have required a man of talent rather than a high nobleman, and both in one if possible, as ambassador to a new government, which needed to be flattered and humoured. However, it is not in the first moment that defects of character are perceptible in the intercourse of life. At the outset all goes on smoothly. Lord Whitworth was received most graciously: the most delicate attentions were paid to his wife, the duchess of Dorset, an English lady of very high distinction. The First Consul gave splendid entertainments to the ambassador and his consort, as well at St. Cloud as at the Tuileries. M. de Talleyrand displayed all the skill and all the elegance of manners which dis-

tinguished him, in order to give them a suitable reception. The two consuls Cambacérès and Lebrun had orders themselves to assist him, and they did their best. To these attentions was added the still more flattering attention of publishing them.

In the feeling of England towards France there was a great deal of wounded pride, though interest had the largest share in it. The demonstrations of respect lavished by the First Consul on the British ambassador produced the greatest effect on public opinion in London, and for a moment instilled better sentiments. General Andreossy himself felt their influence, and met with a flattering reception, exactly similar to that given to Lord Whitworth in Paris. During the months of December and January, a sort of calm prevailed. The funds, which had fallen in both countries, rose considerably, and reached the height which they had attained at the moment of the greatest confidence. The five per cents were at 57 or 58 francs in France.

The winter of 1803 was almost as brilliant as that of 1802. It appeared even still more calm, for at home the country was perfectly tranquil, whereas, in the preceding year, the opposition of the Tribunate, without exciting alarm, had occasioned a certain uneasiness. All the high functionaries, consuls, ministers, had orders to throw open their houses, as well to their subordinates as to Parisian society and foreigners. The commercial classes were satisfied with the general state of trade. A feeling of prosperity was everywhere diffused, and at length reached even the circles of the returned emigrants. Every day, some personage bearing a great name was seen quitting the idle, restless, scurrilous group of the old French nobility, and soliciting, in the grave and monotonous saloons of the consuls Cambacérès and Lebrun, appointments in the magistracy or in the financial department. Some went to madame Bonaparte herself, to apply for places in the new court. The others spoke ill of those who obtained them, but envied them too at bottom, and were not far from following their example.

This state of things had lasted part of the winter, and might have lasted longer but for a circumstance by which the British government began to feel itself embarrassed; the demur to the evacuation of Malta. In committing the grave fault of countermanding that evacuation, the government had produced in the people of England a very dangerous longing to keep a position which commanded the Mediterranean. Either a strong administration in England, or some sort of concession on the part of France, would have been required to render the relinquishment of so valuable a pledge possible. Now, there was not a strong administration in England, and the First Consul was not so accommodating as to create, by sacrifices, facilities for that which did exist. All that could be expected of him was not to be too precipitate in demanding the execution of the treaties.

A new circumstance rendered the danger of this situation



urgent. Thus far there had been a pretext for deferring the execution of the treaty of Amiens in regard to Malta; the refusal of Russia to accept the guarantee of the new order of things established in that island. But the Russian cabinet, appreciating the danger of this refusal, and sincerely wishing to concur in the maintenance of peace, had soon changed its first determination, from a feeling of courtesy, which did honour to young Alexander: but, to assign a motive for this change, it had attached some insignificant conditions to its guarantee, such as the recognition by all the powers of the sovereignty of the Order in the island of Malta, the introduction of natives into the government, and the suppression of the Maltese tongue. These conditions made no alteration in the treaty, for they were almost expressly included in it. Prussia, equally solicitous to insure the peace, had also abandoned her first determination, and granted her guarantee in the same terms as Russia. The First Consul was eager to adhere to the new conditions added to Article X. of the treaty of Amiens, and had formally accepted them.

The English cabinet could no longer hold back. It was obliged to accept the guarantee, such as it was given, or it would be guilty of an evident breach of faith; for the new clauses proposed by Russia were so insignificant that they could not reasonably be refused. Though embarrassed by the difficulties which itself had created, it was nevertheless disposed to seize the last act of the Russian government, as a natural occasion for evacuating Malta, with the proviso of certain apparent precautions in regard to Egypt and the East, when an unlucky incident occurred, and furnished a pretext for its bad faith, if it were bad faith, or a bugbear for its weakness, if it were but weakness.

We have seen that colonel Sébastiani had been sent to Tunis, and from Tunis to Egypt, to ascertain whether the English were ready to leave Alexandria or not, to observe what was passing between the Mamelukes and the Turks, to re-establish the French protection over the Christians, and to carry to general Brune, our ambassador at Constantinople, a new confirmation of his first instructions. The colonel had completely executed his commission: he had found the English settled in Alexandria, and apparently not disposed to leave it; the Turks engaged in implacable war with the Mamelukes; the French deeply regretted, since people were enabled to compare their government with that of the Turks; and the East still ringing with the name of general Bonaparte. He had mentioned all this; he had even added that, in the situation of Egypt, placed between the Turks and the Mamelukes, a corps of six thousand French would be sufficient to reconquer the country. This report, though guarded, could not be published without inconveniences, because it had been drawn up for the government, and contained many things fit to be said to it alone. For instance, colonel Sébastiani complained bitterly of the English general Stuart, who occupied Alexandria, and who, by the language which he



used, had well nigh caused him to be assassinated at Cairo. Altogether, the report proved that the English were not yet thinking of evacuating Egypt. This decided the First Consul to have it inserted in the *Moniteur*. He found that great liberties were taken in regard to the execution of the treaty of Amiens; and though he had not yet wished to appear pressing in respect to Malta and Alexandria, yet he was not sorry to be able to expose publicly the dilatoriness of the English, by putting forth a document proving their backwardness in performing their engagements, and the ill-will of their officers towards ours. This report was inserted in the *Moniteur* of the 30th of January. But little noticed in France, it produced in England a sensation as strong as it was unexpected. The expedition to Egypt had left behind in the English an extreme susceptibility to every thing which concerned that country; and they fancied that they always had before their eyes a French army ready to embark at Toulon for Alexandria. The narrative of a French officer, exhibiting the wretched state of the Turks in Egypt, the ease with which they might be driven out of it, the favourable impressions left behind by the French, and complaining, in particular, of the ill behaviour of a British officer, alarmed them, mortified them, roused them from the tranquillity in which they began to be lulled. This effect, however, would have been but transient, had not the parties made a point of aggravating it. Wyndham, Dundas, Grenville, raised a greater outcry than ever, and drowned the voices of the liberal men, such as Mr. Fox and his friends. In vain the latter contended that there was nothing very extraordinary in this report, and that, if the First Consul had any designs upon Egypt, he would not have made them public. People would not listen to them; they declaimed with violence; they alleged that the English army was insulted, and that it must have a signal reparation to satisfy its outraged honour. The impression produced in London came back to Paris, like a sound reverberated by numerous echoes. The First Consul, hurt at seeing his intentions everlastingly misconstrued, at length lost all patience. He thought it extraordinary that people who were his debtors, for they were in arrear on two essential points, the evacuation of Alexandria and of Malta, should be so ready to complain, when he, on the contrary, had complaints to make against them. He therefore directed M. de Talleyrand in Paris, and general Andreossy in London, to bring the matter to an issue, and to have a categorical explanation relative to the execution of the treaties so long deferred.

The explanation came very unseasonably at the moment. The English ministers, scarcely daring to evacuate Malta before the publication of the report of colonel Sébastiani, were still less able to do so since the report. They refused to explain, grounding their refusal on motives, which for the first time afforded a glimpse of suspicious intentions. Lord Whitworth was directed to maintain that a compensation was due to England for all the advan-

tage obtained by France; that the treaty of Amiens had been founded on that principle, for it was in consideration of the conquests made by one of the two powers in Europe that numerous possessions in America and India had been granted to the other; that, France, having since the peace adjudged to herself new territories and a new extension of influence, equivalents were due to England; that, on this ground, England would be justified in refusing to give up Malta; but that, from a desire to preserve peace, she was ready to evacuate that island, without having thought of demanding any compensation, when the report of colonel Sébastiani appeared; and that, since the publication of that report, the British cabinet had resolved not to grant any thing relative to Malta, but on condition of a two-fold satisfaction, in the first place for the insult offered to the English army; in the second, regarding the views of the First Consul relative to Egypt, views, which were expressed in the report in question in such a manner as to give offence and uneasiness to his Britannic Majesty.

When this declaration was addressed to M. de Talleyrand, it excited in him the utmost astonishment. Though he could comprehend the jealousy with which every thing relating to Egypt must be viewed in England, he could not conceive that, if the disposition to give up Malta were sincere, that disposition could be changed for so insignificant a motive as the report of colonel Sébastiani. He communicated his sentiments to the First Consul, who was astonished in his turn, but, agreeably to his character, more incensed than astonished. He was of opinion, however, and M. de Talleyrand with him, that it was necessary to extricate himself from a situation unpleasant, intolerable, worse than war. The First Consul came to the conclusion that, if the English were desirous to keep Malta, and if all their recriminations were mere pretexts, destined to cloak that desire, he ought to come to a clear explanation with them, and to make them sensible that it was impossible to deceive, to weary him out, or to shake him on this point; that if, on the contrary, the apprehensions which they professed were sincere, he ought to dispel them by communicating his intentions with a truth of language which should remove every doubt. He resolved, therefore, to see lord Whitworth himself, to speak to that ambassador with unbounded frankness, in order to persuade him that his resolution was taken on both points, the evacuation of Malta, which he determined imperatively to insist upon, and the peace which he most sincerely desired to maintain when he should have obtained the execution of the treaties. It was a new experiment that he was about to make: to say absolutely every thing, even that which a man never says to his enemies, in order to allay their suspicions, if they were but suspicious, or to convict them of falsehood if they were insincere.

On the 18th of February, he invited lord Whitworth to come in the evening to the Tuileries, and received him most gra-

ciously.\* A large writing-table occupied the middle of his cabinet: he begged the ambassador to take a seat at one end of this table, and seated himself at the other.† He told him that he wished to see him, to converse with him in person, in order to convince him of his real intentions, which none of his ministers could do so well as himself. He then recapitulated his transactions with England from their origin, the care which he had taken to offer peace on the very day of his accession to the Consulship, the refusals which he had met with, his eagerness to renew negotiations as soon as he could do so honourably, and lastly the concessions he had made to arrive at the conclusion of the peace of Amiens. He then expressed the mortification he felt to see his efforts to live on good terms with Great Britain meet with so little return. He adverted to the unhandsome treatment which had immediately followed the cessation of hostilities, the animosity of the English newspapers, the licence allowed to the journals of the emigrants, a licence not to be justified by the principles of the British constitution; the pensions granted to Georges and his accomplices, the continual trips of Chouans to the islands of Jersey and Guernsey, the welcome given to the French princes, who were received with the insignia of the ancient royalty, the sending of agents to Switzerland and Italy to raise difficulties everywhere for France.—Every wind, exclaimed the First Consul, every wind that blows from England, brings me nothing but hatred and insult. Now, added he, we have come to a situation from which we must absolutely relieve ourselves. Will you, or will you not, execute the treaty of Amiens? I have executed it on my part with scrupulous fidelity. That treaty obliged me to evacuate Naples, Tarento, and the Roman States within three months: in less than two months all the French troops were out of those countries. Ten months have elapsed since the exchange of the ratifications, and the English troops are still in Malta and at Alexandria. It is useless to try to deceive us on this point: will you have peace, will you have war? If you are for war, only say so; we will wage it unrelentingly and till the ruin of one of the two nations. If you are for peace, you must evacuate Alexandria and Malta. For, added the First Consul, with the accent of imperturbable resolution, that rock of Malta, on which so many fortifications have been

---

\* Lord Whitworth says, "with tolerable cordiality," in his admirable despatch to lord Hawkesbury, of the 21st of February, 1803, for which see Annual Register for 1803, p. 687.—*Translator*.

† On this very same day the First Consul gave an account of this conversation to the minister for foreign affairs for the purpose of being communicated to our ministers at the foreign courts. He talked of it to his colleagues and to several persons, who have left a record of it. Lastly, it was transmitted entire by lord Whitworth to his cabinet. It circulated throughout Europe, and was related in various ways. It is from these versions, and taking that which appeared to me the most indisputable of all, that mine is composed. I give not the terms but the substance, and pledge myself for the accuracy of the report.

erected, is no doubt of great importance in a maritime point of view; but it has a much greater in my estimation, inasmuch as it interests the highest point of honour of France. What would the world say if we were to allow a solemn treaty signed with us to be violated? It would doubt our energy. For my part, my resolution is fixed: I had rather see you in possession of the heights of Montmartre than of Malta.

Fearful expression, which has been but too completely realized for the misfortune of our country!

Lord Whitworth, silent, motionless, not knowing what to make of the scene in which he was to act a part, replied briefly to the declarations of the First Consul. He alleged the impossibility of extinguishing in a few months the animosities which a long war between the two nations had kindled; he laid great stress on the impediments raised by the English laws, which afforded no means of repressing the licentiousness of writers; lastly, he represented the pensions granted to the Chouans as being in remuneration of past services, not in payment of future services—strange admission from the lips of an ambassador!—and the welcome granted to the French princes as an act of hospitality towards misfortune—an hospitality nobly practised by the British nation. All this could not justify either the toleration granted to French pamphleteers, or the pensions allowed to assassins, or the insignia of ancient royalty permitted to be worn by the Bourbon princes. The First Consul remarked to the ambassador how weak his answer was on all these points, and reverted to the important object, the deferred evacuation of Egypt and Malta. As for the evacuation of Alexandria, lord Whitworth affirmed that it was accomplished at the moment he was speaking. As for that of Malta, he accounted for the delay which had taken place by the difficulty of obtaining the guarantee of the great courts, and by the obstinate refusal of the grand-master Ruspoli. But, he added, the island was at last about to be evacuated, when the changes which had taken place in Europe, and above all the report of colonel Sébastiani had raised fresh difficulties. Here the First Consul interrupted the English ambassador.—To what changes are you alluding? he asked. Not the presidency of the Italian Republic, conferred on me before the signature of the treaty of Amiens; not the erection of the kingdom of Etruria which was known to you before that same treaty, for the recognition of that kingdom was asked of you, and you held out hopes that it might soon be granted. It cannot be that which you mean. Is it Piedmont? is it Switzerland? So little have those two circumstances added to the reality of things, that indeed they are not worth mentioning. But, be that as it may, you have no right now to complain; for, as for Piedmont, I told every body even before the treaty of Amiens, what I meant to do with it: I told Austria, Russia, and yourselves. I never consented when

I was solicited on the subject, to promise the re-instatement of the house of Sardinia in its dominions, nor would I even stipulate any determinate indemnity for it. You knew then that I designed to unite Piedmont with France; and, besides, that annexation makes no change in my power over Italy, which is absolute, which I will have so, and which shall remain so. As for Switzerland, you were thoroughly convinced that I should not suffer a counter-revolution there. But all these allegations cannot be taken seriously. My power over Europe since the treaty of Amiens is neither greater nor less than it was. I should have called upon you to share it in the affairs of Germany, if you had shown other sentiments towards me. You well know that, in all I have done, it has been my object to complete the execution of the treaties and to insure the general peace. Now, look, seek about: is there anywhere a state that I am threatening, or that I design to invade? None, as you well know; at least while the peace shall be maintained. What you say about the report of colonel Sébastiani is not worthy of the relations of two great nations. If you are jealous of my designs upon Egypt, my lord, I will endeavour to satisfy you. Yes, I have thought a great deal about Egypt, and I shall think about it still more, if you force me to renew the war. But I will not endanger the peace which we have enjoyed so short a time, for the sake of reconquering that country. The Turkish empire threatens to fall. For my part, I shall contribute to uphold it as long as possible; but, if it crumbles to pieces, I mean France to have her share. Nevertheless, be assured that I shall not precipitate events. If I had pleased, out of the numerous divisions which I despatched to St. Domingo, I might have sent one to Alexandria. The four thousand men you have there would not have been any obstacle to me. They would have been, on the contrary, my excuse. I could have pounced unawares upon Egypt, and this time you should not have wrested it from me. But I have no thoughts of the kind.—Do you imagine, added the First Consul, that I deceive myself in regard to the power which I exercise at this moment over public opinion in France and in Europe? Now, that power is not great enough to allow me to venture with impunity upon an aggression without adequate motive. The opinion of Europe would instantly turn against me; my political ascendancy would be lost; and, as for France, it is necessary for me to prove to her that war is made upon me, that I have not provoked it, in order to inspire her with that enthusiastic ardour, which I purpose to excite against you, if you oblige me to fight. All the faults must be yours and not one of them mine. I contemplate, therefore, no aggression. All that I had to do in Germany and Italy is done; and I have done nothing but what I had previously announced, avowed, or comprehended in a treaty.

Now, if you doubt my desire to preserve peace, listen, and judge how far I am sincere. Though yet very young, I have attained



a power, a renown, to which it would be difficult to add. Do you imagine that I am solicitous to risk this power, this renown in a desperate struggle? If I have a war with Austria, I shall contrive to find the way to Vienna. If I have a war with you, I will take from you every ally on the continent; I will cut you off from all access to it, from the Baltic to the Gulf of Tarento. You will blockade us, but I will blockade you in my turn; you will make the continent a prison for us, but I will make the extent of the seas a prison for you. However, to conclude, there must be more direct means; there must be assembled 150,000 men, and an immense flotilla; we must try to cross the Strait, and perhaps bury in the depths of the sea my fortune, my glory, and my life. It is an awful temerity, my lord, an invasion of England! And, having uttered these words, the First Consul, to the great astonishment of his auditor, began himself to enumerate the difficulties and the dangers of such an enterprize; the quantity of materials, of men, of ships, which must be pushed into the Strait, and which he would not fail to push into it, for the purpose of attempting the destruction of England; and, insisting more and more strongly, and contending more and more warmly, that the chance of perishing was greater than the chance of succeeding, he added, in a tone of extraordinary energy: This temerity, my lord, awful as it is, I am determined to hazard, if you force me to it. I will risk my army and my person. With me that great enterprize will have chances which it cannot have with any other. I have crossed the Alps in winter; I know how to render possible what appears impossible to the generality of men; and, if I succeed, your latest posterity shall deplore with tears of blood the resolution that you shall have obliged me to take. See, now, resumed the First Consul, if I ought, powerful, prosperous, peaceable, as I am at this moment, if I ought to risk power, prosperity, and peace in such an enterprize; and if, when I say that I am desirous of peace, I am not sincere. Then, in a calmer tone, the First Consul added: It is better for you, for me, to keep within the limit of treaties. You must evacuate Malta, not harbour my assassins in England: let me be abused, if you please, by the English journals, but not by those miserable emigrants, who dishonour the protection you grant them, and whom the Alien Act permits you to expel from the country. Act cordially with me; and I promise you on my part, an entire cordiality! I promise you continual efforts to reconcile our interests wherever they are reconcileable. See what power we should exercise over the world, if we could bring our two nations together! You have a navy, which, with the incessant efforts of ten years and the employment of all my resources, I should not be able to equal; but I have 500,000 men ready to march under my command whithersoever I choose to lead them. If you are masters of the seas, I am master of the land. Let us then think of uniting rather than of going to war, and we shall rule at pleasure the destinies of the world. Every thing is possible, in the interest



of humanity and of our double power, to France and England united.

This language, so extraordinary for its frankness, had surprised and agitated the English ambassador, who, unfortunately, though a very honest man, was not capable of appreciating the loftiness and the sincerity of the words of the First Consul. It had been well if the two assembled nations could have listened to such a conversation and replied to it.

The First Consul had not failed to apprise lord Whitworth that in two days he should open the session of the Legislative Body, agreeably to the prescriptions of the consular Constitution, which fixed that opening for the 1st Ventôse (20th of February); that, according to custom, he should present the annual *exposé* of the state of the Republic, and people must not be surprised in England to find the intentions of the French government as plainly expressed there as they had been to the ambassador himself. Lord Whitworth retired, to give his cabinet an account of what he had just seen and heard.

In fact, the First Consul had himself drawn up that *exposé* of the situation of the Republic, and, it must be confessed, never had government to describe a more glorious situation, or done it in nobler language. Tranquillity everywhere infused into men's minds, the re-establishment of religious worship effected with astonishing promptness and without disturbance, the traces of civil discord everywhere effaced, commerce resuming its activity, agriculture advancing, the revenues of the State manifestly increasing, the public works proceeding with prodigious despatch, the defensive works on the Alps, on the Rhine, on the coasts carrying on with equal rapidity, entire Europe directed by the influence of France, and without being offended at it, with the exception of England—such was the picture which the First Consul had to present, and which he had delineated with the hand of a master. The day after the opening, the 21st of February (2nd Ventôse), three orators of the government carried this report to the Legislative Body, according to the practice introduced under the Consulate, and the reading of it there produced the same thrilling effect as it was destined to produce everywhere else. But the passage relative to England, the object of general curiosity, was marked by such unmitigated pride, and above all by a precision so categorical, that it could not fail to lead to a speedy solution. After advert-  
ing to the happy conclusion of the affairs of Germany, the pacification of Switzerland and the conservative policy of France in regard to the Turkish empire, the document added that the British troops still occupied Alexandria and Malta, that the French government had a right to complain, that, however, it had just been informed that vessels which were to convey the garrison of Alexandria to Europe had entered the Mediterranean. As to the evacuation of Malta, it did not intimate whether it was likely to take place soon or not, but it added these significant words:

“The government guarantees to the nation the peace of the continent, and it has reason to hope for the continuance of the maritime peace. That peace is needed and desired by all nations. To preserve it, the government will do all that is compatible with the national honour, essentially involved in the strict execution of treaties.

“But in England two parties are squabbling for power. One of them concluded the peace, and appears decided to maintain it; the other has sworn implacable hatred to France. Hence that fluctuation in opinions and in counsels, and that attitude at once pacific and threatening.

“While this struggle of parties lasts, there are measures which prudence dictates to the government of the Republic. Five hundred thousand men ought to be, and shall be, ready to defend and to avenge it. Strange necessity, which miserable passions impose upon two nations, that one and the same interest and the like will attach to peace!

“Be the success of the intrigue what it will in London, it will not drag other nations into new leagues, and government asserts with just pride that England single-handed is unable to cope with France.

“But let us have better hopes, and rather believe that the British cabinet will listen to the counsels of wisdom and the voice of humanity.

“Yes, no doubt peace will be daily more and more consolidated; the relations of the two governments will assume that character of good-will which is suitable to their mutual interests; a happy tranquillity will banish the remembrance of the long calamities of a disastrous war, and France and England, by reciprocally making each other happy, will entitle themselves to the gratitude of the whole world.”

To form a correct judgment of this *exposé*, it must not be compared with what are now called in France and England “Speeches of the Crown,” but with the “Message” of the President of the United States. This may serve to explain and justify the details into which the First Consul entered. He was absolutely resolved to notice the parties which divided England, that he might have the means of expressing himself freely concerning his enemies, and yet without the possibility of his words being applied to the British government itself. It was a very bold and a very dangerous way of interfering in the affairs of a neighbouring country; it was, above all, offering a cruel and useless insult to British pride to assert in such haughty terms, that England reduced to her unaided strength, was incapable of contending with France. Here the First Consul sinned in point of form, though he was right in regard to fact.

When this exposition of the state of the Republic, an admirable paper, but too haughty, reached London, it produced an effect infinitely stronger than the report of colonel Sébastiani, and much

stronger than even the acts for which the First Consul had been censured, in Italy, Switzerland, and Germany.\* Those unseasonable words asserting the inability of England to meet France single-handed, fired the heart of every Englishman. Add to this that the First Consul had accompanied the document with a note requiring the British government to explain itself definitively on the evacuation of Malta.

The English cabinet was at length forced to take a resolution, and to declare its intentions in regard to that island, the subject of such contention, and the cause of such important events. Its embarrassment was great, for it was unwilling either to avow the intention of violating a solemn treaty, or to promise the evacuation of Malta, which its weakness rendered impossible. Urged by public opinion to do something, and not knowing what to do, it adopted the course of addressing a message to Parliament, which is sometimes in representative governments a way to occupy minds and to lull their impatience, but may prove very dangerous, unless one knows clearly whither one would lead them, and not merely strives to afford them a momentary satisfaction.

On the 8th of March, the following message was addressed to Parliament:—

“GEORGE R.

“His Majesty thinks it necessary to acquaint the House of Commons that, as very considerable military preparations are carrying on in the ports of France and Holland, he has deemed it expedient to adopt additional measures of precaution for the security of his dominions. Though the preparations to which his Majesty refers are avowedly directed to the colonial service, yet, as discussions of great importance are now subsisting between his Majesty and the French government, the result of which must at present be uncertain, his Majesty is induced to make the communication to his faithful Commons, in the full persuasion that, whilst they partake of his Majesty's earnest and unvarying solicitude for the continuance of peace, he may rely with perfect confidence on their public spirit and liberality, to enable his Majesty to adopt such measures as circumstances may appear to require, for supporting the honour of his Crown and the essential interests of his people.”

A more clumsy contrivance than this message cannot possibly be conceived. It was founded on errors in fact, and had, moreover, something offensive to the good faith of the French government. In the first place, there was not a disposable ship in our

---

\* I have myself heard a high personage, one of the most respectable members of the English diplomacy, declare, after the lapse of forty years, when time had effaced in him all the passions of that period, that those words alleging that England could not cope single-handed with France revolted every English heart, and from that day the declaration of war was considered as inevitable.

ports; all our vessels in a state to keep the sea were at St. Domingo, most of them armed *en flûte*, and employed in transporting troops. A great deal of building was going forward in our ports, and that was no secret; but the government had no intention to equip a single ship. There was merely in the Dutch port of Helvoetsluys, a small armament of two sail of the line and two frigates, having on board 3000 men, and notoriously bound for Louisiana. They had been detained for several months by fear of the ice, and the object of their mission was announced to all Europe. To say that this armament, destined ostensibly for the colonies, might have in reality a different aim, was a most offensive insinuation. Lastly, to allege that discussions of great importance were going on with the French government was extremely imprudent; for thus far all had been confined to a few words relative to Malta, put forth by France, and left unanswered on the part of England. To represent this as a discussion was to declare at once an intention to refuse to execute the treaties; unless it were to be alleged that a few expressions picked out of the report of colonel Sébastiani, or out of the exposition of the state of the French Republic, constituted a grievance sufficient to cause the whole force of England to be called out. This message, then, could not bear examination: it was at once inaccurate and insulting.

Lord Whitworth, who began to know the government to which he was accredited a little better, guessed immediately the impression which the message to Parliament would produce on general Bonaparte. Hence it was not without great regret that he gave a copy of it to M. de Talleyrand, urging that minister to hasten to the general, in order to appease him, and to persuade him that this was not a declaration of war, but a mere measure of precaution. M. de Talleyrand immediately repaired to the Tuileries, and could scarcely succeed with the fiery master who occupied that palace. He found him highly incensed at the initiative so abruptly taken by the British cabinet; for this extraordinary message, which there was nothing to justify, seemed to be a provocation offered before the face of the world. He felt it to be a public defiance, deemed himself insulted, and asked where the British cabinet could have picked up all the falsehoods contained in that message; for there was not, he said, a single armament in the ports of France, neither was there yet any declared difference between the two cabinets.

M. de Talleyrand prevailed upon the First Consul to curb his resentment, and, if he must resolve upon war, to let the English incur the blame of the provocation. This was, in fact, the intention of the First Consul, but it was difficult for him to contain himself, so deeply aggrieved did he feel. The message was communicated to the English parliament on the 8th of March, and known in Paris on the 11th. Unluckily, the next day but one was Sunday, the day on which the First Consul received the

diplomatic body at the Tuileries. A very natural curiosity had drawn thither all the foreign ministers, who wished to observe the attitude of the First Consul on this occasion, and in particular that of the British ambassador. The First Consul had gone, till it should be time for the audience, to madame Bonaparte in her own apartments, and was playing with the infant which was then considered as his heir, the new-born child of Louis Bonaparte and Hortense de Beauharnois. M. de Remusat, prefect of the palace, announced that the circle was formed, and mentioned among other names that of Lord Whitworth. That name produced a visible impression upon the First Consul; he left the infant with which he was engaged, abruptly took the hand of madame Bonaparte, passed the door opening into the drawing-room, and proceeded in front of the foreign ministers, who advanced to meet him, direct to the representative of Great Britain. My lord, said he, with extreme agitation, have you any news from England? And, scarcely waiting for an answer, he added, You are bent on war, then?—No, general, replied the ambassador with great calmness, we are too sensible of the advantages of peace.—You are bent on war, then, repeated the First Consul in a very loud tone, so as to be heard by all present. We have been fighting these ten years; do you desire then that we should fight for ten years longer? How durst you assert that France is arming? You are imposing upon the world. There is not a ship in our ports: all the ships for service have been despatched to St. Domingo. The only armament existing is in the waters of Holland, and every body has known, for four months past, that it is bound for Louisiana. It has been asserted that discussions subsist between France and England; I know of none. I only know that the island of Malta has not been evacuated within the time prescribed; but I cannot imagine that your ministers mean to violate English good faith by refusing to execute a solemn treaty. At any rate, they have not said so yet. Neither do I suppose that by your armaments you design to intimidate the French people: you may kill them, my lord; intimidate them, never!—The ambassador, surprised, and somewhat agitated, notwithstanding his self-possession, replied that his government intended neither the one nor the other, but sought, on the contrary, to live in good understanding with France.—Then, replied the First Consul, it must respect treaties. Woe betide those who do not respect treaties! He then passed to Messrs. d'Azara and de Markoff, and told them aloud that the English would not evacuate Malta, that they refused to keep their engagements, and that thenceforward "the treaties must be covered with black crape." As he made his round, he perceived the minister of Sweden, whose presence reminded him of the ridiculous despatches addressed to the Germanic Diet and published at the time. Your king, said he, forgets then that Sweden is not what it was in the time of Gustavus Adolphus, that it has sunk to a third-rate power? He finished the round of the circle, still agitated, his eyes flashing, frightful as power when



enraged, but destitute of the calm dignity which becomes it so well.

Sensible, however, that he had passed the bounds of decorum, the First Consul, having completed his round, returned to the ambassador of England, and in a milder tone made inquiries concerning his lady, the duchess of Dorset; expressed a wish that, after she had passed the worst season in France, she might have it in her power to spend the best there. He added that this would not depend upon him, but upon England; and that, if he were obliged to resume arms, the entire responsibility would lie, in the eyes of God and man, upon those who refused to keep their engagements. This scene could not but deeply irritate the self-love of the English nation, and led to a mischievous reciprocity of incivilities. The English were in the wrong at bottom; for their ambition, so nearly undissembled, in regard to Malta, was an absolute scandal. They ought to have been left to bear the odium of the act, without the First Consul incurring that arising from violated forms. But, galled as he was, he took a sort of pleasure in making the thunders of his wrath reverberate to the extremities of the earth.

The treatment which lord Whitworth had experienced was immediately made public, for it had been witnessed by more than two hundred persons. Each gave his own version of the affair, and exaggerated it as much as he could. It produced a painful sensation in Europe, and added greatly to the embarrassment of the British cabinet. Lord Whitworth, affronted, complained to M. de Talleyrand, and declared that he would never more make his appearance in the Tuileries unless he received a formal assurance that he should not experience such treatment again. M. de Talleyrand replied verbally to these complaints, and, on this occasion, his calmness, his even temper, and his address were of great service to the policy of the cabinet, compromised by the natural vehemence of the First Consul.

A sudden revolution had taken place in the excitable and passionate spirit of Napoleon. From those prospects of a laborious and fruitful peace on which but lately he delighted to feast his active imagination, he turned all at once to those visions of war, of prodigious greatness attained by victory, of the renewal of the face of Europe, of the re-establishment of the empire of the West, which but too often haunted his mind. From the benefactor of France and of the world, as he flattered himself that he should be, he resolved to become the wonder of both. A wrath at once personal and patriotic took entire possession of him; and to conquer England, to humble her, to abase her, to destroy her, became from that day the passion of his life. Persuaded that every thing is possible to man, on condition of great intelligence, resolution, and perseverance, he suddenly seized the idea of crossing the Strait of Calais, and carrying to England one of those armies which had conquered Europe. He had said to himself, three



years before, that the St. Bernard and the ice of winter, reputed to be invincible obstacles for the generality of men were not so for him; he said the same thing to himself with reference to the arm of the sea between Dover and Calais, and thenceforward he was bent on crossing it, with a profound conviction that he should succeed. From that moment, that is to say, from the day on which the message of the king of England was received, are dated his first orders; and then it was that his mind, led astray in politics by the feeling of his power, again became the prodigy of human nature, when the point was to foresee and to surmount all the difficulties of a vast enterprize.

He immediately sent off colonel Lacuée to Flanders and Holland, to inspect the sea-ports of those countries, to examine their form, extent, population, and naval *materiel*. He directed him to obtain an approximative statement of all the vessels destined for coasting and for fishing between Havre and the Texel, and capable of keeping up with a military squadron when under sail. He sent other officers to Cherbourg, St. Malo, Granville, Brest, with orders to review all the vessels employed in the deep sea fisheries, and to ascertain their number, value, and total tonnage. He ordered the repairs of the gun-boats which had composed the old flotilla of Boulogne in 1801 to be commenced. He required naval engineers to submit to him models of flat-bottomed boats capable of carrying heavy cannon; he applied to them for a plan for a vast canal between Boulogne and Dunkirk, for the purpose of placing those two ports in communication. He directed the arming of the coasts and islands from Bordeaux to Antwerp to be set about. He commanded an immediate inspection of all the forests bordering the coasts of the Channel, with a view to ascertain the nature and quantity of the timber which they contained, and what supplies could be derived from them for the construction of an immense war flotilla. Having learned from his correspondence that emissaries of the English government were bargaining for timber in the Roman States, he despatched agents with the necessary funds to buy it up, and with recommendations which left the pope no choice of customers.

Three acts were, according to him, to mark the commencement of hostilities: the occupation of Hanover, of Portugal, and of the Gulf of Tarento, so as to effect the absolute and immediate closing of the coasts of the continent from Denmark to the Adriatic. In this view, he began with composing at Bayonne the artillery of a *corps d'armée*; he assembled at Faenza a division of 10,000 men and twenty-four pieces of cannon, destined to enter the kingdom of Naples; he ordered the troops which had been embarked at Helvoetsluys for Louisiana to be put on shore. Conceiving that it would be too dangerous to send them to sea, on the eve of a declaration of war, he directed part of them upon Flushing, a sea-port belonging to Holland, but placed under the power of France while we should occupy the country. He sent thither an offi-

cer, commissioned to assume all the powers belonging to a military commandant in time of war, and orders to arm the place without delay. The rest of these troops were marched for Breda and Nimeguen, two points for the assemblage of troops to form a corps of 24,000 men. This corps, placed under the command of a firm and prudent general, Mortier, was to take possession of Hanover on the first act of hostility committed by England.

This invasion, however, was not a thing politically very easy. The king of England, as sovereign of Hanover, was a member of the Germanic Confederation, and had a right, in certain cases, to the protection of the confederated States. The king of Prussia, director of the circle of Lower Saxony, in which Hanover lay, was the natural protector of that State. It was necessary therefore to have recourse to him, and to obtain his adhesion, which he could not but be very reluctant to give, for it was involving the north of Germany in the formidable quarrel which was about to take place, and perhaps exposing it to the blockade of the Weser, the Elbe, and the Oder, by the English. The cabinet of Potsdam affected, it is true, a warm attachment for France, which procured for it large indemnities; this attachment might extend so far as to induce it to refuse to join in any plans of coalition, to exert itself to prevent them, and even to apprise the First Consul of them; but, in the present state of things, this friendship could not be converted into such a positive alliance as that, if France had need of any signal act of devotedness, she could seriously reckon upon it. The First Consul immediately despatched his aide-de-camp Duroc, who was thoroughly acquainted with the court of Prussia, with instructions to inform that court of the danger of a speedy rupture between France and England, of the intention of the French government to carry the war to the last extremity, and to take possession of Hanover. General Duroc was directed to add that the First Consul had no wish to make war for the sake of war, and that, if the monarchs not concerned in the quarrel, such as the king of Prussia and the emperor of Russia, should find means to adjust the difference by inducing England to respect the treaties, he would instantly halt in that career of unrelenting hostilities into which he was ready to rush.

The First Consul also thought it right to take a step of civility towards the emperor of Russia. He had thus far negotiated with that sovereign some of the greatest affairs of Europe, and he wished to interest him in his cause, by constituting him judge of what was passing between France and England. He addressed to him a letter, of which colonel Colbert was to be the bearer, and in which, recapitulating all the events that had occurred since the peace of Amiens, he declared himself disposed to submit to his mediation, without soliciting it however, in case Great Britain would submit to it on her part, so strongly did he rely, he said, on the goodness of his cause and the justice of the emperor Alexander.

To all these determinations, so promptly taken, was to be

added one more relative to Louisiana. The four thousand men destined to occupy it had just been disembarked. But what was to be done? what plan was to be adopted in regard to that rich possession? There was no reason to be uneasy respecting our other colonies. St. Domingo was full of troops, and the soldiers who were disposable in the colonial depôts were hastily put on board all the merchantmen ready to sail. Guadeloupe, Martinique, the Isle of France, were likewise provided with strong garrisons, and immense expeditions would have been required to dispute them with the French. But Louisiana contained not a single soldier. It was an extensive province, which four thousand men were not sufficient to occupy in time of war. The inhabitants, though of French origin, had so frequently changed masters during the last century, that they were attached to nothing but their independence. The North Americans were by no means pleased to see us in possession of the mouths of the Mississippi, and of their principal outlet in the Gulf of Mexico. They had even applied to France to grant their commerce and navigation advantageous conditions of transit in the port of New Orleans. If we were determined to keep Louisiana, we might therefore reckon on the greatest efforts on the part of the English against us, on perfect indifference on the part of the inhabitants, and on positive ill-will on the part of the Americans. These latter, in fact, wished to have none but Spaniards for neighbours. All the colonial dreams of the First Consul were dispelled at once by the appearance of the message of king George III., and his resolution was instantly formed. I will not keep, said he to one of his ministers, a possession which would not be safe in our hands, which would perhaps embroil me with the Americans, or produce a coldness between us. I will make use of it, on the contrary, to attach them to me, and to embroil them with the English, and raise up against the latter enemies who will some day avenge us, if we should not succeed in avenging ourselves. My resolution is taken; I will give Louisiana to the United States. But as they have no territory to cede to us in exchange, I will demand a sum of money towards defraying the expenses of the extraordinary armament which I am projecting against Great Britain.—The First Consul intended not to contract any loan; he hoped with a considerable sum, which he should procure extraordinarily, with a moderate increase of the taxes, and a few sales of national domains slowly effected, to be able to meet the expenses of the war. He sent for M. Marbois, minister of the treasury, formerly employed in America, and M. Decrés, minister of the marine, and wished, though decided himself, to hear what they had to say. The First Consul listened to them very attentively, without appearing to be in the least touched by the arguments of either; he listened to them, as he often did, when he had made up his mind, to satisfy himself that he was not mistaken on any important point of the questions submitted to his judgment. Confirmed rather than shaken in his re-

solution by what he had heard, he directed M. de Marbois to send, without losing a moment, for Mr. Livingston, the American minister, and to enter into negotiation with him about Louisiana. Mr. Monroe had recently arrived in Europe to settle with the English the question of maritime right, and with the French the question respecting transit on the Mississippi. On his arrival in Paris, he was met by the unexpected proposal of the French cabinet. He was offered not certain facilities of transit through Louisiana, but the annexation of the country itself to the United States. Not embarrassed for a moment by the want of powers, he concluded a treaty immediately, subject to the ratification of his government. M. de Marbois demanded eighty millions, twenty out of that sum being to indemnify American commerce for captures illegally made during the late war, and sixty for the treasury of France. The twenty millions destined for the first purpose were expected to secure us the hearty good-will of the merchants of the United States. As for the sixty millions destined for France, it was agreed that the cabinet of Washington should create annuities, and that they should be negotiated to Dutch houses, at an advantageous rate, and not far from par. The treaty was therefore concluded on these bases, and sent to Washington to be ratified. In this manner the Americans purchased from France that extensive country, which has completed their territory in North America, and made them masters of the Gulf of Mexico for the present and for the time to come. They are consequently indebted for their birth and for their greatness to that long struggle between France and England. We shall presently see to what purpose those sixty millions were applied, and what result they had well nigh produced.

These precautions, once taken, the First Consul followed with more patience the progress of the negotiation. The involuntary storm of passion, which he was unable to repress on receiving the message of the king of England, having subsided, he promised himself, and he kept his word, that he would not suffer any thing to ruffle his temper, but submit to be so visibly pushed to extremities, that it should be impossible for France and Europe to mistake as to the real authors of the war.

M. de Talleyrand, who, under these circumstances, had conducted himself with rare discretion, had contributed more than any other person to instil these new dispositions into the First Consul. That minister was well aware that a war with England, owing to the difficulty of rendering it decisive, owing to the influence of British subsidies, which would soon make it continental, would be merely the renewal of the conflict of the Revolution with Europe; and, to prevent the calamity of a universal conflagration, he determined to use that *vis inertiae* which he sometimes employed with the First Consul, in the way of water thrown upon a blazing fire to moderate its violence. If on some occasions this inertness had been attended with inconveniences, it proved

at this time of great benefit; and, with any other cabinet but that which then so feebly governed England, it might have had the effect of preventing a rupture, or at least of deferring it for a considerable time longer. In consequence, after consulting with the First Consul, he made a calm and frank communication to the British cabinet for the purpose of apprizing it that military precautions were commencing on the part of France, but that they had not commenced till that day, namely, the day on which the message of king George III. to Parliament was received. Since you are arming in England, said M. de Talleyrand, the British cabinet must not be astonished if Switzerland, which was about to be evacuated, is not evacuated; if a body of troops is marching towards the south of Italy to reoccupy Tarento; if a corps of twenty thousand men enters Holland and takes the nearest position to Hanover; if the *materiel* of a division is collecting at Bayonne, to act in case of need against Portugal; if lastly, we extend the works going on in our ports from mere ship-building to equipping. No doubt the effect will be a redoubled sensation in England, and the usual inflammers of the public opinion will conclude that France is meditating fresh aggressions; but what is to be done? We must make up our minds to it, since the British cabinet has been the first to take those measures of precaution which end with being in reality measures of provocation—In fact, they were actively arming in England, they were pressing on the wharfs of the Thames, in the heart of the city of London. Thus they were preparing for sea the fifty ships of the line which, according to the message sent to Parliament, were to be ready to sail on the very day that war should be declared.

The administration of Mr. Addington, feeling that it was incompetent to these circumstances, had made some overtures to Mr. Pitt, to induce him to enter the cabinet. These overtures Mr. Pitt had haughtily repelled, and he continued to live almost always at a distance from London and from the agitations of the parties. Feeling his strength, foreseeing the events which would render him necessary, he had much rather hold power from those events than from weak ministers, who were the ephemeral usurpers of it. He, therefore, refused their offers, leaving them by this refusal in cruel perplexity. The steps to which we have adverted had been taken without the consent of king George III., who would have wished to keep his cabinet; for he had an almost invincible aversion for Mr. Pitt. He found in Mr. Pitt, along with opinions which were his own, a minister who was almost a master. He found in Mr. Fox, along with a noble and engaging character, opinions that were hateful to him. He was not disposed, therefore, to have either. He was anxious to keep Mr. Addington, the son of a physician, to whom he was attached; lord Hawkesbury, son of lord Liverpool, his particular confidant; he was anxious also to maintain peace if possible, and, if he could not, was resigned to wage war, which had become a sort of habit



for him, but to wage it with his present ministers. Mr. Addington and lord Hawkesbury entertained nearly the same sentiments; still they would have been glad to strengthen themselves, and, after having been an administration of peace, to constitute themselves an administration of war. In default of Mr. Pitt, who had refused them, they could not possibly admit Mr. Wyndham and lord Grenville, for the violence of these went far beyond public opinion in England. Mr. Addington and lord Hawkesbury would fain have applied to Mr. Fox, whose pacific ideas were perfectly suited to theirs; but here the will of the king was an insurmountable obstacle; and they were obliged to remain as they were, weak, unsupported in Parliament, and of course dependent on the parties. Now, the party which was strongest at the moment, because it worked upon the national passions, was the Grenville party, which began to be distinguished, on account of its violence, from the Pitt party, and which revenged itself for being kept out of the administration by obliging those in power to do what it would have done itself. The weakness of the cabinet, therefore, was almost as certain to plunge it into war, as if Grenville, Wyndham, and Dundas had been members of it.

Mr. Addington and lord Hawkesbury were now extremely embarrassed, after all the fuss which they had made about the events in Switzerland, as well on account of retaining Malta, as of having replied to a haughty expression of the First Consul's by a message to Parliament. They would fain have found an expedient for extricating themselves from the dilemma; but unfortunately they had placed themselves in a situation where any thing short of the definitive conquest of Malta must appear insufficient in England, and provoke an indignation under which they must fall. As for Malta, they had no hope of obtaining it from the First Consul.

M. de Talleyrand, with a view to relieve them, insinuated that a convention, in which France should agree to the evacuation of Switzerland and Holland in return for the evacuation of Malta, and engage to respect the integrity of the Turkish empire, might perhaps be the means of pacifying public opinion in England and dispelling its jealousies.

This proposal was not answerable to the desires of the English ministers, for Malta was the absolute condition which the rulers of their weakness had imposed upon them. They must either satisfy the cupidity excited by their fault, or succumb in full Parliament. They were sensible, at the same time, that in the end they would cover themselves with ridicule in the eyes of England, of France, and of Europe, if they continued in an equivocal position, not daring to say what they wanted. At length on the 13th of April (1803) they produced their demands. The First Consul exciting apprehensions respecting Egypt, they must, they said, retain possession of Malta as a precautionary measure capable of setting them at ease. They offered two alternatives; either the



possession by England of the fortresses of the island in perpetuity, leaving the civil government to the Order; or that possession for ten years, on condition, at the expiration of the ten years, of giving up the forts not to the Order but to the Maltese themselves. In either case, France was to engage to second a negotiation with the king of Naples to induce that prince to cede to England the island of Lampedosa, not far from Malta, for the avowed object of founding a naval establishment there.

Lord Whitworth strove to persuade M. de Talleyrand to assent to these demands, and even addressed himself to the First Consul's brother, Joseph, who dreaded not less than M. de Talleyrand the chances of a desperate struggle, in which they might be forced to risk perhaps all the greatness of the Bonapartes. Joseph promised to use his influence with his brother, but without any great hope of succeeding. The only proposition which appeared to him to have any chance of success with the First Consul was to leave for some time, but only a short time, the possession of the fortresses of Malta to the English, meanwhile upholding the existence of the Order with great care, that those fortresses might afterwards be placed in its hands; and to grant to France in compensation the immediate recognition of the new States in Italy. In consequence, Joseph and M. de Talleyrand exerted their utmost efforts to prevail upon the First Consul. They laid great stress upon the maintenance of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem, as a certain pledge in the eyes of the public that the occupation of the forts would be temporary, and as a salvo of the dignity of the French government. The First Consul manifested invincible obstinacy; all these palliatives appeared to him beneath his character. It would be better, he said, merely to relinquish the island of Malta to the English; that this would be a sort of compensation voluntarily granted to England for the alleged encroachments of France since the peace of Amiens; that, in the concession thus explained, there would be something frank and straightforward, and it would look more like an act of justice voluntarily performed than a weakness; that, on the contrary, the possession of Malta granted in reality (for the forts were the whole island, and some years were perpetuity) granted in reality, but cloaked, would be unworthy of him; that nobody could be imposed upon by it, and that the very efforts made to disguise this concession would betray the feeling of one's own weakness—No, said he, either Malta or nothing! But Malta gives the dominion of the Mediterranean. Now, nobody will believe that I consent to surrender the dominion of the Mediterranean to the English unless because I am afraid of measuring my strength with them. Thus I lose at once the most important sea in the world and the opinion of Europe, which believes in my energy, which believes it to be superior to all dangers.—But, replied M. de Talleyrand, the English hold Malta, and, in breaking with them, you do not take it from them.—Yes, answered the First Consul, but I will not give up an immense advantage without a struggle:

I will fight, arms in hand, for the possession of it, and I hope to reduce the English to such a state that they shall be forced to give up Malta and a great deal more; without taking into account that, if I once get to Dover, it will be all over with these tyrants of the seas. Besides, as we must fight sooner or later with a people to which the greatness of France is intolerable, why, the sooner the better. The national energy is not blunted by a long peace; I am young; the English are in the wrong, more in the wrong than they ever will be again: I had rather settle the matter at once. Malta or nothing, he incessantly repeated: but I am resolved they shall not have Malta.

The First Consul, however, assented to the proposal for negotiating the cession to the English of Lampedosa or some other small island near the coast of Africa, but on condition that they should evacuate Malta immediately. Let them obtain, said he, a place in the Mediterranean to put into: I have no objection. But I am determined that they shall not have two Gibaltars in that sea, one at the entrance, and another in the middle.

This answer gave the greatest disappointment to lord Whitworth, and, accommodating as he had at first appeared while he had hopes of succeeding, he then became stiff, haughty, and almost uncivil. But M. de Talleyrand had promised to support his proposals, for the purpose of preventing, or at least retarding, a rupture. Lord Whitworth told M. de Talleyrand that whether the First Consul staked his honour or did not stake it was of no consequence to England; that she was not one of those petty States to which he could dictate his pleasure, and which he could force to submit to the constructions which he chose to put upon honour and policy. M. de Talleyrand replied, with calmness and dignity, that England, on her side, had no right, upon the plea of distrust, to demand the relinquishment of one of the most important points of the globe; that there was no power in the world which could impose upon others the consequences of its suspicions, whether founded or not; that this would be an extremely convenient way of making conquests, for in that case one need only say that one had apprehensions, to be authorized to lay hands on any part of the earth.

Lord Whitworth communicated this answer to the English cabinet, which, finding itself placed between the evacuation of Malta, which it considered as its downfall, or war, took the culpable resolution of preferring war, war with the only man who could involve England in serious dangers. This resolution once taken, the cabinet thought that it was necessary to gratify still more the party under whose domination it was, by being short, arrogant, hasty, in bringing the matter to a crisis. Lord Whitworth was instructed to require the cession of Malta for ten years at least, the cession of the island of Lampedosa, the immediate evacuation of Switzerland and Holland, a precise and specific indemnity in favour of the king of Sardinia, and to offer by way of

compensation the recognition of the Italian States. To these orders sent to the ambassador was added the injunction to apply for passports immediately, if the conditions of England were not accepted.

The despatch was dated the 23rd of April; it arrived in Paris on the 25th. The 2nd of May was the fatal term. Lord Whitworth made some attempts at accommodation with M. de Talleyrand, for he had himself a dread of this rupture. M. de Talleyrand, on his part, made a point of giving him to understand that he had no hope of obtaining Malta either for ten years or for less, and that some other arrangement must be thought of. At the same time he took pains, by the turn of his expressions to avoid an immediate conclusion. Lord Whitworth, concurring entirely in his intentions, was resolved not to forestall the term fixed, the 2nd of May. There was not a man, in fact, however bold, but contemplated with dread the consequences of such a war. In this conflict, none continued unshaken but the English ministers, anxious to preserve their sorry existence at any price, and the First Consul, defying all the risks of an awful struggle, to support the honour of his government and the preponderance of France in the Mediterranean. In this manner Lord Whitworth and M. de Talleyrand reached the seventh day without breaking.

At length, on the 2nd of May, Lord Whitworth not daring to disobey the orders of his court, demanded his passports. M. de Talleyrand, to gain a little longer time, replied that he would lay before the First Consul this application for passports, and again begged him not to be in a hurry, alleging that, perhaps, if they were to consider, they might yet hit upon some unforeseen mode of arrangement. M. de Talleyrand had an interview with the First Consul, conferred a long time with him, and his conference produced a new and very ingenious proposal. It consisted in putting the island of Malta into the hands of the emperor of Russia, and leaving it there in trust, till the conclusion of the discussions which had arisen between France and England. Such a combination could not but take from the English every pretext for distrust, since the integrity of the young emperor could not be disputed, and this constituted him judge in the quarrel. It happened opportunely that this prince had just written in answer to communications from the First Consul, that he was ready to offer his mediation, if that could be a means of preventing war; and the king of Prussia, actuated by the same desire, made the like offer. It was therefore very certain that those two monarchs would be found disposed to take upon themselves the trouble of the mediation. To refuse it would be proving that no fears were entertained either for Malta or for Egypt, since an impartial depositary was not satisfactory, but that the English ministers wanted a conquest for the nation and an argument for the Parliament.

M. de Talleyrand, happy in having devised such an expedient,

repaired to lord Whitworth's to prevail upon him to defer his departure, and to beg him to transmit this new proposal to his cabinet. The orders which that ambassador had received were so positive that he durst not disobey them. He, nevertheless, suffered himself to be shaken by the fear of taking a step perhaps irreparable, if he insisted on having his passports immediately. He therefore dispatched a courier to London, to transmit the last offers of the French cabinet, and to make an excuse for the delay which he had allowed to take place in the execution of the orders of his court.

M. de Talleyrand likewise sent off an extraordinary courier to general Andréossy, who had not seen the English ministers since their last communications, and ordered him to try a decisive step with them. General Andréossy obeyed and spoke up like an honourable man. If it was not Malta that they wanted to acquire, in contempt of treaties, they could have no motive for refusing to deposit that valuable pledge in powerful, disinterested, and perfectly safe hands. Mr. Addington appeared shaken; for, at bottom, he wished for a pacific solution. This head of the cabinet said with great simplicity that he desired to be enlightened, expressing regret that he was not sufficiently so for such an important conjuncture, and wavered between the two-fold fear of committing a weakness or provoking a destructive war. Lord Hawkesbury, more ambitious, more firm, appeared immovable. The cabinet, after deliberating, refused the proposal. It had been made with a view to satisfy the national ambition, and to place Malta itself in the hands of a disinterested third party; but this was going beside the mark. To give it up, moreover, to this disinterested third party would probably be to lose it for ever; for the ministers well knew that there was no umpire in the world who could give judgment in favour of England in such a question. To colour the rejection of this last proposal, they used an argument that was absolutely false. They knew for certain they said, that the emperor of Russia would not accept the office which France wished to impose upon him. Now the contrary was certain, for Russia had just offered her mediation, and, soon afterwards, on being informed of the last proposal of the French government, she lost no time in declaring that she consented to it, notwithstanding the dangers attached to the deposit proposed to be placed in her hands. The English ministers, nevertheless, were desirous to reserve a last chance of obtaining Malta, and devised an expedient which was not acceptable. Judging of the First Consul by themselves, they conceived that he refused Malta only out of deference to the public opinion. They proposed, therefore, by adding some patent articles to the treaty of Amiens, to throw into a secret article the obligation to leave the English troops in Malta. The patent articles were to purport that Switzerland and Holland should be immediately evacuated; that the king of Sardinia should receive a territorial indemnity; that the Eng-

lish should obtain the island of Lampedosa, and meanwhile remain at Malta. The secret article was to say that their stay there was to last ten years.

This answer, discussed on the 7th of May, despatched on the same day, arrived on the 9th in Paris. On the 10th, lord Whitworth communicated it in writing to M. de Talleyrand, whom he could not see, because that minister was kept in attendance on the First Consul, who was ill in consequence of the upsetting of a carriage. When the proposal of a secret article was made to him, he proudly rejected it, and would not hear of it on any account. He devised in his turn a last expedient, which was cleverly contrived for keeping the two national ambitions in equilibrium, both in respect to real advantages, and in respect to apparent advantages. This expedient consisted in leaving the English at Malta for an indefinite space of time, but on condition that the French should for the same space of time occupy the Gulf of Tarento. This plan was attended with important circumstantial advantages. The English ministers would win that kind of wager which they had laid to obtain Malta; the French would occupy an equal position on the Mediterranean; all the powers would soon be tempted to interfere, to oblige the English to leave Malta in order to get the French out of the kingdom of Naples. The First Consul, however, would not propose this new arrangement unless he had a hope of its being accepted. M. de Talleyrand therefore had instructions not to venture upon this last step without extreme caution.

Next day, the 11th of May, M. de Talleyrand saw lord Whitworth at noon, and told him that a secret article was unacceptable, for the First Consul would not deceive France respecting the extent of the concessions granted to England; that, however, there was one more proposal to make, the result of which was to cede Malta, but on condition of an equivalent to France. Lord Whitworth declared that he could not admit of any proposition but that sent by his cabinet; and that, after having taken it upon himself to defer his departure a first time, he could not delay it a second time without a formal adhesion to what his government demanded. M. de Talleyrand made no reply to this declaration, and the two ministers parted, both very sorry not to have been able to effect an accommodation. Lord Whitworth applied for passports for the next day, but said that he should travel slowly, and that there would still be time to write to London and to receive an answer, before he could embark at Calais. It was agreed that the ambassadors should be exchanged on the frontiers, and that lord Whitworth should wait at Calais till general Andréossy had reached Dover.

Great curiosity prevailed in Paris. An eager concourse beset the gate of the hotel of the English ambassador, to see whether he was making preparations for travelling. Next day, the 12th, after waiting the whole day, and leaving the French cabinet all the



time possible for reflecting, lord Whitworth took the road for Calais, making short journeys. The report of his departure produced a strong sensation in Paris, and every one foresaw that prodigious events would mark this new period of the war.

M. de Talleyrand had sent a courier to general Andréossi, to carry to him the new proposition for allowing the French to occupy Tarento, in compensation for the occupation of Malta by the English. It was by M. de Schimmelpennink, minister of Holland, that the proposition was to be made, not in the name of France, but as an idea of his own, and of the success of which he was quite sure. The idea, submitted to the British cabinet, was not approved, and general Andréossi was obliged to leave England. Quite as much anxiety was manifested in London as in Paris. The Parliament house was incessantly thronged for some days, and every one was applying to ministers for news of the negotiation. At the moment of so important a determination, the warlike passion subsided, and men were seized with dread of the consequences of a desperate conflict. The people of London had little desire for the renewal of the war. The Grenville party and the great merchants alone were satisfied.

General Andréossi was accompanied at his departure with great demonstrations of respect and visible regret. He arrived at Dover at the same time that lord Whitworth reached Calais, that is, on the 17th of May. Lord Whitworth was immediately conveyed across the Strait. The first thing he did was to visit the French ambassador; he loaded him with tokens of esteem, and conducted him himself to the ship that was to carry him back to France. The two ambassadors parted in the presence of a concourse, agitated, uneasy, sorrowful. At this solemn moment, the two nations seemed to bid each other adieu, not to meet again till after a tremendous war and the convulsion of the world. How different would have been their destinies if, as the First Consul observed, these two powers, the one maritime, the other continental, had united and completed themselves, for the purpose of peacefully regulating the interests of the universe! General civilization would have made more rapid advances; the future independence of Europe would have been for ever ensured; and the two nations would not have paved the way to the domination of the North over the divided West.

Such was the melancholy termination of that short peace of Amiens.

We shall not attempt to conceal the vivacity of our national sentiments: it would be painful to us to condemn France; but we would do it without hesitation if she seemed to us to deserve condemnation: we shall not flinch from doing it whenever unfortunately she is in the wrong, because truth is the first duty of the historian. However, after mature reflection, we cannot condemn France for this renewal of the conflict between the two nations. The First Consul, on this occasion, conducted himself with



perfect good faith. He erred, we admit, in points of form; but even these were not all his errors. He was not guilty of one in regard to things themselves. The complaints of England, respecting the change produced in the relative situation of the two countries since the peace, were unfounded. In Italy, the Italian Republic had chosen the First Consul for president, but in reality this made no change in the dependence of that Republic, which existed and which could not exist but by France. Besides, this event was dated from February, and the treaty of Amiens from the month of March, 1802. The erection of the kingdom of Etruria, and the cession of Louisiana and the duchy of Parma to France, were public facts before that same month of March, 1802. It should be added that at the congress of Amiens, England had almost promised the recognition of the new States in Italy. The annexation of Piedmont was likewise foreseen and avowed in the negotiations of Amiens, for the English negotiator had made some efforts to obtain an indemnity in favour of the king of Piedmont. Switzerland and Holland had not ceased to be occupied by our troops, either during the war, or during the peace; and, in more than one conversation, lord Hawkesbury had acknowledged that our influence over those States was a consequence of the war; that, provided that their independence were definitively recognized, no complaint would be made. England, then, could not suppose that France would suffer a counter-revolution to be effected in Switzerland, or in Holland, that is, at her very door, without interfering. As for the secularizations, they were an act obligatory by treaties, an act full of justice and moderation, executed jointly with Russia, assented to by all the States of Germany, including Austria, sanctioned by the king of England himself, who had, in the quality of king of Hanover, adhered to the division of the indemnities, which was extremely advantageous for him. What was there then on the continent to reproach France with? Her greatness alone, a greatness concentrated by treaties, admitted by England at the congress of Amiens, which had, it is true, become more evident in the calm of peace and amidst negotiations which her influence and her skill decided in an irresistible manner.

The reproach of alleged designs upon Egypt was a false pretext, for the First Consul had none at that moment, and colonel Sébastiani had been sent only as an observer, for the sole purpose of ascertaining whether the English were ready to evacuate Alexandria. The examination of the most secret documents leaves not the slightest doubt on this head.

What ground then could there be for the strange violation of the treaty of Amiens relative to Malta? In order to account for it, we need but call to mind the events which had occurred during the last fifteen months.

The English, passionate like all great nations, wished in 1801, after a ten years' contest, for a moment's respite, and wished for

it ardently, as every change is wished for. This sentiment, enforced by the distresses of the labouring classes in 1801, became one of the impulsions which in free governments overthrow or set up administrations. Pitt retired: the feeble administration of Mr. Addington succeeded him, and made peace on clear conditions, perfectly known to its nation and to the world. It conceded the advantages gained by France in the preceding ten years, for peace would have been impossible on any other conditions. In a few months this peace appeared not to give all that was expected from it: is it ever the case that reality equals hope? The English saw France, great by war, become great by negotiations, great by the efforts of industry and commerce. Jealousy again inflamed their hearts. They solicited a treaty of commerce, which the First Consul refused, being convinced that the French manufactures, in their very infancy, could not thrive without strong protection. Nevertheless, the English manufacturers were satisfied, because smuggling opened outlets enough for them. But the great merchants of London, alarmed at the competition with which they were threatened by the French, Spanish, Dutch, and Genoese flags, which had again made their appearance upon the seas, deprived of the profits of the loans, connected with Pitt, Wyndham, and Grenville, the great merchants of London became hostile, more hostile than the English aristocracy itself. They were in close connexion with Holland, and complained bitterly of the influence which France exercised over that country. A counter-revolution having taken place in Switzerland, owing to the good faith of the First Consul, who was in too great haste to evacuate that country, it was found necessary to enter it again. This was a new pretext. The animosity was soon at its height; and the war-party, composed of the mercantile interest, having at its head Mr. Pitt, absent from Parliament, and the Grenvilles present at all the discussions, visibly pushed things to a rupture. The British press indulged in the most horrible invectives. The press of the French emigrants took advantage of the occasion far to surpass the violence of the English papers.

Unfortunately, a weak administration, desirous of preserving peace, but fearing the war party, alarmed at the noise that was made on account of Switzerland, committed the blunder of countermanding the evacuation of Malta. From that moment, peace was irrevocably sacrificed; for, the rich prize of Malta, once held forth to British ambition, could not possibly be refused to it afterwards. The promptness and moderation of the French intervention in Switzerland having put an end to the grievance made out of it, the British cabinet would have been very glad to evacuate Malta, but no longer durst. The First Consul summoned it in the language of justice and wounded pride to execute the treaty of Amiens, and summons after summons led to the deplorable rupture which we have just recorded.

Thus the English commercial aristocracy, much more active on

this occasion than the old noble aristocracy, leagued with ambitious spirits of the tory party, assisted by French emigrants, not duly checked by a feeble administration, this commercial aristocracy and its associates, exciting, provoking an impetuous character, full of the two-fold feeling of its strength and of the justice of its cause—these were the real authors of the war. We believe that we are adhering to truth and justice in marking them out by these traits to posterity, which for the rest will weigh the faults of us all in scales, much truer, much surer than ours, we admit, because they will be held by a cooler and more impartial hand.

## BOOK XVII.

### CAMP OF BOULOGNE.

Message of the First Consul to the great Bodies of the State—Speech of M. de Fontanes—Violences of the English Navy with regard to French Commerce—Reprisals—The Communes and the Departments, by a spontaneous Movement, offer Flat-bottomed Boats, Frigates, and Ships of the Line to the Government—General Enthusiasm—Assemblage of the French Navy in the European Seas—State in which the War has placed the Colonies—History of the Expedition to St. Domingo continued—The Yellow Fever breaks out—Destruction of the French Army—Death of the Captain-general Leclerc—Return of the Fleet—Character of the War between France and England—Comparative Strength of the two Countries—The First Consul boldly resolves to attempt an Invasion—He prepares for it with extraordinary Activity—Works in the Ports and in the Inner Basins of the Rivers—Formation of Six Camps of Troops from the Texel to Bayonne—Financial means—The First Consul will not have recourse to a Loan—Sale of Louisiana—Subsidies of the Allies—Concurrence of Holland, Italy, and Spain—Incapacity of Spain—The First Consul releases Spain from the Execution of the Treaty of St. Ildefonso, on condition of a Subsidy—Occupation of Otranto and of Hanover—Light in which the new War was considered by all the Powers—Austria, Prussia, Russia—Their Anxieties and their Views—Russia pretends to limit the Means of the Belligerent Powers—She offers her Mediation, which the First Consul accepts with affected Eagerness—England replies coldly to the Offers of Russia—During these Harleys the First Consul sets out on a Tour to the Coasts of France, to hasten the Preparations for the grand Expedition—He is accompanied by Madame Bonaparte—The most laborious Activity mingled with the Poms of Royalty—Amiens, Abbeville, Boulogne—Means devised by the First Consul for transporting an Army from Calais to Dover—Three Species of Vessels—Their Qualities and their Defects—War Flotilla and Transport Flotilla—Immense Maritime Establishment created at Boulogne by enchantment—Plan for concentrating Two Thousand Boats at Boulogne, when the Works in the Ports and Rivers are completed—Preference given to Boulogne over Dunkirk and Calais—The Strait, its Winds and Currents—Excavation of the Harbours of Boulogne, Vimereux, and Ambleteuse—Distribution of the Troops along the Coast—Their Labours and military Exercises—The First Consul, having inspected and regulated every thing, leaves Boulogne, to visit Calais, Dunkirk, Ostend, and Antwerp—Stay at Brussels—Concourse of Ministers, Ambassadors, and Bishops in that City—Cardinal Caprara in Belgium—Journey of M. Lombard, the King of Prussia's Secretary, to Brussels—The First Consul strives to dispel the Apprehensions of King Frederick William by frank Communications—Return to Paris—The First Consul resolves to put an end to the Russian Mediation, and announces a War with England to the last extremity—He finally determines to oblige Spain to explain herself, and to execute the Treaty of St. Ildefonso, leaving the choice of means to herself—Strange Conduct of the Prince of the Peace—The First Consul denounces that Favourite and his scandalous Proceedings to the King of Spain—Deep Abasement of the Court of Spain—It submits and promises a Subsidy—Continuance of the Preparations at Boulogne—The First Consul purposes to execute his Project in the Winter of 1803—He creates a small Residence for himself at Pont de Briques near Boulogne, where he frequently makes his appearance—Assemblage of all the Divisions of the Flotilla in the Channel—Brilliant actions of Gunboats with Brigs and Frigates—Confidence acquired in the Expedition—Perfect harmony between the Seamen and Soldiers—Hopes of a speedy Execution of the Plan—Unforeseen Events for a moment call the Attention of the First Consul to Internal Affairs.



## BOOK XVII.

## CAMP OF BOULOGNE.

THE fondness for war which the First Consul might naturally be supposed to cherish would have awakened suspicion in the public opinion in France, and perhaps caused him to be accused of too much precipitation in breaking with England, had she not, by her manifest violation of the treaty of Amiens, taken it upon herself to justify him completely. It was evident to all minds that she had not been able to resist the temptation to keep Malta, and thus to secure a compensation not the most legitimate for our greatness. The rupture was therefore accepted as a necessity of honour and interest, though people indulged in no illusions respecting the consequences. They were aware that war with England might become war with Europe; that its duration was as incalculable as its extent, for it was not easy to go to London to terminate it, as one might go to the gates of Vienna to settle a quarrel with Austria. It must, moreover, strike a mortal blow at commerce, for the seas could not fail to be soon closed. Two considerations, however, greatly diminished the chagrin for France. Under a chief such as Napoleon, the war would no longer be the signal for new internal commotions; and people did flatter themselves that they might perhaps witness some prodigy of his genius, which should put an end at one stroke to the long rivalry of the two nations.

The First Consul, who, on this occasion, resolved to pay great deference to public opinion, conducted himself as the head of the oldest established representative government might have done. He convoked the Senate, the Legislative Body, and the Tribunate, and communicated to them such papers relative to the negotiation as deserved to be known. He had no need, in fact, to resort to any dissimulation; for, excepting some gusts of passion, he had in reality nothing to reproach himself with. These three bodies of the State responded to the proceeding of the First Consul, by sending deputations charged to convey to the government their entire approbation. A man who excelled in that studied and solemn eloquence which so well befits the head of great assemblies, M. de Fontanes, recently introduced into the Legislative Body through the influence of the Bonaparte family,



was deputed to express to the First Consul the sentiments of that body, and did it in terms worthy of being recorded by history.

"France," said he, "is ready to cover herself again with those arms which have conquered Europe. Woe to the ambitious government which would recall us to the field of battle, and which, grudging humanity so brief an interval of repose, would plunge it back into the calamities from which it has scarcely emerged! . . . . England can no longer assert that she is defending the conservative principles of society threatened in its foundations; it is we who shall be able to hold that language, if war is rekindled; it is we who shall then avenge the rights of nations and the cause of humanity, in repelling the unjust attack of a nation, which negotiates but to deceive, which demands peace only to recommence war, which signs treaties only to break them. Let us not doubt that, if the signal is once given, France will rally with one unanimous movement around the hero whom she admires. All the parties, which he keeps in silence about him, will then vie only in zeal and courage. All are sensible that they have need of his genius, and acknowledge that he alone can support the weight and the greatness of our new destinies. . . . ."

"Citizen First Consul, the French people cannot entertain any but grand ideas and heroic sentiments like yours. It has conquered that it might have peace; it desires peace, like yourself, but like you, it will never be afraid of war. Does not England, who fancies herself so well protected by the Ocean, know that the world sometimes sees extraordinary men arise, whose genius executes what before them appeared impossible? And if one of these men has appeared, ought she imprudently to provoke him and to force him to obtain from his fortune all that he has a right to expect? A great people is capable of every thing when it has for its leader a great man, from whom it can never separate its glory, its interests, and its happiness."

In this brilliant and polished language, one could not, to be sure, discover the enthusiasm of '89, but it exhibited the prodigious confidence which every one felt in the hero who held in his hand the destinies of France, and from whom was expected the ardently desired humiliation of England. A circumstance easy enough, it is true, to be foreseen, served greatly to increase the public indignation. Almost at the moment of the departure of the two ambassadors, and before any regular manifestation, news arrived that the ships of the royal English navy were capturing French merchantmen. Two frigates had taken in the bay of Audierne a number of trading vessels, which were going to seek refuge at Brest. These first acts were soon followed by many others, intelligence of which arrived from all the ports. It was a violence not at all conformable to the law of nations. There was a formal stipulation on this subject in the late treaty signed between America and France (30th of September, 1800, Art. 8), but in the treaty of Amiens, it is true, there was nothing

of the sort. That treaty contained no stipulation for delaying, in case of rupture, the commencement of hostilities against commerce. But this delay resulted from the moral principles of the law of nations, placed far above all written stipulations. The First Consul, all the ardour of whose character was kindled by this new situation, determined instantly to use reprisals, and drew up an *arrêté*, by which he declared all the English travelling in France at the time of the rupture, prisoners of war. Since the English, he said, were determined to visit upon mere traders, innocent of the policy of their government, the consequences of that policy, he was authorized to do the same, and to secure means of exchange by constituting the British subjects actually arrested on the soil of France his prisoners. This measure, though actuated by the conduct of Great Britain, nevertheless exhibited a character of rigour which was liable to ruffle the public opinion, and to excite apprehensions of the renewal of the violences of the last war. M. Cambacérès strongly remonstrated with the First Consul, and obtained a modification of the projected dispositions. Thanks to his efforts, those dispositions were made to apply only to such British subjects as were in the military service or held any commission whatever from the government. For the rest, they were not confined, but merely prisoners on parole in various fortified places.

All France was soon in vehement commotion. For a century past, that is to say, ever since the English navy seemed to take the lead of ours, the idea of terminating the maritime rivalry of the two nations by an invasion had possessed all minds. Louis XVI. and the Directory had made preparations for a landing. The Directory, in particular, had kept for several years a certain number of flat-bottomed boats on the coasts of the Channel; and it will be recollected that in 1801, shortly before the signature of the preliminaries of peace, admiral Latouche Treville had repulsed the repeated attempts of Nelson to carry the Boulogne flotilla by boarding. It had become a sort of popular tradition that it was possible to transport an army from Calais to Dover in flat-bottomed boats. By an impulse absolutely electric, the departments and the great cities, each according to its means, offered the government flat-bottomed boats, cutters, frigates, even ships of the line. This patriotic idea was first broached by the department of the Loiret, which taxed itself to the amount of 300,000 francs, to build and equip a frigate of 30 guns. At this signal, communes, departments, and even corporations, came forward to imitate the example. The mayors of Paris opened subscriptions, which were soon filled with a multitude of signatures. Among the models of boats proposed by the marine were some of different dimensions, costing from 8000 to 30,000 francs. Each locality could consequently proportion its zeal to its means. Small towns, as Coutances, Bernay, Louviers, Valogne, Verdun, Moissac, gave merely flat-bottomed boats of the first or second dimension. The more considerable towns voted frigates, and even

ships of the line. Paris voted a ship of 120 guns, Lyons one of 100, Bordeaux an 84, Marseilles a 74. These gifts of the great cities were independent of those made by the departments. Thus, though Bordeaux had offered an 80-gun ship, the department of the Gironde subscribed 1,600,000 francs to be expended in building vessels. Though Lyons had given a ship of 100 guns, the department of the Rhone added a patriotic gift amounting to one-eighth of its taxes. The department of the North added a million to the sum voted by the city of Lille. The departments in general levied on themselves a contribution of from two to three hundred thousand francs, up to 900,000 and a million. Some gave their share in produce of the country serviceable for the navy. The department of Côte d'Or made a present to the State of 100 pieces of cannon of large calibre, which were to be founded at Creuzot. The department of Lot and Garonne voted an addition of 5 centimes to its direct contributions for the service of the year XI. and the year XII., to be expended in the purchase of sail-cloth in the country. The Italian Republic, imitating this spirit, offered the First Consul four millions of Milanese livres, to build two frigates, one called the President and the other the Italian Republic, besides twelve gun-boats, named after the twelve Italian departments. The great bodies of the State would not be left behind, and the Senate gave a ship of 120 guns for its donation. Mercantile houses, such as that of Barillon, persons holding situations in the finances, as the receivers-general, for instance, offered flat-bottomed boats. Such a resource was not to be disdained, for it could not amount to less than 40 millions. Compared with a budget of 500 millions, it was of real importance. Added to the price of Louisiana, which was 60 millions, to various subsidies obtained from allies, to the natural increase of the produce of the taxes, it would relieve the government from the necessity of recurring to the expensive, and at that time almost impossible resource, a loan in annuities.

We shall presently describe in detail the creation of this flotilla, capable of carrying 150,000 men, 400 pieces of cannon, 10,000 horses, and which for a moment was very near effecting the conquest of England. For the present it will be sufficient to mention that a condition imposed by the marine on these flat-bottomed boats of all dimensions was that they should not draw more than 6 or 7 feet water. When disarmed, they were not to draw more than 3 or 4. Thus they could float upon all the rivers, descend them to the mouth, and then be collected in the ports of the Channel, keeping close to the coasts. This was a great advantage, for our ports would not have been adequate, for want of stocks, timber, and workmen, to the building of 1500 or 2000 boats, which were required to be finished in a few months. By building in the interior, the difficulty was surmounted. The banks of the Gironde, of the Loire, of the Seine, of the Somme, of the Oise, of the Scheld, of the Meuse, of the Rhine, were all

at once covered with building yards. The workmen of the country, under the direction of boatswains of the navy, were perfectly equal to these singular creations, which at first astonished the population, which sometimes furnished it with subjects of raillery, but which, nevertheless, soon became a cause of serious alarm to England. In Paris, from La Rapée to the Invalides, there were 90 gun-boats on the stocks, and more than 1000 workmen employed in building them.

The first thing to be done, on occasion of the new war with England, was to collect our naval force, distributed in the West Indies, and engaged in reducing our colonies under the authority of the mother-country. This was the very first point to which the First Consul turned his attention. He lost no time in recalling our squadrons, in ordering them to leave at Martinique, Guadeloupe, and St. Domingo, all the men, ammunition, and *materiel* they could. The frigates and light vessels only were to remain in America. But it was necessary to beware of being too sanguine. The war with England, if it could not wrest from us the smaller islands, such as Guadeloupe and Martinique, was destined to cause us to lose the most valuable of all, that for the preservation of which an army had been sacrificed—we mean St. Domingo.

We have seen the captain-general Leclerc, after well conducted operations and a considerable loss of men, become master of the colony, having reason to flatter himself even that he had restored it to France, and Toussaint, retiring to his habitation at Ennery, waiting there for the month of August as the term of the reign of the Europeans in the island of Haïti. That terrible black predicted truly when he foresaw the triumph of the climate of America over European soldiers. But he lived not to enjoy that triumph, for he was destined to perish himself from the inclemency of our climate—melancholy retaliations of the war of races, obstinately bent on disputing with each other the regions of the equator.

Scarcely had the army begun to establish itself, when the noble soldiers of the army of the Rhine and of Egypt, transported to the West Indies, were attacked by a scourge frequent in those parts, but this time more destructive than ever. Whether the climate, from some unknown decree of Providence, was this year more fatal than usual, or whether its action was more powerful upon fatigued soldiers, crowded together in considerable number, forming a stronger focus of infection, Death swept them away with awful rapidity and violence. Twenty generals were carried off nearly at once: officers and soldiers perished by thousands. To the 22,000 men brought by several squadrons, 5000 of whom were *hors de combat*, and 5000 ill of various diseases, the First Consul had added, towards the end of 1802, about 10,000 more. The new comers, in particular, were seized at the very moment of their landing. Fifteen thousand men at least perished in two months. The army was reduced to nine or ten thousand soldiers,

seasoned, it is true, but mostly convalescents, and unfit to resume arms immediately.

As soon as the yellow fever commenced its ravages, Toussaint Louverture, delighted to see his sinister predictions verified, felt all his hopes revive. From his secluded retreat of Ennery, he secretly placed himself in correspondence with his trusty followers, ordered them to hold themselves in readiness, enjoined them to obtain accurate information relative to the progress of the disease, and particularly to the state of the health of the captain-general, on whom his cruel impatience invoked the infliction of the scourge. His proceedings were not so secret but that some of them came to the knowledge of the captain-general, and especially of the black generals. These lost no time in giving notice of them to the French authority. They were jealous of Toussaint, though they obeyed him, and this sentiment had contributed not a little to their prompt submission. These *noirs dorés* (*gilt blacks*), as the First Consul called them, were content with the repose and the opulence which they enjoyed. They had no desire to recommence the war, and they were afraid lest Toussaint, if he should again become all-powerful, would make them atone for their desertion. They endeavoured, therefore, to persuade general Leclerc to seize the old dictator. The secret influence exercised by the latter was revealed by an alarming symptom. The blacks formerly composing his guard, and incorporated with the colonial troops which had passed into the service of the mother-country, left the ranks, to return, they said, to work, but in reality to throw themselves among the bluffs about Ennery. The captain-general, pressed by a twofold danger, on one hand the yellow fever which was sweeping off his army, on the other revolt, which was manifesting itself on all sides, having moreover instructions from the First Consul, enjoining him, on the first sign of disobedience, to get rid of the black chiefs, resolved to have Toussaint arrested. Besides, the intercepted letters of the latter would sufficiently authorize this step. But it was necessary to resort to dissimulation in order to seize that powerful chief, surrounded already by an army of insurgents. His advice was asked respecting the means of inducing the return of the blacks who had run away to work, and the choice of the most suitable stations for re-establishing the health of the army. To flatter his vanity thus was the very way to entice Toussaint to an interview. You clearly see, cried he, that these whites cannot do without old Toussaint. Accordingly, he repaired to the place of rendezvous, surrounded by a party of blacks. No sooner had he arrived than he was seized, disarmed, and carried prisoner on board a vessel. Surprised, ashamed, and nevertheless resigned, he uttered only these memorable words: In overthrowing me, you have overthrown only the trunk of the tree of liberty of the Negroes; but the roots are left; they will shoot up again, because they are deep and numerous.—He was sent to Europe, where he was confined in the Fort of Joux.



Unfortunately, the spirit of insurrection had spread among the blacks; it had again taken possession of their hearts, accompanied by distrust of the designs of the whites and the hope of conquering them. The tidings of what had been done in Guadeloupe, where slavery had lately been re-established, had reached St. Domingo, and produced an extraordinary impression there. A few words on the re-establishment of slavery in the West India islands, dropped in the tribune of the Legislative Body in France, words applicable exclusively to Martinique and Guadeloupe, but which, with a slight degree of mistrust, might be extended to St. Domingo, had contributed to impress the blacks with a conviction that the Europeans designed to reduce them again to slavery. From the humble labourers to the generals, the idea of again falling under the yoke of slavery thrilled them with indignation. Several black officers, more humane, more worthy of their new fortune, such as Laplume, Clervaux, even Christophe, who, not aspiring like Toussaint to be dictator of the island, were perfectly satisfied with the authority of the mother-country, provided that she respected the freedom of their race, expressed themselves with a warmth which left no doubt of their sentiments. We are willing, said they, to remain French, to be submissive, and to serve the mother-country faithfully, for we have no desire to begin anew a life of pillage; but, if the mother-country attempts to make slaves again of our brethren or our children, she must come to the resolution to slaughter us to the last man. General Leclerc, whose integrity touched them, quieted them for a few days, by assuring them upon his honour that the intentions attributed to the whites were an imposture; but, at bottom, their jealousy was incurable. Let the general in chief do what he would, he found it impossible to remove that. If Laplume and Clervaux, sincerely reconciled to the mother-country, argued as we have just shown, Dessalines, an absolute monster, such as slavery and revolt alone can form, was intent, with deep treachery, in setting the blacks against the whites and the whites against the blacks, on urging the one to exasperate the other, on triumphing amidst the general massacre, and on stepping into the place of Toussaint Louverture, whose apprehension he had been the first to call for.

In this painful perplexity, the captain-general, having only a small part of his army left, and seeing that remnant diminishing daily, threatened at the same time by a speedy insurrection, thought it right to give orders for disarming the Negroes. The measure appeared reasonable and necessary. The black chiefs whose principles were upright, such as Laplume and Clervaux, approved it; but those blacks who harboured perfidious intentions, like Dessalines, recommended it most earnestly. It was set about immediately, and downright violence was required to carry it into effect. Great numbers of blacks fled to the bluffs; others submitted to torture rather than give up what they considered as liberty



itself—their musket. The black officers, in particular, showed no mercy in this kind of search. They caused men of their own colour to be shot, and acted thus, some to prevent war, others, on the contrary, to excite it. By these means, however, there were taken out of their hands about 30,000 muskets, mostly of English manufacture, and purchased through the forecast of Toussaint. These severities excited insurrections, in the north, in the west, in the environs of Port au Prince. Toussaint's nephew, Charles Belair, a Negro, who possessed a certain superiority over the blacks, by his manners, his understanding, and his acquirements, and whom, on account of these qualities, his uncle purposed to make his successor, Charles Belair, irritated by some executions perpetrated in the department of the west, fled to the bluffs and raised the standard of revolt. Dessalines, who resided at St. Marc, solicited most urgently to be employed in reducing him; and finding here the two-fold occasion of displaying the deceptive zeal which he affected, and to revenge himself upon a rival who had given him great umbrage, he kept up an unrelenting war against Charles Belair. At length, he found means to take him with his wife, sent them before a military commission, and had both those unfortunate persons shot. Dessalines excused himself to the blacks for this conduct by alleging the merciless injunctions of the whites, and at the same time availed himself of the occasion for destroying a detested rival. Melancholy atrocities, which prove that the passions of the human heart are everywhere the same, and that climate, time, features, and complexion, make no perceptible difference in man! Thus every thing urged on the revolt of the blacks—the dark mistrust which had taken possession of their minds, the vigorous precautions necessary to be adopted in regard to them, and the ferocious passions by which they were divided; passions which the French were obliged to tolerate, and frequently even to employ.

To these misfortunes of situation were added faults, owing to the confusion which the disease, the danger springing up every where at once, the difficulty of communication between one part of the island and another, began to introduce into the colony. General Boudet had been withdrawn from Port au Prince to be sent to the Windward Islands as successor to Richepanse, who had died of the yellow fever. General Rochambeau, appointed to fill his place, was a brave officer, equally intelligent and intrepid, but had contracted in the colonies, where he had served, all the prejudices of the Creoles residing there. He hated the mulattoes, as did the old colonists themselves. He found them dissolute, violent, cruel, and said that he liked the blacks better, because, as he alleged, they were more simple, more sober, more hardy for war. General Rochambeau commanding in Port au Prince and in the south, where mulattoes abounded, manifested on the approach of the insurrection as strong a distrust of them as of the blacks, and imprisoned a great number. Another thing

he did, which irritated them, and that was to send away General Rigaud, formerly chief of the mulattoes, long the rival and enemy of Toussaint, vanquished and expelled by him, naturally taking advantage of the victory of the whites to return to St. Domingo, and hoping for a favourable reception there. But the same fault that the whites committed at the commencement of the revolution in St. Domingo, in not allying themselves with the people of colour, they again committed at its conclusion. The mulattoes, offended, grieved, thenceforward showed a disposition to unite with the blacks; which was extremely prejudicial, especially in the south, where they predominated.

By these concurring causes, the insurrection which had at first been partial, was rendered general. In the north, Maurepas and Christophe fled to the bluffs, not without expressing regret, but mastered by a sentiment stronger than themselves—the love of their threatened liberty. In the west, the barbarous Dessalines, at length throwing off the mask, joined the revolters. In the south, the mulattoes, united with the blacks, began to ravage that fair province, hitherto left intact and flourishing as in the most prosperous times. Laplume was the only black who continued faithful, definitively attached to the mother-country, and preferring that to the barbarous government of men of his own colour.

The French army, reduced to eight or ten thousand men, scarcely fit for service, had in the north nothing but the Cape and a few surrounding positions; in the west Port au Prince and St. Marc; in the south Les Cayes, Jeremie, and Tiburin. The anguish of the unfortunate Leclerc was extreme. He had with him his wife, whom he had lately sent to Turtle Island, to save her from the pestilence. He had witnessed the death of the wise and able M. Benezech, and of several of the most distinguished generals of the armies of the Rhine and Italy; he had just received intelligence of the decease of Richepanse; he was a daily spectator of the end of his most valiant soldiers, without having it in his power to afford them relief; and he saw that the moment was approaching when he should no longer be able to defend against the blacks the small strip of coast that was still left him. Tormented by these distressing reflections, he was more exposed than any other to the attack of that malady which was destroying the army. He was actually seized by it in his turn, and, after a short illness, which, assuming the character of a continued fever, at last deprived him entirely of strength, he expired, expressing incessantly noble sentiments, and his mind appearing to be wholly occupied with his wife and his companions in arms, whom he left in a deplorable situation. He died in November, 1802.

General Rochambeau, as senior officer, assumed the command. This new governor of the colony was not deficient either in valour or military talents, but he wanted prudence and the coolness of a chief untinctured with the passions of the tropics. General Rochambeau .

reckoned upon quelling the insurrection everywhere, but it was too late. It would be as much as he could do, by concentrating his forces at the Cape, and abandoning the west and the south, to maintain his ground. Attempting to make head at all points at once, his efforts were everywhere feeble and inefficient. He returned to the Cape to take possession of his new authority. He arrived there at the moment when Christophe, Clervaux, and the black chiefs of the north attacked, in hopes of reducing, that capital of the island. General Rochambeau had for its defence a few hundred soldiers, and the national guard of the Cape, composed of planters, brave like all the men of those countries. Christophe and Clervaux had already carried one of the forts; general Rochambeau retook it with extraordinary courage, seconded by the energy of the national guard, and behaved so bravely that the blacks concluding that reinforcements must have arrived on the island, beat a retreat. But, during this heroic defence, a frightful scene had taken place in the road. Twelve hundred blacks had been sent on board the ships, because the French knew not how to guard them on shore, and were unwilling to give such an additional force to the enemy. The crews, decimated by the disease, were much weaker than their prisoners. At the sound of the attack on the Cape, they threw—we shudder while we write—they threw part of them overboard. At the same instant, a mulatto, named Bardet, in the south of the island, was subjected to the like treatment: he was drowned on account of an unjust and atrocious suspicion. From that day the mulattoes, who had still wavered, joined the Negroes, slaughtered the whites, and completely ravaged the fine province of the south.

Let us close this doleful recital, in which History has nothing more that is worthy of record to introduce. At the period of the renewal of the war between France and Great Britain, the French, shut up at the Cape, Port au Prince, and Cayes, had difficulty to defend themselves against the united blacks and mulattoes. The new European war heightened their despair. They had no alternative but between the Negroes who had become more ferocious than ever, and the English waiting till they should be forced to surrender to them, when they would be sent prisoners to England, after being stripped of the last remnant of their property.

Out of from thirty to thirty-two thousand men, sent by the mother-country, there were finally left seven or eight. More than twenty generals had perished, and among them Richepanse, the most to be regretted of all. At the moment Toussaint Louverture, ill-boding prophet, was dying of cold in France, a prisoner in the fort of Joux, our soldiers were sinking under the rays of a burning sun. Deplorable compensation, this death of a black of genius for the loss of so many heroic whites!

Such was the sacrifice made by the First Consul to the ancient commercial system of France, a sacrifice for which he has been keenly censured. Still, to judge soundly of the acts of the heads

of governments, we should always take into account the circumstances under the control of which they acted. When peace had been made with the whole world, when the ideas of old commerce poured in again like a torrent, when, in Paris and in all the seaports, the merchants, the ruined colonists, loudly demanded the re-establishment of our commercial prosperity; when they urged the recovery of a possession which once constituted the wealth and the pride of the ancient monarchy; when thousands of officers, seeing with mortification their career cut short by peace, offered to serve in any part of the world where their arms were needed; was it possible to refuse to the regrets of the former and to the activity of the latter the occasion for restoring the commerce of France? What has not England done to preserve North America, Spain to preserve South America? What would not Holland do to preserve Java? Nations never suffered any great possession to slip out of their hands, without making an effort to retain it, even though they have no chance of success. We shall see if the American war has furnished the English with a lesson, and if they will attempt to defend Canada, whenever that northern colony shall indulge the very natural predilection which attracts it towards the United States.

The First Consul had recalled to Europe all our squadrons, with the exception of the frigates and light vessels. They had all entered our ports, one only excepted, consisting of five sail of the line, which had been obliged to put into Corunna. A sixth ship had taken refuge in Cadiz. It was necessary to collect these scattered elements, for the purpose of engaging in a conflict hand to hand with Great Britain.

It would have been a difficult task even for the ablest and the most firmly established government to maintain a conflict with England. It was easy, it is true, for the First Consul to screen himself from her blows; but it was just as easy for England to screen herself from his. England and France had conquered a nearly equal empire, the former at sea, the latter on land. Hostilities having commenced, England was about to unfurl her flag in both hemispheres, to take some Dutch and Spanish colonies, perhaps, but with more difficulty, some French colonies. She was about to interdict navigation to all nations, and to arrogate it to herself exclusively; but, unaided, she could do no more. The appearance of English troops on the continent would but have brought upon her a disaster similar to that of the Helder in 1799. France, on her part, could, either by force or by influence, forbid England access to the coasts of Europe from Copenhagen to Venice, confine her intercourse to the shores of the Baltic alone, and oblige her to bring down from the Pole the colonial produce of which during the war she would be the sole depository. But, in this struggle of two great powers, who ruled each on one of the two elements, without having the means of quitting them to grapple one another, it was to be feared that they would be re-

stricted to threatening without striking, and that the world, trampled upon by them, would finally rebel against one or the other, for the purpose of withdrawing itself from the consequences of this tremendous quarrel. In such a situation, success must belong to that which should contrive to get out of the element in which it reigned to reach its rival; and, if that effort proved impossible, to that which should find means to render its cause so popular in the world, as to gain it over to its side. It was difficult for both to attach nations to themselves; for England, in order to arrogate to herself the monopoly of commerce, was obliged to harass neutrals; and France, in order to close the continent against the commerce of England, was obliged to do violence to all the powers of Europe. To conquer England, therefore, it was requisite to solve one of these problems: either to cross the channel and march to London, or to sway the continent, and to oblige it, either by force or by policy to refuse all British commodities; to realise, in short, an invasion or a continental blockade. We shall see, in the course of this history, by what series of events Napoleon was gradually led from the first of these enterprizes to the second; by what a concatenation of prodigies he at first approached his aim so as nearly to attain it; by what a combination of faults and misfortunes, he was afterwards hurried away from it, and finally fell. Happily, before reaching that deplorable term, France had achieved such things, that a nation which Providence permits to accomplish them remains for ever glorious, and perhaps the greatest of nations.

Such were the proportions which this war between France and Great Britain must inevitably take. It had been from 1792 to 1801 the struggle of the democratic principle against the aristocratic principle; without ceasing to have this character, it was about to become, under Napoleon, the struggle of one element against another, with much more difficulty for us than for the English; for the whole continent, out of detestation to the French revolution, out of jealousy of our power, must hate France much more heartily than the neutrals hated England.

With his keen glance, the First Consul soon perceived the drift of this war, and he took his resolution without hesitating. He formed the plan of crossing the Strait of Calais with an army, and putting an end to the rivalry of the two nations in London itself. We shall find him for three successive years applying all his faculties to this prodigious enterprize, and remaining calm, confident, even happy, so full of hope was he in anticipation of an attempt which must either lead to his becoming absolute master of the world, or bury himself, his army, his glory, in the depths of the Ocean.

The reader may say, perhaps, that Louis XIV. and Louis XVI. had not been driven to such extremities to fight England, and that numerous squadrons, contesting the plains of Ocean, had then been sufficient. We answer that, in the 17th and 18th centuries,



England had not yet, by making herself mistress of universal commerce, acquired the greatest maritime population of the globe, and that the means of the two navies were much more unequal. The First Consul was determined to make immense efforts to raise the French navy, but he had doubts of any great success, though he possessed a vast extent of coast, though he had at his disposal the ports and dock-yards of Holland, of Belgium, of ancient France, and of Italy. We say nothing of those of Spain, then too unworthily governed to be a useful ally. Reckoning his whole naval force, now collected in Europe, he had not above 50 sail of the line to send to sea in the course of the year. He might procure 4 or 5 in Holland, 20 or 22 at Brest, 2 at Lorient, 6 at La Rochelle, 5 which had put into Corunna, 1 at Cadiz, 10 or 12 at Toulon, in the whole about 50. With the timber with which his vast empire was covered, floated down the rivers to the docks of Holland, the Netherlands, and Italy, he might build 50 more ships of the line, so that there would be 100 sail bearing his glorious tri-coloured flag. But he would want more than 100,000 sailors to man them, and he had scarcely 60,000. England would presently have 75 sail of the line quite ready for sea; it would be easy for her to raise her establishment to 120, with the number of frigates and small vessels which such an establishment supposes. She could put on board them 120,000 seamen and more, if she ceased to show any delicacy to neutrals, and pressed out of their merchantmen. She possessed, moreover, experienced admirals, confident because they had conquered, behaving at sea as generals Lannes, Ney, and Masséna behaved on land.

The disproportion of the two fleets resulting from time and circumstances was therefore very great: the First Consul, however, was not daunted. He purposed to build everywhere, in the Texel, in the Scheld, at Havre, at Cherbourg, at Brest, at Toulon, at Genoa. He thought to introduce a certain number of land troops into the composition of his crews, and to make amends by this expedient for the inferiority of our maritime population. He had been the first to perceive that a ship, having a crew of 600 good seamen and two or three hundred picked landmen, kept under sail for two or three years, trained to manœuvres and firing, was capable of fighting any ship whatever. But, in employing these means and others, it would take him ten years, he said, to create a navy. Now he could not wait ten years, with his arms crossed, till his navy, running over the seas in small detachments, should have qualified itself to enter into conflict with the English navy. To employ ten years in forming a fleet without doing any thing of consequence in the mean time would have been a plain avowal of impotence, mortifying to any government, still more mortifying to him, who had made his fortune, and who had to keep it up by dazzling the world. He must, therefore, while applying himself to reorganize our naval force, boldly attempt to cross the strait, and make use at the same time of the terror in-



spired by his sword, to oblige Europe to close the access to the continent against England. If with his genius of execution for great enterprizes he united a skilful policy, he might, by these combined means, either destroy the British power at a blow in London itself, or ruin it for a long time by ruining its commerce.

Many of his admirals, especially Decrès, the minister, recommended to him a slow recomposition of our navy, consisting in forming small naval divisions, and sending them out to sea to cruise about till they were sufficiently trained to manœuvre in large squadrons; and meanwhile, they exhorted him to stop there, considering as doubtful all the plans proposed for crossing the Channel. The First Consul would not submit to be bound by such opinions: he purposed, indeed, to restore the French navy, but yet to make some more direct attempt to strike England. In consequence, he ordered numerous vessels to be built at Flushing, which was at his disposal, in consequence of his power over Holland; at Antwerp, which had become a French port; at Cherbourg, at Brest, at Lorient, at Toulon, lastly at Genoa, which France occupied by the same title as Holland. He directed 22 ships to be repaired and equipped at Brest; 2 to be finished at Lorient; 5 to be launched and equipped at La Rochelle. He claimed from Spain the means of refitting and revictualling the squadron which put into Corunna, and dispatched from Bayonne by land all that it was possible to send, in men, money, and *materiel*. He took the same precautions respecting the ship which had put into Cadiz. He gave orders for the equipment of the Toulon fleet, which he intended to compose of 12 ships. These various armaments, added to 3 or 4 Dutch ships, would, as we have said, make the force of France amount to about 50 ships, without including what might afterwards be obtained from the Dutch and Spanish navies, or what might be built in the ports of France, and manned with a mixture of sailors and land soldiers. The First Consul, however, did not flatter himself that with such a force he should gain in pitched battle the maritime superiority or even equality, in regard to England: he resolved to employ it for keeping the sea, for going to and coming from the colonies, for opening the Strait of Calais for a few moments by movements of squadrons, of the profound combination of which the reader will soon be enabled to judge.

Towards this strait all the efforts of his genius were concentrated. Whatever means of conveyance might be devised, it was first requisite to have an army, and he formed a plan for the composition of one, which left nothing to be desired in respect to number and organization; for distributing it in several camps from the Texel to the Pyrenees; and for placing it in such a manner that it might be concentrated with rapidity at certain points of the coast judiciously chosen. Independently of a corps of 25,000 men, assembled between Breda and Nimeguen, to march for Hanover, he ordered the formation of six camps, the first in the environs of Utrecht, the second at Ghent, the third at St.

Omer, the fourth at Compiègne, the fifth at Brest, the sixth at Bayonne, the latter destined to overawe Spain, for reasons which shall be given hereafter. He began with forming parks of artillery at these six points of assemblage, a precaution which he usually took before any other, saying that it was this which was always most difficult to be organized. He then sent to each of these camps a sufficient number of demi-brigades of infantry to make them amount to 25,000 men at least. The cavalry was despatched more slowly, and in less proportion than usual, because, in case of embarkation, but very few horses could be transported. It was requisite that the quality and quantity of the infantry, the excellence of the artillery, and the number of pieces, should compensate in such an army for the numerical inferiority of the cavalry. In this two-fold respect, the French infantry and artillery combined all the conditions that could be desired. The First Consul took care to assemble on the coast, and to form into four great divisions, the whole arm of the dragoons. The soldiers of that arm, capable of serving on horseback or on foot, were to be separately embarked with their saddles, and to be useful as foot-soldiers, till they could become horsemen, when mounted with horses taken from the enemy.

All the dispositions were ordered for manning and horsing 400 field-pieces, besides a vast park of siege artillery. The demi-brigades, which were then of three battalions, were to furnish two war battalions, of 800 men each, taking out of the third battalion sufficient to complete the first two. The third battalion was left at the dépôt, to receive the conscripts, and to instruct and train them. Nevertheless, a certain number of these conscripts were sent immediately to the war battalions, that with the old soldiers of the Republic there might be mixed a sufficient proportion of choice young soldiers, having the vivacity, the ardour, and the docility of youth.

The conscription had been definitively introduced into our military legislation, and regularized under the Directory upon the plan proposed by general Jourdan. The law by which it was established nevertheless still exhibited some chasms, which had been filled by a new law of the 26th of April, 1803. The contingent had been fixed at 60,000 men per year, levied at the age of twenty years. This contingent was divided into two parts of 30,000 men each. The first was to be always raised in time of peace; the second formed the reserve, and might be called out in case of war to complete the battalions. It was now the middle of the year XI. (June 1803); the government demanded authority to levy the contingent for the years XI. and XII. without touching the reserve of those two years. There would thus be 60,000 conscripts to take immediately. By calling for them in advance, time would be gained for instructing them and training them to military service in the camps formed on the coasts. Recourse could further be had, if necessary, to the reserve of those

two years, which afforded 60,000 more disposable men, but who were not expected to be wanted unless in case of a continental war. Thirty thousand men only demanded out of each class, were a small sacrifice, which could scarcely be felt by a population composed of 109 departments. Besides, there was yet left to be taken part of the contingents of the years VIII., IX., and X., which had not been called for, thanks to the peace which the country had enjoyed under the Consulate. An arrear of men is as difficult to recover as an arrear of taxes. In regard to this matter, the First Consul made a sort of compromise. And of these arrears of contingents the First Consul demanded a certain number of men, picked from among the most robust and the most disposable; he exempted a greater number on the coast than in the interior, imposing upon those who were not called the service of a coast-guard. In this manner he provided the army with about 50,000 more men, older and stronger than the conscripts of the years XI. and XII. The army was thus raised to 480,000 men, distributed in the colonies, Hanover, Holland, Switzerland, Italy, and France. Out of this effective force, about 100,000, employed in guarding Italy, Holland, Hanover, and the colonies, were no expense to the French treasury. Subsidies in money or provisions furnished on the spot defrayed the cost of their keep. Three hundred and eighty thousand were wholly paid by France, and entirely at her disposal. Deducting from these 380,000 men, 40,000 for ordinary non-effectives, that is to say for soldiers sick, temporarily absent, on the way, &c., 40,000 for gendarmes, veterans, invalids, drill-sergeants, one might reckon upon 300,000 disposable men, seasoned, and capable of taking the field immediately. If 150,000 were destined to fight England, there would be left 150,000, 70,000 of which, forming the depôts, were sufficient for guarding the interior, and 80,000 might hasten to the Rhine, in case of any alarm on the part of the continent. It is not from the number that one ought to form a judgment of such an army. These 300,000 men, almost all tried soldiers, inured to fatigue and war, commanded by accomplished officers, were worth six or seven hundred thousand, a million, perhaps, of those that one usually has after a long peace; for between a perfect soldier and one who is not the difference is infinite. In this respect, the First Consul had nothing to wish for. He commanded the finest army in the world.

The grand problem to be resolved was the assemblage of the means of transport for conveying this army from Calais to Dover. The First Consul had not yet fully made up his mind on the subject. One thing only was definitively fixed, after a long series of observations—that was the form of the vessels. Flat-bottomed boats, which could run aground, and advance with sails and oars, had appeared to all the engineers of the navy the means best adapted for crossing, besides affording the advantage that they might be built anywhere, even in the upper basin of our rivers.

But then they were to be collected, to be sheltered in harbours suitably situated, to be armed, to be equipped, and the best system of manœuvres for working them with order before an enemy was to be devised. For this purpose it was necessary to undertake a series of long and difficult experiments. The First Consul purposed to establish himself in person at Boulogne, on the coast of the Channel, to live there very often and for a considerable time together, to study the localities, the circumstances of the sea and of the weather, and to organize himself, in all its parts, the vast enterprize which he meditated.

Till the vessels ordered to be built throughout all France should be sufficiently forward to render the presence of the First Consul on the coast useful, his attention was engaged in Paris with two essential points, the finances and the relations with the powers of the continent; for it was necessary, on the one hand to provide for the costs of the undertaking, and, on the other, to make sure of not being disturbed during its execution by the continental allies of England.

The financial difficulty was not the least of the difficulties attending the renewal of the war. The French Revolution had swallowed up an immense mass of national domains under the form of assignats, and ended in bankruptcy. The national domains were almost exhausted, and credit was ruined for a long time. To spare the alienation of national domains to the value of 400 millions in 1800, they had been divided among various public services, such as public Instruction, the Invalides, the Legion of Honour, the Senate, the Sinking Fund. Thus changed into endowments, they eased the budget of the State, and reserved domains that would hereafter be of immense value, thanks to the rise of landed property, steady at all times, but always greater immediately after a revolution. They would, it is true, be diminished by some portions to be restored to emigrants, portions not considerable, because the domains not alienated were almost entirely domains of the Church. To what was left were to be added the domains situated in Piedmont and in the new departments of the Rhine, to the value of from 50 to 60 millions. Such were the disposable resources in national domains. As for credit, the First Consul was resolved not to have recourse to that. It will be recollected that, when he completed in the year XI. the liquidation of the preceding, he availed himself of the rise of the public funds to pay in annuities part of the arrears of the years V., VI., VII., and VIII.; but this was the only operation of the kind upon which he would venture, and he paid the services of the years IX. and X. entirely in cash. In the year X., the last budget voted, he had caused it to be laid down as a principle that the annual charge on the public debt should never be allowed to exceed 50 millions, and that, if such a thing did happen, a resource should be immediately created for extinguishing the

surplus in fifteen years. This precaution had been necessary to support confidence, for, notwithstanding a general prosperity, credit was so destroyed that the 5 per cent. annuities were scarcely ever above 56, and had never exceeded 60 at the moment when peace was most firmly anticipated.

For a long time past in England, and of late in France, the public funds have become an object of regular commerce, in which the great houses, ever disposed to treat with governments for the supply of such sums as they need, take a part. That was not the case at this period. Not a house in France would have subscribed a loan. It would have lost all credit by avowing that it was connected by business with the State; and if rash speculators had consented to make a loan they would have given at most 50 francs for a 5 per cent. annuity, so that the Treasury would have had to bear the enormous interest of 10 per cent. The First Consul therefore declined so expensive a resource. There was at that time another way of borrowing: it was to run in debt with the great companies of contractors for the army supplies, by not paying up all that was owing to them. They indemnified themselves by getting paid for their services twice or thrice as much as they were worth. Hence bold speculators, who are fond of launching into great enterprizes, instead of sticking to loans, were eager to engage in contracts. By applying to them, of course, one might have had a substitute for credit; but this expedient would have been far more costly than a loan itself. The First Consul intended to pay the contractors regularly, to oblige them to execute their services regularly, and to execute them at reasonable prices. He rejected, therefore, the resource of the alienation of national domains, which could not yet be sold to advantage, and the resources of loans then too difficult and too dear, and lastly the resource of the great contracts, entailing abuses difficult to calculate. He flattered himself, with strict order and economy, with the natural increase of the produce of the taxes, and some accessory receipts which we are about to mention, to escape the hard necessities to which speculators oblige those governments to submit which are destitute at once of revenues and credit.

The last budget, that of the year X. (September 1801 to September 1802), had been fixed at 500 millions (620 with the expense of collection and the additional centimes). This amount had not been exceeded, owing to the peace. The taxes alone had surpassed in their produce the anticipations of the government. A revenue of 470 millions had been assumed, and a small alienation of national domains voted to make the receipts equal the expenditure. But the taxes had exceeded the expected amount by 33 millions, and the alienation voted had therefore become unnecessary. This unexpected augmentation of resources arose from the registration, which, thanks to the increasing number of private transactions, had produced 172 millions instead of 150; the



customs which, thanks to reviving commerce, had produced 31 millions instead of 22; lastly, from the posts and some other less important branches of revenue.

Notwithstanding the renewal of the war, it was hoped, and the event confirmed the expectation, it was hoped that there would be the like increase in the produce of the taxes. Under the vigorous government of the First Consul, no fears were entertained either of further commotions or of reverses. While confidence kept up, private transactions, internal trade, the daily extending commerce with the continent, could do no other than follow an increasing progression. Maritime commerce alone was liable to suffer; and the revenue of the customs, then figuring at 30 millions in the budget of the receipts, plainly showed that from this suffering no great loss could result to the treasury. There was reason, therefore, to calculate upon receipts to the amount of more than 500 millions. The budget of the year XI. (September 1802 to September 1803) had been voted in March, with a fear, but not with a certainty, of war. It had been fixed at 589 millions, exclusively of the costs of collection, but including in it part of the additional centimes. This was consequently an augmentation of 89 millions. The navy, raised from 105 millions to 126, the war from 210 to 243, had obtained part of that augmentation. The remainder had been divided among the public works, the clergy, the new civil lists of the Consuls, and the fixed expenses of the departments, entered this time in the general budget. It was assumed that this augmentation of expenditure would be met by the supposed increase of the produce of the taxes, by the additional centimes, formerly applied to the fixed expenses of the departments, and by several foreign receipts arising from the allied countries. The current budget might be considered as in equilibrium, excepting an indispensable excess for the expenses of the war. In fact, it was not to be supposed that twenty millions added to the charge for the navy, and thirty to the charge for the army could suffice for the necessities of the new situation. The war with the continent cost in general very little, for our victorious troops, crossing the Rhine and the Adige, at the commencement of the operations, went and supported themselves at the cost of the enemy; but here the case was different. The six camps established on the coast from Holland to the Pyrenees, must be subsisted upon the soil of France, till the day when they should cross the Strait. It was requisite, moreover, to provide for the expenses of the ships that were to be built, and to place a prodigious mass of artillery upon our coasts. One hundred millions additional per annum would be scarcely sufficient to meet the expense of the war with Great Britain.\* The following were

---

\* This sum will appear trifling in comparison with the present amount of our budgets; but we must bear in mind the value of money at that period, and recollect that 100 millions in those days were equivalent to 200 or 250 at the present day, perhaps more, when military expenses are in question.



the resources of which the First Consul purposed to avail himself.

We have just adverted to some foreign receipts, already carried to the budget of the year XI., in order to cover in part the sum of 89 millions, by which this budget exceeded that of the year X. These receipts were those of Italy. The Italian Republic, having as yet no army, and being unable to do without ours, paid 1,600,000 francs per month (19,200,000 francs per annum) for the subsistence of the French troops. Liguria, in the same predicament, furnished 1,200,000 francs per annum; Parma, 2 millions. This was a resource of 22 millions and a half, already carried, as we have just said, to the budget of the year XI. There was still to be found the whole of the sum of 100 millions, which it would probably be necessary to add to the 589 millions of the budget of the year XI.

The voluntary donations, the price of Louisiana, the subsidies of the other allied States—such were the means on which the First Consul reckoned. The voluntary donations of the towns and the departments amounted to about 40 millions, fifteen payable in the year XI., 15 in the year XII., the remainder in the following years. The price of Louisiana, sold for 80 millions, 60 of which were to be paid in Holland on behalf of the French treasury, and the net sum of 54 to be received for it, the expense of negotiation deducted, furnished a second resource. The Americans had not yet legally accepted the contract, but the house of Hope offered already to advance part of that sum. By dividing this resource of 54 millions between two years, there would be 27 millions added to the 15 arising from the voluntary donations, which would raise the annual supplement to about 42, for the services of XI. and XII. (September 1802 to September 1804). Lastly, Holland and Spain were to furnish the surplus. Holland, delivered from the stadtholdership by our arms, defended against England by our diplomacy, which had obtained the restitution of the greater part of her colonies, would now have been glad to be released from an alliance which dragged her anew into war. She would fain have remained neuter between France and Great Britain, and, happily situated between the two countries, reaped the profits of her neutrality. But the First Consul had taken a resolution, the justice of which cannot be denied: that was to make all the maritime nations concur in our contest with Great Britain. Holland and Spain, said he incessantly, are undone if we are conquered. All their colonies in India and America will be either taken, or destroyed, or urged into revolt by England. No doubt those two powers would find it convenient not to take either side, to look on at our defeats if we are vanquished, to profit by our victories, if we are victorious; for, if the enemy is beaten, it will be as much for their benefit as for ours. But that cannot be: they must combat with us, like us, with equal effort. Justice requires it, and their interest too, for their resources are

indispensable to our success. If by uniting all our means we conquer the rulers of the sea, it is as much as we can do. Singly, each limited to our separate strength, we shall not succeed, we shall be beaten. The First Consul had therefore concluded that Holland and Spain should assist him; and it may be said with perfect truth that, in forcing them to concur in his designs, he merely obliged them to take care of their own interest. Be this as it may, in order to compel attention to language so reasonable, he had, in regard to Holland, force, since our troops occupied Flushing and Utrecht, and in regard to Spain, the treaty of alliance of St. Ildefonso.

For the rest, at Amsterdam, all enlightened and truly patriotic men, with M. de Schimmelpennink at their head, thought like the First Consul. There was no difficulty therefore in coming to an arrangement, and it was agreed that Holland should assist us in the following manner. She engaged to subsist and pay a corps of 18,000 French and 16,000 Dutch, in all 34,000 men. To this land force she promised to add a naval force, composed of a squadron of ships of the line and a flotilla of flat-bottomed boats. The squadron was to consist of five sail of the line, five frigates, and transports sufficient to convey 25,000 men and 2500 horses from the Texel to the coast of England. The flotilla was to be composed of 350 flat-bottomed boats of all sizes, and capable of carrying 37,000 men and 1500 horses from the mouth of the Scheldt to that of the Thames. In return, France guaranteed to Holland her independence, the integrity of her territory, European and colonial, and the restitution of the colonies lost in the late war. The aid obtained by means of this arrangement was considerable; for 18,000 French ceased for a time to be a burden to the treasury of France; 16,000 Dutch were to swell our army, and, lastly, means of transport for 62,000 men and 4000 horses were to be added to our naval resources. It would be difficult to say, however, for what sum such aid might figure in the extraordinary budget of the First Consul.

The concurrence of Spain was yet to be obtained. That power was less disposed to devote herself to the common cause than even Holland. We have already seen her under the capricious influence of the prince of the Peace, meanly wavering between the most contrary directions, sometimes leaning towards France, in order to obtain an establishment in Italy, sometimes towards England, to relieve herself from the efforts imposed by a courageous and indefatigable ally, and losing in these fluctuations the valuable island of Trinidad. Alike impotent, whether friend or foe, one knew not what to do with her either in peace or war; not that the noble Spanish nation, full of patriotism, not that the magnificent soil of the peninsula, containing the ports of Ferrol, Cadiz, and Carthagená, were to be despised—very far from it. But an unworthy government betrayed, by profound incapacity, the cause of Spain, and that of all the maritime nations. Accord-

ingly, after mature reflection, the First Consul made up his mind to derive no other advantage from the treaty of alliance of St. Ildefonso, but that of obtaining subsidies. By that treaty, signed in 1796, during the first administration of the prince of the Peace, Spain engaged to furnish France with 24,000 men, 15 sail of the line, 6 frigates, and 4 cutters. The First Consul resolved not to claim these succours. He considered, and very justly, that to draw Spain into a war would not be doing any service to France or to herself: that she would not cut a brilliant figure in it; that she would be stripped at once of her only resource, the piastres of Mexico, which would be intercepted; that she could not equip either an army or a fleet; that, consequently, she would be of no use, and merely furnish England with a pretext which she had long been seeking to excite all South America to revolt; that if, it was true, the participation of Spain in hostilities changed the whole coast of the peninsula into an enemy's coast for the English ships, none of her ports could have a useful influence like those of Holland on the operation of the invasion; that, consequently, the advantage of having them at one's disposal was not great; that, in a commercial point of view, the British flag was already excluded from Spain by the tariffs, and that French productions would continue to find there a sure preference, whether in peace or war. From all these considerations, he caused it to be privately intimated to M. d'Azara, ambassador of Charles IV. in Paris, that, if his court had a dislike to the war, he was willing to allow it to remain neuter, on condition of a subsidy of 6 millions per month (72 millions per year) which would open to French manufactures a more extensive market than they at that moment enjoyed.

This very moderate offer was not received at Madrid with the favour which it deserved. The prince of the Peace was closely connected with the English and openly betrayed the alliance. It was for this motive that the First Consul, anticipating this treachery, had placed at Bayonne itself one of the six camps destined to operate against England. He was determined to declare war against Spain, rather than suffer her to desert the common cause. He, therefore, ordered general Beurnonville, his ambassador, to explain himself on this subject in a peremptory manner. The English, by usurping an absolute authority over the seas, obliged him to exercise an absolute authority over the land, for the defence of the general interests of the world.

To the succours of the allied States must be added those about to be derived from such States as were hostile, or ill-disposed, or at least on the point of being occupied. Hanover would suffice for subsisting 30,000 men. The division formed at Faenza, and on march for the gulf of Tarento, would have to live at the expense of the court of Naples. Informed by his ambassador, the First Consul knew positively that queen Caroline, governed by

Acton, the minister, was in perfect harmony with England, and that it would not be long before he should be obliged to drive the Bourbons from the continent of Italy. He did not fail therefore to explain himself frankly to the queen of Naples—"I will no more suffer the English in Italy," said he, "than in Spain and Portugal. On the first act of complicity with England, war shall do me justice for your enmity. I have it in my power to do you either a great deal of good or a great deal of harm. It is for you to choose. I have no wish to take your dominions from you; I am satisfied to make them subservient to my designs against England, but I will surely take them if they are employed in serving her."—The First Consul spoke sincerely, for he had not yet made himself the head of a dynasty, and had no thoughts of conquering kingdoms for his brothers. In consequence, he required that the division of 15,000 men, established at Tarento, should be subsisted by the treasury of Naples, the expense to be accounted for thereafter. He considered this charge as a contribution imposed on enemies quite as much as that which was about to burden the kingdom of Hanover.

On recapitulating what goes before, we find that the resources of the First Consul were the following. Naples, Holland, and Hanover, were to keep about 60,000 men. The Italian Republic, Parma, Liguria, Spain, were charged with the payment of a regular subsidy. America was preparing to pay the price of Louisiana. The patriotism of the departments and of the great cities, furnished wholly voluntary supplements to taxes. Lastly, the public revenue promised an increasing augmentation of receipts, even during the war, thanks to the confidence inspired by an energetic government, a government reputed invincible. With all these means, the First Consul flattered himself that he should add to the 589 millions of the budget of the year XI., the extraordinary resource of 100 millions per annum, for two, three, or four years. He had for the future the indirect taxes. He was thus sure of being able to keep an army of 150,000 men on the coasts, another army of 80,000 on the Rhine, the troops necessary for the occupation of Italy, Holland, and Hanover, 50 sail of the line, and a flotilla of transports of unknown extent, hitherto unexampled, since the object was to convey 150,000 soldiers, 10,000 horses, and 400 pieces of cannon.

The world was agitated, affrighted, one may say, at the preparations for that gigantic conflict between the two most powerful empires of the globe. It was scarcely possible for it to be indifferent to the consequences: the war was not confined to France and England, for neutrals would be subject to the annoyance of the British navy, and the continent obliged to promote the designs of the First Consul, either by closing its ports or by suffering inconvenient and expensive occupations. At bottom, all the powers laid the blame of this rupture on England. The pretension to keep Malta had appeared to all, even to those which were least

favourable to us, a manifest violation of treaties, not justified by any thing that had occurred in Europe since the peace of Amiens. Prussia and Austria had sanctioned by formal conventions what had been done in Italy and Germany, and approved by notes what had been done in Switzerland. Russia had less expressly adhered to the conduct of France, but excepting some remonstrances, in the form of a claim for the too long deferred indemnity of the king of Sardinia, she had as good as approved all his acts. She had praised, in particular, our intervention in Switzerland as skilfully conducted and equitably terminated. None of the three powers of the continent, therefore, could find in the events of the last two years a justification of the usurpation of Malta, and on this subject they explained themselves with frankness. Still, notwithstanding this mode of viewing things, they leaned rather to England than to France. Though the First Consul had taken the greatest pains to repress anarchy, they could not help recognizing in him the French Revolution victorious, and much more glorious than was agreeable to them. Two of them, Prussia and Austria, were too unmaritime to feel strongly interested in the liberty of the seas; the third, that is Russia, had also too remote an interest in that liberty to be strongly prepossessed in its behalf. All three were far more sensitive to the preponderance of France on the continent than to the preponderance of England on the ocean. The maritime law which England strove to enforce seemed to them an infringement of justice and of the general interest of commerce; but the domination which France already exercised, and which she would soon be led to exercise still more in Europe, was an immediate and pressing danger which greatly alarmed them. Hence they were angry with England for having provoked this new war, and loudly said as much; but they had returned to that aversion for France which the wisdom and glory of the First Consul had, as it were, suspended for a moment by a sort of surprize given to their hatred by his genius.

A few words, dropped by the greatest personages of the time, prove better than any thing that we can say, the sentiments of the powers towards us. M. Philip de Cobentzel, ambassador at Paris, and cousin of M. Louis de Cobentzel, minister of foreign affairs at Vienna, conversing at table with admiral Decrès, who by the vivacity of his ideas called forth a like vivacity in others, M. de Cobentzel could not help saying, Yes, England is to blame; she advances pretensions that cannot be maintained; that is true. But, to confess the truth, you frighten every body too much to let them think of being afraid of England.\* The emperor of Germany, Francis II., who finished his long and prudent career not many years ago, and who covered great shrewd-

---

\* I have read this statement in a note in the handwriting of M. Decrès himself, addressed immediately to Napoleon.



ness with apparent simplicity, speaking to our ambassador, M. de Champagny, about the new war, and expressing his sorrow for it with manifest sincerity, declared that, for his part, he was determined to remain at peace, but that he was filled with involuntary uneasiness, the cause of which he durst scarcely mention. M. de Champagny encouraging him to confidence, the emperor, with a thousand excuses, with a thousand protestations of esteem for the First Consul, said, If general Bonaparte, who has accomplished so many miracles, fails to accomplish that for which he is now preparing, if he does not cross the strait, it is we who shall be the victims; for he will fall upon us, and fight England in Germany.\* The emperor Francis, who was timid, felt regret for having said so much, and would have recalled his words, but it was too late. M. de Champagny immediately transmitted them to Paris by the first courier. It afforded proof of extraordinary foresight in that prince, but which was of little service to him; for it was not very long before he himself offered Napoleon an occasion to fight, as he said, England in Germany.

Of all the powers, however, Austria had least to fear from the consequences of the present war, if she could withstand the suggestions of the court of London. She had, in fact, no maritime interest to defend, since she possessed neither commerce, nor ports, nor colonies. The port of old Venice choked with sand, which had recently been given to her, could not create for her interests of that kind. She was not like Prussia, Spain, or Naples, mistress of extensive coasts, which France was tempted to occupy. It was, therefore, easy for her to keep out of the quarrel. She gained, on the contrary, full liberty of action in the Germanic affairs. France, obliged to confront England, could no longer bear with all her weight upon Germany, and Austria, on the contrary, had free scope upon questions left unresolved. She was desirous, as we have seen, to change the number of votes in the College of the princes, to appropriate fraudulently to herself all the personal property of the secularized States, to prevent the incorporation of the immediate nobility, to wrest the Inn from Bavaria, and by all these combined means to recover her superiority in the empire. The advantage of resolving all these questions in her own way comforted her greatly for the renewal of the war, and, but for her extreme prudence, would almost have inspired her with joy.

The two powers of the continent which felt most chagrin at this moment were Prussia and Russia, and they felt it from different motives and not in equal degree. The most affected was Prussia. It is easy to conceive, from the character of her king, who hated war and expense, what pain the prospect of a new European conflagration must give him. The occupation of Hanover would have, moreover, the most serious inconveniences for his dominions. To

---

\* I have no need to say that this statement also is extracted from an authentic despatch of the ambassador of France.



prevent that occupation he had attempted an arrangement, which might suit at once both France and England. He had offered England to occupy that electorate with Prussian troops, promising to hold it faithfully in trust, on condition that she would throw open the navigation of the Elbe and Weser. On the other hand, he had offered the First Consul to hold Hanover for France, and to pay the revenues of the country into the French treasury. This two-fold zeal, testified to both powers, was prompted, in the first place, by a desire to save the navigation of the Elbe and Weser from the rigorous measures of England; and, in the second, to spare the north of Germany the presence of the French. These two were important interests for Prussia. It was by the Elbe and Hamburg, by the Weser and Bremen, that all the produce of her territory was exported. The linens of Silesia, which constituted her principal exportable wealth, were purchased by Hamburg and Bremen, exchanged in France for wines, and in America for colonial produce. If the English blockaded the Elbe and the Weser, all this trade would be at an end. It was a point of equal importance to her not to have the French in the north of Germany. In the first place, their presence made Prussia uneasy. In the next, it drew upon her keen reproaches from the German princes, who were her partisans in the empire. They told her that, connected as she was with France from reasons of ambition, she abandoned the defence of the soil of Germany, nay, contributed by her pusillanimous complaisance to draw foreign invasion upon it. They even went so far as to maintain that, by the Germanic law, she was obliged to interfere for the purpose of preventing the French from occupying Hanover. These princes were most assuredly wrong, according to the strict principles of the law of nations; for the German States, though united to each other by a federative bond, had the individual right of peace and war, and might be, each separately, at peace or at war with a power, without the confederation's being on the same terms with that power. It would have been strange, in fact, if king George III. could have alleged that he was at war for England which is inaccessible, and at peace for Hanover, which is not so. This way of interpreting the public law would have been too convenient, and the First Consul, when an attempt was made to take an advantage of it, replied by a parable equally true and ingenious.—There was, said he, among the ancients, a right of sanctuary in certain temples. A slave, fleeing for protection to one of these temples had almost cleared the threshold, when he was caught by the foot. The right anciently established was not contested; the slave was not dragged from his asylum, but his foot which was outside the temple was cut off.—Prussia negotiated, therefore, before she spoke out definitively respecting the occupation of Hanover, announced, for the rest, by the First Consul as certain and near at hand.

The rupture which had recently taken place between France and England had disagreeably surprised the court of Russia, on

account of the matters with which that court was then engaged. The young emperor had taken a new step in the execution of his projects, and consigned the affairs of the empire a little more to his young friends. He had dispensed with the services of prince de Kourakin, and called to the head of his councils a considerable personage, M. de Woronzoff, brother of him who was ambassador of Russia in London. He had given to M. de Woronzoff the title of chancellor, minister of foreign affairs, and divided the administration of the State into eight ministerial departments. He had made a point of putting at the head of these different departments men of known merit, at the same time taking care to place beside them as assistants his friends Messrs. de Czartoryski, de Strogonoff, and de Nowosiltzoff. Thus prince Adam Czartoryski was attached to M. de Woronzoff, as assistant in the department of foreign affairs: M. de Woronzoff, on account of his health, being frequently absent on leave at his estates, prince Adam was charged almost entirely with the foreign relations of the empire. M. de Strogonoff was attached to the department of justice; M. de Nowosiltzoff to that of the interior. The prince de Kotschoubey, the oldest of the personal friends of the emperor, had been made minister in title and charged with the department of the interior. These eight ministers were to deliberate jointly on all affairs of State, and to make annual reports to the Senate. It was a first considerable change to make ministers deliberate, and a still greater to make them report to the Senate. The emperor Alexander considered these changes as a step towards the institutions of free and civilized countries. Wholly occupied with these internal reforms, he was painfully affected to find himself recalled into the immense and perilous field of European politics; and manifested an evident displeasure on account of it to the representatives of the two belligerent powers. He was displeased with England, whose extravagant pretensions, and whose evident bad faith in the affair of Malta, disturbed Europe afresh; he was displeased also with France, but from different motives. France had taken little heed of the demand so frequently repeated of an indemnity for the king of Piedmont; moreover, in granting to Russia an apparent influence in the Germanic affairs, she had but too plainly arrogated the real influence to herself. The young emperor had perceived it. Very anxious, young as he was, to make people talk of him, he began to view with a sort of displeasure the glory of the great man who swayed the West. The disposition of the court of Russia, therefore, was a general dissatisfaction with everybody. The emperor, deliberating with his ministers and his friends, decided on offering the mediation of Russia, called for plainly enough by France. It would strive thereby to prevent a universal conflagration; at the same time, it would tell the truth to all; it would not fail to represent to England, how illegitimate were her claims to Malta; and it would make the First Consul sensible of the necessity of at length

acquitting himself towards the king of Piedmont, and of showing some civility to the petty powers composing the clientele of the court of Russia.

In consequence, through the medium of M. de Woronzoff, speaking to general Hedouville, and through the medium of M. de Markoff, speaking to M. de Talleyrand, the Russian cabinet expressed its strong displeasure at the new disturbance of the general peace, through the rival ambitions of France and England. It admitted that the pretensions of England to Malta were ill founded, but intimated that the continual enterprizes of France might have generated, though not justified, those pretensions; and added that France would do well to moderate her action in Europe, if she would not render peace impossible with all the powers. It offered the mediation of Russia, painful as it was to her to intermeddle in differences which thus far were foreign to her, but which, if she interfered, might perhaps become personal to her. It concluded by saying that, if, in spite of his good-will, his efforts for re-establishing peace should prove unsuccessful, the emperor hoped that France would spare the friends of Russia, especially the kingdom of Naples, which had become her ally in 1798, and the kingdom of Hanover, guaranteed by her in quality of a German State. Such was the substance of the communications of the Russian cabinet.

Youth brought up in dissipation is generally volatile in its language; youth brought up in a serious manner is apt to be dogmatic: for nothing is more difficult for youth than moderation. Hence it was that the young rulers of Russia lectured the two most powerful governments of the world, the one under the guidance of a great man, the other of great institutions. The First Consul smiled, for he had long since discovered how inexperienced and presumptuous the Russian cabinet was. But, restraining himself for the interest of his vast designs, he resolved not to complicate the affairs of the continent, and thus cause a war to break out upon the Rhine, which would have diverted him from that for which he was preparing on the coast of the Channel. Receiving the lessons addressed to him from St. Petersburg, without appearing to notice them, he resolved to cut short all the reproaches of the young czar, by constituting him absolute arbiter of the great quarrel which occupied the world. He therefore offered the Russian cabinet, through M. de Talleyrand and general Hedouville to give a bond by which he would engage to submit to the award of the emperor Alexander, whatever it might be, confiding entirely in his justice. This proposal was as wise as it was politic. If England rejected it, she would acknowledge that she distrusted either the goodness of her cause or the emperor Alexander; the whole blame would lie upon her, and she would authorize the First Consul to war with her to the last extremity. The closing of all the ports under the influence of France, the occupation of all the countries belonging to England became a

legitimate consequence of this war. Nevertheless, in regard to the kingdoms of Naples and Hanover, the First Consul, assuming the decided tone which was consonant with his plans, declared that he would do whatever was required by the war which had been raised against him, and which he had not begun.

Having taken that attitude which seemed to him at the moment to be the best in regard to the powers of the continent, the First Consul immediately proceeded to the occupation already prepared for and announced. General St. Cyr was at Faenza, in the Romagna, with a division of 15,000 men and a considerable *materiel* in artillery, such as would be requisite for arming the road of Tarento. He received orders, which he executed immediately, to march through the Roman States to the extremity of Italy, paying for every thing by the way, to avoid offending his Holiness. Agreeably to the convention concluded with the court of Naples, the French troops were to be subsisted by the Neapolitan administration. General St. Cyr, regarded, as he deserved to be, by the First Consul as one of the best generals of the time, particularly when he was acting alone, had an embarrassing position in the midst of a hostile kingdom; but he was capable of encountering any difficulties. His instructions left him, moreover, immense latitude. He was directed, on the first sign of insurrection in the Calabrias, to leave them and throw himself into the capital of the kingdom. Having already conquered Naples once, he knew better than any one else how to set about it.

The First Consul caused Ancona also to be occupied, after giving the Pope all the satisfaction which could mitigate that unpleasant proceeding. The French garrison was to pay punctually for what it consumed, not to give the least disquiet to the civil government of the Holy See, even to assist it, if needful, against disturbances, in case there were any.

Orders had been sent at the same time for the invasion of Hanover. The negotiations of Prussia had proved unsuccessful. England had declared that she would blockade the Elbe and the Weser, if the dominions of the house of Hanover were touched, whether Prussians or French were employed. This was certainly one of the most unjust of pretensions. Were she to prevent the French flag from appearing upon the Elbe and the Weser, nothing could be more legitimate; but to stop the trade of Bremen and Hamburg because the French had invaded the territory within which those cities were enclosed, to require all Germany to brave war with France for the interests of the house of Hanover, and to punish it for a compulsory inaction by destroying its commerce, was most iniquitous conduct. Prussia could do no more than complain bitterly of the injustice of such a proceeding, and at last make up her mind to suffer the British flag at the mouths of the two German rivers, as well as the presence of the French in the bosom of Hanover. She had no longer the same motive for undertaking the occupation, since, in any case, her

commerce was to be interdicted. The First Consul caused his regret to be expressed to her, promised not to pass the boundary of Hanover, but excused himself for this invasion by the necessities of the war and the immense advantage which he should derive from closing the two great commercial channels of the continent against the English.

General Mortier had orders to march. He had proceeded with 25,000 men to the northern extremity of Holland, on the frontier of the lower part of the bishopric of Munster, belonging, since the secularizations to the house of Aremberg. The French were sure of the consent of that house. From its territory they passed into that of the bishopric of Osnabruck, recently annexed to Hanover, and from the territory of Osnabruck into Hanover itself. They had thus no occasion to enter the Prussian territory; and this was an indispensable forbearance towards the court of Prussia. The First Consul had recommended to general Mortier to treat mildly the countries through which he should pass, and above all to pay particular attentions to the Prussian authorities whom he would meet with along the whole frontier of Hanover. That general, discreet and upright, as well as brave, was the fittest person who could have been chosen for that difficult commission. Marching across the barren sands and the swampy heaths of Friesland and Lower Westphalia, he entered Hanover at Meppen, and arrived in June on the banks of the Hunte. The Hanoverian army occupied Diepholz. After a few skirmishes of cavalry, it fell back behind the Weser. Though composed of excellent troops, it knew that resistance was impossible, and that it should only draw down calamities upon the country, if it persisted in fighting. It offered, therefore, to capitulate honourably, to which general Mortier cheerfully consented. It was agreed at Suhlingen that the Hanoverian army should retire with arms and baggage behind the Elbe; that it should give its word of honour not to serve during the present war, unless exchanged for a like number of French prisoners; that the administration of the country and the collection of the revenues should belong to France, saving the respect due to individuals, to private property, and to the different religious professions.

This convention, called the convention of Suhlingen, was sent to the First Consul and to the King of England, to receive their double ratification. The First Consul instantly gave his, unwilling to reduce the Hanoverian army to despair by imposing harder conditions. When the same convention was submitted to old George III., he was seized with so violent a fit of passion, as, it is said, to fling it in the face of the minister who laid it before him. This old king, in his sombre reveries, had always considered Hanover as likely to be the last asylum of his family, the cradle of which it was. The invasion of his patrimonial dominions drove him to despair; he refused to sign the convention of Suhlingen, and thus exposed his soldiers to the cruel alternative of either laying down



their arms, or submitting to be slaughtered to the last man. His cabinet alleged, in excuse for so singular a determination, that the king would not have any thing to do with matters arising out of the enterprise against his territories; that to ratify the convention would be adhering to the occupation of Hanover; that this occupation was a violation of the soil of Germany; and that he appealed to the Diet on account of the violence done to his subjects. This was a most extraordinary mode of reasoning, and the most unwarrantable in every respect.

When this intelligence reached Hanover, the brave army, commanded by Marshal de Walmoden, was thunderstruck. It was drawn up behind the Elbe, in the heart of the country of Lüneburg, established in a strong position, and resolved to defend its honour. The French army, which for three years had not fired a shot, desired nothing better, on its part, than to fight a brilliant battle. More prudent sentiments, however, prevailed. General Mortier, who united humanity with valour, did all that lay in his power to mitigate the fate of the Hanoverians. He did not require them to surrender themselves prisoners of war; he was satisfied with their disbanding, and agreed with them that they should leave their arms in the camp, and retire to their homes, promising never to arm or to assemble. The *materiel* of war contained in the kingdom, which was very considerable, was given up to the French. The revenues of the country were to belong to them as well as the personal property of the elector of Hanover. To this property belonged the beautiful horses of the Hanoverian breed, which were sent to France. The cavalry dismounted and gave up 3500 superb horses, which were employed in remounting the French cavalry.

It was but in a very indirect manner that general Mortier possessed himself of the administration of the country, leaving the greater part of it in the hands of the local authorities. Hanover, if you meant not to fleece it, could well support 30,000 men. This was the force intended to be placed in the country, and which the First Consul had promised the King of Prussia not to exceed. With a view to avoid the long circuit of Holland and Lower Westphalia, he had applied to that monarch to assent to the establishment of a route for troops through the Prussian territory, punctually paying contractors designated beforehand for the maintenance of troops going to Hanover or returning from that country. The king of Prussia complied, in order to please the First Consul. Thenceforward direct communications were established, and advantage was taken of them to send a great number of horse-soldiers, who went on foot and returned with three horses, one which they rode, and two others which they led. The possession of this part of Germany soon became very useful for our cavalry, and served to render it excellent in point of horses, as it was before in point of men.

While these different occupations were effecting, the First Con-



sul prosecuted his preparations on the coast of the Channel. He caused naval stores to be purchased in Holland, and particularly in Russia, that he might be provided before the latter power, whose dispositions were not most satisfactory, should be induced to refuse supplies. Flat-bottomed boats of all sizes were building in the basins of the Gironde, the Loire, the Seine, the Somme, and the Scheld. Thousands of labourers were felling the forests on the coast. All the foundries of the Republic were at work casting mortars, howitzers, artillery of the largest calibre. The Parisians saw a hundred gunboats building on the quays of Bercy, the Invalides, and the Military School. It began to be evident that such a prodigious activity could not be a mere demonstration destined only to annoy England.

The First Consul having resolved to set out for the coast of the Channel as soon as the vessels everywhere begun should be somewhat more advanced, and when he had arranged the most urgent affairs. The session of the Legislative Body had been peacefully passed in giving the government entire approbation for its conduct towards England; in lending it the most complete moral support; in voting it the budget, the principal dispositions of which we have seen above: and, lastly, in discussing noiselessly, but profoundly, the first heads of the civil Code. From this period the Legislative Body was but a great council, having nothing to do with politics, and devoted exclusively to business.

By the end of June the First Consul found himself at liberty. He purposed to inspect the whole coast as far as Flushing and Antwerp, to visit Belgium, which he had not yet seen, the departments of the Rhine, which he was not acquainted with, to make in short a military and political tour. Madame Bonaparte was to accompany him, and to share the honours which awaited him. For the first time he applied for the crown jewels to the minister of the public treasury in whose custody they were, to have them made up for his wife. He wished to exhibit himself to the new departments and even on the banks of the Rhine, in nearly the style of a sovereign; for he had been considered as such since he became consul for life and had a right to choose a successor. His ministers were appointed to meet him, some at Dunkirk, others at Lille, at Ghent, at Antwerp, at Brussels. The foreign ambassadors were invited to visit him in the same cities. As he was going to show himself to people who were stanch Catholics, he thought it right to appear among them accompanied by the papal legate. On the mere expression of this wish, cardinal Caprara, notwithstanding his great age and infirmities, determined, after obtaining permission from the Pope, to swell the consular train in the Netherlands. Orders were immediately issued for giving this prince of the Church a magnificent reception.

The First Consul set out on the 23rd of June. He first visited Compiègne, where vessels were building on the banks of the Oise; Amiens, Abbeville, and St. Valery, where they were build-

ing on the banks of the Somme. He was hailed with transport, and received with absolutely royal honours. The city of Amiens presented him, according to ancient custom, with four swans of the purest white, which were sent to the garden of the Tuileries. His presence everywhere called forth manifestations of attachment to his person, hatred for the English, and zeal to combat and conquer those ancient enemies of France. He listened with extreme good-nature to the addresses of the authorities and the inhabitants; but his attention was evidently engrossed by the great object which occupied him at the moment. His anxious attention was exclusively directed to the dock-yards, the magazines, the supplies of all kinds. He visited the troops which began to collect towards Picardy, caressed the old soldiers whose faces were known to him, and left them full of confidence in his vast enterprise.

No sooner had he finished these visits than he returned to his quarters, and, though exhausted with fatigue, dictated a multitude of orders which still exist, for the instruction of governments engaged in great preparations. Here, the treasury had delayed sending funds to contractors; there, the minister of the marine had neglected to order naval stores to be furnished; elsewhere, the direction of the forests had retarded the felling of timber, on account of various formalities; yonder again, the artillery had not despatched the cannon or the ammunition required. The First Consul repaired these neglects, or removed these obstacles, by the power of his will. In this manner he reached Boulogne, the principal centre to which his efforts converged, and the presumed point of departure of the great expedition planned against England.

This is the fit place for describing in detail the immense armament contrived for carrying 150,000 men across the Strait of Calais, with the number of horses and guns, and the quantity of ammunition and provisions, proportionate to such an army. It is a vast and difficult operation to carry beyond sea twenty or thirty thousand men only. The expedition to Egypt, executed fifty years ago, the expedition against Algiers, executed in our days, are proofs of this. What an undertaking it must be to embark 150,000 soldiers, ten or fifteen thousand horses, three or four thousand pieces of cannon and their carriages! A ship of the line can carry on an average six or seven hundred men, in case the passage takes some days; a large frigate can contain half the number. For embarking such an army there would of course be required 200 sail of the line, that is to say, a chimerical naval force, which nothing but the concurrence of France and England in the same object could render barely conceivable. An attempt to throw 150,000 men into England, if England had been at the distance of Egypt or the Morea, would consequently have been an impracticable undertaking. But there was only the Strait of Calais to cross, that is to say, only eight or ten leagues to go. There was no necessity for employing large ships for such a pas-

sage. Neither could they have been employed, if one had had them, for there is not a single port capable of admitting them from Ostend to Havre: neither is there, without going far out of the way, a single port on the other side where they could effect a landing. The idea of small vessels, considering the passage and the nature of the ports, had therefore at all times occurred to all minds. Besides, these small vessels were adequate to such marine circumstances as were liable to be met with. Long observations made on the coast had led to the discovery of these circumstances, and to the determination of the vessels best adapted to the purpose. In summer, for instance, there are in the Channel almost absolute calms, and long enough to enable one to reckon upon forty-eight hours of the same weather. It would take about that number of hours, not to cross, but for the immense flotilla in question to work out of harbour. During this calm, the English cruizers, being condemned to lie motionless, vessels built to go either with oars or sails, might pass with impunity even before an enemy's squadron. Winter has also its favourable moments. The dense fogs of the cold season, being attended with no wind, or scarcely any, offered another chance of crossing in presence of an enemy's force, either immovable or deceived by the fog. There was still a third favourable occasion, namely, that offered by the equinoxes. It frequently happens that, after equinoctial storms, the wind suddenly subsides, and leaves sufficient time for crossing the strait, before the return of the enemy's squadron, which is obliged by the gale to stand off. Such were the circumstances universally fixed upon by the seamen living on the coast of the Channel.

There was one case, in which, in all seasons and in any weather, excepting a tempest, one might always cross the strait: it was when a strong squadron of the line could be brought for a few hours by skilful manœuvres into the Channel. Then the flotilla, protected by this squadron, could sail without being uneasy about the enemy's cruizers.

But the case of a great French squadron brought between Calais and Dover depended on such difficult combinations, that it could not be at all reckoned upon. It was requisite even, to build the transport flotilla in such a fashion that it might, to appearance at least, dispense with any auxiliary force; for if it had been demonstrated by its construction that it was impossible for it to keep the sea without an assisting squadron, the secret of this great operation would have been immediately revealed to the enemy. Aware of this, they would have concentrated all their naval forces in the strait, and prevented every manœuvre of French squadrons for the purpose of getting thither.

To the considerations arising from the nature of the winds and the sea were added considerations arising from the form of the coast: the French ports in the strait were all left dry at low water and had not a depth of more than eight or nine feet at high water.

Vessels, therefore, were required, which, when laden, needed no more than seven or eight feet water to float, and which could not take injury from grounding. As for the coast of England, the ports situated between the Thames, Dover, Folkstone, and Brighton, were very small; but whatever they might be, all that needed to be done to effect so vast a disembarkation was to run in close to shore, and for this reason vessels fit for grounding were required. For these various reasons flat-bottomed boats had been adopted, capable of proceeding with oars, in order to cross either in calm or in fog; capable of carrying heavy cannon, without drawing more than seven or eight feet water, in order to move about more freely in the French ports in the Channel, in order to take the ground without going to pieces on the shores of England.

To comply with all these conditions, large gun-boats, with flat bottoms, solidly built, and of two different kinds to answer two different purposes, were contrived. The first kind, properly called gun-brigs, were built in such a manner as to carry four pieces of large calibre, 24 to 36-pounders, two at the head, two at the stern, capable, consequently of returning the fire of ships of the line and frigates. Five hundred gun-brigs, armed with four pieces would therefore equal the fire of twenty 100-gun ships. They were rigged like brigs, that is to say with two masts, worked by 24 seamen, and could carry a company of infantry of 100 men, with its staff, arms, and ammunition.

The brigs of the second kind, which, to distinguish them from the others, were called gun-boats, were less heavily armed, less manageable, but destined to carry field-artillery as well as infantry. These gun-boats were provided with one 24-pounder at the head, and at the stern with one field-piece left upon its carriage, with the tackle necessary for hoisting it in or out in a few minutes. They carried, moreover, an artillery waggon, full of ammunition, and placed upon deck so as not to interfere with the working of the vessel, and to be put on shore in the twinkling of an eye. They contained, lastly, in the very centre of their hold, a small stable, in which were to be lodged two artillery horses, with forage for several days. This stable, placed in the centre, open above, crowned by a moveable cover, was combined with the mast in such a manner that a horse, grappled on shore by a yard, was rapidly lifted up, and lowered into his stall with the greatest ease. These gun-boats, inferior in their arming to the brigs, but capable of throwing large balls, and discharging grape by means of the field-piece placed upon their deck, had the advantage of carrying, besides a portion of the infantry, the whole artillery of the army, with two horses to draw it into line at the very moment of landing. The surplus of the teams was to be put on board transports, the organization of which will be seen presently. Less adapted than the gun-brigs for manœuvring and fighting, they were rigged like the large coasting smacks, and had three great sails attached to

three masts, without top or topgallant masts. Their crew consisted of no more than six sailors. They were capable of holding, like the gun-brigs, a company of infantry, with its officers, besides two artillery-drivers, and some artillery-men. Supposing that there were three or four hundred of these vessels they could carry, besides a considerable mass of infantry, three or four hundred field-pieces, with a waggon containing ammunition sufficient for one battle. The rest of the ammunition and the rest of the teams were to follow in the transports.

Such were the flat-bottomed boats of the first and second kind. It had been deemed necessary to build some of a third sort, still lighter and more moveable than the preceding, drawing two or three feet water, and calculated for landing anywhere. These were large narrow boats, 60 feet long, having a moveable deck, which could be taken up at pleasure, and distinguished from the others by the name of pinnaces. These large boats were provided with about sixty oars, carried a light sail to be used when needed, and went with extreme swiftness. When sixty soldiers, trained to handle the oar as well as the sailors, set them in motion, they glided over the sea like the light craft dropped from the sides of our great ships, and astonishing the eye by the rapidity of their course. These pinnaces could take from 60 to 70 soldiers, besides two or three seamen to steer them. They had on board a small howitzer, and likewise a four-pounder, and they were not to have any other lading than the arms of their passengers and some camp provisions, stowed as ballast.

After numerous experiments, these three sorts of vessels had been definitively fixed upon: they answered all the purposes of the passage, and, when drawn up in order of battle, presented a formidable line of fire. The gun-brigs, easier to work and more heavily armed, occupied the first line; the gun-boats, inferior in both those respects, were ranged in the second line, facing the intervals between the brigs, so as to leave none of those spaces without fire. The pinnaces, which carried only small howitzers, and which were chiefly formidable on account of the musketry, placed, sometimes in front of the line of battle, sometimes in rear or on the wings, could pull up rapidly to board, if engaged with a fleet, or throw their men on shore if the intention was to land, or sheer off if exposed to the fire of heavy artillery.

These three species of vessels were to be collected to the number of twelve or fifteen hundred. They were to carry at least 3000 pieces of cannon of large calibre, besides a great number of pieces of small dimension, that is to say, discharge as many projectiles as the strongest squadron. Their fire was dangerous, because it was horizontal, and directed so as to take effect between wind and water. When engaged with large ships, they presented a mark difficult to hit, and, on the contrary, fired at a mark which they could scarcely miss. They could move about, divide, and surround the enemy. But if they had the advantages of division, they



had also its inconveniences. The order to be introduced into this moving and prodigiously numerous mass was an extremely difficult problem, in the solution of which admiral Bruix and Napoleon were incessantly engaged for three years. We shall see by and by to what a degree of precision in the manœuvres they contrived to attain, and to what point the problem was resolved by them.

What effect would have been produced by a squadron of large ships, dashing in full sail through this mass of small craft, running down, upsetting all before them, sinking those struck by their balls, but surrounded in their turn by this swarm of enemies, receiving on all sides a dangerous fire of artillery, assailed by the musketry of 100,000 infantry, and perhaps boarded by intrepid soldiers trained to the manœuvre? It is impossible to say; for one cannot form any idea of so strange a scene, without any known antecedent, capable of assisting the mind to foresee the different chances. Admiral Decrès, a man of superior intelligence, but disposed to find fault, admitted that, by sacrificing 100 vessels and 10,000 men, one might probably get over an encounter with an enemy's squadron, and cross the strait. One loses them every day in battle, replied the First Consul, and what battle ever promised the results which a landing in England authorizes us to hope for? But the most unfavourable chance was that of meeting with English cruisers. There were still left the chance of crossing in a calm which should paralyze the enemy, in a fog which should conceal our flotilla from view, and lastly the still more propitious chance of a French squadron appearing all at once in the strait for a few hours.

Be this as it may, the vessels were strong enough to defend themselves, to approach a coast and sweep it, to remove from the mind of an enemy all idea of an auxiliary squadron, to give confidence to the soldiers and seamen destined to man them. They had inconveniences, however, attached to the very form of their construction. Having, instead of a deep-sunk keel, a flat bottom, and drawing but little water, and being moreover heavily masted, they had the disadvantage of being crank, liable to heel over in a stiff breeze, and even to capsize if caught in a sudden squall. This did once happen in Brest harbour to a gun-boat lightly ballasted, in the presence of Admiral Ganteaume, who, in affright, wrote immediately to the First Consul. But such an accident never occurred again. With precautions in the stowage of the ammunition, which served them for ballast, the vessels of the flotilla acquired sufficient steadiness to stand rough weather; and no other accident befel them but that of grounding, which was natural when navigating along the coast, and in general voluntary on their part, in order to escape the English. For the rest, whenever they were obliged to run aground, they were sure to float again with the next flood-tide.

A still greater inconvenience belonging to them was that of



drifting with the current. This was owing to their clumsy build, which afforded more hold to the water than their masts did to the wind. This inconvenience was aggravated when, having no wind, they plied the oars, and had nothing but the strength of the rowers for overcoming the strength of the current. In this case, they were liable to be carried far away from their goal, or, what was worse, to reach it separately, for, being of different forms, they could not but drift unequally. Nelson experienced the same thing when, in 1801, he attacked the Boulogne flotilla. His four divisions, being unable to act all together, made but unconnected efforts. This sort of inconvenience, troublesome in any sea, was particularly felt in the Channel, where there are two strong contrary currents every tide. When the tide is rising or falling, it produces alternately an ascending or descending current, the direction of which is governed by the configuration of the coasts of France and England. The Channel is very open to the west, between Cape Finisterre and the extremity of Cornwall; very narrow to the east, between Calais and Dover. The sea, in rising, rushes in more forcibly by the wider passage, producing with the in-coming tide a current ascending from west to east, from Brest to Calais. The same effect is produced, in a contrary direction, when the tide is falling; the water then runs off more rapidly at the wider outlet, and hence results, with the out-going tide, a current from east to west, from Calais to Brest. This double current, receiving various inflexions near the coast, and from the very form of it, must produce a certain perturbation in the course of these two thousand vessels, a perturbation more or less to be apprehended, according to the lightness of the wind and the strength of the current. This greatly diminished the advantage of crossing in a calm, which was one of the most desirable. Still, the channel between Boulogne and Dover, being not only very narrow but also of no great depth, would admit of casting anchor at an equal distance between the two coasts. The admirals, therefore, considered it as possible to lie-to, in case the current should drift too much, and wait at anchor for the return of the contrary current, which could not occasion a loss of more time than three or four hours. This was a difficulty, but not an insurmountable one.\*

This inconvenience soon caused a species of boats called *prames* to be abandoned. These, absolutely flat, without any curve in their sides, and having three keels, were real floating pontoons, destined to carry a great number of cannon and horses. It had been at first resolved to build fifty of them, which would have

---

\* All that I am here stating is extracted from the voluminous correspondence of the admirals, particularly that of admiral Bruix, with the minister of the marine and with Napoleon. Be it understood that I introduce no conjectures of my own, but give the substance as nearly as I can, and with historical precision, of all that is essential in that correspondence, which I think most justly characterized by the epithet, admirable.

furnished the means of transport for 2500 horses and a force of 600 pieces of cannon. But the inferiority of their navigating qualities caused them to be soon given up, and not more than twelve or fifteen were built. We shall say nothing of clumsy barks, short and wide, armed with one 24-pounder at the stern, which were called *caïques*, nor of cutters, having a light draught of water, carrying about ten heavy cannon, both of them built by way of experiment, and the plan of which, on trial, was relinquished. The whole of the flotilla was composed almost exclusively of the three species of vessels which I have described above, that is to say, gun-brigs, gun-boats, and pinnaces.

Every brig and gun-boat was capable of holding a company of infantry, every pinnace two-thirds of a company. If 500 brigs, 400 boats, and 300 pinnaces, that is to say, 1200 vessels were collected, they would afford the means of embarking 120,000 men. Supposing the Brest squadron to carry fifteen or eighteen thousand, and that at the Texel 20,000, there would be 150 or 160 thousand men, who might be thrown into England, 120,000 in a single mass on board the flotilla, 30 or 40 thousand in separate divisions, on board two large squadrons, sailing the one from Holland, the other from Bretagne.

Here would be sufficient to conquer and reduce that proud nation, which pretended to sway the world from the recesses of its inviolable asylum.

But to convey the men was not the only point: they would want *materiel*, that is to say, provisions, arms, horses. The war flotilla, as it was called, could take on board the men, the ammunition indispensable for the first engagements, provisions for about twenty days, field-artillery, with two horses for each piece. They would want, besides, the rest of the draught-horses, at least seven or eight thousand cavalry horses, ammunition for a whole campaign, provisions for one or two months, a large park of artillery, in case there should be walls to batter down. The horses were particularly difficult to transport, and it would require at least six or seven hundred boats to carry only from seven to eight thousand.

For this latter purpose there was no occasion to build. Coasters and vessels employed in the deep sea fisheries would furnish a very considerable naval resource, and which was quite ready. On all the coasts from St. Malo to the Texel, and even in the interior of Holland, there could be bought vessels measuring from 20 to 60 tons, engaged in the coasting trade and in the cod and herring fisheries, perfectly sound, excellent sea-boats, and capable of taking in whatever it might be thought fit to put on board them, with suitable alterations. A commission formed for this object, was buying up, from Brest to Amsterdam, vessels costing on an average from twelve to fifteen thousand francs a-piece. Several hundred were already procured; the remainder it would not be difficult to find.

Reckoning the war flotilla at twelve or thirteen hundred vessels, the transport flotilla at 900 or 1000, there were 2200 or 2300 vessels to be collected—a prodigious naval assemblage, unexampled in past times, and that will probably continue to be so in future ages.

The reader will now comprehend how impossible it would have been to build at one or two points of the coast that immense quantity of vessels. Small as were their dimensions, neither the materials, nor the workmen, nor the yards required for building them, could ever have been procured at a single spot. It was therefore indispensable to make all the ports and all the basins of the rivers concur in the same object. It was quite enough to reserve for the ports in the Channel, where they were to be collected, the duty of providing for and keeping these 2500 vessels.

But, after building them at a considerable distance from one another, it was requisite to collect them at a single point, from Boulogne to Dunkirk, in spite of the English cruizers, intent on destroying them before they had assembled. It was then requisite to take them into three or four ports, as nearly as possible under the same wind, at but little distance, in order to weigh and to start together. It was finally requisite to lodge them without encumbrance, without confusion, protected from danger by fire, within reach of the troops, so that they could frequently run out and in, and learn to take on board and land expeditiously men, guns, and horses.

All these difficulties could be resolved only at the places themselves by Napoleon, seeing things with his own eyes, and surrounded by the ablest and the most special officers. He had summoned to Boulogne, M. Sganzin, engineer of the navy, and one of the ablest men of that distinguished body; M. Forfait, minister of the marine for a few months, possessing little talent for administration, but superior skill in the art of ship-building, full of invention, and devoted to an enterprize, of which, under the Directory, he had been one of the most ardent promoters; lastly, Decrès, the minister, and admiral Bruix, whom I have already mentioned, and who deserve more particular notice here.

The First Consul would have been glad to possess rather fewer good commanders in his land armies and rather more in his naval armies. But war and victory only form good commanders. Of war at sea we had had enough during the last twelve years; unfortunately, our navy, disorganized by the emigration, becoming at once inferior to that of the English, had almost always been obliged to shut itself up in the ports; and our admirals had lost, not bravery, but confidence. Some were very old, others wanted experience. Four attracted at the moment, the whole attention of Napoleon—Decrès, Latouche Treville, Ganteaume, and Bruix. Admiral Decrès was a man of extraordinary intelligence, but a fault-finder, looking only at the unfavourable side of things, as

excellent critic of the operations of another, and on this account a good minister, but not an active administrator, very useful, nevertheless, at the elbow of Napoleon, who made up by his own activity for the want of it in everybody else, and who needed advisers less confident than he was himself. For these reasons admiral Decrès was the one of the four who was most serviceable at the head of the navy office, and who would have been least so at the head of a squadron. Ganteaume, a brave officer, intelligent, well-informed, could lead a naval division into action; but, out of the fire, hesitating, irresolute, letting fortune slip past without laying hold of it, he was fit to be employed only in the least difficult enterprizes. Latouche Treville and Bruix were the two most distinguished seamen of the time, and called certainly, had they lived, to dispute with England the empire of the seas. Latouche Treville was all ardour, all daring: he united intelligence and experience with courage, infused into the seamen the sentiments which he was full of, and in this respect he was the most valuable of all, since he possessed that in which our navy was deficient, self-confidence. Lastly Bruix, mean in person, and infirm in health, worn out by indulgence in pleasure, endowed with vast intelligence, with a genius of rare organization, never at a loss for resources, possessing great experience, the only man who had commanded forty sail of the line at once, as clever at conceiving as executing, would have been the very man for minister of the marine had he not been so fit for commanding. These were not all our naval chiefs: there was Villeneuve, afterwards so unfortunate; Linois, the conqueror of Algesiras, in India at the time of which we are treating; and others whom we shall see figuring in their place. But the four to whom we are adverting were the principal.

The First Consul resolved to assign to admiral Bruix the command of the flotilla, because there, every thing was to be created; to Ganteaume the Brest fleet, which had only a transportation of troops to execute; lastly, to Latouche Treville the Toulon fleet, charged with a difficult, daring, but decisive manœuvre, which we shall notice hereafter. Admiral Bruix, having to organize the flotilla, was incessantly in contact with admiral Decrès. Both were too clever not to be rivals, consequently enemies; their nature, moreover, was incompatible. To declare difficulties invincible, to find fault with the attempts made to overcome them—that was the disposition of admiral Decrès. To see them, to study them, to seek to triumph over them, was the way of admiral Bruix. It must be added that they mistrusted each other: they were continually apprehensive, admiral Decrès lest the First Consul should be made acquainted with the inconveniences of his inactivity, admiral Bruix with those of his dissolute life. Under a weak master these two men would have disturbed the fleet by their dissensions: under a master such as the First Consul they were useful from their very diversity. Bruix proposed combina-

tions; Decrès criticized them; the First Consul decided with the certainty of infallible judgment.

It was amidst these men and on the spot that Napoleon decided all the questions left in suspense. His arrival at Boulogne was urgent; for, notwithstanding the energy and the frequency of his orders, many things remained undone. No building was going forward at Boulogne, Calais, and Dunkirk, but there the old flotilla was under repair, and they were preparing to make the alterations judged necessary in the vessels built or purchased, when they should be collected. They were in want of workmen, timber, artillery of long range to keep off the English, who were in the habit of employing incendiary projectiles.

The presence of the First Consul, surrounded by Messrs. Sganzin, Forfait, Bruix, Decrès, and a great number of other officers, soon imparted new activity to his enterprize. He had employed in Paris an expedient which he resolved to apply in Boulogne and all the places that he visited. He ordered five or six thousand men, belonging to all the trades engaged in working up wood or iron, such as cabinet-makers, carpenters, sawyers, cartwrights, blacksmiths, locksmiths, to be selected from among the conscripts. High pay was granted to those who showed intelligence and willingness, and in a short time the yards were covered with a population of workmen, whose original profession it would have been difficult to guess.

Forests abounded about Boulogne. An order had assigned all those of the environs to the marine. The wood, employed the same day that it was cut, was green, but fit for posts, thousands of which were wanted in the ports of the Channel. Boards and planks might also be obtained from it. As for the wood destined to supply knees, that was brought from the north. Naval stores, such as hemp, masts, copper, pitch, carried from Russia and Sweden to Holland, to be brought by the inland waters from Holland and Flanders to Boulogne, were at this moment detained by various obstacles in the canals of Belgium. Officers were despatched immediately with orders and funds, to hasten their arrival. Lastly, the foundries of Douai, Liege, and Strasburg, notwithstanding their activity, were behindhand. The scientific Monge, who accompanied the First Consul almost everywhere, was commissioned to speed their operations and to order large mortars and pieces of great calibre to be cast at Liege. Aides-de-camp were sent off daily by post to stimulate his zeal, and to bring an account of the guns or carriages that were in arrear. In fact, besides the artillery of the vessels, there were wanted from five to six hundred pieces in battery, in order to keep the enemy at a distance from the building yards.

These first orders given, it was necessary to direct attention to the great question of the ports of rendezvous, and of the means of proportioning their capacity to the extent of the flotilla. It was requisite to enlarge some, to create others, to defend all. After



conferring with Messrs. Sganzin, Forfait, Decrès, and Bruix, the First Consul decided upon the following arrangements.

The port of Boulogne had for a great length of time been indicated as the best point of departure for an expedition directed against England. The coast of France, advancing towards that of England, throws out a cape called Cape Grisnez. To the right of this cape, it runs eastward towards the Scheld, faced by the vast extent of the North Sea. On the left, it runs towards that of England, thus forming one of the two borders of the strait; then descends abruptly from north to south, towards the mouth of the Somme. The ports on the right of Cape Grisnez, such as Calais and Dunkirk, placed outside the strait, are less favourably situated for points of departure; the ports on the left, on the contrary, in the strait itself, have always been reckoned preferable. In fact, if we set out from Dunkirk or Calais, we must double Cape Grisnez to enter the strait, encounter the gusts of the Channel winds, always experienced in doubling the cape, and work to windward of Boulogne, in order to make the land between Dover and Folkstone. On the contrary, in going from England to France, one is naturally more inclined towards Calais than Boulogne. For passing over to England, as in the case of the projected expedition, Boulogne and the ports situated to the left of Cape Grisnez, were better than Calais and Dunkirk. Only, they had the inconvenience of affording less extent and depth than Calais and Dunkirk, a circumstance accounted for by the accumulation of sand and gravel, which is always greatest in a narrow space like a strait.

Nevertheless, the port of Boulogne, consisting of the bed of a small marshy river, the Liane, was capable of being considerably enlarged. The basin of the Liane, formed by two plateaux, which separate in the environs of Boulogne, and leave a space of semicircular figure between them, might with great labour be converted into a very extensive port, dry at low water. The bed of the Liane had a depth of from six to seven feet at high water, in ordinary tides. It was possible by excavating to give it from nine to ten. It was, therefore, practicable enough to create in the swampy bed of the Liane, nearly facing Boulogne, a basin similar in form to the ground, that is to say semicircular, capable of containing some hundreds of vessels, more or less, according to the radius that should be given to it. This basin and the excavated bed of the Liane might be made to hold twelve or thirteen hundred boats, consequently more than half the flotilla. It was not enough to have a sufficient surface; very extensive quays were required, that these numerous boats might, if not all at once, at least in very great number, get to the margin of the basin to take in their lading. The extent of the quays, therefore, was as important as the extent of the port itself. None of these things had been thought of under the Directory, because no plans had ever gone the length of projecting the assemblage of 150,000 men



and 2000 vessels. The First Consul, in spite of the magnitude of the work, hesitated not to give orders immediately for excavating the basin of Boulogne and the bed of the Liane. Those same 150,000 men, who, by their number constituted the difficulty of the enterprize, were now employed to conquer it, by digging themselves the basin from which they were to embark. It was decided that the camps, originally placed at some distance from the coast, should be immediately moved nearer to the sea, and that the soldiers should themselves take away the enormous mass of earth which would have to be got rid of.

A sluice was ordered for excavating the bed of the stream and procuring the requisite depth of water. Ports which are not, like that of Brest, formed by the sinuosities of a deep coast, and which we call *ports d'échouage*, consist in general of the mouths of small rivers; these, swollen at high water, form a basin in which the vessels float, then decrease with the ebb tide, till they look like large rivulets running through a bed of mud, leaving the vessels aground upon their banks. The sand carried down by these rivers, stopped and swept back by the sea off their mouths, forms banks or bars, which are impediments to navigation. To remove this obstacle, sluices are constructed in the bed of the rivers, which open to the ascending tide, admit the abundance of water, and retain it by closing against the descending tide, and do not allow it to escape till the moment for clearing arrives. That moment, for which low water is generally chosen, being come, the sluice is opened: the water rushes into the river, and, driving the sand by this artificial torrent, clears a channel or passage. This is what engineers call *écluses de chasse*; and no time was lost in constructing such a sluice in the upper basin of the Liane.

Twenty thousand feet of timber, felled in the forests of Boulogne, served to line both banks of the Liane and the circumference of the semicircular basin with posts. Part of the trees sawed into thick planks, then laid like a floor upon the posts, formed spacious quays along the Liane and the semicircular basin. The numerous vessels of the flotilla could thus lie alongside these quays, to embark or disembark the men, the horses, and the *matériel*.

The town of Boulogne was situated on the right of the Liane, the basin on the left, and nearly opposite. The Liane ran longitudinally between both. Bridges were built to facilitate the communication between one bank and the other, and placed above the point where the anchorage commenced.

These vast works were far from being sufficient. A great maritime establishment presupposes workshops, building yards, magazines, barracks, bakehouses, hospitals, in short, every thing necessary for the preservation of large stores of various kinds, for the reception of seamen healthy or sick, for feeding, clothing, arming them. Only conceive what time and efforts such establishments as those of Brest and Toulon have cost! The point

here was to create establishments of a different sort, magazines, hospitals, adequate to the wants of 30,000 seamen, 10,000 workmen, and 120,000 soldiers. Had even those creations not been destined to be but temporary, they would have been absolutely impossible. Still, though temporary, the difficulty of producing them, owing to the quantity of things to be brought together on one spot, was immense.

All the houses in Boulogne that could be converted into offices, warehouses, or hospitals, were hired. The villas and farm-houses in the environs fit for the same purposes, were likewise engaged. Cots were built for the shipwrights and boarded sheds for the horses. As for the troops, they were obliged to encamp in the open field, in huts constructed with the timber of the neighbouring forests. The First Consul chose the spot which the troops were to occupy, on the right and on the left of the Liane, on the two plateaux, the separation of which formed the basin of Boulogne. Thirty-six thousand men were divided between two camps: one called the left, the other the right. The troops assembled at St. Omer, under the command of general Soult, came to occupy these two positions. The other corps were successively to remove nearer to the coast, when proper quarters had been prepared for them. The troops would there be in a fine air, exposed, it is true, to violent and cold winds, but provided with great abundance of wood for forming huts and for fuel.

Immense supplies of provisions were ordered from all quarters, and brought to these magazines so suddenly created. By inland navigation, which is carried to high perfection, as every body knows, in the north of France, were brought flour to be converted into biscuit, rice, oats, salt provisions, wine, and spirits. From Holland were obtained great quantities of round Edam cheeses. These various alimentary matters were to serve for the daily consumption of the camps, and to supply the cargo of provisions which the war and transport flotillas were to carry. The reader may easily figure to himself the quantities necessary to be collected, if he considers that the army, the fleet, the numerous population of workmen drawn to the spot, were to be fed during the encampment, and then for two months of the expedition; which presupposes provisions for nearly 200,000 mouths, and forage for 20,000 horses. When we add that the allowances were on so liberal a scale as left nothing to be desired, the reader must be convinced that never was a more extraordinary creation executed by any nation, or by the chief of any empire.

But a single port was not sufficient for the whole expedition. Boulogne could not contain more than twelve or thirteen hundred vessels, and there were about 2300 to provide for. This port would have held the requisite number, but it would have taken too much time to make them all leave it by one and the same channel. In stormy or unsettled weather, it was a great in-

convenience not to have a single place of refuge. If, for instance, a great number of vessels put to sea, and bad weather or the enemy obliged them to return suddenly, they might choke up the entrance, lose the tide, and be doomed to perdition. About four leagues to the south, there was a small river, the Canche, the mouth of which formed a winding bay, much choked with sand, unluckily open to all winds, and affording a much less secure anchorage than that of Boulogne. A little fishing port, that of Etaples, had been formed there. On this same river Canche, about a league inland, was the fortified town of Montreuil. It would be difficult to excavate a basin there, but one might drive a series of piles, for the purpose of mooring the vessels, and construct on these piles wooden quays suitable for embarking and disembarking troops. It was a tolerably safe shelter for three or four hundred vessels. They could leave it with nearly the same winds as at Boulogne. The distance of Boulogne, which was from four to five leagues, was certainly productive of some difficulty in regard to simultaneousness of operations; but this was a secondary difficulty; and a harbour for 400 vessels was too important to be neglected. The First Consul formed a camp there, destined for the troops collected between Compiègne and Amiens, and reserved the command of it for general Ney, who had returned from his mission in Switzerland. This camp was called the camp of Montreuil. The troops were ordered to construct cots for themselves, like those who were encamped around Boulogne. Establishments were prepared for the reception of the provisions, for the hospitals, in short, for all the wants of an army of 24,000 men. The centre of the army was supposed to be at Boulogne; the camp of Montreuil was the left.

A little to the north of Boulogne, before you reach Cape Grisnez, there are two other bays, formed by two small rivers, the beds of which were much encumbered with mud and sand, but in which the water, at flood-tide, rose to six or seven feet. One was a league, the other two leagues, from Boulogne; they were, moreover, under the same wind. By excavating the ground, by constructing sluices, it would be possible to shelter several hundred vessels there; which would complete the means of lodging the entire flotilla. The nearest of these two little rivers was the Vimereux, discharging itself at a village of the same name. The other was the Selacque, emptying itself near the fishing village of Ambleteuse. In the time of Louis XVI., basins had been dug there; but the works executed at that period had been completely buried by mud and sand. The First Consul ordered the engineers to examine the localities, and, in case of their report being favourable to his views, troops were to be employed there and encamped in cots, as at Etaples and Boulogne. These two ports were to hold, the one 200, the other 300 vessels: these made 500 more which would be under shelter. The guard, the

collective grenadiers, the reserves of the cavalry and artillery, and the different corps forming between Lille, Douai, and Arras, were there to find their means of embarking.

There was still left the Batavian flotilla, destined to convey the corps of general Davout, and which, according to the treaty concluded with Holland, was independent of the squadron of the line lying in the Texel. Unluckily, the Batavian flotilla was less effectively armed than the French flotilla. It was a question whether it should start from the Scheld for the coast of England, under the escort of a few frigates, or whether it should be taken to Dunkirk and Calais, and ordered to set out from the ports situated to the right of Cape Grisnez. Admiral Bruix was desired to solve that question. The corps of general Davout, which formed the right of the army, would thus be brought near the centre. One did not even despair that, by dint of enlarging the basins and contracting the camps, it might be transferred to the other side of Cape Grisnez, and established at Ambleteuse and Vimereux. Then the united French and Batavian flotillas, to the number of 2300 vessels, carrying the corps of generals Davout, Soult, Ney, besides the reserve, that is to say 120,000 men, might start simultaneously with the same wind from the four ports situated within the strait, with the certainty of acting together. The two great war fleets, weighing at the same time, the one from Brest, the other from the Texel, were to carry the remaining 40,000 men, whose co-operation and destination were to be the exclusive secret of the First Consul.

To complete all the parts of this vast organization, it was requisite to place the coast in security from the attacks of the English. Besides the zeal with which they would no doubt strive to prevent the concentration of the flotilla at Boulogne, by watching the coast from Bordeaux to Flushing, it was to be presumed that, in imitation of what they had done in 1801, they would endeavour to destroy it, either by setting it on fire in the basins, or by attacking it at the anchorage, when it was going out to manœuvre. It was, therefore, necessary to render the approach of the English impossible, as well for the safety of the ports themselves as to insure free egress and regress; for if the flotilla were doomed to continue motionless, it would be incapable of manœuvring and of executing any great operation.

This approach of the English it was not easy to prevent, owing to the form of the coast, which was straight without any re-entering or salient point, and consequently furnished no means of reaching to a distance. This deficiency, however, was remedied in the most ingenious manner. Off Boulogne, two points of rock ran out into the sea, the one on the right called *Pointe de la Crèche*, the other on the left called *Pointe de l'Heurt*. Between the two there was a space of 2500 fathoms, perfectly safe and very convenient for anchorage. From two to three hundred vessels might here lie at their ease in several lines. These points of rock, covered

by the sea at high water, were dry at low water. The First Consul ordered two forts to be erected on them, of substantial masonry, of semicircular form, solidly casemated, presenting two tiers of guns, and capable of covering the anchorage extending from the one to the other with their fire. He ordered the works to be commenced immediately. The engineers of the navy and army, seconded by the masons taken out of the conscription, fell to work forthwith. The First Consul insisted that these forts must be finished by the beginning of winter. But such was his care to multiply precautions that he resolved to defend the middle of the mooring line by a third *point d'appui*. This *point d'appui* chosen in the middle of that line was facing the entrance of the harbour; and, as the ground there was a loose sand, the First Consul resolved to build this new fort of solid timber. Numerous hands immediately fell to work to drive at low water hundreds of piles, to serve as a foundation for a battery of eighteen 24-pounders. In general, they had to drive them under the fire of the English.

Independently of these three points, projecting into the sea, lying parallel to the coast of Boulogne, the First Consul had cannon planted on every slightly salient part of the cliff; and he left not a spot capable of receiving artillery unarmed with cannon of the largest calibre. Precautions of less magnitude, but yet sufficient, were taken in regard to Etaples and the new ports which he was engaged in excavating.

Such were the vast plans definitively adopted by the First Consul, after surveying the places, with the concurrence of the engineers and officers of the navy. The building of the flotilla was proceeding rapidly, from the coasts of Bretagne to those of Holland; but, before it should be collected at Ambleteuse, Boulogne, and Etaples, it was requisite to have completed the excavation of the basins and the erection of the forts, brought the artillery *materiel* to the coast, concentrated the troops near the sea, and prepared the establishments necessary for their wants. He reckoned upon the completion of all these works by the winter.

On leaving Boulogne, the First Consul visited Calais, Dunkirk, Ostend, and Antwerp. He was particularly desirous to see the latter port, and to ascertain with his own eyes whether there was any truth in the very different reports that had been addressed to him. After examining the site of the city with that rapid glance and unerring eye which belonged to none but him, he had no doubt of the possibility of making Antwerp a great naval arsenal. Antwerp possessed, in his estimation, quite peculiar advantages: it was seated on the Scheld, opposite to the Thames; it was in immediate communication with Holland, by the finest of inland navigations, and consequently within reach of the richest depôt of naval materials. By the Rhine and the Meuse, it could receive without difficulty the timber of the Alps, the Vosges, the Black Forest, Wetteravia, and the Ardennes.



Lastly, Flemish workmen, naturally attracted by the proximity, would come hither to offer thousands of hands for ship-building. The First Consul, therefore, resolved to create at Antwerp, a fleet whose flag should constantly float between the Scheld and the Thames. This would be one of the severest mortifications that he could inflict on his henceforth irreconcilable foes, the English. He ordered the ground necessary for the construction of vast basins, which still exist, and which are the pride of the city of Antwerp, to be immediately secured. These basins, communicating with the Scheld by a sluice of the largest dimensions, were to be capable of containing a whole fleet of ships of war, and to be continually provided with thirty feet water, whatever might be the height of the river. In this new port of the Republic the First Consul resolved to build 25 ships, and, until new experiments relative to the navigability of the Scheld should be made, he ordered several seventy-fours to be put on the stocks, without renouncing the intention of building ships of a larger rate at a future time. He hoped to make Antwerp an establishment equal to Brest and Toulon, but infinitely better situated for disturbing the slumbers of England. -

He proceeded from Antwerp to Ghent, from Ghent to Brussels. These Belgian populations, discontented under their former government, showed but little docility under the French administration. The fervour of their religious sentiments rendered the administration of the department of religion more difficult than anywhere else. There the First Consul at first met with some coolness, or, to speak more correctly, a less expansive cordiality than in the old French provinces. But this coldness soon disappeared, when the young general was seen, surrounded by the clergy, respectfully attending the religious ceremonies, accompanied by his wife, who notwithstanding her fondness for dissipation, had in her heart the piety of a woman, and of a woman of the old court. M. de Roquelaure was archbishop of Malines: he was an old man full of suavity. The First Consul treated him with infinite respect, and even restored to his family considerable property still under the sequestration of the State, showed himself frequently to the people in company with this metropolitan of Belgium, and succeeded in allaying by his demeanour the religious mistrust of the country. Cardinal Caprara was waiting for him at Brussels. Their meeting produced the best effect. The stay of the First Consul in that city was prolonged. The ministers and Cambacérès, the consul, repaired thither to hold consultation. Part of the members of the diplomatic body likewise went to Brussels to obtain audiences of the ruler of France. Surrounded thus by ministers, generals, numerous and brilliant troops, general Bonaparte held in that capital of the Netherlands a court which had all the appearances of sovereignty. One would have supposed that it was an emperor of Germany, come to visit the patrimony of Charles V. Time had flown faster



than the First Consul had conceived. Numerous matters recalled him to Paris; there were orders to give for the execution of what he had resolved upon at Boulogne; there were also negotiations with Europe, which this state of crisis rendered more active than ever. He gave up, therefore, for the moment, the idea of visiting the provinces of the Rhine, and deferred that part of his tour till his next journey, which was to take place soon. But, before he left Brussels, he received a visit, which was much remarked, as it deserved to be, on account of the personage who had come to see him.

This personage was M. Lombard, private secretary of the king of Prussia. Young Frederick William, in his distrust of himself and others, was accustomed to detain the work of his ministers, and to subject it to a fresh examination, which he made jointly with his secretary, M. Lombard, a man possessing intelligence and talent. Owing to this royal intimacy, M. Lombard had acquired very high importance in Prussia. M. Haugwitz, skilful in seizing all influences, had contrived to acquire an ascendancy over M. Lombard, so that the king, in passing from the hands of the minister into those of the private secretary, was still under the guidance of the same inspirations, namely those of M. Haugwitz. M. Lombard, coming to Brussels, represented, therefore, with the First Consul, both the king and the prime minister, that is to say the whole Prussian government, excepting the court, ranged exclusively around the queen, and animated by a different spirit from that of the government.

The visit of M. Lombard to Brussels was a consequence of the agitation of the cabinets since the renewal of the war between France and England. The court of Prussia was in especial anxiety, increased by the recent communications of the Russian cabinet. This cabinet, as we have seen, diverted from its internal affairs by the affairs of Europe, would fain have compensated itself by playing an important part. It had at the very first endeavoured to induce the two belligerent parties to accept its mediation, and to recommend protégés to France. The result of these first steps was not of a nature to satisfy it. England had received its overtures very coldly; she had plumply refused to consign Malta to its keeping, and to suspend hostilities while the mediation was going on. Only, she had declared that she would not reject the interposition of the Russian cabinet, if the new negotiation were to embrace the whole of the affairs of Europe, and consequently to take cognizance of all that the treaties of Lunéville and Amiens had resolved. To accept the mediation on such a condition was to reject it. While England was answering in this manner, France, on her part, acceding with entire deference to the intervention of the young emperor, had nevertheless occupied without hesitation the countries recommended by Russia, Hanover, and Naples. The court of Petersburg was extremely mortified to find that it was so little heeded, when it pressed

England to accept its mediation, and France to limit the field of hostilities. It had, therefore, cast its eyes on Prussia, for the purpose of prevailing upon her to form a third party, which should give law to the English and the French, but to the French in particular, who were far more alarming, though more polite, than the English. The emperor Alexander, who had met the king of Prussia at Memel, who at that meeting had vowed everlasting friendship to him, who had discovered all sorts of analogies with the young monarch, analogies of age, of disposition, of virtues, sought to persuade him, in a frequent correspondence, that they were made for each other; that they were the only honest men in Europe; that in Vienna there was nothing but falsehood, in Paris nothing but ambition, in London nothing but avarice; and that they ought to unite themselves closely, in order to curb and govern Europe. The young emperor, showing a precocious shrewdness, had, in particular, sought to persuade the king of Prussia that he was the dupe of the caresses of the First Consul, and that for minor interests he made dangerous sacrifices of policy; that, owing to his condescension, Hanover was seized; that the French would not limit their occupations to this; that the reason which induced them to close the continent against the English, would carry them farther than Hanover, and conduct them to Denmark, in order to possess themselves of the Sound; that then the English would blockade the Baltic as they blockaded the Elbe and the Weser, and close the last outlet left to the commerce of the continent. This apprehension expressed by Russia could not be sincere; for the First Consul had no idea of pushing his occupations as far as Denmark, and it was not possible that he should have. He had occupied Hanover, as being English property, Tarento, by virtue of the uncontested domination of France over Italy. But to invade Denmark, first passing over the body of Germany, was impossible, unless one began with conquering Prussia herself. And, fortunately, the policy of France at that time had not acquired such an extension.

The suggestion of Russia were, therefore, deceitful, but they excited uneasiness in the king of Prussia, who was already disturbed by the occupation of Hanover. This occupation had brought upon him not only the complaints of the German States, but severe commercial sufferings. The Elbe and the Weser being closed by the English, the exportation of Prussian produce had suddenly ceased. The linens of Silesia, usually bought by Hamburg and Bremen, the extensive commerce of which they fed, had become unmarketable the very day that the blockade commenced. The great merchants of Hamburg, in particular, had, out of a sort of spite, declined every kind of business, in order to stimulate the court of Prussia still more, to make it feel more keenly the inconvenience of the occupation of Hanover, the sole cause of the closing of the Elbe and the Weser. The Prussian

grandeecs were now suffering immense losses. M. Haugwitz, in particular, had lost half his revenues; but this had not at all ruffled that composure which constituted one of the merits of his political genius. The king, beset by the complaints of Silesia, had been obliged to lend that province a million crowns (four millions of francs), a very great sacrifice for an economical prince, who was anxious to re-establish the hoard of the great Frederick. He was applied to at the time for double that sum.

Agitated by the Russian suggestions and by the complaints of Prussian commerce, king Frederick William was also apprehensive lest, if he suffered himself to be influenced by these suggestions and these complaints, he should be led into connexions hostile to France; this would have deranged his whole policy, which, for some years, had been based on the French alliance. It was to extricate himself from this painful state of anxiety that he had sent M. Lombard to Brussels. He was instructed to observe the young general closely, to endeavour to penetrate his intentions, to ascertain if he designed, as it was alleged at Petersburg, to extend his occupations to Denmark; if lastly, it was so dangerous, as it was further said at Petersburg, to trust to this extraordinary man. M. Lombard was to strive at the same time to obtain some concessions relative to Hanover. King Frederick William would have wished the corps occupying that kingdom to be reduced to a few thousand men; which would silence the apprehensions, sincere or affected, occasioned by the presence of the French in Germany. He would have wished, moreover, for the evacuation of a little port, situated at the mouth of the Elbe, that of Cuxhaven. This little port, at the very entrance of the Elbe, was the nominal property of the Hamburgers, but in reality was used by the English for continuing their commerce. If it had been left unoccupied, as being Hamburg territory, the English commerce would have been carried on there as in time of profound peace. Of course, the object proposed by France would not have been attained; and this was so true that, in 1800, when Prussia had taken Hanover, she had occupied Cuxhaven.

In return for these two concessions, the king of Prussia offered a system of northern neutrality, copied from the ancient Prussian neutrality, which should comprehend, besides Prussia and the north of Germany, some new German States, perhaps even Russia; at least so king Frederick William flattered himself. This would be, according to that monarch, guaranteeing to France the harmlessness of the continent, thus leaving her the free employment of her means against England, and consequently deserving some sacrifices on her part. Such were the different points consigned to the prudence of M. Lombard.

This secretary of the king set out for Brussels warmly recommended by M. Haugwitz and M. de Talleyrand. He was deeply sensible of the honour of approaching and conversing with the First Consul. The latter, apprised of the dispositions in which

M. Lombard came, gave him the most brilliant reception, and took the best method of gaining access to his mind, which was to flatter him by unbounded confidence, and by revealing all his thoughts, even the most secret. For the rest, he could exhibit himself at that moment free from all disguise, without disadvantage, and he did so with a frankness and an exuberance of language that were overpowering. He had no wish, he said to M. Lombard, to acquire a single territory more on the continent; he wanted nothing more than the powers had secured to France by treaties, patent or secret: the Rhine, the Alps, Piedmont, Parma, and the maintenance of the present relations with the Italian Republic and Etruria. He was ready to recognise the independence of Switzerland and Holland. He was firmly resolved not to interfere any more in the affairs of Germany, after the Recess of 1803. He was intent on one thing only, that was to curb the maritime despotism of the English, insupportable assuredly to others as well as himself, since Prussia, Russia, Sweden, and Denmark had united twice in twenty years, in 1780 and 1800, to put an end to it. It was for Prussia to assist him in this task, for Prussia, who was the natural ally of France, who had received for some years a multitude of services from her, and who had still such important services to expect. If, in fact, he were victorious, but signally victorious, what might he not have it in his power to do for her? Had he not in his hands Hanover, that so natural, so necessary complement to the Prussian territory? And was not that an immense and certain return for the friendship which king Frederick William should show him on this occasion? But, to render him victorious and grateful, he must be seconded in an efficacious manner: an ambiguous good-will, a neutrality more or less extended, were trifling succours. It was requisite to assist him to close completely the coasts of Germany, to endure some momentary sufferings, and to connect himself with France by an open and positive union. What was called since 1795 the Prussian neutrality was not sufficient to ensure the peace of the continent. To render that peace certain, there must be a formal, public alliance, offensive and defensive, between Prussia and France. Then none of the continental powers would dare to form any plans. England would be manifestly alone, reduced to a struggle hand to hand with the army of Boulogne, and, if to the prospect of this struggle were added the closing of the markets of Europe, she would either be obliged to compromise, or crushed by the formidable expedition preparing on the coast of the Channel. But for this, said the First Consul repeatedly, were required the effective alliance of Prussia, and a serious and entire concurrence on her part in the projects of France. Then he should succeed, then he should have it in his power to heap benefits on his ally, to make her a present which she did not ask for, but for which in her heart she ardently longed, that of Hanover.

The First Consul, by the sincerity and warmth of his explanations, and the dazzling brilliancy of his mind, had not duped M. Lombard, as a hostile faction in Berlin soon asserted, but fascinated and convinced him. In the end, he had persuaded him that he contemplated nothing against Germany, that all he wanted was to procure himself means of action against England, and that a magnificent aggrandizement would be the price of a frank and sincere concurrence on the part of Prussia. As for the concessions desired by M. Lombard, the First Consul made him sensible of the serious inconveniences attending them; for, to leave British commerce to act freely while he was engaged in a war, which, till the quite uncertain day of the descent, would be of no consequence to England, would be abandoning to her all the advantages of the contest. The First Consul even went so far as to declare that he was ready to indemnify the suffering commerce of Silesia at the expense of the French treasury. Still, in case Prussia consented to an alliance offensive and defensive, he was disposed, in such an interest, to make some of the concessions desired by king Frederick William.

M. Lombard, convinced, dazzled, enchanted by the familiarities of the great man, whose slightest attentions even princes appreciated with pride, set out for Berlin, disposed to communicate to his master and to M. Haugwitz all the sentiments with which his soul was filled.

The First Consul, after keeping a brilliant court at Brussels, having nothing further to detain him in Flanders, while the works ordered on the coast were not more advanced, set out on his return to Paris, where he had every thing to do in the two-fold departments of administration and diplomacy. He passed through Liege, Namur, and Sedan, was everywhere received with transport, and arrived in the beginning of August at St. Cloud.

While continuing to issue orders from Paris for the preparations for his great expedition, he was anxious to clear up and to fix definitively his relations with the great powers of the continent. In the uneasiness of Prussia he had clearly discerned Russian influence; he discerned that influence elsewhere, that is to say in the ill-will shown him at Madrid. The Spanish cabinet refused, in fact, to explain itself respecting the execution of the treaty of St. Ildefonso, and alleged that, as the Russian mediation yet afforded hope of a pacific termination, it was necessary to await the result of that mediation before taking a decided part. Other circumstances had disagreeably affected the First Consul: I allude to the evident partiality of Russia in the attempt at mediation which she had lately made. While the First Consul had accepted that mediation with entire deference, and England, on the contrary, had thrown difficulties of all sorts in its way, sometimes refusing to trust Malta to the hands of the mediating power, sometimes entering into endless arguments on the extent of the



negotiation, Russian diplomacy leaned rather to England than to France, and seemed to appreciate neither the deference of the one nor the ill-will of the other. The proposals recently forwarded from Petersburg revealed that disposition in the clearest manner. Russia declared that, in her opinion, England ought to give up Malta to the Order of St. John of Jerusalem; but that, in return, it would be right to grant to her the island of Lampedosa; that France ought moreover to give an indemnity to the king of Sardinia; to recognize and respect the independence of the States situated in her vicinity; to evacuate for good, not only Tarento and Hanover, but the kingdom of Etruria, the Italian Republic, Switzerland, and Holland.

These conditions, acceptable in some respects, were wholly unacceptable on all the rest. To concede Lampedosa in compensation for Malta was giving the English the means of making with money, which they never were in want of, a second Gibraltar in the Mediterranean. The First Consul had well nigh assented to it in order to preserve peace. Now, involved in war, full of hopes of success, he was no longer willing to make such a sacrifice. To indemnify the king of Piedmont was not a difficulty for him; he was disposed to devote Parma or an equivalent to this purpose. To evacuate Tarento and Hanover, on the re-establishment of peace, would be a natural consequence of peace itself. But to evacuate the Italian Republic, which had no army, Switzerland, Holland, which were threatened with an immediate counter-revolution if the French troops were withdrawn, was desiring that States, which France had acquired the right to dispose of by ten years' wars and victories, should be given up to her enemies. The First Consul could not consent to such conditions. What decided him still more powerfully not to suffer that mediation to continue was the form in which it was offered. The First Consul had assented to an arbitration, supreme, absolute, and without appeal, of the young emperor himself, for it was interesting the honour of that monarch to be just, and obtaining a certainty of a speedy conclusion. But to refer the matter to the partiality of Russian agents, all of them devoted to England, was subscribing to a disadvantageous and endless negotiation.

He declared, therefore, after discussing the proposals of Russia, after showing the injustice and the danger of some, that he was still ready to accept the personal arbitration of the czar himself, but not a negotiation conducted by his cabinet in a manner not at all friendly to France, and so complicated that one could not hope to see the end of it; that he thanked the cabinet of St. Petersburg for its good offices, but declined to avail himself of them any further, leaving to war the task of restoring peace. The declaration of the First Consul concluded with these words, deeply impressed with his character: "The First Consul has done every thing to preserve peace; his efforts have been vain; he could not help seeing that war was the decree of Fate. He will make war,



and he will not flinch before a proud nation, capable, for these twenty years, of making all the powers flinch from it." (August 29, 1803.)

M. de Markoff was coolly treated, and so he deserved to be, for his language and his attitude in Paris. The invariable approver of England, of her pretensions, of her conduct, he was the avowed detractor of France and of her government. When he was told that in this way he did not conform to the intentions, apparent at least, of his master, who professed a strict impartiality between France and England, he replied that *the emperor had his opinion but the Russians had theirs*. It was to be feared that he would draw upon himself some storm like that which lord Whitworth had experienced, and even still more disagreeable, because the First Consul had not the consideration for M. de Markoff, which he professed for lord Whitworth.

The thread of this false mediation once cut, still without breaking with Russia, the First Consul resolved to oblige Spain to explain herself, and to say how she intended to execute the treaty of St. Ildefonso. The question was whether she would take part in the war, or whether she would remain neuter; paying France a subsidy, instead of furnishing succours in men and ships. Till this question was settled, the First Consul could not turn his whole attention to his expedition.

Spain felt extreme repugnance to come to a decision; and this feeling had produced sentiments most unfavourable to France. It was certainly onerous to have to follow a neighbouring power in all the vicissitudes of its policy; but in entering, by the treaty of St. Ildefonso, into the engagements of an offensive and defensive alliance with France, Spain had contracted a positive obligation, the consequences of which it was impossible to contest. Independently of this obligation, that power must have unworthily degenerated, to wish to keep aloof when the question of maritime supremacy was about to be discussed for the last time. If England proved victorious, it was evident that Spain had no longer either commerce, or colonies, or galleons, or, in short, any thing that for three centuries constituted her greatness and her wealth. When the First Consul pressed her to act, he pressed her not only to fulfil a formal engagement, but to fulfil the most sacred duties towards herself. Bearing in mind her present imbecility, he left her neuter, and, in thus allowing her to receive the piastres of Mexico, he asked her to devote part of them to a war waged for the common benefit, to pay, in short, in money when she could not pay in blood, the debt incurred on account of the liberty of the seas.

Our relations with Spain, impaired, as we have seen, on occasion of Portugal, somewhat improved since, owing to the vacancy of the duchy of Parma, were again so changed as to have become absolutely hostile. They were complaining every day at Madrid of having ceded Louisiana for the royalty of Etruria, which was called nominal, because French troops guarded Etruria, incapable

of guarding itself. It was said that, if France wanted to alienate that valuable colony, it was to the king of Spain that she ought to have addressed herself, not to the Americans, who would become dangerous neighbours for Mexico; that, if France had restored that colony to Charles IV., he would have undertaken to save it from the hands of the Americans and of the English. It was ridiculous, in fact, for people who were about to lose Mexico, Peru, and all South America, to pretend to be able to keep Louisiana, which was not Spanish either in manners, mind, or language. In Madrid, this alienation of Louisiana was made so serious a grievance, and one of such importance, against France, that the government held itself released from all obligation towards her. The real motive of this humour was the refusal of the First Consul to add the duchy of Parma to the kingdom of Etruria; a compulsory refusal at the moment, for he was obliged to keep some territories to indemnify the king of Piedmont, since an indemnity was so urgently demanded for that prince; and, besides, the Floridas, after the cession of Louisiana, were not an acceptable object of exchange. In its conduct towards France, the cabinet of Madrid did not confine itself to the attitude of ill-humour; it had gone to much greater lengths. Our commerce was unworthily treated. Vessels had been seized upon pretext of smuggling and their crews sent to the presidios in Africa. All the remonstrances of persons of our nation were unheeded, and the ambassador was no longer answered upon any subject. To crown this ill-usage, French vessels had been suffered to be taken in the roads of Algesiras and Cadiz, under the very fire of the Spanish guns: this, putting all alliance out of the question, constituted a violation of territory, which it was disgraceful to put up with. The squadron which had taken refuge in Corunna: was, on a false allegation of quarantine, kept outside the harbour, in which it might have found itself safe. The crews were suffered to die on board for want of the most indispensable resources, and for want, in particular, of the salubrious air on shore. This squadron, blockaded by an English fleet, could not put to sea again without rest, without a considerable refit, and without a supply of provisions and ammunition. All this was refused it even for money. Lastly, out of a bravado, which crowned all these proceedings, while the Spanish navy was left in a state of pitiable decay, extraordinary attention was paid to the army, and the militia was organized, as if to prepare for a national war against France.

What could thus drive into the abyss the stupid favourite whose sway debased the noble blood of Louis XIV. and reduced a brave nation to the most disgraceful impotence? Want of sequence of ideas, wounded vanity, indolence, incapacity, such were the miserable movers of that usurper of Spanish royalty. He had formerly leant to France; this was quite sufficient for his inconstancy now to incline to England. The First Consul could not dissemble his contempt, while the English and the Russian

agents, on the contrary, overwhelmed him with flatteries; then, and above all, France required of him courage, activity, a good administration of the Spanish affairs; this was more than enough to make him detest so troublesome an ally. All this will end, said the First Consul, in "*a clap of thunder*." Thus did sinister flashes announce the lightning hidden in the bosom of that thick cloud, which began to gather over the ancient throne of Spain.

The sixth of the camps formed on the shores of the Ocean was at Bayonne. The preparations were accelerated and augmented so as to compose a real army. Another force was collecting towards the eastern Pyrenees. Augereau was appointed commander-in-chief of these different corps of troops. The ambassador of France was ordered to demand of the court of Spain the redress of all the grievances which it had to complain of, the release of the French who were confined, with an indemnity for the losses which they had sustained; the punishment of the commandants of the forts of Algesiras and Cadiz, which had suffered French ships to be taken within reach of their guns; the restitution of the captured vessels; admission for the squadron which had taken refuge at Corunna into the docks of Ferrol; its immediate refit and revictualling, to be charged to the account of France; the disbanding of all the militia; and lastly, at the option of Spain, either the stipulation of a subsidy, or the equipment of the fifteen ships and the 24,000 men promised by the treaty of St. Ildefonso. General Beurnonville was to communicate these express requisitions to the prince of the Peace, and to say that, if the court of Madrid persisted in its silly and culpable conduct, it was on him that the indignation of the French government would fall; that, on entering the country, it would denounce to the king and the people of Spain the degrading yoke under which they were held, and from which they came to deliver them. If this declaration made to the prince of the Peace had no effect, general Beurnonville was to apply for an audience of the king and queen, to repeat to them what he had said to the prince, and, if he did not obtain justice, to retire from court, and wait for further instructions from Paris.

General Beurnonville, impatient to put an end to intolerable insults, lost no time in calling upon the prince of the Peace, to tell him the harsh truths which he was instructed to communicate to him; and, to leave no doubt of the seriousness of these threats, he placed before him several passages of the despatches of the First Consul. The prince of the Peace turned pale, dropped a few tears, was alternately mean and arrogant, and concluded with declaring that M. d'Azara had instructions to adjust matters in Paris with M. de Talleyrand; that, for the rest, this affair did not concern him, the prince of the Peace; that in listening to the ambassador of France he was overstepping his part, for he was generalissimo of all the Spanish armies, and had no other function in the State; and that, if the ambassador had any declaration to

make, it was to the minister for foreign affairs, and not to him, that it ought to be addressed. He even refused a note which general Beurnonville was to deliver at the conclusion of this conference. "Monsieur le prince," said the general in this dilemma, "there are fifty persons in your antechamber. I will call them to witness your refusal to receive a note of importance to the service of your king, and to attest that, if I am not able to do my duty, the fault rests with you alone, not with me." The prince, intimidated, received the note, and general Beurnonville withdrew.

Making a point of executing his instructions in their fullest extent, the ambassador desired to see the king and queen, found them surprised, dismayed, seeming not to comprehend what was passing, and repeating that the chevalier d'Azara had received instructions to arrange every thing with the First Consul. Our ambassador left the court, broke off all communication with the Spanish ministers, and hastened to inform his government of what he had done, and the trifling result which he had obtained.

M. d'Azara had, in fact, received a communication most singular, most indecorous, and most disagreeable to him. That clever and discreet Spaniard was a sincere partisan of the alliance of Spain with France, and a personal friend of the First Consul's ever since the war in Italy, during which he had performed a conciliatory part between the French army and his Holiness. Unluckily, he was not careful enough to conceal the grief and disgust which the state of the Spanish court excited in him ; and that court, in its displeasure, attributed the disesteem in which it was held to the ambassador who deplored it. He was, so it was said in the despatches just addressed to him from Madrid, he was the humble servant of the First Consul ; he informed his court of nothing ; he knew not how to save it from any exigency. They went so far as to declare that, if the First Consul had not been so anxious to keep him in Paris, another representative would have been chosen. Thus, without dismissing him, the government provoked his resignation. It instructed him, as the only conclusion, to offer France a subsidy of two millions and a half per month, declaring that this was all Spain could do, and more than that sum it was absolutely impossible for her to pay. M. d'Azara transmitted this proposal to the First Consul, and then sent off a courier to Madrid with his resignation.

The First Consul sent for M. Hermann, secretary of embassy, who had had personal relations with the prince of the Peace, and charged him with his orders for Madrid. M. Hermann was to intimate to the prince that he must either submit, or expect an immediate downfall, prepared by means which M. Hermann had in his portfolio. The First Consul had written a letter to the king, in which he denounced to that unfortunate monarch the misfortunes and the disgrace of his crown, but in such a manner as, without offending, to awaken a sense of his dignity : he then

gave him his choice between the removal of his favourite or the immediate entry of a French army. If the prince of the Peace, after he had seen M. Hermann, did not instantly, without shuffling, without sending off to Paris, give complete satisfaction to France, general Beurnonville was to demand a solemn audience of Charles IV., and to put into his own hands the thundering letter of the First Consul. Twenty-four hours afterwards, if the prince of the Peace were not dismissed, general Beurnonville was to leave Madrid, and to send Augereau directions to cross the frontier.

M. Hermann, proceeded with all expedition to Madrid. He saw the prince of the Peace, signified to him the demands of the First Consul, and this time found him not mean and arrogant, but mean only. A Spanish minister, intent on defending the interests of his country, or worthily representing his king and not covering him with ignominy, would have braved disgrace, death, any thing rather than such a display of foreign authority. But the indignity of his position left the prince of the Peace without any resource of energy. He submitted, and affirmed, upon his word of honour, that instructions had been sent to M. d'Azara, with power to consent to all that the First Consul demanded. This answer was brought to general Beurnonville. The latter, who had orders to require an immediate solution, and not to be put off with a new despatch to Paris, declared to the prince that he had express injunctions not to believe his word, and to require a signature in Madrid itself, or to deliver the fatal letter to the king. The prince of the Peace repeated his sorry story that every thing was settled at the moment in Paris, and agreeably to the wishes of the First Consul. That wretched court conceived that it was saving its honour in leaving to M. d'Azara the pitiful part of submitting to the will of France, and moving the spectacle of its humiliation to the distance of four hundred leagues. General Beurnonville then deemed it his duty to deliver to the king the letter of the First Consul. The directors of the king, that is the queen and the prince, would have refused the audience, but then a courier would have ordered Augereau to enter Spain. They devised a way of arranging matters. They advised Charles IV. to receive the letter, but persuaded him not to open it, because it contained expressions which might be offensive. They endeavoured to prove to him that, by receiving it, he would spare himself the entry of the French army, and that by not opening it he would save his dignity. Things were arranged accordingly. General Beurnonville was admitted at the Escorial, into the presence of the king and queen, but not of the prince of the Peace, whose exclusion he had orders to insist upon, and delivered to the Spanish monarch the overwhelming denunciation of which he was the bearer. Charles IV., with a cheerfulness which proved his ignorance, said to the ambassador, "I receive the letter of the First Consul, since it must be so, but I will soon



return it to you without opening it. You will know in a few days that you might have spared yourself the trouble, for M. d'Azara was directed to settle the whole business in Paris. I esteem the First Consul; I am disposed to be his faithful ally, and to furnish him with all the succours that my crown has at its disposal." After this official answer, the king, assuming a tone of familiarity quite unworthy of the throne and of the present occasion, spoke in terms of embarrassing vulgarity concerning the impetuosity of his friend general Bonaparte, and his determination to forgive him every thing rather than break the union between the two courts. The ambassador withdrew confounded, painfully affected by such a spectacle, and considering it his duty to wait for another courier from Paris, before he sent word to general Augereau to march.

This time the prince of the Peace told the truth: M. d'Azara had received the necessary authority for signing the conditions imposed by the First Consul. It was agreed that Spain should remain neuter; that, instead of the succours stipulated in the treaty of St. Ildefonso, she should pay to France a subsidy of six millions per month, one third of which was to be reserved for the settlement of the accounts existing between the two governments; that Spain should discharge at a single payment the instalments due for the four months which had elapsed since the beginning of the war, that is, sixteen millions. An agent named Hervas, who transacted financial business for the court of Madrid in Paris, was to go to Holland to negotiate a loan with the house of Hope, consigning to it dollars, to be brought from Mexico. It was understood that, if England declared war against Spain, the subsidy was to cease. As the price of these succours, it was stipulated that, if the plans of the First Consul against Great Britain should succeed, France should restore to her ally Trinidad in the first place, and in the next, in case of a complete triumph, the celebrated fortress of Gibraltar.

This convention being signed, M. d'Azara persisted, nevertheless, in resigning his post, though without fortune and destitute of every resource for cheering a precocious age. He died in Paris a few months afterwards. The prince of the Peace had moreover so little dignity as to write to his agent Hervas, and to order him to arrange, as he expressed it, all his personal affairs with the First Consul. All that had passed was, according to him, only a mistake, only one of those ordinary tiffs between persons who are attached to one another, and who are afterwards better friends than before. Such was this personage; such were the energy and elevation of his character.

It was now autumn: the unfavourable season was approaching, and one of the three occasions reputed to be the best for crossing the strait was about to occur with the fogs and the long nights of winter. The First Consul was, therefore, unremittingly engaged with his grand enterprize. The end of the quarrel with Spain



had come very seasonably, not only to supply him with pecuniary resources, but to give back to him part of his disposable troops. The assemblages formed towards the Pyrenees were dispersed, and the corps composing them marched towards the Ocean. Several of these corps were placed at Saintes, quite handy for the Rochefort squadron. The others were ordered to proceed to Bretagne to be embarked in the great Brest squadron. Angereau commanded the camp formed in that province. The plan of the First Consul was gradually matured in his mind: he thought that, to give the more annoyance to the British government, the attack ought to be made on several points at once, and that part of the 150,000 men destined for the invasion ought to be thrown into Ireland. Such was the aim of the preparations making at Brest. Decrès, the minister, had conversed with the fugitive Irish, who had already attempted to separate their country from England. They promised a general rising in case 18,000 men were landed, with a complete *materiel*, and a great quantity of arms. They required that, in return for their efforts, France should not make peace without insisting on the independence of Ireland.

The First Consul assented to this, on condition that a corps of 20,000 Irish should have joined the French army and fought along with it during the expedition. The Irish were confident, and prolific in promises, as all emigrants are; yet there were some among them who gave no great hopes, who would not even promise any effective aid on the part of the population. At any rate, according to these latter, one might expect to find them friendly; and this would be enough to afford a support to our army, to give serious embarrassment to England, and to paralyze perhaps forty or fifty thousand of her soldiers. The expedition to Ireland would have the further advantage of keeping the enemy in doubt respecting the real point of attack. But for this expedition, in fact, England would have believed that there was but one plan, that of crossing the strait for the purpose of marching an army upon London. On the contrary, with the preparations at Brest, many people imagined that what was doing at Boulogne was a feint; and that the real plan consisted in a great expedition to Ireland. The doubts excited on this point were at first an extremely useful result.

The squadron lying at Ferrol was at last admitted into the docks, began to be refitted, and was supplied with refreshments, of which the crews had great need. That at Toulon was preparing. In Holland they began to equip the squadron of large ships, and to collect the mass of boats necessary to form the Batavian flotilla. But it was at Boulogne, in particular, that every thing was carried on with wonderful ardour and rapidity.

The First Consul, full of the persuasion that one ought to see every thing with one's own eyes, that the most trusty agents are often inaccurate in their reports, for want of attention or intel-

ligence, if not from wilful falsehood, had created for himself at Boulogne a residence, where he purposed to sojourn frequently. He had hired a small *château* in a village called Port des Briques, and had fitted it up with every thing necessary for lodging himself and his military household. Setting out from St. Cloud at night, and travelling the sixty leagues from Paris to Boulogne with the rapidity with which princes in general run after vulgar pleasures, he reached the theatre of his immense labours about the middle of the next day, and made a point of examining every thing before he took a moment's sleep. He had required admiral Bruix, worn out with fatigue, sometimes agitated by his quarrels with Decrès, the minister, to live not in Boulogne itself, but on the cliff, upon a height commanding a view of the port, the road, and the camps. Here had been erected a well-caulked hut, in which that man, so much to be regretted, ended his days, having incessantly before his eyes all the parts of the vast creation over which he presided. He made up his mind to an abode so dangerous to his declining health, in order to satisfy the restless vigilance of the head of the government.\* The First Consul had

---

\* I subjoin an extract from the correspondence of Decrès the minister, proving the devotedness of admiral Bruix to the enterprize, and well depicting the nature of his character : only his sufferings were less imaginary than Decrès represents, for he died in the following year.

*The Minister of the Marine and Colonies to the First Consul.*

Boulogne, January 7, 1804.

Citizen Consul,

Admiral Bruix had not disguised your dissatisfaction from himself, as it appeared to be a relief to him to find me disposed to talk over the subject in confidence with him. He fancies that he continually sees general Latouche\* at the gates of Boulogne, and this idea is very far from agreeable to him.

This affair, said he very nobly, is so great and so important that it cannot be entrusted to any but the man whom the First Consul shall think the most worthy. I am aware that no private consideration can be admitted, and if the First Consul thinks Latouche more capable, he will name him, and he will do right. For my part, at the point at which things have arrived, I cannot leave the game, but shall serve under Latouche.—But will your health permit you?—Yes, it must permit me ; and I am almost sure I shall be able.—The First Consul requires so much activity, and what an extraordinary example he sets of it himself!—Yes, indeed, I plainly perceived that it was a lesson which he was giving me, and that lesson shall not be lost.—What! you mean to enter into all the details, to inspect every boat?—Yes I will, because he desires it; though I am convinced that this method is not so good as mine, which is to let people go on and to show one's self but seldom.—But the First Consul?—Oh! he may always show himself, for he always subdues: but we who are not *he*, not even the Hephæstion of your Alexander, we ought in my opinion to show greater reserve. But he desires it, he expects it: and I will let him see that I can do all he wishes.

Such, citizen Consul, is the summary of part of my dialogue with him. He was wonderfully well, and, some generals having entered at the end of our conference and inquired how he did, he suddenly put on his dying look, and

---

\* Admiral Latouche Treville.

even had a similar hut built for his personal use close to the admiral's and there passed sometimes days and nights. He required generals Davout, Ney, Soult, to reside without intermission in the camps, to be personally present at the operations and manœuvres, and to report daily on the most trifling circumstances. General Soult, who was distinguished by a valuable quality, that of vigilance, was in this respect of great and continual utility. When the First Consul had received the daily communication of his lieutenants, which he answered at the moment, he set out to verify himself the accuracy of the reports transmitted to him, never believing any but his own eyes in all matters whatever.

The English had done their best to impede the execution of the works destined to protect the anchorage of Boulogne. Their cruizers, consisting in general of about twenty vessels, three or four of them seventy-fours, five or six frigates, ten or twelve brigs and cutters, and a certain number of gun-boats, kept up an incessant fire upon our workmen. Their balls, passing over the cliff, fell in the harbour and the camps. Though their projectiles had done very little damage, still this firing was extremely annoying, and, when a great number of boats were crowded together, might cause great mischief, perhaps, even a conflagration. One night even, the English, advancing most daringly in their pinaces, surprised the workshops in which the materials for the construction of the wooden fort were preparing, cut in pieces the machines used for driving piles, and did as much mischief to the works as it took several days to repair. The First Consul was greatly irritated at this attempt, and issued fresh orders for preventing the like in future. Armed boats, relieving one another, like sentries, were to pass the night around the works. The workmen, encouraged, piqued in their honour, like soldiers whom one is leading against an enemy, were induced to work in presence of the English ships and under the fire of their artillery. It was at low water only that the works could be prosecuted. When the heads of the piles were left sufficiently uncovered by the water for driving, the men fell to before the tide was out, and continued, while it was returning, up to the middle in water, singing as they worked, while the balls of the English were flying around them. The First Consul, however, with his inexhaustible fertility of invention, contrived new precautions to keep off the enemy. He caused experiments to be made on the coast, to ascertain the range of heavy cannon, fired at an angle of 45 degrees,

---

complained in a lamentable voice of the state of his health. Involuntary sacrifice to his old habit !

From all he said, it results that he trembles lest you should take the command from him, that he has not concealed from me that he entertains that fear, and that he has promised me to do in the greatest detail all that you have set him an example of, and to begin this very day.

DECEMBER

nearly as mortars are fired. The experiment succeeded; 24-pound balls were projected to the distance of 2300 fathoms, and the English were obliged to keep at that distance. He did still more; thinking incessantly on the same subject, he first devised an instrument, which at this day occasions frightful ravages, and which appears destined to produce powerful effects in maritime warfare—hollow projectiles employed against shipping. He ordered large shells to be fired at the vessels; these, bursting in the timber-work or the sails, could not fail to produce fatal breaches in the hull, or large rents in the rigging. It is with projectiles which burst, he wrote, that timber must be attacked. It is not easy to introduce any thing new, especially where there are old habits to be overcome, and he had to repeat frequently the same instructions. When the English, instead of those solid balls, which dash like lightning through every thing before them, but limit their ravages to their own diameter, beheld a projectile, having it is true less impulsion, but which explodes like a mine, either in the hull of the ship or on the heads of her defenders, they were surprised and kept at a great distance. Lastly, to obtain still more security, the First Consul devised an expedient not less ingenious. He conceived the idea of establishing submarine batteries, that is to say, he had batteries of heavy cannon and large mortars placed at low-water mark, which were covered by the sea at high water, and left uncovered at ebb-tide. It cost great trouble to secure the platforms on which the pieces rested, so as to prevent them from sinking into the sand or being buried by it. This was accomplished, however, and at ebb-tide, which was the time for work, when the English approached to disturb the men, they were received with discharges of artillery, poured all at once from the low-water line: so that the fire advanced or receded in a manner with the sea itself. These batteries were employed only while the forts were building; as soon as they were finished they became useless.\*

The wooden fort was first completed, owing to the nature of the construction. Solid platforms were laid on the top of the piles some feet above the level of the highest tides. This work was armed with ten pieces of large calibre and several mortars having a long range; and, as soon as it began to fire, the English ceased to appear off the entrance of the harbour. The whole line of the cliffs was protected by 24 and 36-pounders and mortars. About 500 pieces were placed in battery, and both French and English gave the coast the name of *Iron Coast*. During this interval, the forts of masonry were finished without any obstacle but from the sea. At the beginning of winter, in particular, the waves, lashed by the winds of the Channel, sometimes became so furious as to shake and to inundate the most solid and the loftiest

---

\* All the details here given are extracted from the original correspondence of admiral Bruix and Napoleon, to which we have already adverted.

works. Twice they carried away whole courses of building, and hurled the largest blocks from the walls commenced at the bottom of the sea. Those two important works, indispensable for the safety of the anchorage, were, nevertheless, continued.

During these operations, the troops, drawn nearer to the coast, had constructed their hovels and laid out their camps so as to resemble real military cities, divided into quarters, traversed by long streets. This business finished, they had gone back to the basin of Boulogne. The task was divided among them, and each regiment had to remove a certain portion of that prodigious bed of sand and mud, which lay at the bottom of the Liane. Some excavated the bed of the river itself, or the semi-circular basin; the others drove the piles destined to form quays. The ports of Vimereux and Ambleteuse, the construction of which was ascertained to be practicable, were already commenced. The sand and the mud had begun to be removed, and sluices were constructing for the purpose of excavating an entrance channel by repeated discharges of the water. Other detachments were engaged in laying out roads to connect the ports of Vimereux, Ambleteuse, Boulogne, and Etaples with one another, and those ports themselves with the neighbouring forests.

The troops employed in these laborious operations recruited themselves after they had accomplished their task, and those which had done removing mould performed manœuvres of all kinds, suitable for completing their training. Clad in the coarse dress of labourers, protected by wooden shoes from the dampness of the soil, well lodged, abundantly fed, thanks to the wages for their labour added to their pay, living in the open air, they enjoyed perfect health amidst the sharpest weather and a most inclement season. Content, occupied, full of confidence in the enterprise for which they were preparing, they were daily acquiring that two-fold force, physical and moral, which was to enable them to conquer the world.

The moment was come for concentrating the flotilla. The building of the boats of all kinds was almost everywhere finished. They had been taken down to the mouths of the rivers; they had been rigged and armed in the ports. The carpenters set at liberty in the interior had been formed into companies, and led, some to Boulogne, others to the neighbouring ports. It was proposed to employ them in jobbing and keeping the flotilla in repair, when once collected.

It was requisite, therefore, to proceed to those concentrations impatiently awaited by the English, who made sure of destroying even to the very last of our light vessels. Now it was that the resources of the mind of the First Consul were more particularly displayed. The divisions of the flotilla, which had to repair to Boulogne, were about to start from all points of the coast of the Ocean from Bayonne to the Texel, in order to rally in the Strait of Calais. They were to coast the shore, keeping constantly at a

very short distance from land, and running aground when too closely pressed by the English cruizers. One or two accidents which befel boats belonging to the flotilla suggested to the First Consul the idea of a system of succour equally effective and ingenious. He had seen some brigs run ashore to escape the enemy, and successfully assisted by the inhabitants of the neighbouring villages. Struck by this circumstance, he ordered numerous corps of cavalry to be distributed along the coast from Nantes to Brest, from Brest to Cherbourg, from Cherbourg and Havre to Boulogne. These corps of cavalry, divided by arrondissements, had with them batteries of horsed artillery, trained to manœuvre with extreme rapidity, and to gallop over the smooth sands left dry by the sea in receding. These sands are in general so solid as to be capable of bearing horses and carriages. Our squadrons, drawing artillery after them, were to patrol the beach incessantly, to advance or retire with the sea, and to protect the boats in their course by their fire. In general only pieces of small calibre are drawn by horses; the First Consul had carried the employment of all means so far as to have 16-pounders drawn by horses, and moving as rapidly as four or eight-pounders. He had insisted and carried his point, that every horse soldier, qualified for all the services, should submit to dismount to fire the pieces, or to run, carbine in hand, to the assistance of seamen aground on the coast. "The hussars," he wrote to the minister at war, "must be taught to recollect that a French soldier must be horseman, foot-soldier, artilleryman, that he must be competent to any thing." (Sept. 29th.) Two generals, Lemarrois and Sébastiani, were charged with the command of all this cavalry. They had orders to be incessantly on horseback, to make the squadrons manœuvre every day with their pieces, and to keep themselves constantly informed of the movements of convoys, in order to escort them in their progress.\*

---

\* The following letter, relative to a negligence committed, proves into what a state he had brought the coast:—

*To general Davout.*

October 30, 1803.

Citizen general Davout,—I have seen not without pain, from the report of the general of brigade Seras, that the English had time to plunder and destroy the rigging of the boat which ran aground between Gravelines and Calais. In the present state of the coast, no such circumstance ever happened on this side of Bordeaux. Detachments of cavalry and moveable pieces should have come up to prevent the English from plundering the vessel. This is the second time that boats aground on this coast have not been assisted. The fault lies with him whom you have appointed overseer of the coast. Give the inspection of the coast to two generals of brigade: one from Calais to Dunkirk, the other from Dunkirk to the Scheld. Let piquets of cavalry be so disposed as to cross each other incessantly, and let pieces, with horses, be so placed that, at the first signal, they may be able to reach in the least possible time the place where vessels have grounded. Lastly, these inspectors-general ought to be constantly on horseback, to make the land-batteries manœuvre, to inspect the coast-guard artillerymen, to escort the flotillas along the strand, whenever



This system produced, as we shall see, excellent results. The boats were formed into convoys of 30, 50, and even 60 sail. They were to begin about the end of September, to run out of St. Malo, Granville, Cherbourg, the river of Caen, Havre, St. Valery. There were not many beyond the point of Brest; but at any rate the English watched that part of our coast too closely to risk that trip before making numerous experiments. It was not the same commanding officer who conducted convoys all the way from the point of departure to the point of arrival. It was conceived that a naval officer well acquainted with the coasts of Bretagne, for example, would not know the coasts of Normandy or Picardy so well. They had been distributed, therefore, according to their local knowledge, and like coasting pilots, they never went out of the district assigned to them. They received the convoys at the limit of their district, directed them as far as the limit of the next district, and thus transmitted them from hand to hand to Boulogne. Troops were embarked in the boats, and even horses in those destined to receive them; they were laden, in short, precisely as they were to be during the passage from France to England. The First Consul had ordered the most minute attention to be paid to ascertain how they acted at sea under the load which they were destined to convey.

Towards the end of September (the beginning of Vendémiaire, year XII.) a first division composed of brigs, gun-boats, and pinaces, left Dunkirk, to double Cape Grisnez and proceed to Boulogne. Captain St. Haouen of the navy, an excellent officer, who commanded this division, though a very bold man, advanced with great caution. When he was off Calais, he suffered himself to be intimidated by a circumstance in reality of little importance: he saw the English cruizer sheer off, as though she were going to fetch other vessels. Apprehensive of being soon attacked by a numerous squadron, instead of crowding all sail to reach Boulogne, he ran into the harbour of Calais. Admiral Bruix, apprized of this blunder, hastened in person to the spot to remedy it if possible. The English, in fact, had soon appeared in considerable number, and it was evident that they would stick close to the port of Calais, to prevent the division which had put into it from getting out again. The admiral repaired to Dunkirk, to hasten the organization of a second division which was ready in that harbour, and to send it off to the assistance of the first.

The English were before Calais with a considerable force, including several bomb-vessels. On the 27th of September (4th Vendémiaire) they threw a great number of bombs into the town and harbour. They killed one or two men but hit none of the vessels. The horse-batteries galloped up to the beach, answered

---

they put themselves in motion. Let me know the name of all the posts that you shall have established, and the places where you shall have stationed moveable pieces.

them with a well-sustained fire, and obliged them to sheer off. They retired, quite confounded at having produced so little effect. Next day, admiral Bruix ordered St. Haouen's division to sea in the teeth of the enemy's cruizers, to prevent a new bombardment, and, according to circumstances, to double Cape Grisnez and proceed to Boulogne. The second division from Dunkirk was to sail at the same time under the command of captain Pevrieux, and to support the first. Rear-admiral Magon, who commanded at Boulogne, had orders on his part to run out of that port with every thing that was disposable, and to keep under sail for the purpose of lending a hand to the divisions of St. Haouen and Pevrieux, if they should double Cape Grisnez.

On the morning of the 28th of September (5th Vendémiaire, year XII.) captain St. Haouen boldly ran out of Calais and advanced to within cannon-shot. The English made a movement to get to windward. Captain St. Haouen, skilfully taking advantage of this movement, which carried them from him, made all sail for Cape Grisnez. But he was overtaken by the English a little beyond the cape, and soon assailed by a violent fire of artillery. One would have supposed that a score of enemy's ships, some of them of large size, ought to have run down our light vessels; but nothing of the sort took place. Captain St. Haouen continued his progress amidst the English balls, without suffering much from them. A battalion of the 46th and a detachment of the 22nd, embarked in these vessels, worked the oars with admirable coolness, under a very brisk but fortunately not destructive fire. At the same time, the horsed batteries on the beach had hastened up and replied with advantage to the guns of the English ships. At length, in the afternoon, captain St. Haouen came to an anchor in the road of Boulogne, joined by the detachment which had sailed from that port under the command of rear-admiral Magon. The second division from Dunkirk had advanced on its part to within sight of Cape Grisnez; but, detained by calm and tide, it was obliged to anchor off an uncovered coast. In this position it continued till the moment when the current changing should carry it towards Boulogne. It had no wind and was obliged to use the oars. Fifteen English vessels, frigates, cutters, and brigs, were waiting for it at Cape Grisnez. At that point the depth of water being greater, and the English cruizers able to approach the shore while our vessels had not the resource of running aground, it was natural that great fears should be entertained for them: but they passed like those of the preceding day; our soldiers working the oars with extraordinary intrepidity, and the English receiving from our batteries on shore more injury than they could do to our gun-brigs. The Boulogne flotilla and St. Haouen's division, which had entered the preceding day, had again left to go to meet the division of Pevrieux. They joined it at a height called the Tour de Croy, before Vimereux. The three united divisions there brought to; and, ranging themselves in line, and presenting their head,

armed with guns, made direct for them, keeping up a very brisk fire. This fire lasted two hours. Our light vessels sometimes hit the large English ships, but were rarely hit by them. In the end the English sheered off, some of them so damaged as to be obliged to go to the Downs. One of our brigs, the only one to which this accident happened, perforated through and through by a ball, had time to get to the beach before running aground.

This action, followed subsequently by many others, much more important and sanguinary, produced a decisive effect on the opinion of the navy and army. It was seen that these light vessels would not be so easily sunk by large ships, and that they would oftener hit than be hit by their gigantic adversaries: it was seen what assistance might be derived from the co-operation of land-troops, which, without any training had worked the oars and the marine artillery with extraordinary address, and above all shown no fear of the sea and great zeal in seconding the sailors.\*

No sooner had this first experiment been made than the greatest ardour was shown to repeat it. Numerous convoys sailed successively from all the ports in the Channel for the general rendezvous of Boulogne. Several naval officers, captains St. Haouen and Pevrieux, whose names have just been mentioned, and captains Hamelin and Daugier, distinguished themselves by their courage and skill in these coasting expeditions. Our vessels, sometimes using the sails, sometimes the oars, kept close in shore at a very small distance from detachments of cavalry and artillery ready to protect them. They were rarely obliged to betake themselves to the beach, for they navigated almost always in sight of the English, supporting their fire, and sometimes lying-to, when they had time, to face the enemy, and to show their head armed with guns of large calibre. Frequently they obliged brigs, cutters, and even frigates to sheer off. If they foundered on some occasions, it was rather owing to bad weather than to the force of their adversaries. When this did happen, the English threw themselves into boats to take possession of the stranded gun-brigs or pinnaces. But our artillerymen, hastening with their pieces to the beach, or our horse-soldiers, all at once changed into foot, almost into seamen, rushed amidst the breakers to the assistance of the sailors, kept off the English boats by the fire of their carbines, and obliged them to sheer off without any prize, nay, frequently after losing some of their most intrepid seamen.

In the months of October, November, and December, nearly a thousand vessels, gun-brigs, gun-boats, and pinnaces, sailing from all the ports, entered Boulogne. Out of this number the English took only three or four; and the sea destroyed no more than ten or twelve.

These short and frequent trips furnished occasion for many

---

\* We find these sentiments expressed in all the letters written from Boulogne, the day after these two actions.

useful observations. They revealed the superiority of the gun-brigs to the gun-boats. The latter were more difficult to work, made more lee-way, and above all, were defective in point of artillery. The defects of these gun-boats were owing to their construction, and their construction to the necessity for placing field-artillery in them. There was no help for this. The pinnaces left nothing to be desired in regard to working and speed. For the rest, they all went tolerably, even without the assistance of the sail. There were divisions which came from Havre to Boulogne, almost all the way with oars, at an average speed of two leagues an hour. A few alterations were to be made in the mode of stowing the articles on board, in order to produce an improvement in their trim.

The experience of these trips led to a change in the disposition of the artillery, which was immediately adopted throughout the whole flotilla. The heavy cannon placed fore and aft ran in grooves, in which they could only move forward or backward in a straight line. Hence the vessels, when about to fire, were obliged to turn about and to present either the head or the stern to the enemy. It was, therefore, impossible for them, when going, to reply to the fire of the English, because these then turned only their broadside. When lying in the road, the currents obliged them to take a position parallel to the coast, that is, to present their unarmed side to the enemy. This position was changed, when the steadiness of those vessels had been put to the test, and when it was insured by a better system of stowage. Carriages were built very like those of field-pieces, which allowed the gun to be pointed in any direction. With a little use, both landsmen and seamen became competent to practise this kind of firing with precision and without danger.

Particular care was taken to produce complete harmony between the seamen and the soldiers, by the constant appropriation of the same vessels to the same troops. The dimensions of the gun-brigs and gun-boats had been calculated for them to carry a company of infantry, besides some artillery. This was the element employed to determine the general organization of the flotilla. The battalions were then composed of nine companies; the demi-brigades of two war battalions, the third remaining at the dépôt. The gun-brigs and gun-boats were arranged in conformity with this composition of the troops. Nine brigs or boats formed a section, and carried nine companies, or one battalion. Two sections formed a division and carried a demi-brigade. Thus the boat or brig answered to the company, the section answered to the battalion, the division to the demi-brigade. Naval officers of corresponding rank commanded the boat, the section, the division. To produce a perfect coherence of the troops with the flotilla, each division was appropriated to a demi-brigade, each section to a battalion, each brig or boat to a company; and this appropriation once made was invariable. Thus the troops were always

keep the same vessel, and to attach themselves to it, as a rider attaches himself to his horse. Land and sea officers, soldiers and sailors, would by these means learn to know and to have confidence in one another, and be the more disposed to render each other mutual assistance. Each company was to furnish the vessel belonging to it with a garrison of twenty-five men, forming a fourth of the company, always on board. These twenty-five men, forming a fourth of the company, remained on board about a month. During this time, they lodged in the vessel with the crew, whether the vessel went to sea to manœuvre or lay in harbour. There they did all that the sailors themselves did, assisted in working the vessel, and exercised themselves in particular in the management of the oars and in firing the cannon. When they had passed a month in this kind of life, they were succeeded by twenty-five other soldiers of the same company, who came to devote themselves for the same space of time to nautical exercises. Thus the whole company in succession took its turn on board the brigs or boats. Each man, therefore, was alternately land soldier, sea soldier, artilleryman, sailor, and even labouring engineer, in consequence of the works carrying on in the basins. The sailors likewise took part in this reciprocal training. They had infantry arms on board, and, when they were in port, they performed the infantry exercise in the day-time on the quay. They formed consequently an accession of 15,000 foot-soldiers, who, after the landing in England, would be capable of defending the flotilla along the coasts, where it would be lying aground. By giving them a reinforcement of about 10,000 men, they might await with impunity on the shore the victories of the invading army.

The pinnaces, at first, were left out of this organization, because they were not capable of carrying a whole company and were fitter for throwing the troops rapidly on shore than for meeting an enemy at sea. Subsequently, however, they were formed into divisions and specially appropriated to the advanced guard, composed of the united grenadiers. In the interim, they were ranged in thirds of companies in port, and every day the troops to which vessels were not yet assigned went to practise, sometimes working them by oars, sometimes firing the light howitzer with which they were armed.

This settled, attention was directed to another not less important subject, the stowage of the vessels. The First Consul, in one of his journeys, caused some brigs, boats, and pinnaces, to be several times loaded and unloaded before him, and immediately decided upon their stowage.\* Balls, shells, ammunition, were assigned

---

\* *To citizen Fleurieu.*

“Boulogne, Nov. 16, 1803.

“I have passed the day here in superintending the equipment of a brig and a gun-boat. Here the stowage is one of the most important points in the plan of campaign, in order that nothing may be omitted, and the whole equally divided. Every thing is beginning to take a satisfactory turn.”



them by way of ballast, in sufficient quantity for a long campaign. In their holds were stowed biscuit, wine, spirits, salt provisions, Dutch cheese, enough to subsist the whole mass of men composing the expedition for twenty days. Thus the war flotilla was to carry, besides the army and its 400 pieces of cannon drawn by two horses, ammunition for a campaign, and provisions for twenty days. The transport flotilla was to carry, as we have said, the surplus of the artillery horses, the horses necessary for half the cavalry, two or three months' provisions, lastly, all the baggage. With each division of the war flotilla corresponded a division of the transport flotilla; and, in sailing, one was to follow the other. In each vessel, a sub-officer of artillery had the care of the ammunition; a sub-officer of infantry that of the provisions. Every thing was to be kept constantly embarked in the two flotillas, so that, on the signal for departure, there would be nothing to put on board but the men and the horses. The men, frequently exercised in getting under arms, and on board the flotilla, by demi-brigades, battalions, and companies, would take no more time than was required to go from the camps to the port. As for the horses, means had been contrived for simplifying and accelerating their embarkation in a surprising manner. How great soever might be the extent of the quays, it was not possible to range all the vessels alongside them. They were obliged to range them nine deep, the first only touching the quay. A horse, with harness grappling him tightly round the body, raised from the ground by means of a yard, transmitted nine times from yard to yard, was deposited in two or three minutes in the ninth vessel. In this manner men and horses might be put on board the war flotilla in two hours. It took three or four to embark the remaining nine or ten thousand horses in the transport flotilla. Thus, the heavy baggage being constantly on board, one would always be ready to weigh anchor in a few hours; and as it was not possible for so great a number of vessels to get out of the ports in the space of a single tide, the embarkation of the men and horses could never occasion any loss of time.

After incessantly repeated exercises, all these manœuvres came to be executed with equal promptness and precision. Every day, in all weathers, unless it blew a storm, from 100 to 150 boats went out to manœuvre or to anchor in the road before the enemy. The operation of a sham landing along the cliffs was performed. The men first exercised themselves in sweeping the shore by a steady fire of artillery, then in approaching the beach, and landing men, horses, and cannon. Frequently, when the boats could not get close to the shore, the men were thrown into the water where it was five or six feet deep. None were ever drowned, such was the dexterity and ardour which they displayed. Sometimes even the horses were landed in the same manner. They were let down into the sea, and men in small boats directed them



with a halter towards the shore. In this manner, there was not an accident that could happen in landing on an enemy's coast but was provided against and several times braved, with the addition of all the difficulties which could be thought of, even those of night,\* excepting, however, the difficulty of the fire; but that would rather be a stimulant than an obstacle for these soldiers, the bravest in the world by nature and by the habit of war.

This variety of land and sea exercises, these manœuvres intermixed with hard labour, interested these adventurous soldiers, full of imagination and ambitions, like their illustrious chief. With considerably better fare, thanks to the earnings of their labour added to their pay, continual activity, the keenest and most salubrious air, all this could not but give them extraordinary physical strength. The hope of performing a prodigy added a moral force equally great. Thus was gradually trained that incomparable army, which was destined to achieve the conquest of the continent in two years.

The First Consul spent great part of his time among them. He was filled with confidence, when he saw them so disposed, so alert, so animated with his own feelings. They in their turn received continual excitement from his presence. They saw him on horseback, sometimes on the top of the cliffs, sometimes at their feet, galloping over the sands, left smooth and hard by the receding tide, going in that manner by the strand from one port to another;† sometimes on board light pinnaces, going to be present at petty skirmishes between our gun-boats and the English

\* *To the consul Cambacérès.*

“Boulogne, November 9, 1803.

“I spent part of last night in making the troops perform night evolutions, a manœuvre which well-trained and well-disciplined troops may sometimes employ with advantage against levies *en masse*.”

† On the 1st of January, 1804, he thus wrote to the consul Cambacérès: “I arrived yesterday morning at Etaples, where I am writing to you in my hut. A south-west wind is blowing tremendously. I am just going to mount my horse, to ride along the strand to Boulogne.”

He wrote previously, on the 12th of November: “I have received citizen Consul, your letter of the 18th (Brumaire). The sea here continues to be very rough, and the rain to fall in torrents. Yesterday I was on horseback and in boat the whole day. That is the same thing as telling you that I was constantly drenched. In such a season as this one would do nothing if one cared about rain. Luckily, it does me no harm and I never was so well in my life.—Boulogne, Nov. 12.”

On the 1st of January, 1804, he wrote also to the minister of the marine: “To-morrow morning at eight, I shall inspect the whole flotilla, I shall see it by divisions. A commissary of the navy will call over all the officers and soldiers composing the crew. All will be at their post of battle, and in the greatest order. At the moment when I set foot in each vessel, the men will shout three times *Vive la République!* and three times *Vive le Premier Consul!* I shall be accompanied in this inspection by the engineer-in-chief, the commissary of equipment, and the colonel commanding the artillery. During the whole time of the inspection, the crews and the garrisons of the whole flotilla will remain at their posts, and sentinels will be placed to prevent any body from passing over the quay facing the flotilla.”

cruizers, pushing them upon the enemy, till he had made their cutters and frigates fall back by the fire of our frail vessels. Frequently he persisted in braving the sea, and once, having determined to visit the anchorage, in spite of a violent gale, the boat, in which he was returning, sunk not far from the shore. Luckily the men had footing. The sailors threw themselves into the sea, and, forming a close group to withstand the waves, carried him on their shoulders through the billows breaking over their heads.

One day, passing over the beach in this manner, he was animated by the sight of the coasts of England, and wrote the following lines to Cambacérès, the consul: I have passed these three days amidst the camp and the port. From the heights of Ambleteuse I have seen the coast of England, as one sees Calvary from the Tuileries. One could distinguish the houses and the bustle. It is a ditch that shall be leaped when one is daring enough to try. (16th November, 1803. *Archives of the Secretary of State's Office.*)

His impatience to execute this great enterprize was extreme.\*

---

\* The following letters sufficiently prove this impatience, and his desire to make the attempt in Nivôse or Pluviôse, that is in January or February. One of them is addressed to admiral Ganteaume, who for a moment commanded the Toulon fleet, before he was removed to that at Brest. The figures contained in these letters do not agree exactly with those given in our text, because it was not till rather later that the First Consul fixed the definitive number of men and vessels. We have adopted the numbers that were finally resolved upon.

*To Citizen Rapp.*

Paris, November 23, 1803.

You will be pleased to proceed to Toulon. You will deliver the accompanying letter to general Ganteaume; you will make yourself acquainted with the state of the fleet, the organization of the crews, and the number of ships in the road, or ready to move into it. Stay at Toulon till you receive further orders. Forty-eight hours after your arrival, send an extraordinary courier with general Ganteaume's answer to my letter. After the departure of this extraordinary courier, write to me every day what you have been doing, and enter into the minutest details respecting all the departments of the administration. Go every day to the arsenal for an hour or two. Learn by what route the 3rd battalion of the 8th light, coming from Antibes, with orders to repair to St. Omer to join the expedition, is to pass; go to the nearest point to Toulon through which it passes to inspect it, and let me know its condition.

Visit the Hieres Islands to see in what manner they are guarded and armed. Let me have a detailed report about every thing you see.

*To general Ganteaume, councillor of State, maritime prefect at Toulon.*

Paris, November 23, 1803.

Citizen general,—I am despatching to you general Rapp, one of my aides de camp; he will stay some days at your port, and will inform himself in detail of all that concerns your department.

I sent you word two months ago, that, in the course of Frimaire, I depended upon having 10 sail of the line, 4 frigates, and 4 cutters, ready to sail from Toulon, and that I wished this squadron to be supplied with four months' provisions for 25,000 men, good infantry troops, who were to go on board it. I desire that in forty-eight hours after the receipt of this letter by the express—

He had at first thought of the conclusion of autumn; now he was for deferring it till the beginning, or, at latest, the middle, of winter. But the labour was evidently increasing; and, some new improvement daily occurring either to him or to admiral Bruix, he sacrificed time in order to introduce it. The drilling of the soldiers and sailors was rendered more perfect by these inevitable delays, which thus brought along with them their own compensation. The projected expedition might, indeed, have been attempted after these eight months' apprenticeship: but it would require six more, if one were to wait till every thing was ready, till the equipping and arming were completed, till the training of the landsmen and seamen left nothing more to be desired.

But decisive considerations commanded a new delay; the principal being the backwardness of the Batavian flotilla, which was to form the right wing commanded by general Davout. On the wish expressed by the First Consul that a distinguished officer of the Dutch navy might be sent to him, rear-admiral Verhuel was despatched. Struck with the coolness and intelligence of this

dinary courier of general Rapp, you will let me know the precise day when a similar squadron will be ready to sail from Toulon, what you have in the roads, and ready to start at the moment of the receipt of my letter, and what you shall have on the 15th Frimaire and 1st Nivôse.

I am just come from Boulogne, where great activity at this moment prevails, where I hope to have assembled, by the middle of Nivôse, 300 gun-brigs, 500 boats, 500 pinnaces, each pinnace carrying a 36-pounder howitzer, each brig 3 guns, 24-pounders, and each boat one 24-pounder. Let me have your ideas concerning that flotilla. Do you think that it will take us to the coast of England? It is capable of carrying 100,000 men. Eight hours of night favourable for us, would decide the fate of the world.

The minister of marine has extended his tour to Flushing, to inspect the Batavian flotilla, composed of 100 brigs, 300 gun-boats capable of carrying 30,000 men, and the Texel fleet capable of carrying 30,000 men.

I have no need to urge your zeal; I know that you will do whatever is possible. Be assured of my esteem.

*To citizen Daugier, captain in the navy, commanding the battalion of sailors of the guard.*

Paris, January 12th, 1804.

Citizen Daugier,—I desire you to leave Paris in the course of the day, and to proceed direct to Cherbourg. You will there give orders for the departure of all the vessels of the flotilla which are in that port, and stay the time necessary for removing all obstacles and hastening the despatch of the boats. You will go to all the ports out of your road where you know that there are vessels belonging to the flotilla; hasten their departure, and give them instructions that vessels may not lie whole months in those ports, particularly at Dielette.

Perform the same errand at Granville and St. Malo as at Cherbourg. Write to me from both those ports.

Fulfil the same mission at Lorient, Nantes, Rochefort, Bordeaux, and Bayonne.

*The season is advancing; whatever has not reached Boulogne in the course of Pluviôse would be of no use to us. You must, therefore, urge and arrange the operations accordingly.*

You will inform yourself whether the dispositions which have been made for furnishing garrisons are sufficient in every port.

commander, he had begged that every thing connected with the organization of the Dutch flotilla might be intrusted to him: this was accordingly done, and the desired rapidity was soon communicated to the operations. This flotilla, prepared in the Scheld, was to be taken to Ostend, for one was aware of the danger of setting out from points so distant as the Scheld and Boulogne. By and by, hopes were entertained that it might be brought from Ostend to Ambleteuse and Vimereux, when these two ports should be completed. This would insure the immense advantage of weighing all together, that is to despatch 120,000 men, 15,000 sailors, and 10,000 horses, from four ports, all lying under the same wind, and contiguous to one another. But for this purpose it would take several months longer, both for the equipment of the Batavian flotilla and for the completion of the harbours of Vimereux and Ambleteuse.

Two other portions of the army of invasion were not ready—the Brest squadron, destined to throw Augereau's corps into Ireland, and the Dutch Texel squadron, destined to carry the corps of 20,000 men encamped between Utrecht and Amsterdam. These two corps, added to the 120,000 men in the camp of Boulogne, raised the total of the army of invasion to 160,000 men, exclusively of sailors. It would take some months longer before the Texel squadron and that at Brest were completely equipped.

A last condition of success was yet left to be secured, and this condition the First Consul considered equivalent to a certainty of the accomplishment of his enterprize. These vessels, now tried, were quite capable of crossing a strait ten leagues wide, since most of them had had one hundred or two hundred leagues to go to reach Boulogne, and had frequently by their scattered and horizontal fire replied with advantage to the downward and concentrated fire of the ships. They had a chance of passing, without being seen or attacked, either in the calms of summer or in the fogs of winter; and, under the most unfavourable supposition, if they were to fall in with the twenty-five or thirty cutters, brigs, and frigates which the English had cruising, they must pass, were it necessary to sacrifice a hundred brigs or boats of the 2300 composing the flotilla.\* But there was a case which appeared to be

---

\* Here is an extract from a letter of the minister Decrès, who had fewest illusions of any man about Napoleon, which proves that it was believed possible to pass with the sacrifice of about a hundred vessels :—

*The minister of the marine to the First Consul.*

Boulogne, January 7, 1804.

People begin to believe firmly in the flotilla, and that its departure is nearer at hand than was imagined, and they have promised me to prepare very seriously for it. They shut their eyes to its dangers, and will not see in it any thing but Cæsar and his fortune.

The ideas of all the subalterns extend no further than the road and its current. They reason about the wind, the anchorage, the line of moorings, like angels. As for crossing, that is your affair. You know more about it

exempted from every unlucky chance, namely, when a strong French squadron, appearing suddenly in the Strait, should drive the English cruizers from it, keep possession of the Channel for two or three days, and cover the passage of our flotilla. With this case, there could exist no doubt: all the objections raised against the enterprize fell at once, excepting that of an unforeseen storm, an improbable chance if the season were judiciously chosen, and moreover at all times wholly beyond the reach of calculation. But it was requisite that the third of the squadrons of ships of the line, that of Toulon, should be completely equipped, and it was not so. The First Consul destined it to execute a grand combination, the secret of which he communicated to none, not even to his minister of the interior. This combination he matured by degrees, saying not a word about it to any body, and leaving the English under the impression that the flotilla was to act independently, since it was armed so completely, and brought forward every day against frigates and ships of the line.

This man, so daring in his conceptions, was the most prudent of captains in the execution. Though he had 120,000 men assembled at his disposal, he would not stir without the co-operation of the Texel fleet carrying 20,000 men, without the Brest fleet carrying 18,000, without the fleets of La Rochelle, Ferrol, and Toulon, charged to clear the Strait by a profound manœuvre. He was anxious to have all these means ready for February, 1804, and flattered himself that he should, when important events in the interior of the Republic suddenly withdrew his attention for a moment from a great enterprize, on which the eyes of the whole world were fixed.

---

than they, and your eyes are better than their glasses. In every thing you do they have implicit faith.

The admiral himself is at fault there. He has never submitted any plan to you, because, in fact, he has none. Indeed, you never asked him for any. It is the moment of execution that will decide. Very possibly one may be obliged to sacrifice a hundred vessels, which will draw the enemy upon them, while the rest, dashing off at the moment of the attack on the latter, will get over without obstacle.

For the rest, a folio volume would not contain the development of the ideas which he has prepared on this subject. Which of them will be adopted? That circumstances must decide.

## BOOK XVIII.

### CONSPIRACY OF GEORGES.

Alarm excited in England by the Preparations at Boulogne—Effects usually produced upon England by War—First Impressions and Subsequent Alarm produced in London by the Proceedings of the First Consul—Means suggested for resisting the French, and Parliamentary Debates upon those Means—Return of Mr. Pitt to the House of Commons; Position taken by himself and his Friends—Military Strength of England—Mr. Wyndham proposes to raise a Regular Army similar to that of France—Ministers only proceed to form an Army of Reserve and raising Volunteers—Measures taken for protecting the Coast—The British Cabinet, resorting to the former Measures of Mr. Pitt, aid the Plots of the French Emigrants—Intrigues of Messieurs Drake, Smith, and Taylor, the English Diplomatic Agents—The Refugee Princes, in London, league with Georges and Pichegru, and plan an Attack, by a party of Chouans, upon the First Consul, on his Road to Malmaison; they apply to Moreau, the Principal of the Malcontents, with a View to obtain the Consent of the Army—Intrigues of Lajolais—Absurd Hopes founded upon some Expressions of general Moreau—First departure of a Band of Chouans, under the command of Georges; they land at Biville Cliff, and march across Normandy—Georges, concealed in Paris, makes Arrangements for the Execution of the Project—Second Debarkation, including Pichegru and other leading Emigrants—Interview of Pichegru and Moreau; the latter, so far embittered against the First Consul as to desire his Downfall and Death, but by no Means friendly to the Restoration of the Bourbons—Disappointment of the Conspirators; their Discouragement, and the consequent Loss of Time—The First Consul, ill-served by the Police subsequent to the Retirement of M. Fouché, discovers the Danger by which he is threatened, and sends some captured Chouans before a Military Commission, to compel them to confess what they know: he thus procures an Informer, and the whole Plot is revealed—Surprise that Georges and Pichegru are in Paris, and that Moreau is connected with them—Extraordinary Council and Determination to arrest Moreau—Feelings of the First Consul, favourable to the Republicans and irritated against the Royalists; his Determination to proceed without Mercy against the latter—He commissions the *Grand Juge* to summon Moreau before him, that all may be settled by a personal and friendly Explanation; this well-intended Procedure is rendered abortive by Moreau's bearing before the *Grand Juge*—The captured Conspirators unanimously depose that they were to be headed by a French Prince, who was to land in France at Biville Cliff—The First Consul determines that the Prince shall be seized and handed over to a Military Commission—Colonel Savary is despatched to Biville to await the Arrival of the Prince and arrest him—Fearful Laws denouncing Death to all who shall harbour the Conspirators—All Egress from Paris prohibited for several Days—Successive Arrests of Pichegru, of the Messieurs de Polignac, of M. de Rivière, and of Georges himself—Avowal of Georges that he had returned to waylay and despatch the First Consul—Renewed Statement that a French Prince was to head the Conspirators—Increasing Irritation of the First Consul—Fruitless Stay of Colonel Savary at Biville—Inquiries made as to the then Residences of the Bourbon Princes—attention is directed to the Duc d'Enghien, resident at Ettenheim, on the Banks of the Rhine—A Sub-officer of the Gendarmerie is sent thither to make Inquiries; erroneous Report of that Sub-officer, and its fatal Coincidence with a new Deposition of a Servant of Georges—Mistake and headlong Rage of the First Consul—Extraordinary Council, at which the Seizure of the Duc d'Enghien is determined upon; he is seized and conveyed to Paris—The Mistake is partially discovered, but too late—The Prince is sent before a Military Commission and shot in a Fossé of the Chateau of Vincennes—Character of this sad affair.



1

2

3

## BOOK XVIII.

## CONSPIRACY OF GEORGES.

ENGLAND began to be alarmed at the preparations which were making within sight of her shores, and to which, at the outset, she had paid but little attention.

To an insular country, which takes part in the great contests of nations, only with its commonly victorious navies, or, at the most, with armies performing the part of auxiliaries ; to such a country, war causes but little anxiety, and does not disturb the public rest, or even obstruct the daily progress of business. The stability of credit in London, in the midst of the greatest bloodshed elsewhere, is a most striking proof of this statement. If, to these considerations, we add that the army is composed of mercenaries, and that the fleet is manned with sailors to whom it is of but small consequence whether they live on board merchantships or men-of-war, and to whom, on the other hand, prizes hold out an infinite attraction, it will easily be perceived, that for such a country war is a burden felt only in the way of taxation ; a sort of speculation, in which so many millions are expended to procure so many additional markets. It is only for the aristocratic classes, who command those fleets and armies, who shed their blood in their duty as officers, and who aspire not only to conquer new markets for their country, but also to elevate her glory, that war reassumes all its gravity and perils ; though even for those classes it does not present its greatest anxieties, as the danger of invasion does not seem to exist for their ocean-belted territory.

This was the kind of war that Messrs. Wyndham and Grenville, and the weak ministry whom they led in their train, imagined that they had drawn down upon their country. In the time of the Directory, they had heard mention made of flat-bottomed boats ; but that mention had been made so often, and so vainly, that they at length had learned to give no credence to it. Sir Sydney Smith, possessing more experience, too, upon this subject, for he had seen, by turns, French, Turks, and English disembark in Egypt, sometimes in spite of the most efficient squadron ; at other times, in spite of excellent troops posted upon the shore—Sir Sydney Smith, in his place in parliament,

gave it as his opinion, that, strictly speaking, from sixty to eighty gun-boats might be assembled in the Channel, not more than a hundred, even allowing for exaggeration; and that from twenty-five to thirty thousand men was the extreme limit of the force that could be landed in England. According to that officer, the next most serious danger was the descent upon Ireland of a French army, numbering twice, or even thrice, that which had formerly landed in that island—an army, which, having, to a greater or less extent, disturbed and plundered the country, would surrender and lay down its arms, as the former expedition had done. Moreover, there were still smouldering enmities existing in Europe against France—enmities which would soon blaze up again, and recall the First Consul's forces to the continent. The most, then, that was to be feared, was a renewal of the early wars of the Revolution, further distinguished by some victories of general Bonaparte over Austria, but with all the ordinary chances of civil strife in so mutable a country as France, which, for fifteen years past, had not supported any one government for three years, and with the permanent advantage to England of new maritime conquests. Thanks to numerous blunders and mishaps, these views of the case have been realised; but, for several years, as we shall by and by perceive, the very existence of Great Britain was in great and imminent peril.

The news of the preparations that were in progress at Boulogne speedily dissipated the confidence of the English. They heard with surprise and anxiety of from a thousand to twelve hundred flat-bottomed boats (there were in reality upwards of two thousand), nevertheless, they consoled themselves by doubting whether they could be all collected, and, still more, whether they could be sheltered in the Channel ports. But the concentration of these flat-bottomed boats in the Strait of Calais, effected in spite of the numerous English squadrons; their excellent behaviour at sea and under fire; the construction of vast docks for their reception; the establishment of formidable batteries to protect them while at anchor; and the assemblage of 150,000 men ready for embarkation, destroyed, in succession the illusions of a presumptuous confidence. It was quite clearly perceived that preparations so vast were not made by way of a mere feint, and that the ablest and the most daring of mankind had been far too carelessly or wantonly provoked. It is true, there were Englishmen, of the old school, who still held a traditional confidence in the inviolability of their islands, and gave no credit to the rumours of impending peril; but the government and the party leaders did not deem the peril so doubtful as to justify them in leaving the safety or the ruin of England to blind chance. Twenty or even thirty thousand French, however brave and well officered and commanded they might be, would not have alarmed English statesmen; but 150,000 men, led by general Bonaparte, sent a shudder through all orders of the nation. Nor did that

prove any lack of courage, for the bravest people in the world might well be anxious and alarmed in presence of an army which had accomplished such great things, and was about to accomplish more.

This situation of England was rendered still more serious by the apathy of the continental powers. Austria would not for one or two millions of subsidy draw down upon herself the blows intended for England; Prussia had a community of interests, though not of sympathies, with France; and Russia blamed both the belligerent parties and constituted herself judge of their proceedings, but without a formal declaration in favour of either. Unless the French were to carry their arms farther north than Hanover, there was no chance, for that time, at least, of drawing Russia into the war; and it was evident that there was no intention of giving her that reason for taking up arms.

It was necessary, then, for England to make preparations co-extensive with the danger which threatened her. As far as her navy was concerned, England had but little to do to maintain her superiority to France. In the first instance, on the eve of the rupture with France, sixty ships of the line had been put into commission, and eighty thousand seamen raised; the number of ships was increased to seventy-five, and that of the seamen to a hundred thousand, subsequently to the declaration of war; a hundred frigates, and a whole host of brigs and cutters, completed this armament. Nelson, commanding a fleet of superior quality, both as to ships and men, was to cruize in the Mediterranean, blockade Toulon, and prevent any new attempt upon Egypt; admiral Cornwallis, in command of a second fleet, was ordered to blockade Brest, in person, and Rochefort and Ferrol by his senior captains; and lord Keith, commanding the fleets of the Channel and the North Sea, was at once to protect the coasts of England, and to watch the coasts of France. With Sir Sydney Smith for his second in command, he cruized, with seventy-fours, frigates, brigs, cutters, and a few gun-boats, from the mouth of the Thames to Portsmouth, and from the Scheld to the Somme, protecting the coast of England, on the one hand, and blockading the ports of France, on the other. A line of light craft, corresponding along all this extent of sea, by means of signals, were to give the alarm, should the least movement be perceived in our ports.

The English imagined that they had thus secured the inactivity of our squadrons at Brest, at Rochefort, at Ferrol, and at Toulon, and had secured a sufficiently strict *surveillance* in the Strait.

But something more was necessary to meet so novel a danger as that of an invasion of the British territory. The naval officers who were consulted had been almost unanimous in the opinion, formed on observation of the First Consul's preparations, that it was impossible to be secure against a descent on the English coast by the French forces, under favour of a fog, a calm,

or a long winter night. The modern Pharaoh might, indeed, be hurled into the abyss of waters ere he could touch the shore; but should he once succeed in disembarking, not with a hundred and fifty thousand men, but with a hundred thousand, or even with eighty thousand, how could he be resisted? This haughty nation, which had displayed so little concern for the sufferings of the continent, and had been so reckless in renewing a war prosecuted by the blood of foreigners, blood which she purchased by a lavish expenditure of treasure, was now obliged to rely upon her own strength, and to arm in defence of her soil, instead of intrusting that defence to mercenaries. She, so proud of her navy, now learned to regret that she had not competent land forces to oppose to the formidable soldiery of general Bonaparte.

The formation of an army, therefore, was now the chief subject of debate in the House of Commons. And as it is in the most perilous times that the spirit of party is ever the most ardently displayed, it was upon this question that the principal parliamentary personages met and combated each other.

The weak Addington administration remained in office, in spite of its blunders; it still, though but for a short time, had the direction of that war which it had so recklessly and criminally allowed to be renewed. The parliamentary majority knew this ministry to be unequal to the task which it had undertaken, but, unwilling to overthrow the cabinet, supported it against its adversaries, even against Mr. Pitt, though they wished to see him once more at the head of the government. That powerful leader of his party had returned to parliament, recalled thither alike by his secret impatience, the magnitude of his country's danger, and his detestation of France. More moderate, from the first, than his supporters, Wyndham, Grenville, and Dundas, a recent vote had warned him that still greater moderation was requisite; a vote of censure upon the ministry had been proposed, but only fifty-three voted in its favour. The great majority by which the censure was thus negatived entertained the desire very commonly felt in political bodies to place the most celebrated and able men at the helm of the State, without a preliminary overthrow and disgrace of the existing ministry. While anticipating his speedy return to office, Mr. Pitt took part in all debates, almost as though he had been minister, but rather to support and carry out the government measures than to oppose and thwart them.

The principal of these measures was the formation of an army. England had one composed of Irish, Scotch, Hanoverians, Hessians, Swiss, and even Maltese; this army, which had been got together by the skill of the recruiting officers who were so numerous in Europe previously to the establishment of the conscription system, was dispersed in India, America, and divers stations in the Mediterranean. As we have already seen, it had behaved extremely well in Egypt. This army numbered about one hundred and thirty thousand men; now, it is well known

that it requires very skilful management to have eighty thousand men perfectly fit for active service out of a force of one hundred and thirty thousand. To this force, a third of which was necessary for the protection of Ireland, there was added a militia which had recently been increased from fifty to seventy thousand men; a national force which could not be sent to serve out of its own county, and which had never faced an enemy. It was commanded by half-pay officers, and by English nobles and gentlemen, full of patriotism, undoubtedly, but as undoubtedly quite inexperienced in warfare, and quite unfit to be opposed to the veteran legions that had smitten down the European coalition. How was this insufficiency of land forces to be remedied? The ministry, surrounded by the most experienced soldiers, conceived the idea of forming an army of reserve, fifty thousand strong, to consist of Englishmen, drawn by ballot, and only to be liable to service within the limits of the United Kingdom; thus forming, to that extent, a supplement and reinforcement to the troops of the line. Substitutes were to be allowed; but would necessarily, under the circumstances, be very expensive. This, it is true, was not doing much, but it was all that could be attempted on the instant. Mr. Wyndham, siding with the war party, attacked this proposal on the ground of its insufficiency. He proposed the formation of a great army of the line, to be formed on the French principle of conscription, to be at the absolute orders of the government, and liable to be dispatched to any part of the world. He said that what the ministry had proposed was a mere increase of the militia; that it would be in no wise superior to that force, especially when in presence of the tried legions of France, and would obstruct the recruiting for the regular army by the proposed liberty of substitution, as individuals willing to serve would find it more advantageous to engage as substitutes for those drawn to serve in the army of reserve, than to enrol themselves in the regiments of the line; that a regular army formed of the native population, liable to serve wherever their services were required, and, consequently, having the means of acquiring warlike experience, was the only fitting force to oppose to the troops of General Bonaparte. To cut diamond, argued Mr. Wyndham, you require a diamond.

England, already possessed of a navy, was anxious to have a land force, too; a very natural ambition, for it is a rare thing for a nation to have one of those two powers without aspiring to the possession of the other. But Mr. Pitt replied to these proposals in a cold, dogmatical spirit. All Mr. Wyndham's ideas, argued Mr. Pitt, were excellent in the abstract, but how was an army to be formed in a few days? How seasoned to warfare? How fill up its ranks and provide it with competent officers? Such an army as Mr. Wyndham desired was not to be extemporized: what had been proposed by the ministry, was in fact, the only practicable course; and, indeed, even to organise, as pro-



posed, 50,000 men, to drill them, and provide them with competent officers of all ranks, would be found to be quite sufficiently difficult. Mr. Pitt, therefore, intreated that his friend Mr. Wyndham would, for the present, at least, give up his own plan and join with him in supporting that of the government.

Mr. Wyndham paid but little attention to the opinion pronounced by Mr. Pitt, persisted in his own plan, and supported it by new and more potent considerations. He even proposed a levy *en masse*, similar to that of France in 1792, and reproached the weak Addington ministry with not having turned its attention to this mighty resource of nations threatened in their independence. This enemy of France and of Napoleon, by a very common result of hatred, bestowed praises upon the objects of his detestation, and, in his anxiety to convict the English ministry of want of forethought, almost exaggerated our greatness, our power, and the danger with which the First Consul menaced England.

The army of reserve was voted, notwithstanding the contempt and ridicule bestowed upon it by the Wyndham party, who termed it an augmentation of the militia. This force was reckoned upon for the increase of the troops of the line; it was hoped that men whom the ballot condemned to serve would rather enrol themselves in this army than in any other; twenty or thirty thousand recruits would probably be thus thrown into its ranks.

Nevertheless, as the danger hourly became more imminent, and, still further, as continental co-operation daily became less probable, recourse was had to the proposition of the most ardent party, and something like an approach was made to realizing the notion of a levy *en masse*. Ministers required, and were allowed, the power to call to arms all Englishmen from the age of seventeen to that of fifty-five. Volunteers, or, in default of those, the men legally selected, were to be formed into battalions, and drilled for a certain number of hours weekly. They were to be allowed pay in compensation of their loss of time; but this regulation applied only to those volunteers who belonged to the labouring classes.

Mr. Wyndham, who could not but admit that his views were at length adopted, now complained that the adoption was both tardy and insufficient, and he severely criticised many of the details of the proposed measure. But the measure was voted, nevertheless, and ere long, in every county and town in England, the population, called to arms, was to be seen every morning at exercise in the volunteer uniform, which was now worn by men of all ranks. Even the staid Mr. Addington went down to the House of Commons in this uniform, and drew down some little ridicule upon himself by a display so little in accordance with his character and manners. The aged king, and his son, the prince of Wales, reviewed the volunteers on Wimbledon Common; and the exiled French princes, with an unpardonable want of propriety and taste,

were present at these reviews. There were some twenty thousand of these volunteers in London; this, it is true, was no very great number out of so vast a population, but in the whole extent of the country the number was sufficiently great to form an imposing force, had it only been sufficiently organized; but soldiers cannot be formed in a day, and still less can officers. If in France there was but little faith put in our flat-bottomed boats, there was still less faith in England in the value of their Volunteers, who were shrewdly judged to be deficient, not, perhaps, on the score of mere courage, but assuredly in aptitude for actual war. To these measures was added a plan of field fortifications around London upon the roads terminating at that capital, and upon those points of the coast most exposed to attack. A part of the active force was stationed from the Isle of Wight to the mouth of the Thames. A system of signals was arranged for giving the alarm by means of beacon fires to be lighted up all along the coasts at the first appearance of the French; and carriages of a peculiar form were built for the rapid conveyance of troops to whatever point might be menaced. In a word, in England, as in France, invention, was put to the rack for the discovery of new means of attack and defence to subdue the enemy, and to press them into the service as auxiliaries. The two nations, as though they had been irresistibly attracted to these opposite shores, presented there at this instant a most imposing spectacle to the gazing and anxious world. England, uneasy when she reflected upon the inexperience of her land forces, was cheered by the view of that ocean by which she was belted as with a protecting cestus; France, full of confidence in her courage, in her warlike experience and aptitude, and in the genius of her great chieftain, measured with her glance that broad arm of the sea which interposed an obstacle to the progress for which she panted, and rapidly learned to view that obstacle as one too trifling to arrest her, led as she would be by the triumphant hero of Marengo and of the Pyramids.

Neither of the two nations suspected the existence of other preparations than those which were publicly and even ostentatiously made. The English, imagining that Brest and Toulon were strictly blockaded, did not dream that a squadron might suddenly make its appearance in the Channel. The French, daily exercised in manœuvring their gun-boats, were on the other hand accustomed to look upon them as the sole means of crossing the Strait. No one suspected the existence of what was, in truth, the most important part of the First Consul's plan; though some hoped in France, and some feared in England, some new and sudden invention of his daring and fertile genius, and confidence and anxiety were thus to a very high degree excited on either side of the Channel.

It must be confessed that, supposing us fairly across the Channel, the preparations made to resist us were not very formidable. Supposing that, between the Channel and London,

there could be concentrated 50,000 troops of the line, and from thirty to forty thousand of the army of reserve, and any conceivable number of volunteers added to them, the force thus formed would, even in actual number, have fallen short of the French army that was to cross the straits. But even supposing the English force to be numerically twice or thrice as great as it was, what would such a force avail against the 150,000 veterans who, in eighteen months, led by Napoleon, combated and beat the armies of entire Europe, at Austerlitz, at Jena, and at Friedland; veterans apparently equal to the English in courage, certainly more skilled and practised in warfare, and four or five times more numerous! The land force of England, then, was in reality very insufficient, and her chief protection was the ocean still. In any event, whatever might be the final result, the conduct of the English government was already signally punished by the general agitation of all ranks of the people, by the enforced withdrawal of the working classes from their labour, the merchants from their business, and the nobility and gentry from their leisure and their pastimes; the duration of such an agitation for any considerable period would in itself be a great calamity, and might even convulse the social system.

The British government, in its great and well-founded anxiety, adopted every means of averting the danger which threatened the country; and, among those means some which morality repudiates. During the first war, the English cabinet had encouraged and suggested insurrections against every form of government which had existed in France. Latterly, though the powerful and sagacious rule of the First Consul left but little scope for such insurrections, the rebel-staffs of La Vendée and the emigration were retained in London, and profusely subsidized, even during the continuance of peace; and the tenacity with which the guilty tools of an ungenerous warfare were kept at hand, ready for use, had greatly contributed, as we have seen, to rekindle animosity between the two nations. It is quite true that diversions are among the ordinary resources of war, and to produce the insurrection of one of an enemy's provinces is a diversion which, as it is one of the most effective, is also one the least hesitatingly made available. In return for the endeavours of the English to cause a rising in La Vendée, the First Consul had met them by a like attempt upon Ireland: the measure was at once customary and reciprocal. But at the period now spoken of an insurrection of La Vendée was quite beyond the pale of probability. The employment, therefore, of the Chouans and their leader, Georges Cadoudal, could produce but one result, the endeavour to strike some abominable blow, such as that of the Infernal Machine. To urge an insurrection to the extent of overthrowing a government is a course of very disputable fairness; but to aim at overthrowing a government by personal attacks upon the members of it is a flagrant departure alike from morality and the laws of nations.

The facts of the case will sufficiently indicate the extent to which the British ministers were concerned in the criminal projects of the French emigrants who found an asylum in London. It will not be forgotten that of all the Vendean chiefs who had been formerly presented to the First Consul, the only one who had not been propitiated by him was Georges Cadoudal, the formidable chieftain of the Chouans of Morbihan. He was now living in London in a state of actual opulence, distributing among the French refugees the aid allowed them by the British government, and associating with the emigrant princes, especially with the two most active of them, the comte d'Artois and the duc de Berry. Nothing could be more natural than that these princes should desire to return to France; that they should wish to do so at the expense of civil war, was a perversity common enough under such circumstances; but, unfortunately for their reputation, they could no longer reckon upon civil war—they could rely only upon conspiracies and assassins.

Princes or plebeians, all the exiled French were rendered desperate by the peace; war had restored them to hope not only because it secured them the support of a part of Europe, but also because they anticipated that it would destroy the popularity of the First Consul. They had kept up a correspondence with La Vendée through the medium of Georges, and with Paris by the medium of the returned emigrants. The day dreams which they indulged in England, their partizans indulged in France, and the slightest circumstances which flattered their illusions sufficed to convert, to their view, those illusions into certainties. In their lamentable correspondence they repeated to each other that war would prove ruinous to the First Consul; that his power, illegitimate, as regarded the French who continued faithful to the Bourbons, and tyrannical as regarded the French who continued faithful to the Revolution, had but two claims to support—the re-establishment of peace and the preservation of order; that one of these claims had been completely annihilated by the rupture with England, and that the other claim was seriously damaged, as it must, of necessity, be very doubtful if public order could be maintained amidst the excitement and anxieties of war. The government of the First Consul, therefore, argued they, would become unpopular, like the various governments which had preceded it. The peaceful multitude would necessarily be irritated against the First Consul, on account of the renewal of European hostility, and would lose their faith in his good fortune when difficulties seemed no longer to vanish at his approach. Moreover, the First Consul had a variety of enemies who could be made serviceable to the views of the conspirators; firstly the revolutionists, and then those who envied his glory and ascendancy, who were so numerous in the army. The Jacobins were said to be exasperated, the French generals discontented, at perceiving that their achievements had assisted an equal to become their master. Of these

divers malcontents one united party was to be formed to overthrow the First Consul. The sum and substance of all missives, whether from France or from London, was this, Royalists, Jacobins, military malcontents, all who hated, or envied, or feared, the First Consul, must be fused into one party to crush the usurper Bonaparte. Such were the ideas entertained by the French princes in London, and by them communicated to the British cabinet as a plea for asking it for funds, which it lavishly granted with, at least, a general knowledge of the use to which they were destined.

A vast conspiracy, then, was formed upon this plan, and conducted with the impatience common to emigrants; and it was communicated to Louis XVIII., then living at Warsaw. That prince, never agreeing with his brother, the comte d'Artois, whose imprudent and inefficient activity he disliked, rejected the proposed plan. Strange contrast between the two princes! The comte d'Artois was good-hearted but imprudent; Louis XVIII. was prudent but not good-hearted; the comte d'Artois entered into schemes which were unworthy of his heart, which Louis rejected because they were unworthy of his judgment. Louis XVIII. resolved to remain thenceforth a stranger to all the new intrigues to which the war might give birth. The comte d'Artois, residing far from his elder brother, and urged on by his own natural ardour as well as by that of the emigrants, and, still worse, by that of the English themselves, took part in all the schemes to which the changing events of the day gave birth in minds disturbed by continual excitement. The communications of the French emigrants with the British cabinet were carried on through the medium of Mr. Hammond, the under-secretary of State, a prominent person in several negotiations; it was to him that, in England, the emigrants on all occasions applied; abroad they addressed themselves to three English diplomatic agents, viz., Mr. Taylor, minister to Hesse; Mr. Spencer Smith, minister to Stuttgard; and Mr. Drake, minister to Bavaria. These three agents, stationed close upon our frontiers, endeavoured to forward all sorts of intrigues in France, and thus to aid those which were carried on in London; they corresponded with Mr. Hammond, and had considerable sums at their command. It is impossible to mistake these proceedings for obscure police plottings and schemings, such as governments sometimes resort to as the readiest way of procuring information, and to which they devote trifling funds. These on the contrary were veritable political plans, acted upon by agents of the highest order, communicating with the most important department, that of foreign affairs, and costly to the amount of millions.

The French princes who were the most deeply concerned in these projects were the comte d'Artois, and his second son the duc de Berry. The duc d'Angoulême was at that time residing at Warsaw with Louis XVIII.; the princes de Condé were in



London, but in no great intimacy with the princes of the elder branch, and in complete ignorance of their schemes. The comte d'Artois, indeed, and the duc de Berry looked upon the princes de Condé as mere soldiers, always ready for battle, and fit for no other purpose. While the grandfather and father of the family were in London, the grandson, the duc d'Enghien was at Baden, wholly occupied by the pleasures of the chase and by the passionate affection he had conceived for a princess de Rohan. All three of these princes were in the service of Great Britain, were under orders to be ready for active duty, and obeyed as soldiers obey the government which pays them: a melancholy position, no doubt, for the Condés; yet not so melancholy as that of being hourly engaged in hatching conspiracies!

Let us now look at the plan of the new conspiracy. There was no longer any chance of getting up an insurrection in La Vendée; on the other hand, to make a direct attack on the First Consul, in the very heart of Paris, seemed an equally sure and speedy means of attaining the desired end. The Consular government being once overthrown, no other government, according to the authors of this project, could succeed it but that of the Bourbons. Now, as the Consular government was wholly vested in the person of general Bonaparte, it was necessary that he should be destroyed: this conclusion was inevitable. But he must be destroyed without chance of failure. The dagger, the infernal machine, and similar means left too much to chance; the firmness of the assassin's heart or the steadiness of his hand might fail him; the infernal machine might explode an instant too soon or an instant too late. But there was one mode which had not yet been tried, and upon which, consequently, no stigma of ill success rested; that of assembling a hundred resolute men, with the intrepid Georges as their leader; to waylay the First Consul's carriage on the road to St. Cloud or to Malmaison; to attack his guard, numbering only some ten or a dozen horse, disperse it, and kill the First Consul in a *quasi* battle. By this method success was deemed to be certain. Georges, who was brave, who had some military pretensions, and was unwilling to be considered an assassin, required that two of the princes, or at all events one of them, should accompany him, and thus regain his or their ancestral crown sword in hand. Is it credible? These men, perverted by exile, flattered themselves that thus to attack the First Consul while surrounded by his guards was not to assassinate him, but to give him battle! They seemed to be on a par with the gallant archduke Charles, combating against general Bonaparte at Tagliamento or at Wagram; or only inferior to him as to number of troops! Wretched sophistry, to which even those who propounded it could have given but half credence, and which stigmatizes those unfortunate Bourbons, not indeed with a natural perversity, but with a perversity acquired amidst the ferocities of civil war, and in the weariness and misery



of exile. There was but one of these men whose part became him, Georges Cadoudal. He was a proficient in these surprises, which he had practised in the forest wilds of Brittany; and now, that he was about to exert his science at the very gates of Paris, he did not fear being degraded into the mere herd of vulgar tools who are made use of and then disowned or denounced, for he anticipated having princes for his accomplices. He had thus far secured all the dignity which could comport with the part that he was about to play, and he subsequently showed, by his bearing in the presence of his judges, that it was not he who was degraded by these events. But this was not all; it was necessary not only to prepare for the combat, but also to secure the fruits of the victory; it was necessary to provide for the certainty that France would throw herself into the arms of the Bourbons. Parties in France had been so reciprocally destructive, that, as to power, they had, practically, been suicidal. The more violent revolutionists were detested; the more moderate revolutionists, taking refuge behind general Bonaparte, were impotent; the sole power that remained erect and unshaken was that of the army; and it was the army that it was necessary to gain. But it was devoted to the Revolution, for which it had poured forth its blood like water, and it looked with somewhat of horror and loathing upon those emigrants whom it had so often seen combating in the ranks of the Austrians and of the English.

The chief subject of conversation was the quarrel between general Moreau and general Bonaparte. We have already remarked, elsewhere, that the general of the army of the Rhine, reflecting, prudent, firm on the battle-field, was in private life, careless and weak, and governed by those who surrounded him; and that, under this fatal influence, he had not escaped from being tainted with that second-rate vice, Envy; that, although attentions and favours had been showered upon him by the First Consul, he had allowed himself to cherish hostility to general Bonaparte, for no other reason than because that hero was the first man in the State, and general Moreau only the second; that, in this temper, Moreau had been guilty of the impropriety of refusing to attend the First Consul at a review, and that the latter, always alert in returning an affront, had consequently abstained from inviting Moreau to a banquet with which he celebrated the anniversary of the Republic; and that Moreau had committed the grievous error of dining on that very day, in plain clothes, with some malcontent officers, at one of those places of public resort where one is sure to be seen; a course of conduct as offensive to all prudent men, as it was pleasing to the enemies of the Commonwealth. We have spoken but of those pettinesses of wounded vanity, which commence, among women, in vulgar quarrels, and finish, among men, in tragical events. If it be difficult to prevent quarrels between eminent personages, still more difficult is it to stop them when they have fairly broken

forth. From the day of the banquet above spoken of, Moreau had continually shown himself more and more hostile to the Consular government. When the Concordat was settled, he declaimed against the domination of the priests ; when the Legion of Honour was founded, he declaimed against it as the establishment of aristocracy ; and, finally, when the Consulate for Life was settled, he denounced *that* as the re-establishment of royalty. At length he had ceased to present himself either at the Chief Consul's or at either of his colleagues.' On the renewal of war, he might have availed himself of that opportunity of honourably, and without the shadow of personal submission, presenting himself at the Tuileries to offer his services, not to general Bonaparte, but to France. Moreau, drawn by degrees into an evil track, that *facilis descensus Averni*, had looked upon this interruption of peace far less with reference to the suffering of his country, than with reference to the check which war would present to his detested rival, and stood aloof to watch how the difficulty would be solved by the enemy whom he had so wantonly provoked. He, Moreau, was now resident at Grosbois, enjoying his well-earned opulence, like some eminent citizen, the victim of princely ingratitude.

The First Consul not only aroused envy in his own person ; his family connexions, too, aroused it against him. Murat, whom he had for a long time refused to elevate to the rank of his brother-in-law, and who, with much natural talent, an excellent heart, and a perfectly chivalric courage, sometimes made an extremely bad use of those gifts ; Murat, with a vanity which he carefully concealed from the First Consul, but very freely paraded when out of sight of that rigid master ; Murat, galled those who, being too humbly placed to be envious of general Bonaparte, felt themselves, at least, entitled to be envious of his brother-in-law. Thus, then, there were great and little foes aroused against general Bonaparte by that smallest of all possible causes of hatred, Envy. Both classes ranged themselves behind Moreau, as their natural and fitting leader. In Paris during the winter, at Grosbois during the summer, he held a kind of court, at which the malcontents spoke out without restraint. The First Consul was aware of all this, and avenged himself, not only by the onward march of his power and of his glory, but also by his emphatic contempt, unreservedly expressed. At first, he had imposed upon himself an extreme reserve ; but at length he answered the small sarcasms of mediocrity by the literally *flaying* sarcasms of genius ; and these were to the full as generally made known as those of Moreau's party.

Party spirit makes use of quarrels which do *not* exist : of course, it is no less ready to make use of those which *do*. Moreau became a hero on the spot ; if one might credit the malcontents, he was at once the military hero, the peaceful citizen, and the virtuous man ; while general Bonaparte was the imprudent but lucky

chieftain, the ungifted usurper, the presumptuous Corsican, who had dared to overthrow the French Republic, and ascend the steps of that throne which the Revolution had demolished, and which he had reared again.

It would be well, said the emigrants and the malcontents, to allow Bonaparte to involve himself in an absurd and ruinous contest with England, and to withhold from him the aid of their courage, their experience, and their skill. And thus, treating the victor of Egypt and of Italy as a mere adventurer, they represented the patriotic expedition which he had so much at heart as the most extravagant of brain-feverish delusions.

In these unfortunate differences the London conspirators found new facilities for furthering the second portion of their scheme. Moreau was first to be won over, and through him the army; and then the First Consul was to be butchered on the road to Malmaison. Moreau, once won over, would lead the army, and reconcile that formidable portion of the nation to the Bourbons, whom he could represent as having bravely reconquered the throne at the point of the sword. But how was Moreau to be approached, surrounded as he was, exclusively, by Republicans, while the London cabal was as exclusively surrounded by Chouans and ultra-Bourbonists? A mediator was absolutely indispensable, and one had just made his appearance from the far forests of America—Pichegru, the conqueror of Holland, who had been transported by the Directory to Sinnamari. Though fallen far below his former greatness, he was still an illustrious character, endowed with splendid qualities, and influential alike with Royalists and with Republicans. He had made his escape, at this juncture, from his place of banishment, and was resident in London, where he lived in the hope of being enabled to return to France, under favour of that policy which recalled indifferently the victims and the guilty of all parties. But the war, suspended for a brief space, speedily broke out again, and with it once more sprang into life the wild delusions of the emigrants, from whom Pichegru had purchased his liberty at the expence of his honour. In spite of himself, he had been drawn into the conspiracy; and he was now empowered to confer with Moreau, and to gain him to the party of the Bourbons, and thus to fuse into one party both Republicans and Royalists of every shade of opinion and feeling.

The plan resolved upon was rendered sufficiently specious by the apparent posture of affairs; but, even had it been far less so, it would have sufficed to lure on the impatient spirits to which every chance was a good chance, if it did but serve to vary with a new excitement the tedium and forced leisure of exile. The plan being determined upon, the next step was to arrange the details of its execution.

France must needs be the theatre of action. Though Georges required the presence of one or of two of the princes at the decisive moment, he did not insist upon such countenance until

then; he allowed that it was necessary that he should make all arrangements previously to their entering France, that they might not be unnecessarily exposed to the risks of a prolonged residence in Paris under the eyes of an acute and vigilant police. He determined, therefore, to precede them to Paris, and get together a party of Chouans to attack the guard of the First Consul. In the mean time Pichegru was to have a communication with Moreau, first through a third party, and afterwards to go to Paris and have a personal interview with that general. Finally, when every preparation should have been made, when the Chouans should be ready to assail the First Consul, and Moreau should have engaged to secure the adhesion of the army, the princes were to arrive in France, on the eve, or on the very day, of the execution of the project.

All details being thus far arranged, Georges, with a party of Chouans upon whose fidelity he could rely, set out from London for France. He and his men were armed, like so many highwaymen; and he carried in a belt bills of exchange to the amount of a million. Not for an instant can it be supposed that the French princes, reduced to all sorts of expedients to supply their own wants, could furnish such sums as circulated among the wholesale speculators in conspiracy; those sums proceeded from the old source, that is to say, from the British treasury.

An officer of the English royal navy, captain Wright, a bold and skilful seaman, in command of a light vessel, took on board at Deal or Hastings such emigrants as wished to make the French coast, and landed them at such point in France as they chose. Since the First Consul had discovered this, and had caused the coast of Brittany to be more strictly watched than ever, captain Wright had chosen another track, and landed his passengers upon the coast of Normandy.

Between Dieppe and Tréport, in the side of the steep cliff of Biville was a secret passage, formed in a cleft of the rock, and known only to smugglers. A cable, securely fixed to the top of the cliff, descended through this cleft, as far as the surface of the sea. At a certain cry, the concealed wardens of this passage let down the cable, the smugglers seized it, and, by its aid, climbed the precipice, two or three hundred feet in height, carrying heavy loads of merchandise upon their shoulders. The trusty followers of Georges had found out this path and had readily enough purchased the use of it. To render their secret communication with Paris complete, they had established a chain of lodging places; some in solitary farms, some in the chateaux of Norman nobles, faithful and wary Royalists, who rarely left their abodes. By these means it was easy to pass from the Channel coast right onward to Paris without once touching upon a high-road or entering an inn. Finally, that there might be the less risk of discovering this secret way to enemies, it was reserved for the exclusive use of the most important personages of the party and their

immediate followers. The money lavished among some of the Norman Royalists whose shelter was thus secured, the fidelity of others, and, especially, the distance of this secret track from all frequented roads, rendered imprudences but little to be dreaded, and, for some time, at least, the secret secure.

It was by this route that Georges entered Paris, disembarking from captain Wright's vessel at the foot of the cliff of Biville on the 21st of August, 1803, at the very time when the First Consul was inspecting the coasts. Following the track of the smugglers, and accompanied by some of his most trusty lieutenants, he proceeded from shelter to shelter, till he reached Chaillot, in one of the suburbs of Paris. There a small lodging was prepared for him, whence he could nightly steal forth into Paris, to see his associates, and make all ready to strike the blow for which he had returned to France.

Resolute and sensible, Georges partook of the passions but not the illusions of his party, he judged more correctly than his associates of what was practicable, and he was urged by his courage to those measures which his accomplices ventured upon only from blind infatuation. He had no sooner reached Paris, than he discovered that the reports of the First Consul's unpopularity, which were so current in England, were quite unfounded; that the Royalists and Republicans were far enough from the adventurous temper that had been attributed to them, and that now, as ever, action halted far behind profession. But Georges was not a man to be easily intimidated; still less was he the man to cool the zeal of his associates by communicating the discouraging truths which his sagacity revealed to him, and he went steadily forward with the work that he had undertaken. After all, the aid of public opinion was not required for a stroke of violence, and, the First Consul being once slain, it would be easy enough to induce France to accept the Bourbons, for want of better rulers. From the depths of his mysterious lurking-place, he despatched emissaries to La Vendée to ascertain the feelings of that province as to the Conscription; to inquire whether the Conscripts there were not now, as formerly, of opinion that if they needs must serve, it was better to serve against the Revolutionary government than under it. But he found that La Vendée had sunk into the deepest apathy; his own name was the only one which still preserved some influence, because he was looked upon as an incorruptible Royalist, who had preferred exile to the favour of the First Consul; and much sympathy was felt for the representative of a cause which was so dear to the secret hearts of the people, but no one was willing to infest the woods and highways as of old. Moreover, the priests, the real leaders and prompters of the Vendéan population, were attached to the First Consul; all that could be hoped for, therefore, was some very insignificant assemblages which, to the grief of the conspirators, included fewer than ever of those daring and desperate Chouans, who were once ready to do every thing



rather than return to a peaceful course of life. But it was absolutely necessary that some such men should be found; Chouans at once daring and prudent; and in the course of two months' stay in Paris Georges had scarcely been able to get thirty such men together. These were not made acquainted with each other, or with the actual scope of the undertaking for which they were engaged; they knew only that their undertaking was to be in favour of those Bourbons to whom they were devoted, and that they had liberal pay, to which they were not less devoted. Georges secretly prepared arms and uniforms for the day of action. From the depths of his concealment, and with infinite precautions, because his views differed from those of the Republicans, he endeavoured to discover whether matters were more propitious on their part than on that of the Royalists. He caused an attached Breton to sound Moreau's private secretary, Fresnières, who was also a Breton, connected with all parties, even with M. Fouché. This was running no small risk, for Fouché at this period was eagerly looking out for an opportunity of rendering himself servicable to the First Consul. Fresnières held out but small hope as to the inclinations of Moreau; indeed, his information was so unimportant, that Georges paid but little attention to it. Resolved to venture every thing, he urged his emissaries in London to press matters forward; for, perilled as he was in the heart of Paris, his danger was as useless as it was great.

While Georges was thus occupied, the agents of Pichegru, on their part, had sounded Moreau. Some clerks of the commissariat department, a class of men who occasionally became intimate with general officers, were employed to convey Pichegru's proposals to Moreau, who was asked whether he had quite forgotten his former brother in arms, or still cherished any animosity towards him. In truth, it was not for Moreau to feel rancour against Pichegru, whom he had formerly denounced to the Directory; moreover, his present hate was too intense to allow of his cherishing an older one, and he consequently spoke kindly and even sympathisingly of the wrongs of his old friend, and thus encouraged the inquiry whether he would not exert his influence to obtain Pichegru's recall to France. And, in truth, why should the amnesty that was granted to the Vendéans, and to the soldiers of Condé be refused to the conqueror of Holland? Moreau replied, that he fervently wished for Pichegru's restoration to his country, considered that restoration to be due to his services; that he would gladly promote it, if his position with respect to the government were such as to allow of his interference, but that he had definitively broken off all connexion with the rulers of France, and fully determined never again to present himself at the Tuileries. Having gone thus far, he was naturally led to speak of his own wrongs, of his hatred of the First Consul, and of his desire to see France delivered from the rule of Napoleon.

The inclinations of Moreau being thus far ascertained, one of



his former officers, general Lajolais, was employed to communicate with him—a most dangerous connexion for a man too weak for self-control. General Lajolais was diminutive and lame, but endowed with a most decided turn for intrigue, and urged onward in that direction by narrowness of fortune almost amounting to downright destitution. A deserter from the Republican army was sent to him with a considerable sum of money and letters from Pichegru; the deserter in question being disguised as a hawker of lace. He found it a task of but small difficulty to gain over Lajolais, who fastened himself upon Moreau, and drew from him a confession of his wounded feelings, and of his wishes for the destruction of the Consular government, no matter by what means. Lajolais did not completely reveal his views, but, credulous as such speculators in conspiracy usually are, he fancied that to decide Moreau to take an active part in the conspiracy, it was only requisite to propose it to him; and if he fancied more than existed he told his employers still more than he fancied. It is thus that the meshes of this sort of conspiracy are woven by agents who impose half upon themselves and half upon their employers. Lajolais, then, held out the greatest hopes to the emissaries of Pichegru, and, in compliance with their importunities, set out for London to make a personal report to the illustrious personages whose tool he had become.

Lajolais and his guide were obliged to go to London by the way of Hamburg, that they might travel the more safely, and considerable time was thus lost. On reaching England, they found that the British authorities had given orders for their immediate reception, and they proceeded without delay to London, to put themselves into personal communication with Pichegru and the other heads of the conspiracy, whose impatient spirits were thrown into an intoxication of delight by the arrival of Lajolais. At the conferences which were now held, the comte d'Artois had the folly to be present, thus compromising alike his rank, his dignity, and his family. It is true, that he was personally known only to the leading men among the conspirators, but the intensity of his sentiments and of his language speedily revealed him to the rest. When Lajolais, with a ridiculous exaggeration, reported what Moreau had said to him, and affirmed that the mere appearance of Pichegru would secure the adhesion of the republican general, the comte d'Artois, unable to repress his delight, exclaimed, "Ah! let but our two generals agree together, and I shall speedily be restored to France!" This speech attracted the attention of the conspirators to the prince, and caused them to identify him. They discovered that he who thus expressed himself was a prince of the blood, a descendant of kings, and destined to be himself a king; whom the demoralising influence of exile had urged to conduct so little consistent with his rank, and so little creditable to his heart. So great was the satisfaction, said one of the conspirators, who subsequently narrated all the parti-

culars, that, had the king of England been present, he would fain have joined the party.\*

It was agreed that, without further delay, the conspirators should proceed to France to put the finishing stroke to their designs. In truth, there was no time to be lost, for the luckless Georges, thrown forward, unaided, as an advanced guard, was exposed to terrible perils, living as he did beneath the very eyes of the keen-sighted Consular police. Towards the end of December, lest he should fancy himself altogether deserted, a second party of emigrants was sent to join him. It was now resolved that Pichegru himself, accompanied by such illustrious persons as M. de Rivière and one of the Polignacs, should go to France and join Georges; and, as soon as these new emissaries should have made all necessary preparations, and M. de Rivière, the coolest and most prudent of the conspirators, should announce that all was ripe† for action, the princes themselves, the comte d'Artois and the duc de Berry should land in France to take their share in the pretended battle with the First Consul.

Pichegru, then, and other leading French emigrants, set out upon this expedition, in which he was to sacrifice his already tarnished reputation, and that life which should have been more worthily employed. Early in January, 1804, he embarked on board the vessel of captain Wright, who, on the sixteenth of the month, landed him at the cliff of Biville. The conqueror of Holland, accompanied by some of the most illustrious members of the French aristocracy, climbed the smugglers' rope, met Georges who had proceeded to the coast to await them, and, proceeding from one secure lurking-place to another, reached Chaillot on the twentieth of January.

Georges had not collected so large a force as he had proposed to be aided by, yet, daring as he was, he would willingly have led on the force that he had got together to make a deadly attack upon the First Consul; but, previously to proceeding to this last extremity, it was necessary to have such an understanding with Moreau as would secure the safety of the conspirators subsequently to the death of the First Consul. The agents had a fresh interview with him, at which they informed him that Pichegru had privately returned to France, and proposed that they should confer together, to which Moreau consented, but, being unwilling to receive Pichegru at home, he made an appointment to meet him at night on the Boulevard Madeleine. Pichegru went, accordingly; he wished to go alone, for he was cool and prudent, and greatly disliked the company of the restless and vulgar people

---

\* The very letter, as well as the substance, of this pitiable business, are literally extracted from the minutes of the inquiry which took place, part of which was published, the rest remaining in the government archives. We have adopted nothing as credible except what all parties unite in affirming, and what, consequently, bears the undoubted stamp of truth.

† See, further on, the deposition of M. de Rivière.

whose companionship was the first punishment of his conduct. He arrived with too large a company, including Georges, who was for seeing every thing with his own eyes, apparently that he might ascertain upon what sort of foundation he was about to risk his life in a desperate attempt.

On a dark and cold night, in the month of January, Moreau and Pichegru approached each other at a preconcerted signal; it was the first time of their meeting since they had fought side by side in the army of the Rhine, while their conduct and character were still free from stain. Scarcely had they recovered from the emotion caused by so many reminiscences, when Georges appeared upon the scene and made himself known. Moreau, evidently amazed at the presence of Georges, suddenly became cold in his demeanour, and seemed angry with Pichegru for having subjected him to such a meeting. They were obliged to separate without having said any thing of importance; they were to meet under other circumstances, and in a different place.

This first interview with Moreau produced a most painful impression upon the mind of Georges. "This will never do," were his first words. Pichegru himself began to fear that he had ventured too far; but the plotting agents communicated with Moreau, and, throwing aside all secrecy, plainly told him that they wished him to aid in overthrowing the Consular government. Moreau had no objection to the destruction of that government by means which, though not expressed, were perfectly well understood, but he manifested the strongest unwillingness personally to conspire for the service of the Bourbons. What he wished was, to benefit both the Republic and himself by the downfall of the First Consul, but it was only between him and Pichegru that such a course could be treated of. This time Moreau received Pichegru in his own house, and, after many accidents which threatened to discover all, the former companions in arms had a long and serious conference, in which they spoke out. Moreau could not emerge from a certain circle of ideas; he maintained that he had a considerable party both in the Senate and in the army, and that it was in his hands that power would be placed should France be freed from the three Consuls; that power he would use for the protection of those who should free the Republic from her tyrant; but that liberated Republic should not be delivered over to the Bourbons. As for Pichegru, the former victor of Holland, and one of the most illustrious of the French generals, far more than mere protection would be accorded to him; he should be restored to his rank and honours and placed in the most important offices of the State. Moreau, obstinately fixed in these notions, expressed his surprize at finding Pichegru connected with such people; Pichegru needed not Moreau's opinion on that point to render the companionship of the Chouans extremely unpalatable to him; but Moreau himself furnished a proof of the sad society into which a conspirator is of necessity

plunged. Pichegru was too acute and too well-informed to share the illusions of Moreau, and endeavoured to convince him that, the First Consul being put to death, the only government that could succeed him would be that of the Bourbons. But this view of affairs was far too extensive; Moreau, sagacious only on the field of battle, persisted in believing that, on general Bonaparte's death, he, general Moreau, should infallibly become First Consul. Although the murder of the First Consul was never directly mentioned, it was perfectly well understood as the means by which he was to be got rid of. Without endeavouring to find apologies for these sad negotiations, we may, however, remark that the men of that day had seen so much of death upon the scaffold and upon the field of battle, and had issued, or been subjected to, so many terrible orders, that the death of an individual was not in their eyes of that horrible importance, of which it has since been rendered, in our eyes, by the termination of civil war and the gentle influences of peace.

Pichegru was driven to despair by this interview, and said to the confidant who guided him to Moreau's house and thence back again to his obscure shelter, "And this man, too, has ambition, and wishes to take his turn in governing France! Poor creature! he could not govern her for four-and-twenty hours!"

Georges, when informed of what had passed between Pichegru and Moreau, exclaimed with his usual impetuosity of tone—"If we must needs have any usurper, I should prefer the First Consul to this brainless and heartless Moreau!"

Such was the tone in which they privately spoke of the man whom their hired scribes publicly held up as the model of all warlike qualities and public virtues!

The knowledge thus acquired of the actual views and feelings of Moreau threw the unfortunate and guilty emigrants into despair. Another meeting took place between him and Pichegru at Georges' retreat at Chaillot, probably without Moreau's knowledge of his host's identity. Georges was present at the commencement of this interview, but suddenly retired, saying to the two generals, "I will leave you to yourselves, and then perhaps you will come to some understanding."

But their interview produced no such understanding between the republican generals, and it now became obvious to all the conspirators that they had imprudently ventured upon a scheme which could terminate only in ruin. M. de Rivière was driven to despair; he and his friends constantly repeated what is always said by those who cannot cause their feelings and passions to be adopted, "France is apathetic; no longer faithful to her former sentiments, she covets nothing but rest." In truth, France was not, as it had been represented, virulently disposed against the Consular government, nor were all parties prepared to concur in its overthrow: it was only some envious men of mediocre ability who wished for its destruction, and even they were not prepared to go

to the length of actual conspiracy. And, though France grieved at the interruption of peace, and was, perhaps, somewhat suspicious of the First Consul's ambitious and warlike propensity, she yet did not the less look upon him as her saviour. Admiring his genius, she would on no account have been willing to see him and herself exposed to all the hazards of a new revolution.

Already some of the unfortunate and guilty conspirators were tempted to retire, some to Bretagne and others to England. Undeceived as to the actual state of things, the most eminent among them were, moreover, still further disgusted by the kind of company in which they were reduced to the necessity of living; and the most prudent of them all, M. de Rivière and Pichegru confided to each other their vexations and dis gusts.

One day, Pichegru calling some troublesome Chouans to order, one of them said, "But, general, you are one of us." "No!" said Pichegru, with biting contempt, "I am *among* you but not *of* you!" by which he meant that though his life was in their hands, his will and intellect were not so.

All were now agitated by most painful doubts, but Georges was still ready to attack the First Consul, provided only that arrangements should be made for the future; while others inquired what good would be produced by a needless delay. Things were in this position when this plotting, after going on uninterruptedly for six months, at length attracted the attention of the police, but too tardily to do much credit to its vigilance. The First Consul's sagacity saved him, and ruined the imprudent foes who had plotted his ruin. It is the common fate of those who embark in such schemes to stop only when it is too late, and they are not unfrequently discovered, seized, and punished, precisely at the moment when conscience, good sense, and terror, have so far opened their eyes that they are preparing to abandon the evil of their ways.

These goings and comings continued from August to January, beneath the eyes of such a man as the ex-minister Fouché, so anxious to make discoveries, could not but be sooner or later detected. We have elsewhere mentioned that M. Fouché had been deprived of the portfolio of the police when the First Consul wished to inaugurate the consulate for life by suppressing a severe ministry; and the police authority was, as it were, merged into the ministry of justice. The *grand juge*, Regnier, quite a novice in this sort of administration, turned it over to the councillor of State, Real, a man of intellect, but credulous and flighty, and very far from equalling Fouché in sagacity. The consequence was that the police was but poorly managed, and the First Consul was assured that there had never been a time when less plotting was going forward; a confidence which the First Consul was far from sharing, and which, indeed, Fouché took good care not to allow him to share. That acute observer had become a senator, and weary of idleness, and having kept up his connexion with his old



agents, he had correct intelligence which he from time to time communicated to the First Consul, who, listening attentively to what was told him by Réal and Fouché, and carefully reading the reports of the gendarmerie, which are always of the greatest use, because they are faithful and accurate, felt convinced that some plot was in existence against his person. In the first place, circumstances led him to infer that the renewal of war would tempt the emigrants and the republicans to some new design, and in this inference he was confirmed by many indications, such as the arrest of Chouans and the information forwarded to him by Vendean chiefs who were personally attached to him. On receiving information direct from La Vendée that refractory conscripts were forming themselves into troops, he sent to the departments of the West, colonel Savary, whose devotion was boundless, and whose intelligence and courage were alike well tried, to head some moving columns of picked gendarmerie to follow and disperse the insurgents. Colonel Savary carefully observed every thing with his own eyes, and clearly perceived that a conspiracy was secretly a foot. This movement was that of Georges, who, from his concealment in Paris, endeavoured to excite insurrection in La Vendée. But nothing was yet discovered as to that terrible secret which Georges confined to himself and the chief of his associates. Having dispersed the refractory bands in the West, colonel Savary returned to Paris without making any very important discovery.

There was another intrigue a clue to which had fallen into the hands of the First Consul, who took something of pride and pleasure in following it up himself, and this clue promised to throw further light upon what was going on, though it had not done so as yet. The three English ministers to Hesse, Wirtemberg, and Bavaria, who were also charged to superintend intrigues in France, applied themselves to that task with an assiduous but clumsy zeal. Foreigners are but ill qualified to carry on such plots. The minister to Bavaria, Mr. Drake, was the most active of the three; he even resided out of Munich that he might be the more easily visited by agents from France, and to prevent his letters being opened, had a Bavarian post-master in his pay. A restless and busy Frenchman, formerly a Republican, with whom Mr. Drake had undertaken his schemes, and to whom that minister revealed the intrigues of the British, divulged all that he knew to the police. Mr. Drake was anxious in the first instance to get at the consular secrets as to the invasion, then to win over some eminent general, seize, if possible, upon some town, as Strasburg or Besançon, and there commence an insurrection. To get rid of general Bonaparte was constantly the object more or less explicitly insisted upon. The First Consul, delighted at having thus caught an English minister in the fact, caused a considerable sum of money to be paid to the man who thus deceived Mr. Drake,



on condition that he should continue to impose upon that minister, and the First Consul himself furnished the draughts of letters to be written to Drake; in these letters he gave both numerous and correct details as to his personal habits, the manner in which he formed his plans and dictated his orders, and added that the whole secret of the Consular operation and views was contained in a large black portfolio which was entrusted to M. de Meneval, or to a confidential person; that M. de Meneval was above being bribed, but that the other individual was corruptible and would give up the portfolio for a million francs. The First Consul then proceeded to hint that there could be no doubt that other plots existed in France besides that directed by Mr. Drake, and that it was important to become acquainted with them all, so that no one might work to the injury of the rest, but that all should render mutual assistance. Finally, he added, as a most important piece of information, that the real object of the preparations for a descent was Ireland, that what was going on at Boulogne was a mere feint to which it was sought to gain credence by the extent of the preparations, but that the only seriously meant expeditions were those of Brest and the Texel.\* This at once guilty and awkward diplomatist,

---

\* The following curious passages are extracts from letters dictated by the First Consul himself:—

*To the Grand Juge.*

9th Brumaire, An XII. (1st November, 1803.)

It is of consequence to have a secret agent to watch Drake at Munich, and notice all French who go to that place.

I have read all the reports you sent me, and found them somewhat interesting. There must not be any hurry in making arrests; when our man has given all information a plan of action must be settled with him. I wish him to write to Drake and tell him that, while awaiting an opportunity to strike the great blow, he thinks he can venture to promise that he will take from the First Consul's own table in his private study, and in the First Consul's own handwriting, his notes concerning the great expedition, and all other important papers; that this hope is founded upon the connivance of a confidential person who, having formerly been a member of the Jacobin club, and having at present the First Consul's confidence and the charge of his private study, belongs, nevertheless, to the secret committee, but that two things are indispensable to securing his aid, that he shall receive a hundred thousand pounds sterling on delivering the important documents in the First Consul's own writing, and that a French royalist agent shall be sent to provide means of concealment to this person, who would necessarily be arrested should documents so important be missed.

\* \* \* \* \*

Bonaparte scarcely ever writes, he walks up and down his study and dictates to a young man twenty years of age, named Meneval, who is the only person who enters the First Consul's private study, or even the three adjoining rooms. This young man succeeded Bourrienne, whom the First Consul had known from his childhood, but had dismissed.

Nothing is to be hoped from Meneval; but the notes which are of the greatest importance are not dictated by Bonaparte, but written with his own hand. On his table there is a large portfolio divided into as many compartments as there are ministries; this well-secured portfolio is fastened by the First Consul himself, and when he, for however brief a space, leaves his study,

who committed the double error of compromising the most sacred of functions and of so clumsily conducting his intrigues, eagerly swallowed all those details, and no less eagerly requested additional information, especially such as related to the Boulogne expedition; and he announced that he would communicate with his government con-

---

Meneval's duty is to place this portfolio in a cupboard which slides under his writing table, and which is screwed down to the floor of the room.

This portfolio being stolen, only Meneval and the confidential man who lights the fire and keeps the room in order can be suspected: means, therefore, must be provided for the escape of the latter. This portfolio must contain all that the First Consul has written during several years past, as it is the only one which he always carries on his journeys, and which is constantly on the road from Paris to Malmaison and St. Cloud. All his private memoranda of military arrangements must be in this portfolio, and as his authority can only be destroyed by thwarting his projects, there can be no doubt that the carrying off of this portfolio is the readiest way of attaining that end.

*To the Grand Juge.*

Paris, 3rd Pluviose, An XII. (24th January, 1804.)

The letters of Drake seem very important. I should wish Ménéce in his next dispatch to say that the committee had been delighted with the idea that Bonaparte intended to embark at Boulogne, but that it is now perfectly ascertained that the demonstrations at Boulogne are mere feints, which though undoubtedly expensive, are far less so than they seem to be; that all the boats of the flotilla can eventually be made available for ordinary purposes, and that this very fact suffices to show that the demonstrations are merely illusive and temporary. That it must not be concealed that the First Consul is far too wary and believes himself far too well established to risk a doubtful attempt which might compromise a great force. His true design, as far as can be guessed from his foreign policy, is a descent upon Ireland, to be made at once by the Brest squadron and by that of the Texel.

Nothing is said about the Texel expedition, though it is known to be ready, and there is considerable talk about the camps of St. Omer, Ostend, and Flushing. The great number of troops assembled in camps has a political end. Bonaparte is glad of a pretext for keeping them in hand upon a war establishment, and available for a new attack on Germany, should he deem a continental war desirable.

Another expedition is decidedly fixed upon: one to the Morea. Bonaparte has 40,000 men at Tarento, the Toulon squadron is to proceed thither, and he hopes to find a large auxiliary army of Greeks.

The portfolio business must not be lost sight of, and mention must be made that, to prove himself deserving of confidence, the usher has produced many portions of letters in Bonaparte's own handwriting; that this man can render vast services, but that he must be largely paid. The portfolio must, in reality, be delivered, and care will be taken to provide it with precisely such information as we wish Drake and his employers to believe; but, in order to make them value it the more highly, it must be made to cost them at least 50,000*l.* sterling."

*To Citizen Réal.*

Malmaison, 28th Ventôse, An XII. (19th March, 1804.)

I beg that you will send to citizen Maret the last letter written by Drake, that it may be printed in the appendix to the collected documents relative to this affair.

I have also to request that you will add two notes, one to make it known that the supposed aide-de-camp of the general is only an officer sent by the prefect of Strasburg, and the other to explain that the faithless individual was a sheer invention of the agent, and that no person possessing the confidence of government could be tempted by the corrupting gold of England.

cerning the portfolio for which so large a sum was demanded; that in regard to other plots that were supposed to exist he was quite ignorant of them (and here he stated strictly the truth), but that if any such did exist they should be forwarded, not opposed, for, added he, *it is a matter of right little consequence by whom the animal be stricken down provided you are all in the Hunt!*\* To so vile a course, and to such vile language, an agent invested with official importance could venture to descend. But all these proceedings failed to afford the information most wanted; Mr. Drake was unacquainted with the great conspiracy of Georges, whose secret was well kept, and, consequently, his ridiculous credulity had not caused him to furnish any really important information. The First Consul was still strongly persuaded that the men who had conceived the plan of the infernal machine were still more likely to strike some new blow under existing circumstances, and, struck by some arrests effected in Paris, La Vendée, and Normandy, he said to Murat, then governor of Paris, and to M. Réal, who was at the head of the police: The emigrants are certainly at their old tricks; "there have been several arrests; let some of the prisoners be selected and sent before a military commission, and rather than be shot they will tell all that they know." What we here relate occurred between the 25th and the 30th of January, while interviews were taking place between Pichegru and Moreau, and just as the conspirators were becoming disheartened. The First Consul had a list of the arrested individuals laid before him; in this list he discovered some of the agents of Georges, who had preceded or followed him into France, and among them an ex-doctor of the Vendéan armies who had landed in Georges, company in August. After careful consideration of the individual cases, the First Consul pointed out five, and said "Either I am greatly mistaken, or we shall find these men both able and willing to give us information." For some time past no use had been made of the laws formerly enacted for the establishment of military courts; during the peace, the First Consul had been desirous to let these laws fall into disuse, but, on the renewal of war, he thought it necessary to call them again into existence; and especially against those spies who entered France to watch the preparations making there against England, and some of whom had consequently been arrested, condemned and shot. The five individuals, whom the First Consul now selected, were sent to trial, two of them were acquitted, two being convicted of crimes punishable with death, were condemned to be shot, and suffered that punishment without making any confession, beyond a bold avowal that they had entered France to serve that legitimate king who would speedily become victorious over his republican foes. They also spoke

---

\* These are Drake's actual expressions. His letters were deposited in the Senate, and exhibited to all diplomatists who chose to see them.

in most hostile terms against the person of the First Consul. The fifth of these individuals, whom the First Consul had especially pointed out as being likely to make a clean breast, declared when on the way to execution, that he had some important information to give; and he was immediately visited by one of the most astute and experienced agents of the police. He confessed every thing, declaring that he had landed at Biville Cliff in company with Georges himself, as far back as the month of August; that they had made their way through the woods, from one hiding-place to another, till they reached Paris, with the intention of murdering the Consul in an attack to be made upon his escort by open force, and he pointed out several persons, especially innkeepers, who were in the habit of harbouring Chouans. This confession threw a broad and bright light upon the subject; the presence of Georges in Paris was a fact in the utmost possible importance; it was not for any unimportant attempt that a person so important to his party had lain concealed in the heart of Paris with a band of hirelings. The point of disembarkation at the cliff of Biville was now known, as also was the existence of a secret road through the woods, and some, at least, of the secret lodgings which gave shelter to the conspirators. A most strange accident had revealed a name which put the First Consul and the police upon the track of some very important circumstances. A short time before the period of which we are writing, a party of Chouans had landed at this same cliff of Biville, and had exchanged shots with the gendarmerie; a paper wadding which was found on that occasion, was marked with the name of *Troche*. This Troche was a watchmaker at Eu, and he had a son, a very young man, employed as a corresponding clerk. This young man was privately arrested and conveyed to Paris, where he was examined and confessed all he knew. He confessed that it was he who had been employed to receive the conspirators at the cliff of Biville, and had guided them to the first stations at which they were to find shelter; he gave an account of those three disembarkations of which we have already spoken; viz., that of Georges in August, and those of December and January, including Pichegru, and Messrs. de Rivière and de Polignac. He was unacquainted with the name and rank of the persons to whom he had acted as guide; but he was able to say that, early in February, a fourth disembarkation was to take place at Biville; he, in fact, being appointed to receive those who were to land.

Early in February, therefore, search was made in all the known and suspected hiding-places of the Chouans, from Paris as far as the coast; a strict watch was kept on the premises of those innkeepers who had been informed against by the agent of Georges, and in the course of a few days various important arrests took place; two of these, more especially, threw great light upon the business. In the first place, a daring young Chouan, named

Picot, servant to Georges, was taken; he had a sword and pistols, he made a stout resistance to the soldiers, but yielded at the last extremity, loudly declaring that he would die in the service of his king; at the same time Bouvet de Lozier, principal lieutenant to Georges, made a similar resistance, and bearing himself more calmly.

These men were armed in the style of the revolution, and committed the worst of crimes, and besides their arms, they had with them large sums in gold and silver. At five o'clock, of great excitement and enthusiasm, they were brought before the tribunal, and at length confessed all they knew. On the 18th Pluviôse (8th of February), would have been the day, but was gradually led afterwards to speak the truth, that he had landed from England with Georges six months with him in Paris; and he did not leave of their abode there. There was, consequently, no doubt that Georges was in Paris to strike a decisive blow, but this general knowledge was not obtained. Bouvet de Lozier had as yet said nothing, he was very far superior to Picot in both courage and intellect. In the course of the night between the 13th and 14th, however, this Bouvet de Lozier suddenly confessed. The prisoner had endeavoured to hang himself, but in the attempt, had been attacked by a soldier, the influence of which he desired that he might be taken down.

The unfortunate man then declared that he should die for the cause of his legitimate king, and that treacherous person who, uselessly perilling the lives of them into ruin; and he then proceeded to tell a story which perplexed M. Réal a most strange story. He said that he was in London with the princes, when he was offered by officers to Pichegru offering to head a movement against the Bourbons, and to influence the army to come to the aid of the king; and, on receiving this offer, they agreed to aid Georges and Pichegru himself to aid in the restoration. On reaching Paris, Georges and Pichegru had an interview with Moreau, who spoke in a different tone, and proposed that he should exercise Consular power on the overthrow of Pichegru, and their friends had refused the offer. Pichegru, and their friends had refused the offer, and that it was owing to the fatal delusions and pretensions that the arrests had been made. The sad revealer of sad secrets said that he had been told of death that he might avenge himself a man who had ruined them.\*

\* I now subjoin the actual words of Bouvet de Lozier. This document, and those subsequently quoted from Georges, are taken from a collection in eight vo-

Thus from an interrupted suicide there sprang up a terrible charge against Moreau,—an accusation exaggerated by despair but still having all the characteristics of conspiracy. M. Réal, astounded at this confession, hurried away to the Tuileries, where, early as the hour was, he found, as usual, the First Consul risen

---

*of Examination before the Special and Criminal Court of the Department of the Seine, sitting at Paris, of Georges, Pichegru, and others, charged with Conspiracy against the person of the First Consul. Paris: C. F. Putras, Printer to the Court of Criminal Justice. 1804. Copy in the Royal Library. Vol. ii., p. 168. Confession made by Athanase-Hyacinthe Bouvet de Lozier before the GRAND JUDGE, charged with the administration of justice.*

A man just escaped from the gates of the tomb, and still covered with the shadows of death, calls for vengeance upon those whose treachery has plunged him and his party into ruin.

Dispatched to support the cause of the Bourbons, he found himself obliged either to fight for Moreau, or to renounce the enterprize which was his sole object.

Monsieur the comte d'Artois was to enter France to place himself at the head of the Royalists, and Moreau had pledged himself to side with the Bourbons, but refused to do so when the Royalists returned to France.

He proposed that they should labour for him, and raise him to the post of dictator.

Perhaps the accusation I bring against him is but partially borne out by proof.

The following are the facts, on which you will form your own judgment.

Lajolais, a general who formerly served under Moreau, was sent by him to the prince in London; Pichegru was the mediator between them: Lajolais on behalf and in the name of Moreau agreed to the essential points of the proposed plan.

The prince prepared to leave England for France, the number of Royalists in France was augmented, and at conferences in Paris between Moreau, Pichegru, and Georges, the first named avowed his design to act not for a king, but for a dictator.

Thence the delays, the dissensions, and the consequent almost utter ruin of the Royalist party.

Lajolais was with the prince at the commencement of January last past, as I have been informed by Georges.

What consists with my own knowledge is his arrival at La Poterie on the 17th of January, on the day after his landing with Pichegru by our way of communication, with which you are but too well acquainted.

Subsequently, on the 25th or the 26th of January, I saw this same Lajolais in a carriage, in which we were accompanied by Georges and Pichegru, on the way to the Boulevard Madeleine, close by which Moreau was waiting for them. A conference took place among them in the Champs Elysées, at which we had reason to anticipate the proposal made by Moreau in a subsequent meeting with Pichegru alone, viz.: that the re-establishment of a king was not to be thought of, that he should be made dictator, leaving the royalists merely to play the part of his supporters and soldiers.

I know not what weight you will attach to the assertions of a man who but an hour ago was saved from self-destruction, and who still has before his eyes the death to which an outraged government consigns him. But I cannot withhold a cry of despair, or accusing the man to whom I owe my ruin.

At all events, you will find my statements borne out in the course of the trial in which I am involved.

(Signed) **BOUVET.**  
Adjutant-General of the Royal Army.



from bed, and preparing for a long day of arduous toil. The First Consul was still under the hands of his valet, Constant, but as soon as M. Réal began to speak he laid his fingers upon his lips and closeted himself with him to listen to his account. It did not seem to cause him much surprise, but he could not wholly credit the charge made against Moreau. He readily comprehended that all parties were to join against him, and that Pichegru was to unite the Republicans and Royalists; but before the guilt of Moreau could be credited, he wished that Pichegru's presence in Paris should be proved beyond all doubt. Should a clear light be thrown on this part of the business, the connexion between Moreau and the Royalists would be placed beyond all doubt, and he could be proceeded against directly. Nothing in the First Consul's tone announced anger or desire of vengeance; he seemed more curious and thoughtful than irritated.

It was determined to re-examine Picot, Georges' servant, in order to discover whether he was aware of general Pichegru's presence in Paris; he was examined that very day, and by treating him with great mildness they induced him to make full and free communication of what he knew. He avowed all that he knew about Pichegru and Moreau, and though he was less extensively informed than Bouvet de Lozier, his knowledge was more important, as it showed that the desperation produced by the conduct of Moreau had proceeded to the very lowest ranks of the conspirators. As to Pichegru, he strenuously affirmed that he had seen him in Paris not long previously, and, moreover, that he was still concealed there; as for Moreau, he affirmed that he had heard Georges' officers express regret that Moreau had ever been applied to, as his ambitious pretensions perilled every thing.\*

These facts having been elicited in the course of the 14th of February (24th Pluviôse), the First Consul immediately summoned to the Tuileries a secret council, consisting of the consuls

\* Extract from the Second Declaration of Louis Picot, made on the 24th Pluviôse, an XII. (14th of February), at one o'clock in the morning before the Prefect of Police.—Vol. ii., p. 392.

The said Picot declares:

That the leaders drew lots for the task of assassinating the First Consul.

That they were to carry him off if they could meet him on the Boulogne road, or assassinate him while presenting a petition to him at a review or at the theatre.

That he firmly believes that Pichegru is still not merely in France, but also in Paris.

Extract from the Third Declaration of Louis Picot, 24th Pluviôse (14th of February). Vol. ii., p. 395.

That Pichegru has constantly passed under the name of Charles, and that deponent has often heard him thus addressed.

That deponent has often heard general Moreau spoken of, and has heard the leaders frequently express their regret that Moreau had been applied to by the princes, but is not aware when Georges saw Moreau.

Cambacérès and Lebrun, the principal ministers, and M. Fouché, who, though no longer in the ministry, took a leading part in this investigation. This council was held in the night between the fourteenth and fifteenth. The matter was one which required the strictest examination, the conspiracy could not be doubted, any more than the design to attack the First Consul with a band of Chouans, headed by Georges; and the guilty union of all parties, Republicans or Royalists, was proved by the presence of Pichegru, who had mediated between them. It was not easy to say precisely how far Moreau had proceeded in criminality, but neither Bouvet de Lozier in his despair, nor Picot in his subordinate simplicity, could have invented that singular circumstance of the damage done to the Royalist views by the personal ambition of Moreau. It was clear that if the inquiry went forward, and Moreau were left at liberty, he would be constantly mentioned in connexion with the conspiracy, and the government would appear either to be calumniating him or to be afraid to proceed against a great criminal, because he was the second person in the Republic.

This consideration determined the First Consul as to the course that ought to be taken; nothing could have been more trying to his pride as well as his policy than to allow the firmness of his government to be called into question. "They would say," exclaimed he, "that I am afraid of Moreau; that shall not be said; I have been one of the most merciful of men, but if necessary I will be one of the most terrible, and I will strike Moreau as I would any one else, as he has entered into a conspiracy odious alike for its objects and for the connexions which it presumes." Thus reasoning he did not hesitate about arresting Moreau. He had still another motive and a most urgent one. Pichegru and Georges were not yet arrested, three or four of their tools had been taken, but the band of executioners still remained at liberty, and hidden from the police, and it was not unlikely that fear of being arrested might induce them to hasten the attempt for which they had landed in France. On this account it was especially necessary to hasten the proceedings, and to seize as many of the leaders as possible; new discoveries would thus infallibly be made. The immediate arrest of Moreau was therefore resolved upon, as well as that of Lajolais and other conspirators who had been denounced by name.

The First Consul was much irritated, but not directly or chiefly against Moreau; and he acted rather as a man who wishes to secure himself than as one who wishes to take vengeance; he wished to have Moreau in his power, to convict him, get the requisite information from him, and then to pardon him, deeming that thus to terminate the business would be the very height of ability and good fortune.

It was necessary to determine now, under what jurisdiction the

guilty parties should be proceeded against. The consul Cambacérès, profoundly skilled in law, pointed out the danger of trusting such a case to the ordinary tribunals, and proposed that Moreau should be sent before a court-martial, composed of the most eminent military officers; a course justified by the existing laws. But the First Consul opposed this proposition:\* "It would be said," remarked he, "that I had aimed at getting rid of Moreau by causing him under the form of law to be murdered by my own partizans." He therefore proposed a middle course, that of sending Moreau before the criminal court of the Seine, but the constitution allowing of the suspension of juries under certain circumstances and within the limits of certain departments, it was determined that that suspension should be immediately pronounced in regard to the department of the Seine: this was an error, though founded upon an honourable principle. The public considered the suspension of the jury as an act no less severe than sending the accused before a court-martial, and thus without gaining the merit of respecting the forms of justice, all their inconveniences were incurred, as we shall presently perceive.

It was resolved then, that the *grand juge*, Regnier, should draw up a report upon the conspiracy that had been discovered, and the cause of Moreau's arrest, and that this report should be laid before the Senate, the Legislative Body, and the Tribunate. The council remained in deliberation during the whole night, and on the morning of the 15th of February the officers of justice, supported by a detachment of picked gendarmerie, went to Moreau's residence in Paris; not finding him there they set out towards Grosbois, and met the general crossing the bridge of Charonton on his way to Paris. He was arrested quietly, and conveyed in the most respectful manner to the Temple: Lajolais and the commissariat clerks who had abetted the conspiracy were also arrested. The message containing Regnier's report was in the course of the same day presented to the Senate, the Legislative Body, and the Tribunate; it caused a painful astonishment among the friends of government, and a malignant pleasure among its more or less open enemies, of whom there still remained a considerable number in the great assemblies of the state. According to these latter, the conspiracy was a mere machination of the First Consul's aided by the ingenuity of the police, for the purpose of ridding Bonaparte of a rival of whom he was jealous, and of repairing his damaged popularity by creating fears for his life. Slander, as usual in such cases, had free vent, and instead of being called Moreau's conspiracy, it was called the conspiracy *against* Moreau! The general's brother, who was a member of the Tribunate, addressed the assembly, declaring that his brother was calumniated, and that all he needed for the establishment of his inno-

---

\* I here quote the testimony of M. Cambacérès himself.

cence was to be sent before an ordinary, and not before a special, court. All that he demanded on behalf of his brother was facility for showing his innocence. These words were listened to coldly but with grief. The majority of the three great assemblies of the state were at once attached and afflicted. It seemed that since the renewal of war the First Consul's star so proudly in the ascendant till then, had paled somewhat, his friends did not believe that he had invented the conspiracy, but they lamented that his life was again perilled, and that it could only be protected by the fall of some of the most illustrious heads of the Republic. A reply to the message of the government contained the usual expressions of sympathy and attachment to the head of the State, and the warmest entreaties that justice might be promptly and strictly done.

The noise made by these arrests could not but be great; the majority of the public was disposed to be very indignant at whatever put the very precious life of the First Consul in danger; but some doubt was expressed as to the reality of the conspiracy. After the Infernal Machine, to be sure, any thing might be deemed possible to be attempted by conspirators, but in that case the crime had preceded the examination, and had borne an aspect most odiously criminal; now, on the contrary, a plan of assassination was announced, and upon that mere announcement one of the most illustrious men of the Republic had been arrested—a man, too, of whom the First Consul was said to be jealous to the utmost degree. Where, it was asked, was Pichegru? where Georges? These persons, it was confidently asserted, were not at Paris; they would not be found there, for all that was said about them was merely a detestable and clumsy invention.

If the Consul was calm at the first aspect of this new danger which menaced his life, he was deeply stung by the foul calumnies of which that danger was made the occasion and the pretext. He asked whether it was not quite bad enough to be thus exposed to plots the most frightful, without being accused of being himself the inventor of those plots, of being jealous when the vilest jealousy pursued him, and of treacherous attempts upon the life of another, when the most treacherous attacks were levelled at his own life. Every new phase of the inquiry increased the violence of his indignation; he displayed a kind of enthusiasm in pursuing the investigation, not to protect his life, that he thought little about, so confident was he in his star: but he was to the greatest degree desirous of confounding and exposing the villainess of those who wished him to be deemed the inventor of the plots by which his life had been perilled, and might even yet be sacrificed.

This time it was not against the Republicans that he showed himself the most enraged, but against the Royalists. Ever since

the affair of the Infernal Machine, though the guilt of that belonged to the Royalists, Bonaparte had been violently irritated against the Republicans, to whom he attributed the chief obstacles opposed to the good which he vain would have achieved. But now his anger took quite an opposite direction. Ever since he had attained power he had rendered all possible service to the Royalists; he had raised them from oppression and recalled them from exile; he had restored them to their position as Frenchmen and citizens; he had, as far as possible, restored their property, and this, too, in opposition to the opinions and wishes of his own most trusty partizans. In recalling the priests he had braved the most deeply-rooted of the then popular prejudices, and to recall the emigrants he had braved the alarms of the most anxious of all ranks, the holders of the national property. Finally, he had bestowed some most important public trusts upon Royalists, and had even begun to employ some of them about his own person. When, in fact, we contrast the condition in which he found them at the termination of the *régime* of the Convention and the Directory, and that in which he had placed them, it is impossible not to perceive that he had rendered the greatest possible services to the men of that party, and been repaid by them with the greatest possible ingratitude. The First Consul, in rendering services to the Royalists, had gone so far as to peril his own popularity, and, still worse, to risk the loss of confidence of the men who were the most honestly and the most sincerely attached to the Revolution; for he had thus caused them to think and to say that he meditated the restoration of the Bourbons. In return for such services and exertions the Royalists had endeavoured to destroy him by means of a barrel of gunpowder in 1800, and now they wished to butcher him on the highway; and, in their assemblies, calumniated him as the inventor of the conspiracies of their own hatching. These were the considerations which filled his ardent mind, and suddenly inflamed his hatred to the party guilty of such dark ingratitude. And thus his vengeance now sought not after the Republicans; no doubt he would have been well pleased to overwhelm Moreau with the crushing burden of his clemency; but it was upon the Royalists that he desired to heap his vengeance, and he was, he now affirmed, resolved to show them no mercy. New revelations confirmed this feeling, and inflamed it into an absolute and controlling passion.

While the most careful search was being made after Georges and Pichegru, new arrests were effected, and Picot and Bouvet de Lozier were induced to make new and more complete confessions, of greater consequence than their former ones. These men, unwilling to be deemed assassins, hastened to state that they had returned to Paris in the highest company, including the first nobles of the Bourbon court, especially Messrs. De Polignac and De Rivière, and finally, they most distinctly affirmed that they



were to be headed by a prince, whose arrival they had hourly looked for, and that this prince, said to be the Duc de Berry,\* was to accompany the final disembarkation announced to take place in February.

On that point the depositions were to the highest possible degree precise, full, and consistent; and the conspiracy grew terribly clear to the eyes of the First Consul. He saw the comte d'Artois and the duc de Berry, surrounded by emigrants, connected by means of Pichegru with the Republicans, and maintaining in their service a horde of mercenaries, whom they proposed to lead to his murder by means of an ambush, which they affected to look upon as an honourable and equal battle. Possessed by a kind of fury, the First Consul had, now, but one wish, the seizure of that prince, who was to reach Paris from the cliff of Biville. The impassioned language in which Bonaparte frequently expressed himself against the Jacobins subsequent to the affair of the Infernal Machine, was now bestowed exclusively upon the princes and nobles who could descend to play such a part. "These Bourbons fancy," he exclaimed, "that they may shed my blood like that of some vile animal; and yet, my blood is quite as precious as theirs. I will repay them the alarm with which they seek to inspire me; I pardon Moreau the weakness and the errors to which he is urged by a stupid jealousy, but I will pitilessly shoot the very first of these princes who shall fall into my hands; I will teach them with what sort of a man they have to deal." Such was the language to which he was constantly giving utterance during this terrible investigation. He was thoughtful, agitated, threatening, and, what was singular in him, he laboured less than usual; for the time he seemed to have entirely forgotten Boulogne, Brest, and the Texel.

\* Extract from the Fourth Declaration of Louis Picot, before the Prefect of Police, 25th Pluviôse (15th of February):—

"I disembarked with Georges between Dunkirk and the town of Eu. I am not aware whether there had been any prior disembarkations; there have been two subsequently. There was a report of a fourth and more considerable disembarkation, it was to consist of twenty-five persons, including the duc de Berry. I do not know whether this has taken place: I know that Bouvet and one Armand were to meet the prince."—Vol. ii., p. 398.

Extract from Bouvet's Second Examination, the 30th Pluviôse (20th of February):—

"*Question.* At what time and by what means do you imagine that Moreau and Pichegru agreed upon the plan for the restoration of the Bourbons, which Georges had returned to France to put into execution?"

"*Answer.* I believe that Pichegru and Moreau had long been in correspondence, and that it was only through the assurances given by Pichegru to the prince that Moreau was making his utmost efforts to produce a rising in their favour in France that the plan was vaguely settled—the re-establishment of the Bourbons; the Councils to be gained over by Pichegru; a rising in Paris, aided by the presence of the prince; a personal attack upon the First Consul, and the presentation of the prince to the armies by Moreau, who was to prepare their minds beforehand."—Vol. ii., p. 172.



Without losing time, he sent for colonel Savary, upon whose devotedness he confidently relied. Savary was not a bad-hearted man, though he has been called so by the common detractors of every fallen power. He possessed an excellent intellect, but he had passed his life in camps, had no fixed principles upon any subject, and placed his sole morality in his fidelity to that master from whom he had received the greatest favours. He had passed several weeks in the Bocage, in disguise and exposed to the most imminent perils. The First Consul now ordered him to resume his disguise, and to take post at Biville Cliff with a body of picked gendarmes, who bore the same relation to the great body of the gendarmerie that the Consular guard bore to the army in general, that is to say, they were the bravest and most trusty men in their arm of the service; men who might be sent upon the most difficult services without fear of a single error or neglect. Sometimes, on pressing emergency, two of them would set out in a post-chaise to convey millions in gold into Calabria or Bretagne, and they were never known to think of betraying their trust. They were not, then, as has been pretended, mere mercenaries, but soldiers who obeyed their orders with the strictest exactitude—a fearful exactitude, it is true, with the laws of that time, and under an arbitrary government. Colonel Savary was to take fifty of these tried men with him, well armed and in disguise, to Biville Cliff. No one of the deponents had expressed any doubt that a prince would accompany the announced disembarkation; they only differed as to whether the expected prince was the comte d'Artois or the duc de Berry. Colonel Savary had orders to watch night and day at Biville Cliff for the expected party, to seize every man of them, and to convey them to Paris. The First Consul was inflexibly resolved to send to military trial and execution whomever of the princes should fall into his hands. Sad and terrible resolution, of which we shall by and by see the frightful results! While issuing these orders against the Royalists, the First Consul displayed very different sentiments towards general Moreau. He had him at his feet, compromised and degraded, and intended to treat him with the most unbounded generosity. On the very day of the general's arrest, the First Consul said to the *grand juge*: "All that relates to the Republicans must be between Moreau and me. Go to his prison and question him, then bring him in your carriage to the Tuileries, let him settle every thing with me, and I will forgive all the errors caused perhaps, rather by the jealousy of his clique than by his own."

Unfortunately, it was easier for the First Consul to forgive, than for Moreau to accept his forgiveness. To confess every thing, in other words, to humble himself at the First Consul's feet, was a humility scarcely to be expected from a man whose calm soul was little liable to elation, and still less so to depression.

Had M. Fouché still been chief of police, he was the man to whom the examination of Moreau should have been entrusted. His ingratiating manner rendered him precisely the man to impress a mind hardened and soured by pride and misfortune, and to soothe that pride by saying, as he better than any other man could have said: "You wished to overthrow the First Consul, and you have failed; you are now in his power, but as he knows all, so he pardons all, and is anxious to restore you to your proper position. Avail yourself of his favourable disposition towards you; do not let a false pride mislead you into rejecting a clemency which you could scarcely have hoped for, and which is ready to replace you where you would have been had you never been so unwise as to mix yourself up with conspirators." But instead of this unscrupulous, but accomplished mediator, an honourable, but formal man, was sent, who, in parading his authority, thwarted the intentions of the First Consul. The *grand juge*, Regnier, went to the prison in his robes, and, attended by Locré, secretary to the Council of State, summoned Moreau before him, and questioned him at great length, and with something too much of official coldness, considering the sort of man with whom he was dealing. Lajolais, who had been arrested during the day, had confessed pretty nearly every thing concerning the connexion of Moreau and Pichegru. He confessed that he had mediated between those generals, that he had gone to London, brought Pichegru to France and thrown him into the arms of Moreau, with no other intention, as he averred, than that of procuring Pichegru's recall through Moreau's influence and intercession. Lajolais concealed nothing but his connexion with Georges, the mere mention of which would have destroyed the rest of his statement. But this unfortunate man was unaware that the connexion of Pichegru with Georges and with the emigrant princes was proved beyond doubt by other witnesses, and to confess the secret of the interviews of Moreau and Pichegru was fatally to prove the connexion of Moreau, Georges, and the emigrant princes. The depositions of Lajolais, therefore, were in themselves sufficient to prove the guilt of Moreau. The first thing needful was to give the latter a friendly warning as to the other depositions, and thus save him from useless attempts at disguise: it was necessary to induce him to tell all, by proving to him that, in fact, all had already been revealed by others. If this had been done in the true language calculated to inspire him with confidence, perhaps the unfortunate general might have been led to a frankness that would have saved his life. But instead of acting thus, the *grand juge* questioned Moreau as to his connexion with Lajolais, Pichegru, and Georges, and upon each of these points allowed him blindly to persist that he knew nothing, had conferred with no one, and was quite surprized that such questions should be put to

him; the *grand juge* never once warned the general that he was involving himself in a labyrinth of denials which must be useless, and might be fatal. This interview of Moreau and the *grand juge* consequently failed of the effect which the First Consul had anticipated from it; an effect which would have led to an act of mercy alike noble and useful.

M. Regnier returned to the Tuileries to give an account of his interview with Moreau. "Well!" said the First Consul, "if he will not be frank with me, he must be left to the law!" Thenceforward the First Consul caused the affair to be strictly and zealously followed up, and displayed the utmost activity in searching for the guilty. He was especially anxious to save the character of his government, which would be seriously damaged unless the reality of the conspiracy should be proven by the double arrest of Georges and of Pichegru; an arrest indispensably necessary to save him from the imputation of a low and rancorous jealousy which had prompted him to aim at the destruction of the second greatest general of the Republic. Every day fresh arrests were made, and the confessions of the prisoners left no room to doubt of the plot as a whole and as to its details, more especially as to the intended attack upon the First Consul's carriage between St. Cloud and Paris; as to the personal presence of a young prince; as to the arrival of Pichegru in Paris to confer with Moreau upon the antagonism of their views; and as to the consequent delays which had been so ruinous to them all. The facts, then, were ascertained, but it had not yet been found possible to capture any of those leaders whose mere presence would have convinced the most incredulous minds; nor had that expected prince arrived of whom the First Consul in his rage wished to make a terrible sacrifice. Colonel Savary, stationed at Biville Cliff, wrote thence that he had examined matters with his own eyes, and that he had found the most perfect authentication of the statements that had been made alike as to the mode of disembarkation, the chain of secret hiding-places between Biville and Paris, and the existence of a small vessel, which every evening coasted off the rock, her crew being apparently at once desirous to land, and yet afraid to do so. There was reason to believe that this hesitation arose from the absence of signals which some of the conspirators were to have made to the new comers from the summit of the cliff (which signals Savary could not imitate, as he knew not their nature), or still more probably that in obedience to warnings sent from Paris to London, the final disembarkation was postponed, if not wholly given up. Colonel Savary was ordered to wait and watch with untiring patience. In Paris new indications of the presence of Pichegru and Georges were daily discovered; more than once they had been nearly arrested, but their pursuers had always been a moment too late. The First Consul, shrinking from no means of attaining his end, re-

solved to propose a law, the nature of which will show what opinion was at that time held upon the guarantees of individual liberty, now so carefully guarded. A law was proposed to the Legislative Assembly, enacting that any person who should shelter Georges, Pichegru, or any one of sixty of their accomplices, who were mentioned by name, would be punished, not by imprisonment or the galleys, but by DEATH; and whoever should see them, or be aware of their hiding-place, and yet fail to denounce them, should be punished with six years' imprisonment. This fearful law, which commanded, on pain of death, the commission of a barbarous act, was passed without opposition on the very day of its proposal.

Scarcely was this law passed, before it was followed up by precautions not less rigid. It was feared that, harassed as they were, and deprived of hope, the conspirators might endeavour to escape; Paris, consequently, was closed as to egress; all who chose might enter Paris, no one, during some days, was allowed to leave it. To secure the strict enforcement of this order, detachments of infantry were placed at all the gates of Paris, and the horse-guard continually patrolled from gate to gate, with orders to arrest any one who should venture to scale the wall, and to shoot any one who should persist in endeavouring to escape after being challenged to stand and surrender; finally, boats manned by coast-guards rowed watch upon the Seine both by night and by day. No one was allowed to leave the capital, excepting the government messengers, and even they were first searched and recognized, so as to render error or deception impossible.

For an instant the worst times of the Revolution seemed to have returned; Paris was once more filled with a terror like that of the worst days of the Revolution. The enemies of the First Consul passed the most cruel censures on him on account of these measures, and attributed to him the guilt and cruelty which had formerly been attributed to the Committee of Public Safety. Directing the police in his own person, he was informed of all that was said against him, and his exasperation increased, till he seemed capable of the most violent acts; gloomy and harsh, he showed no consideration for any one. Since the recent events he had not dissembled his anger against M. de Markoff, and existing circumstances caused this anger to burst forth very mischievously. Among the persons arrested was a Swiss, attached in we know not what capacity to the Russian embassy; a confirmed intriguer, very unfit to be in the employment of a foreign legation; and to the impropriety of employing such a man M. de Markoff added the still greater impropriety of demanding the prisoner to be given up to him, the Russian ambassador. The First Consul gave instant orders that the Swiss should not only not be given up, but that he should be more closely confined than ever, and

M. de Markoff thus made sensible of the whole impropriety of his conduct. On this occasion the First Consul was struck by two circumstances to which he had previously paid no attention, that M. d'Entraigues, an ex-agent of the emigrant princes, was now at Dresden, on a diplomatic mission from the emperor of Russia; and that another emigrant, named Vernègues, also connected with the Bourbons, and despatched by them to the court of Naples, was now at Rome in the quality of a Russian subject. The First Consul sent to require the court of Saxony to dismiss M. d'Entraigues, and to the court of Rome to immediately arrest and deliver over the emigrant Vernègues; and he demanded these decisive measures in terms so peremptory as to render a refusal scarcely possible. On the first subsequent diplomatic audience, he as severely mortified the pride of M. de Markoff as he formerly had the haughty rigidity of lord Whitworth. He told the Russian ambassador that it was most strange that an ambassador should employ a conspirator against government, and even venture to claim the release of that person when he was arrested as a conspirator. Does Russia, continued he, suppose that she is so superior to us that she can act thus with impunity? Does she fancy that we have so utterly *laid aside the sword for the distaff* that we must needs bear such conduct? She is much deceived if she think this; I will suffer no affront from any prince upon the face of the earth.

Ten years earlier, the well-intentioned Revolution of '89 had become the sanguinary Revolution of '93, through the continued provocations of senseless enemies; and a similar effect was now produced upon the glowing soul of Napoleon. Those same enemies conducted themselves towards Napoleon as they had conducted themselves towards the Revolution, and turned from friendship to enmity, and from moderation to violence, that great man who had governed the State so wisely and so well. The Royalists whom he had rescued from oppression; Europe, that he had aimed at winning over by his moderation, after conquering it by the sword; all, in short, towards whom he had shown most consideration, now showed an inclination to ill-treat him alike in word and in deed; and a tempest was aroused in his great soul by the ingratitude of party and the imprudent rancour of Europe.

The deepest anxiety prevailed in Paris. The terrible laws aimed at all who should shelter Pichegru, Georges, or their accomplices, had not intimidated any one into the base resolution to betray them; but neither was any one inclined to shelter them. These unfortunates, whom we have seen disunited, and discouraged by their differences, wandered by night from house to house, sometimes paying six or eight thousand francs for the shelter granted them only for a few brief hours. Pichegru, M. de Rivière, and Georges, lived thus in the most frightful perplexity;



the last mentioned, however, courageously bearing a situation to which his experience in the chances and changes of civil war had accustomed him. Moreover, he was not oppressed by any sense of degradation; he was the partizan of the most august personages, and he only thought of saving himself now, as heretofore, by his own intelligence and courage. But the members of the French nobility, who had anticipated that France, or, at least, their own numerous party would receive them with open arms, were plunged into despair on finding themselves met only by coldness, doubt, or censure. They now more clearly saw what odium was attached to their plans, which lost those flattering colours, with which the prospect of success covers every project. They felt the degradation of having entered France with a band of Chouans. Pichegru, who, to some deplorable faults added the high qualities of coolness, judgment, and keen sagacity, Pichegru now only too clearly saw that, far from recovering from his former fall, he had plunged into the depths of an abyss. A first fault of former years, that of having criminally connected himself with the Condés, had led him first to treason and then to proscription, and now he found himself among the guilty projectors of an ambush and an assassination. No ray of glory now remained to the former conqueror of Holland. On learning the arrest of Moreau, he at once anticipated his own fate, and exclaimed that he was utterly lost. The familiarity of the mere herd of Chouans was detestable to him; and he sought relief from it in the company of M. de Rivière, whom he found more sensible and prudent than the other friends of the comte d'Artois who had been sent to Paris. One evening, reduced to a state of complete despair, he seized a pistol, and was about to shoot himself through the head, when he was prevented by M. de Rivière. On another occasion, destitute of even a temporary shelter, he was inspired with an idea that did honour to him, and still more honour to the man to whom he had recourse. Among the ministers of the First Consul was M. de Marbois, one of those who had been included in the proscription of the 18th Fructidor. Pichegru unhesitatingly presented himself to this minister, the exile of Sinnamari asking that other exile, now become a minister of the First Consul, to violate the law of his master; and M. de Marbois received him with grief, indeed, but without any fear on his own account. The honour done him by thus trusting to his generosity, he in his turn did to the First Consul, not doubting that he should find his conduct approved. It is some consolation for these melancholy scenes, thus to see three men of such various character, confidently relying each upon the other's generosity; Pichegru relying upon M. de Marbois, and M. de Marbois upon the First Consul. Subsequently, in fact, M. de Marbois avowed what he had done, and the First Consul replied to that avowal in a letter, expressing the noblest approbation of his generosity.



But the position in which the conspirators were placed must soon end in a catastrophe; an officer who had served under Pichegru betrayed him into the hands of the police. At night, while the general was asleep, surrounded by his weapons, which he never laid aside, and by his books, of which he had been enjoying his customary perusal, his lamp being extinguished, his apartment was entered by a detachment of the select gendarmerie. Aroused by the noise they made in approaching, he endeavoured to grasp his weapons, and, being prevented, still struggled stoutly for some time against his captors. Overpowered at length, he was conducted to the Temple, there to terminate most wretchedly a life formerly so brilliant.

The arrest of Pichegru was almost immediately followed by that of M. Armand de Polignac, M. Jules de Polignac, and, finally, M. de Rivière, who had been so incessantly sought that, though not betrayed, they were discovered while on their way to a new shelter. These arrests made a deep and general impression upon the public mind; the great mass of just men, unswayed by the spirit of party, were now convinced of the reality of the plot. The presence of Pichegru and of the personal friends of the comte d'Artois, left no room for even the shadow of a doubt upon that point. It was evident that they had not been drawn into their country by the art of the police, anxious to get up a plot. The greatness of the danger to which the First Consul had been, and even yet was, exposed, was now made evident, and a deeper interest than ever was taken in the safety of a life so precious. He was now no longer looked upon as the envious rival who wished to destroy Moreau, but as the saviour of France, incessantly exposed to the attacks of party. But the malignant and suspicious, though they were disconcerted, were not even yet quite silenced. According to them, the Messrs. de Polignac and de Rivière were imprudent men, too restless to remain quiet, incessantly busied with the comte d'Artois, and present in France merely for the sake of seeing whether circumstances were favourable or unfavourable to their party. But there was neither any serious plot, nor any such threatening peril as could justify the anxiety which was intended to be excited for the safety of the First Consul.

Utterly to confound and silence these babblers, one more arrest was necessary; that of Georges: it would then be scarcely possible for any one to say that Messrs. de Polignac, de Rivière, Pichegru, and Georges, had assembled together in Paris as mere lookers-on. The terrible measures taken by the government were destined speedily to furnish this decisive proof. Georges, pursued by a whole host of police, compelled to seek a new shelter daily, and unable to escape from Paris, guarded as it was both by land and by water, must needs fall. Traces of him were obtained, but, to the honour of the times be it said, though his arrest was gene-

rally wished for, no one was found to betray him. Those who ventured to shelter him, would do so only for a single day; every evening he was obliged to go to a new shelter. On the 9th of March, at nightfall, several officers surrounded a house to which suspicion had been attracted by the frequent arrival and departure of men of strange appearance. Georges, who had been sheltered here, endeavoured to get away to seek some other asylum. He quitted the house about seven o'clock in the evening, walked as far as the Pantheon, and there got into a cabriolet, the driver of which was a determined young Chouan, Georges' confidential servant. The officers in breathless haste followed the cabriolet as far as the cross-road of Bussy; Georges urged his servant to add to their already great speed, when the foremost of the police-officers dashed forward and seized the horse's bridle. Georges presented a pistol, and stretched the officer stark dead upon the spot; then, leaping from the cabriolet to endeavour to escape on foot and under cover of the night, he fired a second shot, which seriously wounded a second of the officers; but, surrounded by a crowd, he was secured in spite of all his struggles, and given into the hands of the officers. He was at once recognized as that formidable Georges, so long sought for, and at length laid hold of, and the news of his arrest excited a very general satisfaction in Paris, where, on his account and that of his accomplices, peaceable men had lived under a sort of oppression from which they were now released. With Georges the servant who accompanied him was also arrested, having been able to run only a few paces.

Georges was taken to the prefecture of police; his first excitement over, this chieftain of conspirators had recovered the most perfect coolness. He was young and powerful; his shoulders were square, his features full, and rather mild and open than gloomy or ferocious, as they might have been supposed to be, from the part he had acted. On his person were found a dagger, pistols, and sixty thousand francs in gold and bank notes. Examined on the instant, he unhesitatingly told his name, and the object of his presence in Paris. He had arrived, he said, for the purpose of attacking the First Consul, not by stealing into his palace with four assassins, but openly, by main force, and fighting in the open country against the Consular guard. He was to have acted in conjunction with a French prince, who was to have joined him in France for that purpose, but who had not arrived. Georges was in some sort proud of the new character of this plot, which he with much care distinguished from an assassination. "But," it was remarked to him, "you sent Saint R jant to Paris to prepare the Infernal Machine."

"I sent him," replied Georges, "but with no detailed instructions as to the means which he was to employ."

A poor explanation, which but too clearly showed that Georges

had been no stranger to that horrible crime. However, on every point that concerned others than himself, this bold conspirator preserved a resolute silence, repeating that there were victims enough already, and that he would not add to their number.\*

---

\* Extract from the First Examination of Georges by the Prefect of Police, 18th Ventôse (9th March). Volume ii., page 79.

We, councillor of State and prefect of Police, have summoned Georges Cadoudal to our presence, and examined him as follows :—

*Question.* What was your purpose in coming to Paris ?

*Reply.* To attack the French Consul.

*Ques.* What means had you for that attack ?

*Reply.* But few ; but I hoped to collect more.

*Ques.* Of what kind were your means ?

*Reply.* Main force.

*Ques.* Had you many followers ?

*Reply.* No, because I was not to attack the First Consul except in presence of a French prince who has not yet arrived.

*Ques.* At the date of the 3rd Nivôse you wrote to Saint-Réjant, reproaching him for his delay in executing your orders against the First Consul ?

*Reply.* I directed Saint-Réjant to assemble means at Paris, but I did not direct him to make the attempt of the 3rd Nivôse.

Extract from the Second Examination of Georges Cadoudal, 18th Ventôse (9th March).

*Question.* How long have you been in Paris ?

*Reply.* I came about five months ago, but I have not actually remained in Paris a fortnight in the whole.

*Ques.* Where have you lodged ?

*Reply.* I will not tell that.

*Ques.* Why did you come to Paris ?

*Reply.* For the purpose of attacking the First Consul.

*Ques.* How ?

*Reply.* By open force.

*Ques.* Where did you expect to find such force ?

*Reply.* Throughout France.

*Ques.* Have you and your accomplices, then, an organized force at your disposal throughout France ?

*Reply.* That is not to be inferred of the force to which I just now alluded.

*Ques.* What, then, did you mean ?

*Reply.* An assemblage of force at Paris : that assemblage is not yet organized, but it would have been when the attack should have been finally resolved upon.

*Ques.* What was the object of yourself and your accomplices ?

*Reply.* To substitute a Bourbon for the First Consul.

*Ques.* Which of the Bourbons ?

*Reply.* Charles-Xavier-Stanislas, formerly Monsieur, now recognized by us as Louis XVIII.

*Ques.* What part were you to take in the attack ?

*Reply.* Such as should be assigned to me by the aforesaid French prince who was to come to Paris.

*Ques.* The plan was then formed, and was to have been executed with the concurrence of the aforesaid French princes ?

*Reply.* Yes, citizen Judge.

*Ques.* You have conferred with those princes, then ?

*Reply.* Yes, citizen.

*Ques.* By whom were money and arms to be supplied ?

*Reply.* I had the funds by me for some time ; the arms I had not yet received.

After the arrest and declarations of Georges, the existence of the plot was verified, and the First Consul was justified; it could no longer be argued, as it had been a month earlier, that the police had invented the plots which they affected to discover; and a Royalist could only cast down his eyes in shame on seeing a French prince presuming to enter France with a horde of Chouans, to fight a so-called battle on the highway. It might, indeed, be urged that the prince would not come, and that was likely enough; but this intended breach of promise to unfortunate men, whose faith in it had led them to risk their lives, was even a greater crime than the one for which it was urged as an excuse. Moreover, it was not Georges alone who announced the expected arrival of the prince; the friends of M. the comte d'Artois, Messrs. de Rivière and de Polignac, held the same language. They confessed the most important part of the plot; they repelled far from them the idea of being concerned in a project of assassination, but confessed that they had arrived in France for some purpose which they did not define; for some sort of movement which was to be headed by a French prince, whom they had preceded, in order to examine with their own eyes whether circumstances were favourable.\*

Like Georges, these gentlemen endeavoured to apologize for being found in such bad company, by pleading that a French prince was to be with them. As this prince had not arrived in France, and did not intend to do so, they felt that nothing that

\* Extract from the First Examination of M. de Rivière by the councillor of state, Real, on the 16th Ventôse (7th March).—Volume ii., page 259.

*Question.* How long have you been in Paris?

*Reply.* About a month.

*Ques.* How did you come from London to France?

*Reply.* I was landed on the coast of Normandy by an English vessel, commanded, I believe, by captain Wright.

*Ques.* How many passengers were there, and what were they?

*Reply.* I do not know.

*Ques.* You are aware that among those passengers were ex-generals Pichegru and Lajolais, and also M. Jules de Polignac?

*Reply.* As that did not concern me, I know nothing about it.

*Ques.* Being landed on the coast, by what route, and how, did you travel to Paris?

*Reply.* By the Rouen road, sometimes on horseback and sometimes on foot.

*Ques.* What were the motives of your journey and of your stay in Paris?

*Reply.* To ascertain the state of affairs in this country, and to communicate my observations to the French princes, that they might judge whether to come to France or to remain in England. I should observe that at this time I had no special mission from them, but having before served them with zeal—

*Ques.* What was the result of your observations upon political affairs, the government, and public opinion? What would you have noted for the guidance of the princes could you have communicated with them?

*Reply.* Generally speaking I thought I saw in France a great deal of egotism, apathy, and a strong desire for peace.

Extract from the Second Examination of M. Armand de Polignac, 22nd Ventôse (13th March).—Volume ii., page 239.

I disembarked on the coast of Normandy; after several temporary halts I

they could confess would injure him, protected as he was by the breadth of the Channel; and quite overlooked the fact, that there were other French princes less securely situated, who, perchance, might be made to atone with their lives for the plots hatched in London.

Would to Heaven that the First Consul had remained contented with the means he already possessed of confounding his enemies! He could have struck awe into them, by inflicting the punishments recognized by our laws; still further, he could have overwhelmed them with confusion; for he had obtained abundance of proofs of their guilt. He had in his hands even more than

---

lodged near the Isle-Adam, in a place also inhabited by Georges, who was known by the name of Lerièrre.

We travelled to Paris together, accompanied by some officers under his orders.

When I left London this last time I was aware of the plans of the comte d'Artois; I was too much attached to him not to join him.

His intent was to come to France and propose to the First Consul to resign the reins of government to the count's elder brother.

If this proposition were rejected by the First Consul, he was to be openly assailed by the comte in the endeavours to recover what he deems the rights of his family.

When I set out, I was aware that the comte was not prepared for an immediate descent in France; I preceded him, as I have already said, in my desire to see my wife, my family, and my friends.

When a second disembarkation was proposed, the comte d'Artois said that on account of the zeal with which I had always served him, and his confidence in me, he wished me to make one of this expedition, and it was this expression of the prince's desire which determined me to pass over on board the earliest vessel.

I must not omit to observe that, at the instant of my setting out, I openly said that, if any means were resorted to which did not bear the stamp of honour, I should at once withdraw, and retire into Russia.

*Ques.* Are you aware of any interviews between general Moreau, Georges Cadoudal, and ex-general Pichegru?

*Reply.* I was informed that they had held a very serious conference at Chaillot, in the house No. 6, in which Georges Cadoudal lodged.

I was assured, too, that Georges, after several explanations and offers made to General Moreau, had said to him: If you like, I will leave you *tête-à-tête* with Pichegru, and then you can more easily come to an understanding; finally, I was informed that the conference terminated only in unpleasant doubts, Georges Cadoudal and Pichegru remaining faithful to the cause of the prince, but that Moreau was undecided, and gave reason to suspect him of personal views. I have since heard that there were other conferences between general Moreau and the ex-general Pichegru.

Extract from the examination of M. Jules de Polignac, before state-councillor Real, on the 16th Ventôse (7th March) quoted in the indictment.—Vol. i., p. 61.

Being questioned, M. Jules de Polignac replied that as it had seemed to both his brother and himself that what was proposed had not the honourable character which they had naturally been led to anticipate, they had spoken of retiring to Holland.

Questioned as to the cause of these fears, he replied, that he suspected that, instead of fulfilling some mission respecting a change of the government, it was proposed to act against an individual, and that it was the First Consul whom Georges proposed to attack.

was needed for his safety and reputation. But, as we have already remarked, though he at this period was well disposed towards the Republicans, the Royalists had outraged and disgusted him with their ingratitude, and he was resolved that they should feel the full weight of his power. Besides the spirit of revenge, another feeling occupied his heart, a sort of pride; he openly said to all who approached him that he cared as little, perhaps rather less, for a Bourbon, than for a Moreau or a Pichegru; that these princes entertained a notion that they were inviolate, and that this notion led them to involve in their plots unfortunate men of all ranks, and then to shelter themselves beyond sea; that they were greatly mistaken in putting so much trust in that shelter; and that he should infallibly finish with seizing some one of them, and having him shot to death like a common malefactor; that it was requisite to let these princes feel the sort of man whom they provoked in attacking him; that he feared no more to put a Bourbon to death, than to do the same by the merest scum of Chouannerie; that he would ere long show the world that all parties were on a level in his eyes; that whoever provoked him, no matter what their rank, should feel the whole weight of his hand; and that though he had hitherto been the most merciful of men, he would prove that when roused he could be one of the most terrible.

No one dared urge a contradiction; the consul Lebrun was silent, so also was the consul Cambacérès, but he gave to his silence that character of disapprobation by which he usually opposed the First Consul. M. Fouché, who wished to regain Napoleon's favour, and who, though generally disposed to lenity, was very anxious to embroil the government and the Royalists, warmly approved the idea of making an example, and M. Talleyrand, not cruel, indeed, but incapable of opposing power, and possessed to a mischievous extent of a taste for flattering the wishes of those to whom he was attached, M. de Talleyrand, too, argued, with M. Fouché, that too much consideration had already been shown to the Royalists; that the lavish kindness shown to them had even excited mischievous doubts in the minds of the Revolutionists, and that the time had now come when it was necessary to punish severely and to punish without exception. With the exception of the consul Cambacérès, every one, either tacitly or in terms, encouraged that anger which needed no encouragement to render it terrible, perhaps even cruel.

This notion of heaping all the punishment upon the Royalists, and reserving all mercy exclusively for the Revolutionists, was so rooted in the mind of the First Consul, that he now attempted for Pichegru what he had previously attempted for Moreau. He was inspired with a profound pity as he thought of the terrible position of that illustrious general mixed up with Chouans, and in danger of being deprived by a criminal trial not merely of life, but also of the last remnant of reputation.



“What an end!” exclaimed Bonaparte to M. Réal, “what an end for the conqueror of Holland! But the men of the Revolution must not thus destroy each other. I have long thought about forming a colony at Cayenne, Pichegru was exiled thither, and knows the place well, and of all our generals he is the best calculated to form an extensive establishment there. Go and visit him in his prison, and tell him that I pardon him; that it is not towards him, or Moreau, or men like them that I am inclined to be severe; ask him how many men and what amount of money he would require for founding a colony in Cayenne, and I will supply him that he may go thither and re-establish his reputation in rendering a great service to France.”

M. Réal took this noble message to the prisoner, who at first could scarcely credit what he heard, and doubted that it was a mere lure to induce him to betray his companions in misfortune. But, speedily convinced by the persistence of M. Réal, who required no confession from him as all was already known, he became much affected; his heart was softened, he shed tears, and spoke much about Cayenne. He said that, by a strange forethought, he had often reflected during his exile upon what might be done there, and had even formed some plans with that view. We shall presently see by what a fatal coincidence the generous intentions of the First Consul were converted into the cause of a deplorable catastrophe.

The First Consul was still very anxiously expecting news from colonel Savary, watching with fifty men at Biville Cliff. The colonel had now been on the look-out there for upwards of three weeks, but no disembarkation had taken place. Captain Wright's brig coasted the cliffs every evening but never put any one ashore, either because captain Wright's passengers expected a signal which was not made, or because they had been warned from Paris not to land. Colonel Savary was at length obliged to say that it was useless for him to remain any longer.

The First Consul, annoyed at not having been able to lay hold of one of those princes who had conspired against his life, now glanced around at the various parts in which they, respectively, had found shelter. One morning, while in his study with Messrs. de Talleyrand and Fouché, he inquired about the various members of that unfortunate family, as pitiable for its errors as for its misfortunes. He was told, in reply, that Louis XVIII. and the duc d'Angoulême lived at Warsaw; the comte d'Artois and the duc de Berry in London, where, also, were the princes of Condé, with the exception of the third, the youngest and most enterprising of them, the duc d'Enghien, who lived at Ettenheim, very near Strasburg, in which neighbourhood it was that Messrs. Taylor, Smith, and Drake, the English diplomatic agents, busied themselves in fomenting intrigues. The idea that that young prince might make use of the bridge of Strasburg, as the comte d'Artois had intended to make use of Biville Cliff, sud-

denly flashed across the mind of the First Consul, and he determined to send an intelligent sub-officer into that neighbourhood to obtain information. There was a sub-officer of gendarmerie, who in his youth had served under the princes of Condé, and he now received orders to assume a disguise, and to proceed to Ettenheim to make inquiries as to the connexions of the young prince, and his way of life. The sub-officer accordingly repaired to Ettenheim. The young prince had lived there some time with a princess of Rohan, to whom he was warmly attached, and he divided his time between this attachment and enjoying the pleasures of the chase in the Black Forest. He had been directed by the British cabinet to repair to the banks of the Rhine, no doubt in anticipation of that movement of which Messrs. Drake, Smith, and Taylor, had held out ill-founded hopes. This prince expected then, that he should shortly have to fight against his country, a pitiable task to which he had for some years been accustomed, but nothing proves that he knew any thing about the conspiracy of Georges; every thing that is known about him tends on the contrary to the supposition that he was ignorant of it. He often left Ettenheim on sporting excursions, and sometimes, it was said, even to go to the theatre at Strasburg. Certain it is that these reports had so much of probability that they induced his father to write to him from London a letter strictly cautioning him to greater prudence.\* In the personal suite of the young prince were certain emigrants, among them a marquis de Thumery.

The sub-officer who was sent to make inquiries arrived at Ettenheim in disguise, and made his way even into the very household of the prince, and obtained a whole host of particulars, from which prejudiced judgments might easily draw the most fatal inferences. The young duke was said to be very frequently absent from Ettenheim; sometimes his absence lasted for days, and his journey extended to Strasburg. A person in his suite, who was represented as of far more consequence than he really was, bore a name which the Germans who gave these particulars to the sub-officer mispronounced in such a way, that it sounded like that of

---

\* *The prince de Condé to the duc d'Enghien.*

Wanstead, 16th June, 1803.

My dear son,—For six months past a report has been current here that you have paid a visit to Paris; others say that you have only ventured to Strasburg. You must admit that this is most imprudently perilling your life or liberty. As for your principles I am not at all alarmed about them, they are as deeply graven in your heart as in ours. It appears to me that you need no longer conceal the facts, and that if you have made such journeys you may tell us the result of your observations.

Now, as to your safety, so dear to us on many accounts, it is true that I told you that you might render your position very useful. But you are very close to danger: take great care of yourself, and insure timely warning to effect your retreat, should it enter the Consul's mind to order you to be seized. Do not imagine that courage requires utter neglect on this score.

(Signed)

LOUIS JOSEPH DE BOURBON.

general Dumouriez. The person in question was in reality the marquis de *Thumery*, of whom we have already made mention, and the sub-officer, misled by the German pronunciation, quite honestly took that name to designate general Dumouriez, and this name he put into the report, written under this unfortunate mistake, and immediately despatched to Paris.

This fatal report reached Paris on the morning of the 10th of March. On the previous evening, at night, and on the very morning in question, a no less fatal deposition had been repeatedly made, by Leridant, the servant of Georges, and arrested with him. At first this young man had resisted the most pressing interrogations, but at length he spoke out with an apparently complete sincerity; declaring that there was a conspiracy, that a prince was at its head, that this prince either soon would arrive, or had arrived already; and that his own opinion inclined to the latter state of the case as he had frequently seen, as a visiter of Georges, a young and well-dressed man, of distinguished manners, to whom all seemed to pay great respect. This deposition repeatedly renewed, and each time with fresh details, was laid before the First Consul. The report of the sub-officer of gendarmerie was presented to him at the same time, and the coincidences struck his mind with a most lamentable force. The absences of the Duc d'Enghien from Ettenheim immediately connected themselves with the pretended presence of the young Prince in Paris; and that young man to whom all the conspirators paid so much respect, could not be a prince arrived from London, so strictly as Biville Cliff had been watched. This young man could be no other than the duc d'Enghien, travelling from Ettenheim to Paris in eight-and-forty hours, and returning in the same space of time, after having a brief conference with his guilty accomplices. But what rendered this lamentable demonstration conclusive in the eyes of the First Consul was the supposed presence at Ettenheim of general Dumouriez, whose presence there filled up the sketch in surprising perfection. The comte d'Artois was to have arrived through Normandy with Pichegru, the duc d'Enghien through Alsace with Dumouriez; the Bourbon princes, to return to France, had seduced two of the most eminent generals of the Republic to be their companions. The First Consul's mind, usually so strong and clear, could not resist so many appearances so well calculated to mislead. He was convinced. It is necessary to have witnessed minds under the bias of an inquiry of this sort, and more especially when passion, of whatever sort, disposes them to belief in what they suspect, to be able to understand how ready such minds are to jump to conclusions, and to learn how very precious are those delays and forms of law which save men from conclusions so quickly drawn from some merely accidental coincidences.

The First Consul, when he read the report which general Moncey, commanding officer of the gendarmerie presented to him

from the sub-officer sent to Ettenheim, was thrown into a state of violent agitation; and gave a very ill reception to M. Réal, who at this moment made his appearance, and whom he reproached for having so long allowed him to remain ignorant of such important particulars. He now firmly believed that he had detected the second and most dangerous party of the conspiracy. Now the sea was no longer to be a barrier to him; the Rhine, the duke of Baden, the Germanic body, were no longer any thing to him. He instantly summoned an extraordinary council, consisting of the three consuls, their ministers, and M. Fouché, who was, though not in name, minister again in reality. The First Consul at the same time sent for generals Ordener and Caulaincourt, to attend him at the Tuileries; but while awaiting their arrival, he took up some maps of the Rhine to lay down a plan of seizure, and not finding the maps he was in search of, he threw all that came to hand in one confused heap upon the floor.

M. de Meneval, a mild-tempered, prudent, and thoroughly incorruptible man, whom the First Consul could not spare from his presence, as it was to him that he was accustomed to dictate his most private letters, was on this day absent for some time. He was sent for to the Tuileries: when he arrived, the First Consul addressed him in terms of unmerited reproach for his absence, and then continued his study of the map of the Rhine, in a state of extraordinary excitement.

The council was at length complete; and an eye-witness gives in his memoirs an account of the proceedings.

The idea of carrying off the prince and general Dumouriez, without hesitating about the violation of the German territory, but with an after-apology to the duke of Baden for that mode of proceeding, was immediately proposed. The First Consul asked for the opinion of the council, but appeared to have formed a very decided resolution, though he listened patiently to the objections that were made. The consul Lebrun seemed to be alarmed at the effect that such an abduction would produce in Europe, and the consul Cambacérès had the courage openly to oppose the proposition. He strove to impress upon the council the dangerous nature of such a resolution, whether at home or abroad, and the violent character which it could not fail to impress upon the First Consul's government. He dwelt especially upon the fact that, if it were a serious thing to arrest, try, and shoot a prince of the blood, even if taken in an overt act of conspiracy,—to go to a foreign territory to seize him was not merely to violate that territory, but also to seize him so as to give him all the appearances of innocence, and to bring down upon ourselves all the appearances of a detestable abuse of power; and he entreated the First Consul, alike for the sake of his policy and his personal reputation, not to allow of a proceeding which would throw his government back among the ranks of those revolutionary governments from which he had shown so much anxiety to distinguish

it. He repeated his arguments with a fervour very uncommon to him, and proposed, as a middle course, to wait till this prince, or any other of the emigrant princes, should be apprehended in France, and then put the existing laws of the land rigorously in force against them. To this proposition it was replied, that it was not likely that the prince, who was to have entered by the Rhine or by Normandy, would venture to expose himself to the imminent perils of that course, now that Georges and the other agents of the conspiracy were in custody; that, moreover, by going to Ettenheim to seize this prince, they would obtain possession of his papers and of his accomplices, as well as of his person, and thus acquire proofs of his guilt, and that those proofs would justify severity; that, to allow a foreign territory to protect emigrants conspiring on the very frontiers of France, was to grant the most dangerous of impunities; that the Bourbons and their friends had an inveterate tendency to these crimes of conspiracy; that by once making a stern and striking example, that one blow would be more effectual than ten punishments of minor tools, and the former merciful system of the Consul could be once more reverted to; that the Royalists stood in need of warning; that, as to the question of territory, a lesson was no less needed by the petty German princes than others; and that, moreover, to seize on the prince without first consulting the duke of Baden, was in reality to confer a favour on the latter; for should France call upon him for the expulsion of the duc d'Enghien, the duke of Baden would have no choice but to be crushed by France for refusal, or to be put under the ban of the Empire for compliance. To these arguments it was added that the only question now was the seizure of the prince, with his accomplices and his papers; that when this was effected it would remain to be determined what should be done with him when the proofs and extent of his guilt should have been inquired into.

The First Consul, though he listened patiently to the arguments on either side, seemed to do so in the inapprehensive and absent mood of a man whose mind is made up. No one could be said to have influenced his determination; though he seemed to be not ill-pleased with the opposition of M. Cambacérès, to whom he said, "I know your motive for speaking—your devotion to me. I thank you for it; but I will not allow myself to be put to death without defending myself. I will make these people tremble, and teach them to keep quiet for the time to come."

The idea of striking terror into the Bourbons, of teaching them that they had to do with a man who was not to be attacked with impunity, and of making them aware that the august blood of the Bourbons was of no more importance in his eyes than that of any illustrious person of the Republic; this thought, and others compounded equally of calculation, vengeance, and the pride of power, had taken complete dominion of his mind.

He gave his orders on the instant. In presence of general Ber-



thier he laid down the rules upon which colonels Ordener and Caulaincourt were to proceed. Colonel Ordener, attended by 300 dragoons, some pontoniers, and several brigades of gendarmerie, furnished with four days' provision, and a considerable sum of money to prevent their being any burden to the Germans, was to repair to the bank of the Rhine, cross that river at Rheinau, dash forward to Ettenheim, surround that town, and carry off the prince and all the emigrants by whom they might find him surrounded. In the mean time another detachment, supported by some pieces of artillery, was to proceed by Kehl to Offenburg, and remain there in observation till the enterprize was effected; and as soon as that was the case, colonel Caulaincourt was to hasten to present himself to the grand-duke of Baden with a note explanatory of the seizure effected. This explanation consisted in saying, that by suffering these gatherings of emigrants, the Baden government had compelled the French government to act for itself, and that, moreover, the necessity for being both prompt and secret had rendered it impossible to apply for a previous assent.

It need not be added, that in giving these orders to the officers intrusted with their execution, the First Consul did not trouble himself to enter into any explanation as to his views in seizing the prince, or his intentions towards him when he should have been seized. He gave his orders as a general to men who obeyed them as soldiers. Colonel Caulaincourt, however, attached by consanguinity to the ex-royal family, and especially to the Condés, was deeply grieved, although he had only to be the bearer of a letter, and, moreover, was far from anticipating the horrible catastrophe which was at hand. The First Consul did not seem to perceive Caulaincourt's sadness, and gave orders that all should set out immediately on quitting the Tuileries.

His orders were punctually obeyed. Five days later, that is to say, on the 15th of March, the detachment of dragoons set out, with all the prescribed precautions from Schelestadt, crossed the Rhine, and surprised and surrounded the little town of Ettenheim before any news of their advance could arrive there. The prince, who had previously been warned, but who at this critical moment had no positive information of his danger, was at his usual residence in Ettenheim. On finding himself assailed by an armed force, he was at first inclined to resist, but perceiving the hopelessness of doing so with effect, he surrendered, made his name known to those who were in search of him, but unacquainted with his person, and loudly expressed his vexation at being thus deprived of his liberty, for the full extent of his danger was even yet unknown to him, and allowed himself to be conveyed as a prisoner to the citadel of Strasburg. No important papers had been found, nor general Dumouriez, who had been described as being with the prince, nor any of those proofs of conspiracy, the



finding of which had been so emphatically urged as a motive to the expedition. Instead of general Dumouriez, they had found only the marquis of Thumery, and some other emigrants of no consequence. The report of the barren details of the arrest was immediately forwarded to Paris.

The result of the expedition ought to have enlightened the First Consul and his advisers, as to the rashness of their conjectures. The mistake relative to general Dumouriez ought to have been especially significant. Let us see what fatal ideas now possessed the First Consul, and those who agreed with him. They had possession of the person of one of those Bourbon princes who were so ready to order conspiracies, and who would never find themselves destitute of madmen and desperadoes ready to venture every thing in their service. It was necessary to make a terrible example of that prince, if they would not expose themselves to the derision of the Royalists by releasing the prince after having seized him; in the latter event, it would infallibly be said that, after acting inconsiderately in seizing the prince they were alarmed by public opinion, afraid of the indignation of Europe; in a word, that they had the inclination to commit a crime, but not the courage. Instead of exciting contempt, their true course was to awaken terror. This Bourbon prince, after all, was at Ettenheim, so close to the frontiers, and under such circumstances, evidently for some purpose. Was it possible that, cautioned, as letters found upon him proved that he had been, was it possible, that thus cautioned, he braved so much danger without any motive? that he was not in some degree an accomplice in the project of assassination? At all events he was at Ettenheim for the purpose of seconding some emigrant movement in the interior, of exciting civil war, and of bearing arms against France, as he had done before. All these were crimes punishable by the laws, and the laws should be put in force against this prince.

Such were the arguments of the First Consul, re-echoed by his advisers. No second council, like that we have spoken of, was held, but there were frequent consultations between the First Consul and those who encouraged his passion. This fatal notion constantly possessed him: "The Royalists are incorrigible, they must be intimidated." Orders, therefore, were given that the prince should be transferred from Strasburg to Paris, and taken before a military court, on the charge of having sought to excite civil war, and of having borne arms against France.

To state the case in these terms was, in fact, to anticipate a sentence of blood. On the 18th of March, the prince was taken, under an escort, from Strasburg to Paris.

At the approach of the moment of this terrible sacrifice, the First Consul desired solitude.

On the 18th of March, Palm Sunday, he set out for Malmaison, where, better than elsewhere, he could command quietness and

solitude. With the exception of the consuls, the ministers, and his brothers, he received no one. For hours together he walked about by himself, giving to his countenance an expression of calmness which he felt not in his heart. Even his inoccupation proves the agitation to which he was a prey, for during a whole week that he staid at Malmaison, he dictated scarcely a single letter, an unique instance of idleness in his active life; and yet, only a few days earlier all the energies of his mind had been bestowed upon Brest, Boulogne, and the Texel! His wife, who, in common with all his family was acquainted with the arrest of the prince, his wife, who, unable to help sympathizing with the Bourbons, thought with horror of the shedding of royal blood, his wife, with that foresight of the heart which is peculiar to women, perhaps anticipated that a cruel action would draw down retaliative cruelties upon her husband, her children, and herself, and spoke to him several times about the prince, shedding tears as she thought of his destruction, which she feared was resolved upon, though her mind revolted from such a belief. The First Consul, who somewhat prided himself upon repressing the movements of his heart, naturally so generous and kind, whatever might be said to the contrary by those who did not know him, the First Consul repelled these tearful supplications of which he feared the effect upon his resolve, and replied to Madame Bonaparte in a homely style, which he strove to render harsh: "You are a woman, and know nothing about politics; your proper part is to hold your tongue."

The unfortunate prince, leaving Strasburg with his escort, on the morning of the 18th of March, reached Paris about noon on the 20th, and was detained till five o'clock, his carriage guarded by the escort, at the Charenton gate.\* On this fatal occasion there was some confusion in the orders given, arising, no doubt, from the agitation of those who gave them.

According to military laws, the military commission should have been formed by the military commandant of the district, who should have assembled the commission and directed the execution of the sentence. Murat was the governor of Paris and commandant of the district. When the order of the consuls reached him, he was seized with grief. Murat was, as we have remarked, brave, and, though sometimes unreflecting, extremely kind-hearted. Some days before, when the expedition to Ettenheim was ordered, he had applauded the vigour of the government; but now that he was to follow it out into its cruel

---

\* An excellent account of the catastrophe of the duc d'Enghien has been published by M. Nougarede de Fayet, whose researches, characterized alike by sagacity and conscientiousness, entitle this piece of secret history to the full confidence of the public. Nougarede de Fayet states that the Prince was taken direct to the gate of the ministry of foreign affairs. It is possible that this statement is correct, but not being able to ascertain it positively, I have kept to the more general tradition.

consequences, his excellent heart revolted. Pointing to the facings of his uniform, he said to his friends in a tone of despair, that the First Consul was about to stain them with blood; he proceeded to St. Cloud and expressed his painful feelings, in person, to his awe-inspiring brother-in-law. The First Consul, who was more inclined than he wished to be to sharing those feelings, concealed beneath a stern countenance the secret agitation of his heart. He dreaded lest his government should be weakened by appearing to fear to strike at a scion of the hostile race of Bourbons. He spoke in harsh language to Murat, reproached him in terms of contempt, and concluded by saying that he would conceal what he called the weakness of Murat, by signing with his own Consular hand the orders of the day.

The First Consul had recalled colonel Savary from Biville Cliff, where he had vainly been on the watch for the princes concerned in the conspiracy, and to him confided the superintendence of the sacrifice of the prince who had taken no part in that conspiracy. Colonel Savary was ready to give up both life and reputation to the First Consul. He offered no advice, but obeyed like a soldier who receives orders from a master to whom his attachment has no bounds. The First Consul had all the orders of the day drawn up, signed them, and then ordered Savary to deliver them to Murat, and to go to Vincennes to superintend their execution. These orders were full and precise; providing for the formation of the commission and designating the colonels of the garrison who were to compose it, naming general Hullin as president, enjoining the immediate assemblage of the commission, that all might be settled in the course of the night; and farther ordering that if, as could not be doubted, the sentence should be that of death, the prisoner should be executed on the spot. A detachment of select gendarmes was to proceed to Vincennes to protect the commission and execute the sentence. Such were the fatal orders that were signed by the First Consul's own hand: in strict legality they must be executed in the name of Murat, but in fact he had nothing to do with them, and colonel Savary, in obedience to his orders, proceeded to Vincennes to see to their execution.

But even yet these orders were not quite irrevocable; there still remained one means of saving the unfortunate prince. M. Real was to proceed to Vincennes, to question the prisoner minutely, and draw from him what he knew of the conspiracy of which they still believed him to be an accomplice though they could find no positive and formal proof of the fact. M. Maret himself had in the course of the evening delivered at the house of the councillor of state, Réal, a written order to proceed to Vincennes to enter upon this examination. If M. Real had seen the prisoner, heard from his own lips a genuine explanation of the facts, been touched by his frankness, and by his urgent request to be allowed an interview with the First Consul, M. Real could communicate his impressions to him who held the prince's life in his powerful

hands. Even after sentence, then, there was still one means left of escaping from the frightful course upon which they had entered, by giving the duc d'Enghien a pardon, at once nobly asked and nobly granted!

This was the last remaining chance of saving the life of the young prince, and of saving the First Consul from the commission of a grievous wrong. And the First Consul thought of this means, even after the strict orders he had signed. During this evil evening of the 20th of March, he was shut up at Malmaison with no other company than his wife, his secretary, and a few officers and ladies. Absent, unsociable, yet affecting to be calm, he at length seated himself at a table to play at chess with one of the most distinguished ladies of the Consular court\* who, knowing of the arrest of the prince and his transfer to Paris, trembled with dread of the consequences of this fatal day. She dared not raise her eyes to the First Consul, who, in his agitated absence of mind, murmured from time to time some of the most celebrated verses of our poets on the subject of clemency; those which Corneille puts into the mouth of Augustus, and then those which Voltaire gives to Alzire.

These muttered quotations could not be the indications of a sanguinary irony; that would be at once too vulgar and utterly useless. But this usually iron man was really much excited and shaken, and could not prevent his thoughts from wandering from projects of vengeance to the grandeur and nobleness of granting a pardon to a vanquished and disarmed foe. The lady was overjoyed, for she believed that the prince was saved: unfortunately such was not the case.

The commission was hastily assembled, the majority of the members of it not even knowing what prisoner they were to sit in judgment upon. They had been told that he was an emigrant, proceeded against for contravening the laws of the Republic. They were told his name. Some of the soldiers of the Republic, mere children when the great monarchy was overthrown, scarcely knew that the title of duc d'Enghien was borne by the heir presumptive of the Condés; nevertheless their hearts were pained by such a task, for the condemnation of emigrants had ceased for some years past. The prince was taken before them; he was calm, almost haughty, even yet he did not expect the fate that awaited him. Questioned as to his name and his conduct, his replies were firm; he denied all complicity in the plot actually in question, but confessed rather too ostentatiously, perhaps, that he had served against France, and that he was upon the banks of the Rhine for the purpose of similarly serving against her again. The president dwelt upon this point in order to show him the danger of such an avowal, and he repented what he had said,

---

\* The lady in question is Madame de Remusat, who gives this account in her as yet unpublished Memoirs, which are as interesting in substance as sparkling in style.

with a boldness rendered noble by its peril, but offensive to the veteran soldiers who had poured out their blood in defence of their fatherland. The impression thus produced was mischievous. The prince repeatedly and earnestly demanded to be allowed to see the First Consul. He was remanded to his prison, and the court deliberated. Although his own reiterated avowals proved him to be an implacable foe to the Revolution, these warrior-hearts were touched by the youth and courage of the prince. Stated as the case was, it could have only a fatal termination. The laws of the Republic and of all times made it a capital offence to serve against France. Nevertheless, many laws had been violated against the prince, in seizing him upon a foreign soil, and depriving him of a defender, and these considerations ought to have influenced the decision of his judges. In their perplexity those unfortunate judges, unspeakably afflicted by their task, pronounced sentence of death; but the majority of them proposed to refer the case to the clemency of the First Consul, and to send before him the prince, who had so urgently desired to be allowed to see him. But the orders of the morning, to finish all during the night, were positive. A delay could only be procured by the arrival of M. Réal to interrogate the prince. M. Réal did not make his appearance; the night was far spent, day was at hand. The prince was taken down into a fosse of the château, and there, with a firmness worthy of his race, received the fire of those soldiers of the Republic whom, in the ranks of the Austrians, he had so often fought against. Melancholy reprisals of civil war! He was buried upon the very spot where he fell.

Colonel Savary immediately set out to report to the First Consul the execution of his orders.

On the road the colonel met M. Réal on his way to question the prisoner. This councillor of state, exhausted with fatigue by the continued labour of several days and nights, had given orders to his servants not to disturb him; the order of the First Consul was not placed in his hands until five o'clock in the morning; he arrived, but too late. This was not, as it has been said to be, a scheme planned to force the First Consul into a crime; not at all, it was an accident, a pure accident, by which the unfortunate prince was deprived of the sole chance of saving his life, and the First Consul of a happy opportunity of saving his glory from a stain. A deplorable consequence of violating the ordinary forms of justice! When these forms, invented by the experience of ages, to guard human life against the mistakes of judges, when these sacred forms are violated, men are at the mercy of chance, of mere trifles! The lives of accused people, and the honour of governments are then sometimes dependent upon the most fortuitous coincidences! No doubt, the First Consul had formed his resolve; but he was much agitated, and could the voice of the unfortunate Condé, appealing for life, have



reached his ear; that cry would not have been uttered in vain, he would have yielded, and proudly yielded, to his gentler feelings.

Colonel Savary arrived at Malmaison in a state of great emotion. His presence gave rise to a painful scene. Madame Bonaparte guessed all as soon as she saw him, and burst into tears; and M. de Caulaincourt, in accents of despair exclaimed that he was dishonoured. Colonel Savary proceeded to the First Consul's study, found him alone with M. de Meneval, and gave him an account of what had taken place at Vincennes. The First Consul asked, "Did M. Réal see the prisoner?" Colonel Savary had scarcely answered in the negative when M. Réal made his appearance, and tremblingly apologised for the non-execution of the orders he had received. Without expressing either approbation or anger, the First Consul dismissed these instruments of his will, went into an apartment of his library, and shut himself up in solitude there for several hours.

In the evening, there was a family dinner at Malmaison: all wore serious and saddened countenances, and no one ventured to speak, the First Consul himself being as silent as the rest. This silence at length became embarrassing, and on rising from table, the First Consul himself broke it, addressing himself exclusively to M. de Fontanes, who had just arrived. He was alarmed at the event which was noised throughout Paris, but he could not express his feelings where he now was. He listened chiefly, and replied but little. The First Consul, speaking almost without interruption, and endeavouring to make up for the silence of his company, discoursed upon the princes of all times, upon the Roman emperors, upon the French kings, upon Tacitus, and the judgments of that historian, and upon the cruelties which were frequently attributed to the rulers of States, when these, in fact, only yielded to inevitable necessities. Having by this circuitous route approached the tragical subject of the day, he said:—

"They wish to destroy the Revolution in attacking my person, I will defend it, for I, I, *I* am the Revolution. They will be more cautious in future, for they will know *of what we are capable.*"

It is not much to the credit of human nature to be obliged to confess that the terror inspired by the First Consul acted effectually upon the Bourbon princes and the emigrants. They no longer felt themselves safe, now that even the German territory had proved no safeguard to the unfortunate duc d'Enghien, and thenceforward conspiracies of that kind ceased. But this sorry efficiency will not justify such deeds. Better would it have been for one danger more to threaten the First Consul, so often perilled upon the field of battle, than that his security from such a danger should have been purchased at such a cost. It was speedily rumoured in Paris that a prince had been seized, carried to Vincennes, and shot. The effect of these tidings was great and melancholy. Ever since the arrest of Pichegru and Georges,



the First Consul had been the object of universal anxiety. Indignation had been aroused against all who had joined the Chouans in threatening his life; this indignation extended to Moreau, whose guilt though less conclusively proved as yet was, nevertheless, beginning to seem very probable, and the most ardent wishes were expressed for the preservation of the man upon whom all looked as the tutelar genius of France. The sanguinary execution at Vincennes produced a sudden reaction. The Royalists were much irritated and still more alarmed; but worthy and reasonable men were filled with regret at seeing a government, hitherto so admirable, imbruing its hands in blood, like those who had put Louis XVI. to death, and imitating them, too, it must be confessed, without the excuse of the revolutionary passions which in 1793 had perverted the coolest heads and the kindest hearts.

None were satisfied with what had been done at Vincennes save those hot Revolutionists, whose senseless rule the First Consul had brought to an end, and who now saw him in a single day reduced almost to their level. None of them any longer feared that General Bonaparte would act for the Bourbons.

Sad proof of the frailty of the human mind! This extraordinary man, of so great and accurate an intellect, and of so generous a heart, had lately been so stern in his judgment of the Revolutionists and their excesses! He had pronounced upon their frenzy without qualification, and sometimes even without justice. He had bitterly reproached them with having shed the blood of Louis XVI., disgraced the Revolution, and irreconcilably embroiled France with Europe! Then he judged calmly; and now, his passions being excited, he had in a single instant paralleled the deed committed upon the person of Louis XVI., and had placed himself in a state of moral opposition to Europe, which speedily rendered a general war inevitable, and compelled him to go in search of peace—a magnificent peace, it is true—to Tilsit, to the other end of Europe! How well calculated are such contrasts to rebuke human pride of intellect, and to prove that the most transcendent genius is not safe from the most vulgar errors, if, even for a single instant, it is deprived of self-control and swayed by passion!

But, to be fully just, while deploring this fatal frenzy of passion, let us turn our eyes to those by whom it was provoked. What were they? Emigrants, those same emigrants who, after having roused to fury an as yet guiltless revolution, left their country to raise up enemies to France throughout the world. That Revolution, recalled from its sad wanderings, and guided by a great man, now showed itself prudent, pacific, and humane. It had recalled these emigrants, re-established them in their country and in their possessions, and was preparing to replace them in all the splendour of their former situation. How did they repay all this clemency? If not grateful, were they, at least, peaceable? No! They went to a neighbouring nation jealous of our greatness, and made use of the

liberty of that nation to turn it against France. By dint of scandalous pamphlets they irritated the pride of both countries, only too easily excited, and after having contributed to arm them against each other, they had not merely made themselves soldiers of the enemies of France, but had lent them the aid of conspiracies. They had got up an infamous plot, they had disguised under wretched sophisms a project of assassination; they had sent Georges and Pichegru into France. If there was one heart envious of the First Consul's glory, to that heart they appealed. They misled, perverted, frenzied, the weak Moreau; they deceived him, made him deceive himself; and then, when their imprudences revealed them to the vigilant eye of the man whom they sought to destroy, they had denounced each other, and fancied that they justified themselves in openly declaring that they were to be headed in their horrible exploits by a French prince! The great man against whom such horrible plots were directed, revolted and enraged at being made the object of such murderous attacks by those whom he had saved from persecution, at length yielded to a fatal anger. He had watched on the rocky coast for the prince whose coming had been announced; he had vainly watched for him, and, while his mind was excited by the confessions of his enemies themselves, he saw on the banks of the Rhine another prince who was there awaiting the renewal of war. At this sight his judgment failed him, he mistook this prince for the intended leader of the conspirators who threatened the peace of France and the life of the First Consul; and then, he felt a sort of pride in seizing that prince even upon the Germanic soil, and striking that scion of the Bourbons as he would have stricken the most vulgar individual, and he did strike him, in order to convince the emigration and all Europe that it was as dangerous as unreasonable to attack his person.

Painful spectacle! where all were wrong, even the victims; where Frenchmen were to be seen serving British greatness against French greatness; Bourbons, sons and brothers of kings, and destined in their turns also to be kings, herding with highwaymen; the last of the Condés atoning with his blood for a conspiracy in which he was not an accomplice, and that Condé, whom, as a victim, one would wish to find wholly irreproachable, incurring the guilt of stationing himself once more beneath the British flag against the French flag; and, finally, a great man, misled by anger and by the instinct of self-preservation and pride, losing on the instant the prudence which all Europe had admired, and imitating the sanguinary Revolutionists whom his victorious hands had put down, and whom he had gloried in not imitating! Fatal cycle of human passions! He who is stricken wishes to return the blow; each blow received is returned at the instant; blood calls for blood, and revolutions thus become a succession of sanguinary reprisals, which would be eternal, did not a day arrive when men stop short, and lay aside this mere brute struggle and cycle of vengeance, to substitute a calm, impar-

tial, and humane justice, and place even above this justice—if any thing can be above it—a lofty and clear-sighted policy which, selecting from the sentences of justice the most urgently necessary, allows only those to be executed, and remits the others to culprits, erring, indeed, but susceptible of repentance. To defend social order by conforming to the strict rules and forms of justice, without allowing any feeling of revenge to operate, is the great lesson to be drawn from these tragical events. Another lesson is to be drawn from them,—to form an indulgent judgment of men of all parties who, preceding us in the career of revolutions, nurtured amidst the corrupting anxieties and excitement of civil war, and with bloodshed ever before them, showed not that respect for human life with which time, reflection, and a long peace have happily inspired us.

END OF VOL. IV.

